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Abstract 
The core of my dissertation is devoted to a re-interpretation of the 
history of the liberation movement in South Africa in two critical periods 
of its development. The first I call in short 'the 1940s' but shall be 
referring more specifically to the years between 1939 and the rise of 
apartheid in 1948; the second I call 'the 1950s' but shall refer to the 
years between the emergence of apartheid and the defeat of the liberation 
movement in 1964. Both the 1940s and the 1950s were marked by fierce class 
struggles which brought with them hopes of a new democratic order in South 
Africa; both closed on the sombre note of defeat for democracy and triumph 
for the forces of reaction and racism. Motivated by a dissatisfaction with 
prevailing interpretations, I shall explore what went wrong in these years 
in order to deepen our understanding of the political culture and social 
base of the liberation movement. I have focussed on these two historical 
periods because I see the basic parameters of the contemporary liberation 
movement as set by the class struggles which occurred within them. My 
central hypotheSis is that, although class relations do not on the whole 
manifest themselves directly on the surface of the liberation movement, 
they have nonetheless been the crucial determinants of its pattern of 
evolution. My introductory chapter will be devoted to a theoretical 
discussion of the relation between nationalism and socialism in the South 
Africa liberation movement. It was written after the historical research 
and its ideas reflect a considerable change of mind which resulted from the 
research; the ideas expressed within it provide a necessary foundation for 
understanding what I wish to say through the subs-tantive history. My final 
section will be an attempt to outline the major lessons which I draw from 
the history of these class struggles; it focusses on what I see as the 
unresolved conflict between the two traditions of 'radical liberalis.' and 
'insurrectionism' which run through the history of the liberatlon struggle 
and on defining what I see as the 'absent centre' of this history: social 
deaocracy or more accurately the 80cial democratic move .. nt of the work1ns 
class. 
Preface 
I should like to thank my supervisor Simon Clarke, my 
partner Glynis Cousin, and my friends Dennis Davis, Mick 
O'Sullivan, Clive Bradley, Tom Rigby, Alan Norrie, Tom 
Schuller, Bi 11 Freu ~ 1.-' Dttr"l Glazer, Du nca n Innes, Iai n 
Smith, Baruch Hirson:~Jon~t~~n Grossman and Martin Thomas 
for their invaluable ~~vice and help. Writing this after 
my thesis defence, I should also like to thank my 
examiners, Stan Trapido and Sam Nolutshungu, for their 
generosity and critical engagement. 
I have used small letters for so-called national groups 
within South Africa - like african, asian, coloured, 
white, non-european, european, black - as a small protest 
against the divisions forced upon the people of South 
Africa by apartheid. It seems to me that capital letters 
have a tendency of reifying these political categories. I 
have used the spelling 'Lutuli' rather than 'Luthuli', as 
is sometimes to be found. 
I have used some concepts in the text that are likely to 
be unfamiliar to the reader. In particular, I employ the 
concept of 'the social weight' of the working class and 
of other classes to refer to the power of a class in 
relation to the other classes in society. I treat the 
'social weight' of the working class as a function of 
many factors - not all of which are strictly economic. I 
include relative numbers, concentrations, skills, 
divisions, organisation and bargaining power. The dynamic 
purpose of the concept is to allow for a distinction 
between the 'being' of the class and its consciousness. 
I have used the term 'social democracy' in the classical 
marxist sense as democratic socialism, that is, the 
coming together of socialist and democratic politics. I 
do not mean it to refer to the modern notion of 'social 
democracy' as counter posed to marxist or revolutionary 
politics. I see the concept of 'social democracy' as 
referring to a stage of development of marxist politics, 
embracing both revolutionary and reformist currents. The 
purpose behind the use of this concept is to provide a 
basis for criticising what I see as a premature 
revolutionism; premature in that it "forgets' the 
achievements of the Second International in the critique 
of its limitations and also 'forgets' that marxist 
revolutionary ideas are thoroughly utopian when divorced 
from the construction of social democracy. 
The critique of reformism in South Africa has often been 
identified with a critique of reform. What I have tried 
to argue through the concept of 'social democracy' is the 
importance of a politics of reform in what Lukacs called 
the 'bildung' (or 'reformation') of the working class. I 
am looking for the concepts which will allow us to pose 
the problem of the development of the working class in 
both its consciousness and its material existence: 
·social weight', ·social democracy', ·proletarian 
reformation', ·bildung', ·politcs of reform'. 
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\ V\ \-y"ctl4' \~.'" , 
PI efa-e:-- nationalism, podalipID and demoq'i,CY 
Proletarian revolutions" ,constantly engage in self-criticism and 
in repeated intel'ruptions of thei r own c'Jurse, They retUl'n to what 
has apparently already been accomplished in order to begin the 
task again; with mel'ciless thor'Jughness they I\)ock thlil inadequatlil, 
weak and wpetched aspec ts of thei p f i I'st attempts; they seem t'J 
thpow their opponent to the ground only to see him draw new 
strength from the earth and rise again before them, more colossal 
than liIvel'; they shrink bad: again and a.~ain befol'e the 
indeterminate immensi ty of theil' .::.wn g'Jals, unti 1 the si tuati'Jn is 
created in which any retreat is irop'Jssible and the conditions 
themselves .:ry 'Jut: Hie Rhodus, hie salta, Here is the rose, danse 
here. (Kar 1 Mar):, Eighteenth Brumai re) (1) 
In the Eighteimth Brumai re Marx remarked that, just as in pdvate li fe a 
.jistincti'JI1 is made between what individuals think an.j say of themselves 
and what they I'eally are and do, s.:> too in hist.::.rical struggles CI. still 
sharper distinction must be made between the phl'ases and fantasies of the 
pal'ties and thei r I'eal organisatic.n and interests, between thei r· con.:eption 
of themselves and what they really are (2). This dissertation is an attempt 
to apply this .:.obsel'vation to the liberatic.n movement in South Africa. It is 
b.:>th a cd tique of tr,e nationalist lens throu.;:)h which the pal'ties of the 
liberation movement perceive the history of class struggle in South Africa 
and a re-.:.)nstruction in class terms of tt-,e I'eal hist'JI'y of the liberati.:>n 
movement. 
Nothing could be more erroneous than the image of a unitary and homogenised 
liberation movement moving inexorably towards the final moment of 
liberation. The imagery of black people as an undifferentiated mass united 
by a single political consciousness in their opposition to apartheid is a 
mirror of the very racism they are fighting. The history of class struggle 
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has t.een one of debate an.j dissent, shal'p breaks and abrupt turns, 
competing political organisations and traditions, ad hoc alliances and 
unpredi.: ted out.:omes, We stK)uld avoid the temptation tc. flatten al'ti fically 
this rocky landscape by drawing a one-dimensional picture of a singular 
movement, hegemonised by this or that party. for ever advancing ~ith the 
SUppOI't of the pe.::>ple t.) the final goal of libel'ation, Bet~een the 
political myth and the real history lies not just a chasm but everything 
tha.t makes the liberation movement in South Afri.:a s.) rich and full t::>f 
revolutionary potential, 
I shall nc.t avoid taking sides in the c.:>nflicts bet~een rival political 
parties in the liberation movement: ~e certainly cannot face the past in 
dc).:trinaire fashi.:>n with a ne~ principle declal'ing 'hel'e is the truth, 
kneel here' (3), We sh,:>uld, ho~evel', use the benefits .jf hindsight t.j 
un.:over the common pl'erflises shared by the different parties and enrich OUI' 
understandin.~ .::>f thei r genel'al strengths and I imi tatit::>ns, Whi Ie ~e can but 
learn frCtrII the old debates - between stalinism and tl'otskyism, nationalisll\ 
and socialism, reform and revolution - it is essential that we are not 
locked in them at the expense of our own intellectual and p.:>li tical 
devel')pment, The comm.:>n pre-supposi tions of the old c';:Intenders are 
sometimes as important as what divided them; simply to take sides and leave 
it at that is to fail to get to the roots of the matter, 
The historiography of the liberation movement is infused with the 
traditions of the past: it celebrates this or that party, repudiates 
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othel's, b'JI'rows the names, slogans and costumes of pl'ior struggles - all at 
tt"n? e;<;pense of building s.jmething that is new, The hardest thing is to 
constl'u.:t a consistent n",.jde of cl'i ticsm, not a,:,:ol'.jin.~ tel standal'ds whi.:h 
are already given, but I'athel' to pal'ticipate in the united effort to 
c.jnstl'uct new standards, A stal'tin.~ p.jint which sh.juld meet wi th C'jmn""jn 
agl'eement is the need not only to celebl'ate the evolution of the liberation 
mc/vement but also to c'Jnfront it critically;, dl'awing less.jns fr'Jm its 
weaknesses as well as its strengths, its defeats as well as its victories, 
Critical histol'Y of this kind, which employs the same tools to analyse the 
parties of the oppressed as it does with regard to the parties of the 
oppressors, sh'Juld n.jt be seen as 'negative' but I'athel' as developmental: 
an integl'al and necessal'y part, as Marx .jbserved in our opening qUQtation, 
of the gl'owth of evel'Y pl'oletal'ian revolution, 
The unhappy mal'riage of nationalism and socialism 
The ,:ommon gl'ound of what we might call the '.:)\'thod'jx' histol'ies (4) of the 
liberation movement is that they see the ideal form of political leadership 
of the libet'ation movement as a marriage of nationalism and S'JC ial ism .nd 
find the embodiment of this ideal in the alliance 'Jf the Afri.:an National 
Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party (SACP). Like ",any private mal'riages, 
this political marriage is conceived as both harmc.nious and unequal, 
consummated under the banner of african nationalisnl and on the basi.s of the 
voluntary subsumption of socialism, The marriage is justified by the 
argument that nationalism is both the rational form of opposition to 
apartheid and the true expression of the consciousness of the masses, The 
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role of socialists is defined as supportive, indeed as the most consistent 
and radical supporters of the national liberation struggle. 
Nationalism appears within this orthodoxy as the rational political form of 
the class struggle in South Africa, whose necessity derives from the 
overwhelming predominance of race over class in the structures of 
oppression and exploitation. The hegemony of nationalism within the 
I it.el'ati.jn f!l.jvement appears, in other words, t.:. arise out of its immanent 
rationality as the political form in which the class struggle is expressed 
in a s.xiety dominate.j by racialism. 
In this prefa.:e we take issue with the theoretical premises of the 
.jl'tt-":II::1o~:y. In our view mar~<ists have ac.:eded too readily to the appeal of 
nationalism in Sc.uth Africa, fud',ding the diffel'en.:es between marxism and 
nationalism and downplaying the basic fact that marxists are not 
nationalists. It is one thing for socialists to recognise the 
progl'essiveness of nationalism in South Africa and t.j a.:cept it as a 
fa.:tual c'Jnditiclll 'Jf theil' stl'uggle as socialists; it is another sin\ply to 
welcor ... e nationalisri. as ideology and pl'ogl'amrl\e. The c'Jnversion of work ing 
class struggle int'J national ism has been fal' less complete than appeal's 
within the orthodoxy and is the result not of the triumph of reason but of 
a def ini te interplay of c lass forces which, though hidden beneath t,he 
surface of political life, are its real social determinants. Eric 
Hobsbawm's sweeping but true observation that 'getting their history wrong 
is an essential characteristic of nations' should be a warning to Marxists 
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not to accept too readily the self-conceptions of the nationalist history 
(5) , 
When the Communist Party temporarily dissolved itself in the face of legal 
repression in 1950, the party historians, Jack and Ray Simons, depicted 
what they saw as the phoenix arising out of the ashes: 
the cc'mml..lnists could claim the a·:hievement of an obje.:tive that 
had been cent,'al t.:. thei,' purpose since 1928, The class strug.;Jle 
had merged with the struggle for national liberation. (6) 
In its ear 1 y days in the 1920s, so their st.:,,'y goes, the Communist Party of 
South Afri.:a ad.:.pted a crude .:lass analysis which failed t.) come to g"ips 
with the reality clf national oppression and in fact oriented to white 
workel's. The sO-I:alled ·third period' of the CPSA (1929-34), when it 
adopted the slogan of 'the Native Republic', was seen as an advance toward 
the party's undel'standing of national oppression in South Africa, but the 
CPSA's own bl'and of black nationalism was thoroughly sectarian toward the 
actual leadel'ship of the nati,)nalist parties whom it charactedsed as 
'cowardly' and 'petty bourgeois', 
From the mid-1930s, however, the CPSA's turn towards a people's front with 
the national ist rnovements was seen as a great advance over the sectarianisft\ 
of the third period, with its new emphasis on the unity of all fore,es 
opposed to segregationism; but its inclusion within the popular front of 
the white labour Movement necessarily caught the CPSA in divided loyalties 
owing to the endemic racism of the latter. In the late 19405 and early 
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'505, with the collapse of the white labour movement as an independent 
political force and the radicalisation of african nationalism, the CPSA 
turned finally t,:;wal'd the ideal of allying itself with national libel'ation 
m'Jvement under the banner of african nationalisf1\, 
On the other side of this divide, so the Simons' story goes, african 
nationalism in its early days was a progressive but exclusively middle 
class m.:,yement, not yet involvin.~ the gl'eat majol'i ty of the afl'iean pe'Jple 
and largely .:ut e.ff from indians and coloureds, The ANC and other 
nationalist ol'ganisations were usually rem'Jte frol\\ the masses, seeking 
advanta.~e f.:,r their edu.:a.ted and pl'opel'tied members alone and using 
strictly c.Jnsti tutional methods .)f peti ti'Jn and deputation whi.:h were 
incapable of relating t.) the masses, There were some early attempts to 
radit:alise afd.:a.11 nati'Jnalism, as when Gumede was elected Pl'esident of the 
ANC in 1927, visi ted Russia and spc4::e in gl,)wing terms about Soviet 
achievements, 
The conservative wing under Seme, however, re-asserted its leadership of 
the ANC at the start of the 1930s; there wel'e some dem.)cratic innovations 
in the 1940s but the ANC remained basically committed to its old methods 
and goals, With the formation of the ANC youth League in 1943, its rise to 
leadership positions in the ANC in 1948, the adoption by the ANC of the 
Programme of Action in 1949, the entry of Communists into both the Indian 
Congress and the ANC, and then the practical turn to Mass struggle 
alongside the Indian Congress in the 1952 Defiance Campaign, african 
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nati.:mal ism .:ame .::>f age, F.::>r the f i I'St time, the ANC set as its g,)al 
national liberation of the african people, whose right to leadership of the 
liberation movement as a whole and of the future South African state was 
justified by vil'tue of the african nation being the fIl.::,ost numel":Ous • 
.:.ppressed and indi.;:!enous of the nations I::>f S.::>uth Afri.:a, 
In the 1950s, the allianl:e between socialism and nationalism was forn)ed dt'i 
fac to when, wi th tt-Ie dissolution of the CPSA, former party men)bers 
pal,tio:ipated a.:tively in the four separate national ol",;Janisations of the 
Ccmgress Alliance. Around the end of the decade, the convergence was 
fOI'malised as the CPSA resurfaced as the SACP, announcing its public 
identity fo\' the first time since its secret re-birth in 1953. It CI:>-
operated ,:losely with ANC members over the formation of Umkonto We SizlNe, 
the a I'med IN i ng of C.:ongl'ess, in the ear I y 1960s; it dec lared its suppor t for 
the pol i tical leadel'ship of the ANC and the ide,:ological hegemony ()f af r iean 
nationalisrli. It adopted lNi th the ANC a mutually agreed analysis of the 
state as a 'I:olonialism of a spe.: ial type ' , a pl'ogramme based around the 
al'med stl'ug',;Jle and an inter lo·:k ing leadership. The convel'gel1ce of 
nationalism and s.)( ialism was near ing completion. 
This is of course a caricatured version of the orthodo~ historiography, but 
the main point we wish to stress is its belief in the progressive political 
evolution of the liberation movement toward its t.los: the marriage of its 
nationalist and socialist currents under the banner of african nationalism, 
In the 1970s leading figures in the SACP sought to theorise the political 
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developrilent of the liberation movement and defend it against those who 
criticised the subordination of socialism to nationalism, 
J'j ~;lovo agreed with cri tics of bourge,jis national ism that 'emphasis on the 
national content of the struggle could '" encourage a disregard of its 
ultimately class basis' (7), but argued that in South Af"ica the twin g,:;.als 
of natit:;.nal and s,jcial libel'atit:m were in fact happily married in the ANC-
SACP alliance, Fol' Slovo, the possibility of capitalism surviving the 
overthl'ow of apartheid on the basis of a 'future black exploiting class' 
was not the,jreti,:ally ruled out but was in pra,:tice deemed remote, The 
blad: bourge'jisie was too weak and the wo,'k ing c lass too strong f'jr a 'neo-
colonial' solution to emerge: the actual array of political forces was 
p",jhibi tive of sud', a scenario, The sped f ic role of the Communist Pal'ty, 
as he saw it, was to serve as the watchdc,g 'jf trle national liberation 
ril'jVement, to insure a steadfast commitment t,:;. true I iberati'jn and generate 
s'j,:ialist consciousness am,jn'~ the 'working masses', On the basis of this 
assessment, Slovo drew two con,: Ius ions: first that the role of an 
independent class-based party was historically vital and second that there 
was an absence of any basic policy divergence between the ANC and the SACP, 
Other party theorists sought to develop the class dimension of the marriage 
of socialism and nationaliSM further, In a mOI'e re,:ent text, Harold Wolpe 
agreed with Slovo that there was a contingent rather than a necessary 
relationship between capitalism and racism in South Africa, but drew the 
conclusion that too close an identification of the national struggle with 
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tt-.e strug,~le against capitalisril had the effect of closing off analysis of 
the dass ,:ontent ,::>f national struggles, He wrote that 'the national 
struggle does nc,t have a single, anti-capitalist cc,nnotation, it wi 11 be 
given a different content by different classes' and criticised the failure 
of at least one versi,::>n of national ist theory to re,:ognise that 'c lass 
interests are differentially served or blocked by these (racial) 
boundaries', and that 'the national struggle '" rilay incorporate 
altel'native class 'Jbje,:tives' (8), 
W,::>lpe c'::>n,:urred with Slovo that nationalis,. ... is the form necessarily taken 
by the stl'ug,~le a,~ainst I'ac ial oppressi,::>n, but stl'essed that it can be 
filled with di f ferent kinds of c lass content, He raised the the'::>I'etical 
possibility of a bourgeois form of african nationalism in South Africa, but 
declared his ,::>wn conviction that no section of the actually e>c:isting 
national liberation movement is committed to or struggles for a 'bourgeois 
natic,nal dem'::>CI'atic revoluti,::>n', W,::>lpe a\'gued that 'I'a,:e may well become 
the content unde\' specific conditions of the class struggle', an 
un,:ontentious view in a s'::>( iety ridden wi th ra,: ial distinctions, al thou'~h 
he leaves open the question of whethel' 'race' 01' the abolition of ra,:ism is 
the only content of the class stl'uggle in South Africa, ,,",olpe also, 
h,::>wever, endol'sed the explicitly nationalist claim made by Stuart Hall that 
'race' is or should be the 'modality in which class is lived, the medium 
through which dass relations al'e experienced, the f.Qr.rn. in which it. is 
appropriated".' (our emphasis) (9), 
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The orth.,dox view of the rt\arl'iage of sc,dalism and nationalism has usually 
been associated with what is known as 'two-stage theory', In the first 
stage, that of the struggle against apartheid, socialism appears as a 
junior partner to african nationalism, the role of the socialist party 
def ined in terms of its supp.j,'t for national liberation as well as being 
beare,' .jf socialist ideas; in the se.:ond stage, which begins when apa,'theid 
has been ovel'ttwown and a national demc,,: ratic state has been established in 
its place, socialist objectives come to the fOl'e and the socialist party 
asserts its claim to leadership. 
The Communist Party has in fa.:t inte"p,'eted • tw.j-stage theory' with 
different emphases: at one moment affirming a rigid separation of stages, 
the inadmissibi I i ty of SCIC ial ist ideas in the first stage and the • jumping 
of stages' which any attempt to int,'oduce socialist objectives w.juld imply, 
At other times, the Communist Party has s.)ught to link two-stage theo,'y to 
the idea of an • ongc.ing' or • uninterrupted rev.::clution'. according to which 
s.::ccialist ideas a,'e actively pr')pagated prior to national liberation as a 
necessal'y springboard for the cl'eation of socialism afterwards (10). 
Although the relative weight of nati.)nalism and s.)cialism is conceived 
differently in these various interpretations. they all rest on the same 
conceptual foundations whi.:h may in brief be termed the hegemony of 
national iSR\. 
Two-stage theory has not been the monopoly of the Communist Party; we find 
it propagated, for example, among many trotskyists in the 19305. More 
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,:hal'acteristically, however, South African trotskyism has countel'posed the 
theory of 'uninterrupted' or 'permanent revolution' to that of two-stages, 
Inf luen,:ed by this tradi tion, Nevi lle Alexander has argued that the role of 
tw,)-stage the,)\'y has been to relegate work ing class leadel'ship out "f sight 
to an indefinite future, in his view a tragically faulted strategy given 
the highly proletarianised nature of South African society, In its place he 
has called for working class leadership in the immediate struggle against 
apartheid, setting as its objective 'the liquidation of those institutions 
an,j pl'actices which have given rise to national oppression", This means 
n,)thing else than the abolition of capitalism itself' (11), 
For Ale~:ander. the stru,~gle is at on,:e against rae ial iSII\ and capitalism, 
against what he sees as 'I'acial capitalism', the ,:onne,:tions between them 
appearing as immanent rather than .:ontingent, His basi,: argument is that 
since racialism is essential to the survival of capitalism in South Africa, 
the abolition of racialism necessarily entails the abolition of capitalism; 
the antinomies of nati,)nalism an,j so.:ialism al'e res.)lved by the doctrine 
that true national liberation is anti-,:api talist, Ale)t:ander end.:orses the 
thesis of permanent or uninterrupted revolution ad'Jpted, as he put it, by 
'marxists in the Unity Movement and the C.,mmunist Party who bel ieved that 
no power on earth would be able t., contain the people' 5 struggle wi thin the 
confines of bourgeois democracy' and that accordingly 'the revolution would 
assume a permanent character as a matter of necessity' (12), 
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Alexander' s view of the revoluti.:mary struggle as a continuous pl'ocess 
t.)wal'd the establishment of a soc ialist order gives the movement fr.)m 
national liberation to socialism a seemingly mechanical certainty: 
the struggle canno:)t be hal ted at the mere integration of the 
bla.:k people into the e~dsting econ.)mic l'elati.)nships", Today 
any attempt at integl'atic.n must infallibly bring ab.::out themOI'e or 
less rapid disintegration of the capitalist system (13), 
The imme.jiate p.)l i tical task then is t.) perfect national ism rather than to 
build soc ialism, or rather to build so.: ialism ttw,)ugh perfecting 
nati.)nalism, Permanent revoluti.::on becomes the alchemist of history. turning 
nati.)nalism into s.)cialism, n.::ot through the conscious intervention of human 
agency and the pl'.::ol i feration of soc ial ist ideas am.::ongst the people, but 
through the objective laws of social development, Whilst the masses al'e 
subje.:tively nationalist, they be.:.::ome objectively socialist acc.::ording to 
the l.::ogic .:of perll'lanent revolutio::on which the leadership alone con\Prehends, 
The antinomies of nationalism 
In a recent article Jo Slovo justifies the leading role of the ANC in the 
alliance in the following terms: 
The two most important determinants in the South African socio-
economic structure - class and race - have given birth to two 
complementary streams of revolutionary consciousness and 
revolutionary organisation, each influencing the other and often 
standing in alliance on those aims they share in common,., The ANC 
is the main constituent of the liberation front in it. qwst for 
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i mmedi a te majority rule", It ie; a national rt\ase; m.:>vQrt\Qnt 
rQpresenting the African people in whom it has helped to develop a 
COIM ... c.n consciousness and feeling of oneness", The S'juth African 
Communist Pcu-ty", repl-esents the aspirations of the w.:>rking class 
and aims for the eventual establ ishment c.f a S·j·: ialist South 
Af \'ica, (our emphas is) (14) 
This particular passage raises many questions: not least how adequately 
these ttl,hj particular poli ti.:al organisatio:ms, the ANC and the SACP, are 
seen as representing the c'Jmplementary currents of national ism and 
socialism, It is of course not enough to rediscover the ideas of african 
natic.nalism and soc ialism in them to prove that they represent their ideal 
embodiment; such an explanation would merely accept the leadership of the 
liberation movement as it is in order to declare it rational, The issue 
which we wish to address, however, is a br'Jader one, 
Accepting the view that the struggle for majority rule takes pre.:edence 
over the struggle against .:api tal ism in S'Juth Afdca, 01-, t.:> put it another 
way, that the struggle against capitalism is in the first instance a 
struggle f'Jr p.jli tical democracy, the question I-emains as to the polt tical 
f.:>rm in which the dert)ocratic struggle is waged, Racial oppression of 
african and other black people in South Africa has historically led to a 
var iety of pol i tical responses art\ong the oPPI-essed: dif feren,t and sometimes 
competing forms of african nationaliSM (witness the historical antagonisms 
between the ANC and the Pan African Congress or PAC), alternative forms of 
black nationalism (like Black Consciousness), as well as various currents 
of socialism and liberalism, The apparent deduction of nationaliSM frOM the 
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struggle against racial oppression conceals the ~pecificity of this 
particular political response, yet it pervades the orthodox literature to 
su.:r. an e~{tent that the struggle against racism is often equated lA'ith its 
nationalist form, as if no other political form of opposition t'J I'ac ism 
lA'ere feasible, 
A parallel may be found f'Jr instan.:e in saying that jewish nati"nalism has 
been a 'natupal' resp'Jnse of jelA's to anti-semi tism rather than explore IA'hat 
differentiated this particular response fl'om other f'jrms of political 
cons': iousness among jelA's, To address the relation betlA'een nati.jnalism and 
socialism in South Africa critically, lA'e need to keep in mind IA'hat 
distinguishes nati'Jnal ist forms of opposition to apartheid from other 
a,:tual ami p,:assible p"l i tical forms: in short, to 'denature' the hegem"ny 
of african nati'Jnalism, A distinction should be made betlA'een the struggle 
for democracy in general and its specific nationalist form, 
Afd,:an nationalism appears in Slovo's IA'ritings as the ideal political 
expression of the consciousness of the 'masses', IA'hich he characterises as 
follolA's: 
f.:ar those IA'ho have to live the hourly reali ties and humiliations 
of race tyranny... there is no issue more immediate and relevant 
tt'lan the experience of national oppression. This is certainly the 
starting point of political consciousness for every black 
lA'orker'. (15) 
But is the experience of national oppression the starting point of 
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political consciousness for every black worker? the question needs to be 
resolved historically rather than philosophically, empirically and not 
dedu.:tively. Altt-I,)ugh political line of the party is portrayed as a 
reflection of the consciousness of the masses, in reality the relationship 
is revel'sed: the n'lasses are decked .)ut in nationalist colours by a party 
committed to nationalisM. 
Underlying this wh.:.le appl'oach is the .:oncept of the 'masses', which has 
played such an imp.:ortant role in the language ,:of the l.iberation Movement. 
Drawn from outside the terrain of marxisM and identif ie.:I wi th theories of 
the right as well as the left, the con.:ept of the 'mass' finds its 
symbiotic counterpart in the concept of the 'elite'; they are inseparable 
fr';)M each othel'. In this c.:on.:eptual m.;).jel, the .;]reat majol'lty of black 
pe.Jple appear uni ted by a singular p,)l i tical ,:onsc iousness - national ism -
whatever othel' sodal di fferen·:es divide them; they enter the p,)li til:al 
stage as a suffering and rebellious mass but not as rational individuals 
enl;]aged in plJl i tical dialogue and debate, Popular cl:msc iousness needs to be 
addressed M.Jre concretely and freed from the Mental ass.:,.:iations which COMe 
fT'l:jM the langual;Je of the 'Masses' I The starting point of political 
consciousness for workers May be a sense of national oppression; it may 
also, however, be a sense of low payor powerlessness in the workpla.:e or 
indeed of the power which comes from organised labour. Such matters are not 
pre-determined, 
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The terms .:,f p.:,li tical debate wi thin the party eli tes are set by the 
natic.nalist mould in whio:h p,:,pular consci,:,usness is set. Rather than see 
parties as what they are, competinl~ pol i ti.:al organisations whi.:h put 
f orwil.rd thei r own views and repl'esent n.:, m.:.re than part of the wh.:,le, they 
appear in more absolutist terms as either representing or failing to 
represent the conso: i.Jusness of the masses in toto. We see here the roots of 
an idealised conception of political parties in which celebrationism and 
betrayal the.)ry are two complementary aspe.:ts. The language of 'national 
rilovements' rathel' than' p'Jli ti.:al parties', which dominates the li tel'atul'e, 
a.:centuates the identi f ication of a particular pol i tical party wi th the 
will of the 'nation' as a whole, c,)no:ealin.~ 01' downplaying the distin.:tion 
between the leadership and those wl"K.m it seeks to repl'esent. The resul t is 
that political pl'ogrammes, manifestos and charters are presented not fop 
what they ape, the pl'oducts of peo.rticular p'Jl i ti,:al 'JI'ganisations appeal ing 
f,:,r SUPP,:'I't bey,)nlj their own I'anks, but rather as the dil'ect expressi'JI' of 
the will of the people (16). The language of national fl)ljVefl)ents enables the 
party t.) ascl'ibe t,) the people of their nation a uni tary consl: iousness in 
its clwn image and party leadel's t,) appear as natur·al heads of thei r nation. 
The apartheid state rationalises its division of South Africa into a number 
of distinct nations, presented as natural entitites based on notions of 
primordial origin, divine mission, spiritual unity, shared culture and 
especially racial hOMIJgeneity; it conceives of nations as corporate units, 
prl)viding the bui lding blocks of the state as a whole, The state and its 
ideologues refer to the nations of South Africa in at least three different 
and conflicting ways, First, under the guise of refurbishing 
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traditionalism, the state seeks to re-tribalise africans as citizens of 
theil' own national h()melands and as f':il'eigners in white South Africa, In 
this vein, the state talks of around ten national groups within the african 
pe,:ople as a whole and organises bantustans and even segregates black 
t.:iwnsrlips an,j minel's' co:)mp,)unds a,:,:ordingly, Second, tt-Ie state a.:.:entuates 
in theory and practice the distinct identities of what it sees as four 
nati(ll1al ';)I'OUps: whites, africans, asians and ':':iloul'eds (the earlier 
tenden,:y to distinguish between afrikaner and english-speaking wt-lites has 
persisted but in less powerful a fOl'm), Lastly, the state pursues a policy 
of racial oppression affecting all black people as blacks, which magnifies 
the sodal distance between blad:s an·j whi tes in geneNil an,j overrides all 
other distinctions, (17) 
Parallel to the growth of these three forms of racialism practiced by the 
state, we find historically three forms of nationalism among the oppressed, 
One has been .:entel'ed aroun,j the goal of national self-detel'mination 
define,j in tel'ms of avowedly tl'aditional tribal l,)yalties, It may be 
i llustrate.j by the Inkatha ffI.:.vement arl)ong the Zulu 01' the National 
Independen.:e Party in the TI'anskei, The second has centered around what has 
been known as four-nation the.)ry, which respects as its starting point the 
separate nati.;:.nal identities of afr icans, col.)ureds, asians and whi tes 
(sometimes five nations if whites al'e divided into afrikaner and english-
speaking wings), This form of organisation has been most vividly expressed 
in the four-spoke wheel of the Congress Alliance and the four separate 
national organisations which comprised it. The third has centered around 
the unity of all non-europeans or blacks, regardless of all other ethnic 
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identi ties, in the face of white oppressi.jn and has been expressed in the 
gl'Owth ':.'If movements like the N'jn-European Unity M.)vemel1t in the 1940s and 
the Blad Consciousness RK,vernent in the 1970s (18), All these national 
identi ties have been manufa.:tured by the state on the basis of certain real 
SCn: ial di f ferentiati':.'Ins among the people but .)nl y wi th the utmost use of 
repression and res.)rt to t':.'Itally irl'ational ways of thinking, The 
fundamental problem facing all these political fc.rms of nationalism lies in 
thei r acceptan.:e .;)f one or other of the rae ial cate,~.::tries of the state as 
thei r c,wn starting p':.'Iint; the limi tation of the national ism of the 
oppressed lies in its pal'asitisR) on the R)·jdels of nationalism constructed 
by the oppressors, 
The problem was vividly expressed in debates around the organisation .;)f the 
liberati'jn m.)vement in the 1950s, The democratic vision of the future put 
f')I'ward in the 19505 in the Freed.;,m Chal'ter was that South Afl'i.:cl belongs 
to all, black and white, regardless of racial divisions, The principle of 
n.::tn-ra.:ialisR) was not, h.)wever, extende.j into the 'jrganisation of the 
Congress All iance, the key k· which was tt-Iat onl y at the t.jP did 
individuals fr.)m di fferent colour groups come together in single bodies 
like the National Consul tati ve Committee, whi Ie ordinary supporters wel'e 
hived off into four sepal'ate national bodies for afri.:ans, indians, 
coloureds and whites respectively. 
In response to critics who argued that such a 'multi-racial' arrangement 
represented 'voluntary segregation' within the liberation movement (18), 
Slovo defended it by reference to the 'group consciousness' of the masses; 
he wrote that while he personally had no principled objection to the idea 
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of creating a single non-racial organisation to struggle against white 
rule, it W'Juld have appealed in the 1950s only to • the ideolo.~ically 
advanced' and not to the • masses' , He saw it as right, therefol'e, that non-
racialism was not imp'Jsed by 'advanced decisions fr.::;.m the top', on the 
grounds that the multi-racial organisation of Congl'ess was a necessary 
stage in the devel'Jpment of a fully mm-ra,:ial liberati'Jn movement (19), 
Slovo's depicti.)n of popular consciousness in the 1950s needs to be tested 
historically, but his characterisation of the liberation struggle as an 
anti-c.)l.:mial movement di rected against a • spec ia1 type of colonialism', 
the offi.:ial d.xtrine ad.)pted by the Communist Party and the ANC in the 
early 1960s, introduced the problem of nationalism in another form (20), In 
nen'mal anti -.:olonial si tuations, I,ational 1 ibel'ation stands for the 
democratic right of the colonised nation as a whole to independence fl'om 
foreign colonial rule; the stl'uggle for independence is at once linked to 
the stl'uggle for the unification of the new nation, In the South African 
case, by .:.)ntrast, Sri tish col.)nial d,)mination was abol ished before the 
First World War as a result in part of the anti-imperialist struggles of 
the boers; the subsequent interpretation of demo.:ratic struggles as • anti-
colonial' meant that the white section of the South African population was 
seen as colonisers of South Africa, This theol'Y suggests the division of 
South Africa into two nations, black and white, rather than a single South 
African nation belonging t.) all who live in it, The anti-whi te logic of 
this form of nationalism has been softened by the claim that the struggle 
is not against the coloni.ers themselves but only against the system of 
colonialism, and by statements declaring that white people in South Africa 
should not be seen as a foreign, 'colon' class; the theory of 'colonialiSM 
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of a special type ' , however, remains as the official doctrine of the ANC-
SACP leadership of the 1 iberation movement, 
Neville Alel<:ander has been one '=>f the most cogent criti,:s '=>f both 'f,::>ur-
nation ' theory and the theory of 'colonialism of a special type', His 
ar9ument is that the ide,:ology IJf african nati'::>nalism is in fal:t a pseudl=>-
nationalism, ,:oncea1 ing a forrl\ of 'co1oUl'-easte' eonse iousness; his own 
intellectual eff':'I't has been directed t,)ward definin9 a tl'ue nationalism 
purge,j ,)f tt-lis racial taint, Under the slo,;;)an I::>f 'one AZania, one nation', 
he has al'gued that in the South African conte~<t genuine nati,::>nalism sh.:ould 
be seen not in terms of separatism but rather of unification, If apartheid 
si,;!ni f ies the balkanisati,:on .::of South Afr ica into I'a,: ial gl'oupings. genuine 
nati'Jnal ism si9ni f ies the unit ieati'Jn ,)f Sc,uth Afr ica as a modern nation-
state embracing all who live in it, 
Alexander'S penetrating critique of existing forms of nationalism draws its 
inspil'ati,)n fp'Jm European nationalist movements ,)f the nineteenth centul'Y, 
the crw,; of whi,:h, as the histc.rian Eri,: H,:obsbawm has rightly p,:ointed out, 
was not SQ much state independence as such but I'ather the constru,:ti'Jn of 
'viable' states through the unification of the old principalities; in their 
w'::>l'ld ball<:anisatil:m was a tel'r ... c,f abuse and petty German prine ipali ties 
were a j'Jke (21), If nationalism is. as Tom Nairn has argued, 'Janus-
faced', with one face pointing to the past and the other pointing to the 
future. Alexander has s'Jught to def ine a nationalisn) in South Afr iea which 
points unequivocaly to the future. looking to the construction of a new 
nation of Azania rather than to the restoration of what he sees as the 
largely imaginary rights of the primordial 'nations' of South Africa (22), 
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If nationalism of the oppl'essed has a tenljency, as John Breuilly has argued 
in his brilliant study of nationalisffi and the state, to be 'parasitic' on 
the naticlnalism of the oppl'eSSI)rs, Alel<:andel' has sought tlJ def ine a 
nationalisffi which radically breaks from the 'national ' categories of the 
apartheid state (23), 
Yet in the writings of Neville Alexander, just as in those of Jo Slovo, 
there has been a tensi.)n between the visi'JI1 of a new nlJn-I'al:ial natilJn in 
the future and the immediate perspectives .:.f the liberation rl'lovement, At 
the same time as he argues that the il\u'ilediate task I)f the I iberatil)n 
ffiovement is the abolition within its own body of all pseudo-nationalisms 
based on I I: I) I'Jul'-caste I categ'Jries, he also aft i rms that the class stl'uggle 
in ::;,)uth Africa must take a nationalist form because I)f I the COloul'-caste 
fraffiework ' of apartheid, He seeks to resolve the conflict by defining the 
nation of Azania as 'all the people who are prepared to throw off the yoke 
of capitalist exploitation and racist oppression ' (24); this political 
definitil)n clf the nation leaves unspecified the status ,:.f those who d,:. nl:ot 
ernbra.:e this dual struggle; the impl'essil:on is given that nati,:onh,:ocllj is a 
reward f,)1' being on the rigrlt side p,)litically, His referenl:e to the black 
wlJrking class as the only class fully prepal'ed to thl'IJW off the ylJke of 
capitalist exploitation and racist oPPI'ession would imply by his own logic 
that the black wl)I'king class will constitute the new nation of Azania and 
del: ide who else to admit, 
Alexander I s political conception of the new nation seems to exclude froll\ 
its boundaries those not prepared to throw off the double yoke of 
oppression and exploitation. It raises the further question of why a new 
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form of nationalism, based on a commitment to 'the nation of South Africa 
still struggling to be born", should serve as an ideal against which to 
assess the historical forms of tribal, african and black nationalism. Is 
not pan-South Afl'ican natio:malism yet anl::.thel' facet of the ideolol;JY of the 
existing state, more or less consciously articulated by the 'liberal" wing 
'::.f the I'uling class, and was it not histol'ica11y represented in the pel'sljn 
of General Smuts priol' tel 1948? If so, can we say that this form of 
nati.::.nalism succeeds in eman.:ipating itself fl,.jm the nati.)nalism of the 
state, where othel's have fallen short? 
The bourge.jis unif i.:ation .jf Sl::>uth Afl'i.:a to.)k place long a.go in the I'e-
constl'uction years after Angl.j-E;.:.el' War, when the establishment of a single 
govel'nmellt, ':Ul'I'en':y, le.;Jal system and transpol't netwlj,'k (the four pi 11 aI's 
of the modern state) marked the beginnings of South Africa as an 
independent. unitary state. Most of its citizens were denied political 
I'ights, whi.:h was not unusual in young b.ju,'gec.is states, most of whi.:h 
imp.jse.j gende,' an.j prl::>perty qual if ications on suff rage. What was unusual in 
South Africa was the form of e>c:.:lusion by virtue of the national or racial 
status allo.:ated t.::> its citizens; subsequently the gljvernment .:)f S'juth 
Africa p,)si ted the myth of separate national identi ties and hOh\elands but 
this in 110 way alters the historical fal:t that tt-.e b,jurgeois tasks of 
bui lding a uni tary state have been accoh\pl ished. The struggle now is to 
replace apartheid with demljc,'al:YI not the unification of the state; the 
liberation of South Africa from its racialist political superstructure 
might well be accompanied by a growth of South African nationalism l but 
whether this should be encouraged by socialists is another matter, 
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The status of this pan-South African nationalism needs tCI be reviewed in 
its I)WI1 dght, in relati,jl1 both t,) the independent intel'ests of the wl)rk illg 
class in South Africa itself and to the interests of solidarity with 
oppressel::l pel)ple beyl::md the e~dsting b'Jrdel's of the S,)uth African state. 
Where will the nation of South Africa 'still struggling to be born ' draw 
its bOl'del's? sh,)uld it inl:lude or e)<clude Botswana, Les,)U""j and Swaziland? 
how would this 'new' nationalism feed into the cl'eation of a wider vista of 
p,jlitical assol:iati.)n reflel:ted in the idea of a futul'e United States of 
S'juthern Af rica (25)7 The assot.: iations which run thrclugh Alexander I s work, 
between on the one side blJurge'Jis leadership and • cIJIIJur-caste ' forms of 
pseudo-nationalism and on the other proletal'ian leadership and an Azanian 
01' pan-South African form of I true nationalism ' , fail to resolve in our 
view the larl~er question clf why nationalism in genel'al should be the 
political form of the working class struggle fol' democl'acy. 
The key ~lIjint is whethel' any forr .... of nationalism can clJnstitute a 
consistently democratic opposition to apartheid. One form of nationalism 
pl'ovides a remedy f,)r the defects of another: african nationalism f,:,r the 
defel:ts of tribalism, black nationalism for the defects of african 
nationalism, pan-South African nationalism fiJI' the defects of black 
natil:malism, lef t nationalism wi th a programme of economic and soc ial 
refol'rn for the defects of bourgeois nationalism. These are vital 
distinctions, the importanl:e of which we do nl)t wish to downplay; it is 
wrong to equate all forms of nationalism as representing basically ·the same 
political phenomenon (26); yet they do not address the fundan~ntal defect 
of nationalism itself in South Africa, its failure to transcend the racial 
terms of reference set by its enemy. Nationalism has undoubtedly been an 
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en,)rm()us Sl)urce I)f emp')Wel'ment to black pelJple but it sh,)uld I1IJt be 
rationalised as an ideal form of political consciousness. This is not to 
deny the material roots of black nationalism in South African society nor 
the importance of relating constructively to it; it is not simply to 
'reject ' nationalism, which has of course played a vital role in the 
struggle against racial oppression; it is rather to reject its idealisation 
in the language of the liberation movement, 
The tendency I)f S'juth Afri,:an mar}dSril tl) put i tsel f at the mel'l:y of 
nati,::onalism is nl)t unique; it has been reflel:ted in many countl'ies in whi.:h 
national issues dominate political debate. Wl'iting about the Arab Middle 
East, Mal<ime R,)dins')n has put the matter well: 
On the one hand, pure nationalism utilised justifications of a 
Mal'ldst kind and recruited apologists fOI"liled by Marxism", On the 
other international leftism .. , vigorously denounced the pure 
nationalist regimes ... But it did not give any less priority to 
the national struggle. The sophistical device for justifying this 
cc.nsiste.j in the thesis that' the rilasses ' wel'e the 'Jl1es to show 
unqual if ied loyalty tlJ the natic,nal ist cause ill its me.st e)<:tl'eme 
form ... Social revolution was therefore seen in what was in the 
final analysis a nationalist persective, Thel'eby it runs the risk 
,:of sub':OI'dination to nationalism, (27) 
Hobsbawm was l'ight when he said that ol1e does 11.::>t have to be a Luxemburgist 
to re,:ognise the dangel's of a marxism which loses i tsel f in national ism, 
Lenin was referring to the clearest case of 'revolutionary' anti-
impel'ialist nationalism when he warned his comrades at the Baku Congress of 
1920: 'Do not paint nationalism red' (28), The Warning still stands, 
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The antinomies of socialism 
The other· side I)f tr.e questicln of naticlnal isrl' is the pla,:e given t,) class 
politics in the nationalist frame of reference, The general argument which 
we find in bl:lth tr.e ol'thclljox and revisi,)nist litel'ature is that, as far as 
the struggle a';jainst apal'theid is ,:oncernelj, c lass pol i ti.:s al'e an 
irrational form of political expression, Slovo argues on the following 
lines: 
Can we posit for South Africa a classic political confrontation 
between the w.)rk in.;} class (bla.:k and white), " against the 
capitalist class (black and white)", Such a perspective in the 
.:.jntemporary scene is a n')nsensical one", This bec.)mes 
immediately apparent if we e~<:amine the dual nature of the 
exploi tati,:," to whi.:h the blao:k wc,rker is subjected, As a worker 
the frui ts Ijf his labour are apPNpl'iated by the owners of the 
l\leans of pI,.jdul:ti.:>n", but in addi tion as a black: wClrkel' he has 
particular disabilities to contend with", The white workers 
constitute an exclusive privileged group". which is politically 
integl'ated int.) the puling class so as tel play an active r.)le i.n 
ma~:imising the e~(ploi tation of the black w.)rkel', In such a context 
it would be pedantic t.) maintain that the black and white workers 
are political brothers, (29) 
A simi lar argument is t.) be found in Alexander, who wri tes as follows: 
According to this view, held by a very small minority of people, 
our struggle is not a struggle for national libel'atiol', It is ~ 
class struggle pure and simple, one in which the 'working class' 
will wrest power from the 'capitalist class', For this rea·son the 
workers should be organised regardless of what so-called group 
they belong to, This tendency seems to say (in theory) that the 
historically evolved differences are irrelevant or at best of 
secondary importance, I find it difficult to take this position 
- 2f.-
seriously, I suspect that in practice the activists who hold this 
view are c')filpelled t,) make the most acr'jbatic c,:ompromises with the 
reality of racial prejudice among 'workers', To deny the reality 
of prejudice and perceived differences, whatever their origin, is 
to disarm oneself strategically and tactically, It becomes 
impossible to ol'ganise a mass movement outside the ranks of it. few 
th'jusand pe l'ha.ps, ( 30 ) 
Can we accept the arguments behind this rejection of a 'classical' class 
pel'spe,:tive on the stl'u,~,~le? The fact that black w,)rkers ape subje,:te,j to a 
dual e)<:plc,i tati.jn as blacks and as wc.rkel'S d.jes n.jt pule .)ut the 
possibility that they may confront racism from a socialist rathep than 
nati':'nal ist standp.:,int; the fa.: t that rl"l.jst whi te workel's wi 11 opP')se a 
class-based, no::on-ra.: la1 so.:iallst movement pr.)vides no reason at all why 
bl~.ck w'jl'kel's sh.)uld not or-ganise themselves on ,:lass lines, Can we accept 
the view that the class ol'ganisation of wOl'kers, 'I'egal'dless of what so-
,:alled gr·,:,up they bel,:,ng to', c.nly appeals to ~. few thousand scn:ialist 
intellectuals? is this not after all the basis of the non-racial tl'ade 
union organisation involving over a million wOl'kers in COSATU? If this is 
p,)ssible in the sphel'e of tl'ade unionism, why is it imp,)ssible in politi.:s? 
To ':'l'ganise ,:,n non-ra,: ial ': lass 1 ines and to espouse S,)C i£11 ist ideas does 
not mean a denial of 'the reality of prejudice and perceived differences' 
but rathel' a refusal to admi t those prejudices into the ranks of the 
I ibel'aticll1 ffi.jVement, Even if it wel'e the case that the • h\aSSeS I al'e infused 
with nationalist sentiments and resistant to socialist ideas, the 
leadership of the liberation ffi'JVement does not have to deny this reality in 
order to argue for socialism nor deny socialism to respect this reality. 
The role of the leadership is not just to follow the people, or its own 
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image of popular consciousness. but to offer what it sees as an effective 
way forward to the achievement of democracy. 
It seems to us that the rational core of the nationalist critique of class 
politics is that the democratic aspect of the struggle against apartheid 
cannot be reduced to a working class struggle against capital. It is 
sterile and sectarian to present the liberation movement as just socialist 
rather than democratic: it is of course both. The question is that of their 
interconnections. The characterisation of class politics as 'workerist" 
which we find in much of the cl:mtemp")ral'Y Ii terature is based ')11 the no:)tiol1 
that it insists 011 an immediate struggle for socialism regardless of all 
Ijemocl'atic questil)ns. that it repudiates intel'-I: lass all iances in the 
strug';)le against apartheid and that it redul:es the c lass struggle tCI the 
eC':ln,)mic stru',;j,;;}les between workers and employers at the p";)int of pl',)du,:tion 
(31). This hat mayor may not fit the heads of certain political currents 
in S,)uth Afl'il:al1 s';)I:ialism, bl...It what I:OI1I:erns us hel'e is the idea that a 
y,!I)rk in,,;j class Sl:": ial ist party is by nature less equipped tCI lead the 
democratic struggle than an 'all-class' nationalist movement. Behind this 
1:I)nSenSUs 1 ies nl:lt only an idealised image of rev,)luticlnary national ism but 
also a diminished conception of socialism. 
The orthl)d':I~: view of the place of soc ial ism in the struggle against 
apartheid places into question the independent existenl:e of an avowedly 
socialist party. For the political tradition represented by Alexander this 
is not a problem since it abandons altogether the idea of a working class 
party in favour of revolutionary nationalism. For the Communist Party, 
which claims to represent the working class and affirms the need for an 
.;-.. -. 
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independent sodal ist ol'ganisation, the pl'oblem .:>f justifying the party has 
advanced gual'd c .. f the "Jt:tl'k ing dass may develop s.)dal ist ideas, it sh.)uld 
subsume its socialism for the sake of a popular alliance with the many 
.)ther blco . .:k pe.)ple wh.) are against apartheid but n.jt yet f.jl' socialism 
(::::2) • 
allian(es in the fight a.~ainst apartheid for tr,e sake .Jf a dc .. :trinail'e 
.:las5 perspect'ive, The real issue is n.:.t whether the advan.:ed se.:ti.)n of 
the working (lass, that is, ol'ganised industl'ial laboul', should fOl'm 
alliarKes with 'Jthel' 91")UPS in a .:.)mmon stl'ug9le a';Jainst apartheid - of 
(.)urse it must - but I'ather wi th whom and on what tel'c.\s all iances al'e 
fOl'med, It cannot be taken for granted that socialist leadership would cut 
out all SUpp.)I't beyond ol'ganised lab.)ur nt;)r cOlwel'sely that afl'ican 
nationalism pl'ovides the best possible shell for unity against apartheid, 
Slovo recognises that in a highly proletal'ianised (ountry like South 
Africa, the workin9 class - broadly defined as those who sell their labour 
f.jl' wages - f.Jrms the gl'eat majori ty .::>f the pe.Jple and to a large measure 
(.)mprises what are called • the masses'; he bases the claim of the party to 
repl'esent the w.)rking class not on thei r c,::>ns.: ious ideas which he sees as 
basically nationalist, but on thei I' objective c lass interests of which Most 
workers are themselves unaware, The party becomes the 9uardian of 
socialiSM, self-consciously substituting for the working class until the 
stage is reached until soc blisr ... can be put on the popular agenda. His 
conception of the party is self-consciously vanguardist. 
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Consistent with this posi ti'Jn, Jo Sl'Jvc, opp,:,ses the extension of soc i.l ist 
ideas int,j any of the mass organisations of the movel\\ent, Tra,je unions 
should be political, he argues, but identify themselves with african 
nati':'nalism an,j n'jt with s'jcialism, He writes: 
The premature atterl\pt to formally incorporate the objective of 
socialism into trade unions and the federation to which they 
belon'd, " would narr.:,w the mass character of the trade uni'Jn 
rll'JVement by demand in.;! an Ul1l'eal level of pol i ti,:al ,:ons,: i,jusness 
fl":'m its 1I"lembers or affiliates as a c.:;.nditic.n of joining, (33) 
Similal'ly he ar'dues that as the head of a nati,:malist movell\ent the ANC 
does not and should not adopt a socialist platform. ,. it 
cOl'rectly welcomes within its ranks all liberation fighters 
whatever their class affiliation who support revolutionary 
nationalism (34), 
At the same time as Slojv.j separates s,x ialisro f rc.rl\ the mass ol'ganisations 
c.f the 1 ibel'ation 1I"I.jVell\ent, he chal'actel'ises the Comrl\unist Pal'ty - the 
pal'ty that' I'epresents the aspirations of a single class, the proletal'iat' 
- as therefore 'not a mass movement', Slovo recognises that in South 
Africa, a largely proletarianised country with a relatively small black 
peasantry and middle class, the working class is the vast majority of the 
popUlation, In what sense then sh'juld the party of the workin,;) c lass not be 
a mass party? It is not because it represents only one class rather than 
the pec.ple as a wt-Iole, since this .:me class cOI\\prises m.:;.st c,f the people as 
a whole; the l'eaS'jn must lie elsewhel'e, 
The key, we think, is to be found in the diss,;)ciation of the social.ist and 
democratic aspects of the struggle; this is vividly expressed in Slovo's 
views on inner-party democracy, He endorses the democratic forms of 
o"ganisation and practices bui 1 t up in the non-rae ial trade unions as 
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'appropriate for workers in economic struggles against their bosses' but in 
principl& rejects their extension into a working class political party, He 
portrays such a pI'oject as 'a paralysing e>::tl'avagance' wl'"lich wCluld lead to 
"jl'ganisational c.:mstipation'. arguin';:j that the trade uni.::>n m'jdel of 
'public elections, complete participation of the membership in all 
decision-making, day-to-day accountability of officials, etc,' cannot and 
should not be applied to the broader political struggle (35), 
In part is this a response to the problems of illegality which demand 
se':I'ecy an.j thel'ef'jl'e a necessary limi tati.:m o:m demo':I'a,:y wi thin the party; 
more fundamentally. however, Slovo argues that a genuine workers' 
leadership has to be in the form of a vanguard party which represents the 
'1'"listc.ric a.pirations' of the w,::orking class but .:h)es not involve the workel's 
therilselves, He rejects mass w.::orkers' parties based 'jn the tl'ade unions, 
like the Labour Party in Britain or the Workers Party in Brazil. as likely 
to 'pursue social democratic rather than revolutionary objectives' (36); 
seemingly n,:.t because of the bureaucrati,: c'jntrc.ls such parties imp.::>se ove\' 
the masses but rather because of their mass democratic character itself, 
F'Jr Slov,:" the identi f ication of the masses wi th national ism finds its 
c.:>untel'p,jint in the identi f icati'jn of S':>C ialisAi with the pal'ty, 
The roots of the dissociation of socialism and den\l:)cracy are perhaps to be 
found in the authoritarian models of socialism identified with stalinist 
parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, In the past the COA,munist 
Party used to make frequent reference to the Soviet Union as an ideal 
socialist state whose defence should be the absolute priority of all 
socialists; this view was reproduced by many South African trotskyists and 
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·jther indepen.jent s.jcialists who bl'oke from the Communist Party itself but 
not from th~ ideas which informed it. Once socialism is dissociated from 
democracy, there are only two possibilities: either before the gates of the 
democratic site of struggle a large and forbidding sign is erected which 
declares: 'all ye who enter here, assemble under the banner of 
nati.jnalism'; 01' alternatively the dem.j.:I'atic site of stl'uggle is abandcmed 
al t.jgethel' in favour the war of class against class, When we exal'l'line the 
history of both the official Communist and trotskyist wings of South 
Afri.:an s'j.:ialism, we find these m.;)des alternating with each othel'. 
For the w.;)rk i ng class in South Af rica to f i,~ht under its own banne!' and by 
its ,jwn meth.jljs f()r democratic rights is an essential part of its fight f,:>r 
socialism. As a political subject, the working class does not stand for 
slj.:ialism I'athel' than democra,:y but fOI' sl;)cialism thr,:>ugh demol:I'acy; what 
this means is the renewal of the democratic content of socialism itself. 
Socialist democracy or democratic socialism is not the same as bourgeois 
dem'jc ra,:y but nei ther is ita related spec ies of animal; it d'jes not 
signi fy the negation of bourgeois dem,jcracy but rathel' its e)<:tension beyon,j 
the limi ts imp.jsed by capitalist exploi tation. The apposite term which Marx 
rightly used to characterise his own view of s,)cialism was that it 
I'epresented the • posi tive 5upercession' of boul'geois democ racy and not its 
'abstract negation'; this remains an impol'tant p,jint of reference (37), 
These days many in the liberation movement speak and write of 'the ,leading 
role of the working class', In addressing the question of what this means 
we have sought to challenge the hegemony of nationalism and in particular 
the arguments of those socialists who serve as the ideological guardians of 
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nati.:>nalism, We have SQught t.;) put s,;)c ial ism back on the map as the 
political form in which .... h:>l'kin.~ class leadership of the dem.:>cratic struggle 
should be pUl'sued if it is to be m.)re than a f Qrmali ty, At the same time we 
have al'gued that the subsumption of soc ial ism to national ism resul ts in 
part fror ... real wea.knesses in the sCII:hlist camp in its relati.:>n to the 
deri":>': ratic tasks of the Sc.uth Afr ican I'evolution, The disso.: iation of 
socialism and democl'acy leads ei ther to the pl'evail ing view that democratic 
questions al'e the pr.)vince of nationalism or to the redu.:ti.:>n of democracy 
t.) the c lass strug.~le for soc ialism, The absent centre of this pol i tical 
dis.:c.urse is tr-,e socialist struggle for democracy or in the language of 
classical mal'xism social democl'acy, 
The question of strategy 
We d.:. n.)t wish to addl'ess in this pl'eface substantive issues concerning the 
stl'ategies ad.Jpted by the liberation m'Jvement, but we do wish to address 
the con.:eptual framework in which these issues are il.jdressed, What we take 
issue with is a tenden.:y we see to legi timise the particular strategies of 
particular parties in the libera.tion I'IKWement as the only rational course 
of action that could have been adopted in the circumstances of the time. 
Party strategies appear to be dictated on the one hand by constraints from 
above, notably the state, and on the other by the prevailing consciousness 
of the Masses frOl'l\ below; the party appears as the rational vanguard of the 
movement, left 'no choice' by circumstance but to adopt the strategies 
which it did adopt. 
In this approa.:h the diversity c.f pc.litical views and the political debates 
over what was t.:> be done ina given si tuation are il'oned c.ut in favour of 
the apparent inevitability and immanent rationality of the decisions which 
were finally reached. We are recon.:iled to the idea that t~,el'e were n.j 
serious al tel'natives and n.:> I'eal choices, since the leadership did what any 
rational leadership would have to do. Conflicting strategies are either 
hidden fl'om hist':>I'y 01' pOI'trayed as irrati.:>nal and out of tune wi th the 
cons.: iousness .:>f the masses, This c.:>nception seems to us to conceal the 
nature of strategic choices as the visible and tangible expression of 
particular parties seek ing to make sense of t~,ei r sl tuatb:>n and a.:t upon 
it; it generates a language of absolutes, of the idealisation of the party 
.:.n the one side and of a·:cusations .:>f betrayal .)n the other, 
This problem is particularly evident in addreSSing the problem of the 
defeats suffered by the liberation movement. The tendency is either to 
\1':>I'mal ise them as having n.:>thing to do with the pol ic ies .::af the leadership 
or to attribute them exclusively to defects of leadership, The 
normalisation .:>f failul'e takes many fOI'fiIS. The l'eality ()f defeat may simply 
be i';Jn.:.red in favour of the celebration of the struggle; the defeats 
suffered by the n",.)vement may be e~<plained thl'ough e)c:ternal factc,rs, state 
repression from above and the defects .:.f the masses from below, on the 
assumption that there was nothing which the party itself could have done 
differently to change the course of the struggle; the reality of defeat may 
be denied, presented instead as merely an apparent defeat disguising a real 
advance; or finally the defeat may be naturalised as a necessary moment in 
the progress of every revolutionary movement toward ultimate goal. We find 
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many e)<:amples 'Jf these interlod:in'~ methods of normalisation in" the 
Ii tel'atul'e. 
For example, we shall see that the suppression of the 1946 african 
mineworkers' strike looked like a failure for the labour movement since the 
minel's l,:,st their demands, thei r unio:.n collapsed and the black tl'ade union 
movement as a whole suffered a terrible defeat. According to the left 
hist,:,rian, Dan O'Meara, h'Jwever, it was only an 'apparent failure' sin':e in 
his words it represented a 'milestone' in South Africa's political 
development. He wrote as follows: 
It profoundly affected the direction and thrust of African 
opposition. Patient constitutional protest by an elite rapidly 
gave way to mass political action ... The strike and the state's 
response illustrated the futility of constitutional protest 
pursued SQ lon,~ by the ANC ... While it was followed by the 
development of the ANC into a mass nationalist movement, the 
purely class organisation and mobilisation of the African 
pI',)letal'id.t, which rea,:hed its peak in 1945-46, began to decline 
as pI'oletarian disc')ntent was ,:hannelled incl'easingly int,:> 
political opposition in the ANC ... The aftermath of the strike 
saw the merging of most elements of African oppostion into a 
class alliance articulating a radical nationalist ideology. (38) 
In this account, the failure of the strike was turned into success by what 
was seen as its poll tical consequen,:e: the c')Iwel'gence of soc ialism and 
nati'Jnal ism under the banner of a radical national ist ideology which 
emel'ged out of it. This account causally links two events which were 
distin,:t in time and place, the failure of the strike and the rec\'uitment 
of workel's to the national ist m,:)vement; its premise seems to be that the 
collapse of class organisation which followed the strike mattered less than 
the strengthening I,f african nationalism which later emiued. 
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When Jc.o Slav,) ,:mlfronte,j the fa,:t that most of the campaigns waged by 
Congress in the 19.50s failed if measured by the yardstick of 'immediate 
achievements', he placed inverted commas around these 'failures' on the 
grounds that failure is inevitable in any revolutionary process: 
'Failure' measured in such narrow terms has been the universal 
experience of every revolutionary movement, Until the moment of 
successful revolutionary take-over, each individual act of 
resistance usually fails and is often crushed, " In this sense 
'failure' is the constant companion of all political endeavour by a 
d.)minated grc.up which is nl)t yet capable of winnin';J power", It is 
,:often thrl)u';Jr-1 the e~,:pel'ience of these sC'-I:a11ed failures that the 
masses begin to understand the need for conquering state p'jwer and 
thus for I'evc,luti,)n, (:3'3) 
Slclvo used a similar metrlolj when wI'iting ab,jut the ANC's turn t,:, armelj 
stl'uggle in the 19605; 1:'Jn,:edin'J that here t,),) the results in theil' 'narr,jw 
immediate sense 1 were a failure, he attl'ibuted it ,:,n the one hand t,:, the 
repressiveness of the state and its imperialist allies and on the other to 
the dec 1 ini ng Iili 1 i tanl:Y clf the masses anlj lal:k IJf supp,:ort from independent 
Afl'ican states, He defende1j, howevel', the bl'oad c':O\ll:eption behind the ANC 
str·ategy which he sa.id could' not be faul te,j' (4(1); what went wr(lng was 
only that I the I)bje,:tive ,:obsta,:les t.;) the implementation Ijf su,:h a plan in 
the 196:3 Soutrl African situaticln were not pl'ope1'ly appreciated ' , Slovo 
con':eded that sel'i'jus errol's wel'e c,)mmi tted by the leadel'ship - , the 
importance of mass work was theoretically appreciated but in practice mass 
wo)l'k was minimal' (41) - but this defect was presented as a stepping stone 
to a higher form of struggle: 'a useful bridge', as he put it, 'between the 
period of non-violent campaigning and the future people's armed struggle', 
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No liberation movement can ensure victory in all its struggles and there is 
truth to the view expressed by Dan Guerin in his history of the French 
Revolution that 'no defeat is fruitless' since it is 'in defeat that 
revc.lutionaries educate themselves and the revoluti.jn comes to a greater 
self-awareness' (42). Yet defeats may also cause terrible damage to the 
liberatic.n cause, whi Ie c.:.nversel y rev.:.lutionary conf iden.:e may be bui I t on 
the foundation of small victories and partial reforms, The experience of 
failure may be a catalyst for radicalism but also for disillusion and 
powerlessness, What seems to us important is to avoid the a priori 
transmutatb:.n of failure into success and diss.)ciation ,)f failuI'e from the 
questi':.n of stl'ategy, If defeats are simply n.jrmal ised after the event and 
the strategies of the leadership absolved of all responsibility, the result 
is flK'I'e I ikel y to be one of sel f-delusion than sel f-awal'eness, 
for those who betrayed the people, it is said, the revolution would have 
su.:.:eeded. We endol'se Engels' .:omment on this way of thinking when wI'iting 
c.f trle defeat of the German revc.lutic.n of 1848. Against those who said that 
it was • Mr This 01' That Ci tizen who "betrayed" trle people', En,~els 
declared: 
Whi.:h reply may be very true or n.)t according to circumstances, 
but under no circumstances does it explain anything - n.jt even 
show how it came to pass tha t the 'peop Ie' a ll'jwed themse I ves to 
be thus betrayed, And what a poor chance stands a political party 
whose enti re sto.:lc:-in-trade consists in the knowledge of t.he 
soli tary fact that Citizen So-and-so is not to be trusted. (43) 
It makes no difference if in place of Citizen So-and-so we substitute this 
or that party, The exposition of the causes of revolutionary convulsions 
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and their suppression in S'juth Afl'ica ,:annot be reduced t'j the rehearsal of 
petty quarl'els and recriminations whil:h mean nothing to those not familiar 
with the details of South African political histol'Y, Engels wrote of those 
wh'j t,lame,j the men',bers of the German Provisional Government for the defeat 
of the revolution: 
No man in I"',is senses wi 11 eve!' believe that eleven men, 1 .... ,)Stly of 
very indifferent capacity either for good or for evil, were able 
in three n',,:,nths t'j ruin a nation of thirty sb: millions, unless 
those thirty six millions saw as little of their way before them 
as the eleven did, (44) 
The real questiljn is not to find the tl'ai t'jr on whom to:l aft i>c: blame but 
rathel' to discover in Engels ' words 'how it came to pass that thirty six 
millions were at once called up,jn t.j decide for themselves which way to go, 
al though pal'tly ';jl',jping in dim twylight, and how then they gljt lost and 
thei r old leaders were f,::or a ml)ment allowed to return t,) thei r leadership' 
(45), In the historiography of the liberation movement in South Africa 
thel'e is n,:, sl"'lortal;je of accusa,tions of betrayal on all sides but they 
explain very little, 
Alongside the dange!' of relating strategy to failure lies that of pre-
Suppl)sinl~ the prljl~ressive nature of every strategic turn, The stl'ategil: 
development of the liberation movement is often undel'st,;:.od as a sequence of 
distinct histol'ica.l phases, each one repl'esenting a higher sta.;Je of 
political consciousness and activity than the last and culminating in the 
ideal formation, In one version we find three strategic periods identified: 
the long constitutional period of petitions and deputations coming to a 
close toward the end of the 19405: the period of mass non-violent struggle 
in the 1950s; and finally the period of armed struggle in the 1960s, In 
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more recent versions the first period of petitions is relegated to the pre-
histOl'y IJf the nati'Jnal libel'atio:)n stl'uggle and a fl::oul'th pel'il:).j is appended 
at the en,j: the integration of mass an,j arme,j strugl;/le said to be 
chal'actel'istic of the contemporary movement (46), 
The tl'ansi tim-. from petitions to mass stl'ul;/l;/le to al'med strug.;/le and 
finally to the unity of armed and mass stl'uggle appears as a l'ational 
progression from pl'otest to challenge, reform to l'evolution: perhaps for 
the party, al th'::ough it may claim t,::o have undel'stood all al,)ng the 
impel'atives ,::of revolution, but certainly fc,r the masses who learnt their 
l'evolutionary lessons from the bittel' fruits of experience, The history of 
tt-.e 1 ibel'ati,:on fiv::ovement is pl'esented in this light as an inexorable process 
of progressive evolution as each phase plays its part in setting the stage 
f'JI' the new aPPl'I::oal:h, In its r .... ost idealised formulations, the histOl'y of 
the libel'ati,::on stl'ul~gle is seen as advancing fl',::om the thesis of mass 
struggle, to the antithesis of armed struggle and finally to the synthesis 
of mass and al'med struggle, We want to arl~ue that the presurnption '::of 
prl:'gress needs to be suspended if we are t,::o assess critil:ally the stl'ategic 
ch'jices ma,je by the parties ,::of the I ibel'ati,::on movement, 
This kind 'jf analysis reflects the rigid separations established by the 
pal'ty between its vari'Jus strate,~ic periods; it I'e-inforces what we have 
termed a 'sequential exclusivism', according to which certain methods are 
reserved for one period and certain other methods for another, ruling out 
the more fluid inter-connections revealed in the struggles of the working 
class (47), Should the 194050 be called an 'age of petitions' not only for, 
the ANC but also for the working class and the other political parties 
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which sought to win influence over the masses? Was the turn to mass 
struggle at the end of the 1940s a turn of the ANC to the masses or a turn 
of the masses to struggle? Were the 1950s a period of non-violent struggle 
for the working class as well as for the political leadership? Was the turn 
.)f the ANC, SACF' and othel' pc.li tical groups to al'll\ed struggle in tt-Ie 1960s 
a tUI'n .)f the w')I'k i ng .: lass t.j arms? T.j answer these questions, we need t.j 
break from a methcllj wt"Ii.:h fuses the strategies ad.)pted by the pol i tical 
leadership with the liberation struggle as a whole, 
The very lan.~uage in which strategies are characterised - accc,rding t.) 
their formal qualities of legality and illegality, non-violence and 
violence - rilakes n.) direct referen.:e t.) the s.:.(ial relations between party 
an.j class whi·:h al'e e~<pressed and ·:.)n.:ealed in these categol'ies, I f we 
attribute all the defects of the strategies ad.:.pted in the 1950s to their 
legal and non-violent character. the solution of illegal armed struggle 
seems naturally to follow as a liberation from these constraints; but 
viewed from the pel'spe.:tive .)f its .:lass c.)ntent, the fOI'mal progression 
f I'(.ril c.)nsti tutional pr.)test tel revoluti.)naI'Y challenge may take .)n a quite 
diffel'ent significance, 
The reificatiol1 of the state 
The questi.)n of stl'ategy is intimately assc,ciated wi th that of the state, 
The neo-classical analysis of the state identifies the ideal capitalist 
state with the free play of market forces and characterises apartheid as a 
vic.lation of this ideal. The roots of apartheid are traced back to factors 
which are quite independent of capital, especially the heritage of racism 
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from the colonial era and the bid for power of the afrikaner nationalists, 
The rational market requirements of capital are seen as fundamentally at 
odds with the status-ridden natUl'e of the apartheid state; however much 
.:api tal might have t.:> c'::lme t'::l tel'I)'IS wi th apal'theid. the under lying 
a,ntagoni sm between the free fI)':Jvement of capi tal and the rac ial 
superstructure of the state appears as a basic contradiction in the 
apartheid system, (48) 
The left odh'::ld.:>~:y which has grown up in opposition to the neo-.:lassical 
model explains the apartheid state in class terms as a form of political 
dC'(liinati.:ln based on the supel'-e>c:ploi tation of blad: labour and the 
in.:.::ll'p'::ll'ati'::ln .:>f white lab.::lur, Thel'e al'e di ffel'ent emphases 011 what ..,..as 
':I'ucial to the f.:.rmation .:of the apal'theid state - the general functions of 
lab'::lur cQntrol, the de·:line of the I'eserves, the gro..,..th of a m.:odel'n 
industrial proletariat, the legacy of colonialism, fears of working class 
mi 1 i tancy - but what holds all these e>c:planati'::lns t.:ogether is that the 
functional requirements of capital are seen as the major determinant of the 
state (4'3), 
We dc. m)t ..,..ish to reheal'se hel'e the e>c:tensi ve debates ..,..hich have taken 
pla.:e between these tW() appl")aches, It seems to us that the left ol'thodoxy 
has trle particular virtue of explaining racism as the pl'odUt:t of the 
alienated forms of so.: ial li fe, I'ather than simply a,:cept it as an 
independent tradition or variable, and of explaining capitalism as a class 
relation of exploitation rather than simply as a rational system of n~rket 
eXChange, What the left orthodoxy forgets, though, is that capital itself 
is not a thing but an expression of a class relation to labour, Just as the 
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capitalist class d"es n.:)t exist in a vacuum but in a defil,ite I'elation to 
I,thel' I:lasses in society, Sl, tOI) the form of tt-,e state is determined by the 
shi f tinl;} I'elations of pr.,ducti"n between the .: lasses and n.:)t by the needs 
and fears of the capitalist class in isolation, If the concept of 
'I'elati"ns of prc"juctil:)n' is to be taken seriously as a detel'minant of the 
political forms of social life, the form of the state should not be 
is.:)latelj fl'.,m the struggles of the w"I'king class, (50) 
While both forms of analysis trace in different ways the effects of the 
apartheid state I,n the fO\'l'l)s of strugl;)le IJf the I ibel'ation movement, they 
both neglect (though in different ways) the effects of class struggles from 
below on the form of the state, What they have in common is that the 
dynamics of state f·,rmation are abstractelj fl'om theil' base in the class 
strug.;Jle, The left ol'th.)do}<:y I'efel's t,) the bla.:k "I,h,rkin,;) class as a vi,:tim 
of state power but n.:.t as an al:tive determinant in the process of state 
formation; an image which reflects the juridic forms of political life in 
south Africa, in so far as they are shaped by the denial of civil and 
p'Jliti.:al rights t,) black people, but one which repr.:.duces the state's own 
illusion of autonomy from the class struggle, It leaves invisible the 
a.:tual effel:ts I,f working class stru';)I;)les on the state, with the possible 
excepti
'
:)1i of those of wM te workers, (51) 
There are marxist accounts of apartheid which seek to break from economic 
determinism by making reference to the struggles of the working cla'5s, For 
example, in his very interesting study of the rise of afrikaner nationaliSM 
Dan O'Meara has argued that 'the HNP came to power as a result of a 
protracted and complex political crisis in which the fierce class struggles 
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of the 1940s rendel'ed the state unable to secure the requisite condi tions 
of accumulation for all capitals '(52); in his view the crucial determinant 
'Jf this political ,:risi5 lay in the gl"Jwing numbel's, organisation and 
militancy of black proletariat, Similarly, Saul and Gelb wrote of 'the 
rapid escalation of Black resistance to the exploitative racial capitalist 
system' and the 'dramatic escalation of trade union organisation and 
working class militancy' in the 1940s which resulted in the 'South African 
I'uling .:il'des", (being) shaken to the core' (,53), O'Meal'a, Saul and Gelb 
agree that the spel: if ie functi,)n of apal'theid was t,) suppl'ess these class 
struggles and restore the conditions of capital accumulation; as O'Meara 
put it: 
The HNP victory marked a decisive shift in the balance of forces 
in the S'Juth Af r i,:an state, Thoul;Jh ,)f ten depic telj as 1 anti-
I:apitalist', paradlJxically it was the new ruling party, " which 
was to secure the conditions of rapid accumulation for all 
capitals, " Apartheid secured the interest of the entire 
capi talist class", pl'imari ly thr'Jugh savage repl'ession IJf wlJrking 
class organisatilJns", By the early 1960s draconian lel~islation 
seemed t,j have broken the bad: ':Jf mass resistance, (54) 
The I'ise of apartheid appears as an ideal adaptation to the needs 'Jf 
capital faced by the spectre of the black proletariat, 
These accounts put the struggles of workers at the centre of their picture 
but leave unl'esolved the central democrati,: question: if thel'e was su,:h a 
powerful escalation of working class militancy in the 1940s, why was it 
unable to carve out a more dem,)cratic future for South Africa? why 'could it 
not compel the ruling classes to recognise the labour movement and come to 
terms with its demands? why did it fail to push the rulers of South Africa 
at least into some form of accomodation, as the liberal wing of the South 
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Af r iean bourgec/isie favoured, rathel' tt"lan see the state captured by its 
ffiQl'tal f.)es? why as it nc.t able to ovel'thl'ow segl'e';;jationism and its mOI'e 
extl'eme afrikaner nationalist variants? To answer these questions, should 
we not reverse the conventional wisdom: rathel' than see the rise of 
apartt-teid as a respc.II1se t.:a w()l'king class mi I i tancy and the (I\eans of its 
suppressi 1jl1, was it m)t the defeat Ijf the wljl'king class m,)vement in the 
1940s wrtieh made p,jssible the rise of apartheid? 
The neo-classical theorists have emphasised what they see as the necessity 
of state refol'm which the development of capitalism brings in its wake, as 
the antal;;jQnisms between apartheid and .:api tal .~row ever shal'per. They have 
alsl) identified the agents of refol'rl\ in the shape of b.)th capitalists and 
workers who are seen as having a common interest in winning reform of 
apal'theid whatevel' other cljnf I il:ts divide them. The pol i tical strategy they 
al'e generally associated with is liberal democratic: to cement an alliance 
between Pl'clI~I'essi ve capi tal, ')l'ganised labour and the liberal politic ians 
around a consensual pl'ogramme of I'eform from above and self-restraint from 
below. (55) 
In I'esponse tCI the profound weaknesses of South African reformism, the view 
has developed on the left that any apparently libel'al refol'(I\s intl'.)duced by 
the state are in reality but new means of ideological subterfuge, control 
over black wOI'kers, co-optation of a black el i te or some other way of 
satisfying the needs of capi tal. The impossibi Ii ty of genuinely liberal or 
democratic reform under apartheid is so frequent a refrain of this 
discourse that the very idea of I reform 1 in the context of the apartheid 
state is bound by inverted commas, It may be ack\1l:)wledged that certain 
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'reforms' introduced by the state have changed the terrain of struggle, so 
that resistance was not only directed against overt oppression but also 
widened tlJ oppose C,)-optati'Jn; it may be ackn'Jwled,~ed tOIJ that at cel'tain 
times the state was forced to introduce 'reforms ' in order to limit the 
effects and derail the course of popular struggles, Ruled out within this 
frame, however, is the possibility that real democratic changes have ever 
been l::al' I:ould ever be fOI'I:ed upon the apal'theid state from bel,jw, 
From the premise that apartheid cannot be reformed out of existence, the 
I:onl: lusil::an is dl'awn that nl) refol'm 1:ljn,:eded by the apartheid state is ever 
a real reform, Bourgeois liberalism has tended to appear as little more 
than a Ijecei t, fulf i 11 ing the functions of the wolf all the more 
dan',;jer,::ausly tl::ar the sheep's clothings it wears (56), The past struggles clf 
the I ibeNAtion o',,)vement tel win limi ted state reforms appear ei ther as a 
limitation of the leadership which it learnt to surpass in the course of 
its clwn l'evoluti'Jnal'y development IJr as a necessal'y means IJt e,jucating the 
masses out of their reformist illusions; in their place came the strategy 
of non-c'Jllab'jration, nlJn-partic ipati,)n and b,jyc'Jtt of the state, 
To rule IJut the the':I\'etical p'Jssibility that the w,)rking class clJuld force 
the apartheid state tlJ make democratic concessltJns is no less I::>f a do,~mat 
than the neo-classical dream of the inevitability of reform, Both are 
rooted in the reifieation of the state as an independent power divorced 
from the class struggle, Reform is the state's response to the str~~gles of 
the w,jrking class within the material limits of its own ca.pa.cities; to wait 
for a state reform which does not seek to entrap the very forces to which 
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concessions are made is to wait for ever, but this does not nullify the 
possibility of reform, 
In contrast to liberal reformism on the one hand and the left repudiation 
of all reform on the other, we should see the struggle for definite state 
reform as an integral element of the struggle for the organisation of a 
':c'nscious w'::OI'kin';:j .:lass (57), The point is absolutely central as far as the 
cr-eati,:,n of a working class ol'ientation in the liberati.jn m.:.vement is 
con.:el'ned, We sh'Juld break fl'om the iojea that winnin,;;! refol'rfls simply 
corrupts those workers who benefit from them or that failure to win reforms 
is simply a catalyst for radicalism; we should remember that reforms may 
significantly improve the quality of life of workers as well as their 
capacity for organisation and struggle; we should ask as Marx did whether 
the struggles of the working class exist for the sake of the revolution or 
the revolution fOI' the sake cd tt-.e w'JI'k in • .;J class, 
The equation of reform and reformism is the product of a view of the state 
which insulates it from the impact of class struggle and of a view of the 
liberation movement which insulates it from any measure of efficacy in 
tel'ms of its impact on the state .jl' impr.)vement of the lives of the people 
(until, that is, the final m'Jment 'Jf liberation), Sometimes the vel'y 
savagery of state repression appears as an index ,::>f the effe,:tiveness of 
the liberation struggle, At issue here is not the advocacy of reform rather 
than revolution and certainly not the endorsement of state reforms: it is 
rather a question of how the foundations of working class power are built, 
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""hen we write of s':II:ial demclI:ra.:y as the absent centre of S.::>uth African 
liberation politics, it is above all to re-construct the relation between 
the c.rganisatb:.n .::>f a conscious w.::>I'kin';j class and the dem.xratic I'efol'r.) of 
the state as the twin aspe.:ts clf what one mar}<:ist wl'i ter has aptly called 
• the epoch of the proletarian Reformation' (58), 
CHAPTER 2 
Indus iC;L and B 1 ae k L.=.,tnjU l' 
I nt rodLJc t i Ijn 
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As S'juth Afl'iea t'=:iilerged ':'Ut clf the Depl'ession in trle n'lid-19:~:Os, a ,:t.Jzen 
virtually uninterrupted years of industrial growth transformed South 
African capitalism and with it the black section of the working class, 
Black people were drawn into industrial production as wage workers and 
cljnl:el1tl'ated in the t.:,wns as urban l'esidents, The (,:andi tions of lab,jur 
which they found in secondary industry were hard but more favourable to 
work ing I: lass ol'ganisatil:an than the servi Ie and abject I: l:andi tions suffered 
by the o;Jl'eat majl:/I'ity ,:at blad: pelJple wh,:a worked in al;;Jricultul'e. IjIJmesti,: 
labour. mining and the informal sector of the urban economy, Compared to 
most black people, industrial workers were both materially and juridically 
better Ijf t: they had more ril;;Jhts; they earned higher wages; they were more 
e::<:p,jse,j t.;. the p'jl i ti,:al . ideas clf trade unionism, S'J': ial ism and national ism 
ass'J': iated wi th modern labour movements; they were in a better position to 
share these ideas socially and put them into practice in the form ~f 
cc,llective action, It was this group which provided the main social base 
for the development 'Jf the black labour m'Jvement in the latter half of the 
1930s and in the ,:,jurse of the Second Wor ld War, On thei I' own they were a 
relatively small group .;.f workers, but they wel'e able to link up wi th the 
fierce rebell iousness IJf black miners and other migrant labourers, feed 
intlJ the urban clJmmuni ty movements and to a lesser extent the protests of 
rural africans, and even draw support from some sections of the white 
work ing class, 
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The spec ial pole 'If the black industrial w'lrk ing c lass was recognised at 
the time by conten~orary trade union organisers. A leading figure in the 
registered trade union movement, Solly Sachs, put the matter thus: 
There is far more competition for jobs in industry. African 
factory workers, although subjected to many restrictions, can 
change their jobs ... more freely than in mining or agriculture. 
A breach of ,:ontract is a ,:riminal offence for Africans even in 
industry, but contracts of service can be terminated by a week's 
or lIl'lnth's notice, IIIhel'eas in the mines these contracts are 
binding for about a year and on the farms for a minimum of six 
months", African workers in industry have possibilities of 
improving their skill and efficiency and obtaining higher wages. 
The majority do not live in compounds and when they finish their 
day's work they are free from the control of their employers, 
Above all, many African workers have been able to organise 
themselves, in spite of tremendous obstacles, into trade unions 
and to fight for better ,:ondi tions, (1) 
The marxist historiography of South Africa has also stres.ad the new 
iMpetus which the growth of the industrial labour force in the 1940s gave 
to the democratic movement as a whole, Martin Legassick, for instance, has 
cited in this context the relevance of Marx's famous observation in the 
Communist M.nif •• to that with the developMent of industry 'the proletariat 
not only increases in number: it becOINII concentrated in greater masses. 
its strength grows and it feel. that strength MOre' (2), This new class 
force on the South African soctal landscape appeared as a powerful motor of 
deMocratic change, Its struggles did not cul.inate, however, tn the trtuaph 
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.:.t demo.:racy nor even the lIIinning of liberal reforms. but rather in defeat 
at the hands .jf reacti.jn IIIrapped in the .:olours .:>f af\'ikaner nationalisM. 
~hat happened to the grollling forces of the industrial lIIorking class IIIhich 
led to this terrible outcome? The prevailing explanation on the left runs 
alan.;! the follollling lines. Starting in 1934. rapid ec.jnomic grolllth, 
highli,;!hte.j by the particularly \'apid development of secondary industry. 
led t,:. a vast and irreversible grolllth of the urban and industrial black 
pr,jletariat. This p\,.jvided the material f.jundation f.jr the mush\,.joming .jf 
trade union organisation and the dramatic escalation of black militancy 
lIIhich occurred in this 1940s. In open defiance of constituted lalll and 
.jrde\'. there lIIas an upsurge of black resistance against the rae ial 
capitalist system. The militancy of the african proletariat stimulated a 
steady grolllth of political opposition by t~~ black middle classes during 
the lIIar. marked especially by the revival of the ANC. the formation of the 
ANC youth League and the lII~ging of joint campaigns by the ANC and the 
Communist Party. The violent suppression of the 1946 African minelllorkers 
strike acte~ as a further catalyst to the radicalisation of black political 
opposition. 
According to this analysis the state lIIas thrown into a profound crisis by 
these developments. Torn between its liberal and ultra-segregationist 
wings, it vacillated over how to respond and deep divisions entered its 
ranks. The rising class struggles led to a progressive paralysis of state 
policy after the war and the increasing collapse of its political control 
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and i,jeolc'gical he,~emo:my. As a result of wOl'kin'~ ,:lass militancy, 
culminating in the miners' strike of 1946, South African ruling circles 
were shaken t.:) the core. The .:risis of the state was l'esolved through the 
rise c.f afrikaner nationalism which despite its populist rhetoric 
functi,::oned on behal f of capi tal to suppress the threat posed by the w,:)rk ing 
class rIi.:)vement. The HNP victory was able to secure the condi tion. of 
.:api tal a,:cumulati.::>n and the intel'ests of the entire capitalist class 
primarily through savage repression of working class organisations, which 
finally seemed t.;, break the ba.:k .::>f p')pular l'esistan.:e in tt-.e eal'ly 19E.c)s. 
The language of this summary account is taken directly from two major 
attempts to theorise the class struggles of this period: those of Dan 
O'Meara and Saul and Gelb (3), It is a language of superlatives: vast and 
irreversible ,~rowth ,)f the urban black proletariat, mushr,:)oming of trade 
union .::organisation, dramati.: escalation of work ing class mi 1 i tancy, populal' 
resistan,:e against racial capitalist exploitation, pN)found ,:risis of the 
state, loss of political contl'ol and ideological hegemony, the (api talist 
resolution of the crisis through the rise of apartheid and the repression 
of black opposition, 
Within its own terms, however, this analysis poses a question which it does 
not resolve and only barely addresses, If the numbers, organisation and 
militancy of black workers were growing apace in the 19405, why could they 
not carve out a more democratic future for South Africa? why could they not 
compel the ruling classes to recognise their Movement and COMe to terms 
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~ith their demands? ~hy did they fail to push the rulers of South Africa at 
least into some form of ac.:omodation, as the 1 iberal ~ing of the 
bourgeoisie favoured, or at most out of political po~er altogether? Was it 
inevitable that their heroic resistance should have ended in defeat or that 
the crisis of the state should have been resolved in the interests of 
capital and at the expense of the mass of the ~orking class? To ans~er this 
question, ~e shall have to revie~ the major premises of the conventional 
left ~isdom. 
First, ~e should not exaggerate the growth of the urban and industrial 
black proletariat in the 19405. It developed rapidly but only from a very 
SMall base. The latter half of the 19305 and the 19405 represented the 
beginning of the era of modern industry in South Africa and the beginning 
of the making of the modern industrial working class. The black industrial 
working class was in its infancy. It did not step onto ~ stage of South 
African history, as it wer.e, ready matured. The importance of this point is 
that what we call the 'social weight' of the black working class, that is, 
its power to effect historic change in society, was far more liMited in the 
19405 than is suggested in a literature which emphasise. its vast and 
irreversible growth. This was not a question in the first instance of the 
political consciousness of the black working class but rather of its social 
being, 
Second, trada union organisation grew rapidly aMOng black worker. in this 
period but fro. a MiniMl bau, Earli.r attapt. at black trade union 
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organisation had been all but wiped out in the Depression years. Major 
weaknesses and divisions were visible in the trade union movement as early 
as 1943-44 and it suffered decisive reversals in the miners' and 
steelworkers' strikes of 1946. There was a growth of industrial action 
during the war but most strikes were economic rather than political in 
character, for higher wages rather than against the 'racial capitalist' 
system. The major wave of industrial strikes by urban black workers peaked 
by 1943 and the strikes of migrant workers in mining, power and steel, 
generally followed rather than integrated with those of urban workers. By 
the end of 1946, two years before the rise of the HNP. trade union 
organisation and industrial action virtually ground to a halt. Although 
there were some militant unions in the 1940s. MOst took a cautious attitude 
toward industrial action particularly between the years 1941 and 1945. 
Their policy was as far as possible to avoid all forms of illegal action. 
with the result that many of the strikes which black workers undertook did 
not have the support of the unions or only had reluctant support. SoMe were 
actively opposed by the unions. 
Third. black politics were radicalised in the 1940s but the political 
leadership of the black movement also took a cautious attitude toward 
worker Militancy, Its support for the war effort, its desire not to disrupt 
war production, its search for an alliance with the liberal middle classes 
and its belief that self-restraint frOM below would be rewarded with 
conc .. sions frOM above were aMOng the factors which distanced the political 
leadership from industrial action and other for .. of working cla •• protest. 
After the war, •• the labour .av..ent declined, this political leadership 
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fragmented and ~as rendered increasingly vulnerable. A significant left 
opp')5i ti.)n .:ame into being in 1943-44, with the formation of the ANC Youth 
League, the Non-European Unity Movement and a trotskyist-led left 
oPPosition in the trade unions. They shared in common a rejection of the 
liberal-democratic paradigm within ~hich the leadership of the black 
movement operated, characterising its moderate constitutionalism as 5elf-
humbling and destined to failure. Apart from this common negative starting 
point, ho~ever, the left opposition ~as deeply fragmented from the start, 
offering conflicting diagnoses of the crisis of political leadership and 
conflicting remedies for the future. Only a small section of the left 
.opposition looked to the re-construction of the black labour movement, 
~hile the majority looked rather to the formation in its place of a new 
social movement under the banner of one or other form of black nationalism. 
Lastly, ~hile the ruling class ~as divided between its liberal and 
afrikaner nationalist ~ings, it acted decisively in one respect: to 
suppress ~orker militancy and to contain worker organisation within 
narro~ly defined limits of legality. In this regard they were brutally 
effective, securing decisive successes in 1946 over the black labour 
movement. The iaage of an escalating threat posed by black workers to 
capital omits the savage defeats they suffered prior to the emergence of 
apartheid and the disintegration of the labour MOvement which followed 
them. It was not in the first place because of apartheid that the 
resistance of black workers was defeated: rather it was because of the 
defeat of their resistance that apartheid was able to resolve the crisis of 
segregationi .. in its own racist and dictatorial fashion, 
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Black trade unionism 
We can see this process at work most vividly in the trajectory of the black 
unions, In the mid-1930s trade unionism was not new f.:>r black industrial 
workers but it had to be re-constructed almost from scratch, In the latter 
half of the 1920s a number of small industrial unions were organised in 
areas like laundry, baking, clothing and municipal work mainly at the 
ini tiative .:>f Communist Party activists like T W Thibedi and Bennie 
Weinbren, In 1928 most of these unions were combined by the Communist Party 
into the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions, In 1928 and 1929 a number 
of new unions (including Dairy Workers, Motor Drivers, Food and Drink 
Workers, Cotton and Rope Workers, Soap and Chemical Workers) joined the 
Federation, which at its peak organised some ten to fifteen thoUsand black 
workers, These unions organised a number of successful strikes between 1927 
and 1929 priMarily on issues of victimisation and employers' evasion of 
Wage Determinations. (4) 
After 1929, however, SAFNETU rapidly diSintegrated. Its young organisation 
was beaten by the mix of economic recession and severe political 
repression, As an affiliate of the Red International of Labour Unions (the 
Prof intern), SAFNETU's survival was not helped by the so-called 'Native 
Republic' policy adopted by the ComMUnist Party of South Africa in the so-
called Third Period of the CoMintern. The affect of this policy was first 
to close the gates to white workers, second to iMPOSe adventurist tactics 
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on the trade union leadership (with recurring calls for militancy and 
general strikes at a time when black workers were weak), and most 
importantly the purging from the CPSA of most of its serious trade 
unionists in what one member aptly called 'an orgy of self-destruction' 
(5). Thibedi, Weinbren, Solly Sachs and Gana Makabeni, the secretary of the 
Native Clothing W,)rkel's Union, were among those expelled. Only two of the 
Federation's uni·)ns survived at all, having broken wi th the Party. They 
were the Native Laundry Workers and the Native Clothing Workers, both of 
which were to play important roles in the revival of black unionism in the 
latter hal f .)f the 19305. 
There were other forms of black trade unionism in the 1920s. After the 
First World War two separate unions were established to organise black 
workers: the Industrial Workers of Africa (IWA), which played a role in the 
organisation of municipal and mining workers but soon collapsed (not least 
because it was infested with government spies) (6), and the Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union which started its life organising dockers (7), In 
the latter half of the 19205 the ICU went on to become the emblem of a 
potent mass movement of rural labourers and was said to number between 
100,000 and 150,000 members at its peak, In 1930 it too rapidly 
disintegrated into demoralised and weak factions. The defeat of both the 
african mineworkers' strike in 1920 and then the white minaworkers' strike 
in 1922 dealt a very heavy blow to working class organisation on the mines, 
as did the successful incorporation of white mine labour in the years that 
followed (8), An attempt was made by Thibedi to .stablish a black 
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minew'Jrkers' union at the end of the 1920s but li ttle is known about what 
became of it. 
The key point is this. Black workers developed some experience of trade 
unionism in the 1920s but prior to the mid-1930s all attempts to establish 
a stable form of trade union organisation among black workers had failed. 
This is the context in which we should see the rise of the black labour 
movement in the latter half of the 1930s and then during the war years of 
the 1940s. In 19:35/36 major initiatives to organise black unions were taken 
by political activists entering the world of black labour, as it were, from 
without. Trotskyist militants and their sympathisers, men like Max Gordon. 
Dan Koza and D. Gosani, in receipt of material and moral support from 
progressive liberals in the Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), were the 
first to take the intiative on the Rand. They re-vitalised the Laundry 
Workers Union, one of the two black unions to survive the Depression, and 
formed a number of new unions, notably among commercial and distributive. 
baking, printing, dairy and chemical workers. By 1939 they were reported to 
have organised seven unions with a combined membership of 15.700, and 
formed the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions with Gordon as 
secretary. Before its dissolution in 1940, the Joint Committee was reported 
to have built up an organisation of some 25.000 workers in 21 unions on the 
Rand. constituting nearly 30S of the african industrial labour force and 
90S of all organised african workers on the Rand (9), After the internment 
of Max Gordon for anti-war activities in May 1940 and his atteMpt frOM gaol 
to have Lynn Saffery. the liberal secretary of the SAIRR, appointed as 
General Secretary of ~ Joint COMmittee, african impatience with what was 
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seen as white supervision led to the splitting of the Joint Committee and 
to Dan Koza's taking over control of the most powerful of its progeny, the 
African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union (ACDWU), 
A smaller body of african trade unions under the title of the Co-ordinating 
Committee was grouped under the leadership of the former Communist, Gana 
Makabeni, and recruited a membership estimated at somewhere between 2672 
and 4000 members, Makabeni revived the second of the two unions that 
survived the depression, the Native Clothing Workers Union, receiving 
support from a progressive registered union, the Garment Workers, which was 
organised by another ex-Communist, Solly Sachs (10), Although Makabeni like 
Sachs had been expelled frOia the CPSA at the turn of the decade, he 
received support in the Communist Party press, Some Communist Party 
members, like Ray Alexander (Simons), were active in the forMation of trade 
unions among coloured and african workers in the Cape, especially through 
the formation in 1936 of the Non-European Railway and Harbour Workers 
Union, but Communists do not appear to have played a direct role in the 
trade union organisation of black workers in the industrial and Mining 
heartlands of the Rand before the war, 
In the course of the war, the black trade union IIOv .... nt expanded, as did 
eo..unist Party involvement in trade unions, In 1941 a trade union cantre 
was built in the Transvaal through the for_tion of the Council of Non-
European Trade Unions (CNETU) , By 1945 it ls .. tl_ted 'that around 401 of 
africans .-ployed in c~rce and priva~ industry were unionised, as CNETU 
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claimed a national membership of 158,000 in 119 unions (11). In 1941 the 
African Mineworkers Union (AMWU) was formed and claimed a membership of 
25,000 by 1944. In addition, there were at least 11 registered unions in 
the fl'ades and Labour Council which organised african workers and many 
organised indian and coloured workers (12). In short there was an 
impressive record of growth within the black trade union movement. 
Between 1942 and 1945 there was also a substantial number of strikes 
recorded among industrial and commercial workers: in the laundry, steel, 
dairy, coal, milling, timber, distributive and commercial, power, municipal 
and other sectors of emploYMent. The figures below offer a rough and ready 
guide to the aggregate picture (13): 
Year No.of strikes No.of whites NO,of blacks Man days lost 
(000) (000) (000) 
1940 24 1.2 0, 7 6,5 
1941 35 0,7 4.8 23,2 
1942 58 1.3 12.8 49.5 
1943 52 1.8 7.4 47,4 
1944 52 0.2 12.0 62. 7 
1945 63 1.5 14.7 91. 1 
A larga strike wave of industrial workers took place between Septa.ber 1942 
and Fabruary 1943, involving at least 8000 african workers in aany 
Witwatersrand industries and 4000 asian worker. in Natal (14), After a lull 
during the r .. t of 19A3, strike action again gathered lIOItentt.., deriving 
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this time mainly from migrant workers in the power stations and mines, In 
the latter years of the war these workers repeatedly revolted against 
threatening starvation and their slave-like existence, the climax coming in 
August 1946 with a strike of over 70,000 African mineworkers and 6000 iron 
and steel workers (15), Most of these strike were over wages but many other 
work-related issues were taken up: trade union recognition, victimisation, 
accidents, assaults, poor and inadequate food and the contract labour 
system, 
In the overcrowded and impoverished townships africans also fought 
community-based battles over a range of social issues, There was the riot 
against police raids in Vereeniging in 1937, when black residents fought 
back against the persistent brutality meted out to them by the police in 
their search for pass offenders and illicit liquor producers, There were 
bus boycotts against rising fares, notably in Alexandra where in 1942, 1943 
and 1944 black workers walked in thousands the long journey from the 
township to work and back again rather than pay an additional penny on the 
fares (16), There were squatter MOvements against the housing shortages, 
notably in Orlando between 1944 and 1946 when the Sofasonke movement ('we 
shall die') under the leadership of the 'shanty chief' "Panza took over 
land and built thair own shanty towns and squatter CaMps, Mpanza became 
known as 'the slicer' for his ability to slice off more land for the 
~el.s. (17), 
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There were political strikes in the urban communities with at least three 
recorded in 1944. In Heidelberg, there was a protest demonstration 
organised by women, sparked by the arrest of an activist in the local Anti-
Pass Committee. None of the people in the location went to work, as they 
e~pressed their grievances against their lack of representation on local 
authorities and the 'permit system' (they were a form of influ~ control in 
which people lodging in other people's houses were required to have a 
lodger's permit). Later there was a second strike involving all four 
thousand residents, apparently related to the conviction of 31 black women, 
At Elsberg 200 women went on strike in protest against the authority's 
refusal to allow men to live with their wives, In Brakpan, a community-wide 
strike was triggered by the victimisation of David Bopape, a leading figure 
in the Anti-Pass Campaign, The issues raised included the victimisation of 
political activists, the separation of families, housing shortages, 
inadequate public transport and lack of representation on local authorities 
(18), We see here between the years 1936 and 1946 an apparent flowering of 
trade union organisation, industrial militancy and community activisM, The 
movement was never large by contemporary standards, but the question 
remains as to what happened to it after 1946, That year was to prove a 
decisive turning point, 
In 1946 the strike of 60-70,000 african mineworkers was beaten and More 
iMPOrtantly the union which had formally organised it, the African 
Mineworkers' Union, was cru.hed, By 1950 the union only had 700 paid up 
MeMbers, In the .... year the strike of 6000 iron and steel workers was 
also beaten and heralded the disintegration of the union fro. a peak of 
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35,000 during the ~ar to 98 members in 1948 (19), CNETU ~as unable to 
provide substantial support either to the mine~orkers or the steel~orkers, 
It ~as itself internally divided and organisationally ~eak, having suffered 
a major major division in 1944-5 ~ith the formation of the militant 
Progressive Trade Union Group as a left opposition ~ithin it. ranks under 
the leadership of Dan Koza (20), In 1947 it suffered a second split when 22 
affiliates, some linked to Gana Makabeni and others to Dan Koza, 
disaffiliated from CNETU citing disillusionment ~ith its Communist Party 
leadership, The number of black ~orkers organised into trade unions 
declined sharply after 1946, By 1950 there ~ere 52 black unions 
representing only 34,500 ~orkers, to ~hich can be added 3700 black members 
of mixed unions: less than a quarter of the 1945 figures (21), After 1946 
CNETU took no major initiatives, Looking back in 1951, the Botha Commission 
into industrial legislation commented on the 'severe setback' suffered by 
the black trade union movement after the ~ar, indicating that 66 trade 
unions had become defunct since that time (22), Black strike action fell 
sharply after 1946, dropping from a high of over 76,000 strikers in 1946 to 
little over 2000 in 1947 and under 1500 in 1948, 
The historical evidence suggests that profound probleMs afflicted the black 
trade unions prior to the defeats of 1946, The 1946 strike figures seam to 
have bean comprised entirely of the 70,000 miners and 6000 iron and steel 
workers who went on strike that year, so that apart frOM these two cases 
strike action appears already to have ground to a halt, The miners' strike 
of 1946 represented the last gasp rather than the high point of the war-
ti .. strike wave, An editorial 1n ~volutionlry COMMUnist the theoretical 
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journal of the trotskyist Workers International League (WIL), commented in 
August of 1945 that the wartime development of black trade unioni~m 
attracted 100,000 workers but that: 
It was a war product - quickly made and of inferior standard. The 
movement faced all the weaknesses of an economic struggle that 
could find no real economic improvements (despite relative wagQ 
increases). Its hands were tied by lack of status, unimaginative 
leadership and governmental oppression. Only those unions which 
displayed vigour in their struggle ... or those that live on the 
traditions of past exploits, have maintained their membership. On 
the other hand, the splits and collapse of nearly half these 
unions - 17 of the Rand it~elf - during the last ~ix months has 
been catastrophic (23). 
This disparaging comment needs to be treated with caution, since it was 
part of an internal polemic within the trotskyist movement articulated by a 
faction which wished to withdraw from trade union work. Its comment, 
however, about the weakness of the unions prior to 1946 was confirmed by 
other observers. In March 1945, for instance, it was reported to the 
Witwatersrand Local Committee of the Trades and Labour Council that Ithe 
position of African unions was comparatively serious in that there was a 
sharp decline in their organisational strength I (24), Whethar the turning 
of the tide of black trade unionism is dated in 1946 or earlier. the 
historical evidence is clear about one thing, Far from apartheid bringing 
about the defeat of the black labour MOvement, it was the defeat of the 
black labour MOvement which preceeded the rise of apartheid, The question 
we turn to is how and why this happened? 
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The social lAlBight of the black working class 
To answer this question we should look to two constraining factors: the 
social forces at the disposal of the labour movement and the nature of the 
ruling class response, We shall start with the question of forces from 
below, Our main argument is that the social weight of the black working 
class was far less developed in the 19405 than is usually represented in 
the literature and that the inability of the black working class to win 
democratic change in this period derived in the first instance from its 
lack of social weight, The concept of the 'social weight' of the working 
class is crucial to understanding what it could or could not achieve in a 
given period, but it is too often subsumed in the literature to the study 
of class consciousness, 
statistics on the growth of the black working class in the 1940. are 
i~ressive, but they give a aisleading picture if isolated from their low 
starting point, Thus between 1933 and 1946 the figures reveal rapid 
industrialisation, Between 1933 and 1939 the national income of South 
Africa rose by 671 and the contribution of secondary industry rose by 1181, 
In 'the war year. between 1939 and 1946 national incOIN rose by 781 and the 
contribution of IUnufacture by over 1001, Taking the period 1933 to 1946 as 
a whole, national incoma rosa almost 2001 and the contribution of secondary 
industry by 3381, The valu. of industrial output shot up fro. £95 Million 
in 1933-34 to £450 Million in 1946-47 and by 1946 industry had ca.fortably 
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overtaken mining and agri,:ul ture as the biggest sector in money terms in 
the South African economy (25). 
The key to industrial growth lay in the heavy metal and engineering 
industry. It was transformed frOM a servicing adjunct to the mines and a 
Minor role even in the small world of manufacture into the driving force of 
industrial expansion. By 1937 one third of all South African steel 
conSUMption was locally produced. The money value of South African Metal 
and engineering products grew from £9 Million in 1934 to £22.2 million in 
1939 and then to £53.8 million in 1945-46. The share of the metal industry 
in Manufacturing output as a whole rose from 19.5% in 1933-34 to over 28' 
in 1946-47 (26). The sectoral shift from light to heavy industry was 
illustrated by the declining share of the food. drink and tobacco industry 
from over 291 of manufacturing output in 1934 to under 201 in 1946-47. By 
the eve of World War 2 the Rand. where most heavy industry was 
concentrated, had achieved an unprecedented national significance with over 
401 of the nation's industrial activity. These developments have led the 
economic historian, Bill Freund. to declare that South Africa had found its 
Ruhr (27), 
AI industry developed in the 1930s and '406, 10 too did the industrial wing 
of the black working class, The total industrial workforce expandad frOM 
aboUt 132,000 in 1932 to 283,000 in 1939 and 422,000 in 1946. The african 
industrial work fore. almost tripled fro. about 85,000 in 1~ to over 
250,000 in 1946, Black worker. beea .. an incr.asingly iMPOrtant part of the 
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industrial labour force as a whole. The proportion of blacks to whites in 
the manuf a,: tur i ng sec to r inc reased from 41 ~ in 1935 to 4 7~ in 1940 and 52~ 
in 1945, the crossing of what Freund has termed an hist'Jric barrier (28). 
The proportion of the total black labour force in manufacturing went 
steadily up: in 1935 57~ were in agriculture, 33~ in mining and 10~ in 
manufacture; by 1945 these percentages stood at 47~ in agriculture, 31~ in 
mining and 17~ in manufacturing (29). Overall employment in the basic metal 
industries went up from about 11.900 workers in 1933 to 33,878 in 1939 and 
then to 61,834 in 1946. By 1944 65,000 black workers were employed in the 
metal and engineering industry, an increase of over 50~ in relation to the 
pre-war total. 
Alongside the growth of modern industry came the growth of towns, According 
to the Native Laws Commission of 1948, the number of urbanised white people 
went up from 1,310,000 in 1936 to 1,720,000 in 1946 or from 65~ to 731 of 
the total white popUlation, The number of urbanised black people went up 
from 1,141,642 in 1936 to 1,794,212 in 1946 or from 17X to 23X of the total 
black population (30), Between 1935 and 1946 the number of urban black 
women, an important marker of permanent urbanisation, almost doubled frOM 
350,000 to 650,000 (31), 
The countryside too was Marked by great changes as agriculture was 
capitalised and the majority of black people on the land were 
proletarianised, a fact which distinguished the class structur. of South 
Africa frOil the pHsant ecol1Olliu of African colonies to the north. The 
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independent african peasantry was badly hit by the collapse of agricultural 
prices during the Depression and then by the mechanisation of farming 
production during the war. On so-called 'white land' or land owned by 
whites and worked by blacks, the 1930s and 1940s saw a marked 
capitalisation of agriculture and corresponding decline of independent 
african production. By the end of the 1940s 87~ of farming land was taken 
up by large commercial farms of over 1000 morgen each. The number of 
tractors used in agriculture went up from around 6000 in 1937 to 48,000 in 
1950, and capital invested in agricultural machinery rose from £30 million 
in 1939 to £150 million in 1952. In the most advanced farming areas in the 
Cape, independent black farming was becoming virtually extinct, though in 
the more backward areas it survived in significant numbers. (32) 
Numerous government commissions pointed to the rapid decline of 
agricultural production in the reserves and the corresponding dependency of 
reservists on migrant labour. As early as 1932, the Native Economic 
commission commented that 'throughout the reserves •.• the carrying capacity 
of the soil for both huMan beings and animals is definitely on the 
doWngrade' and warned that unless remedial measures were taken 'the 
creation of desert conditions' would ensue (33). The 1938 Report of the 
Native Affairs Commission noted that the reserves were generally 
'congested, denuded, eroded and ••• in a deplorable condition' (34). The 
Report of the Social and Economic Planning Council of 1946 COMMented on 
'the incapaCity of the Native Reserves to provide even the Mini.u. 
subsistence requir ... nts under pr ••• nt conditions' (35), The Native Laws 
eo..ission of 1946-48 described the extent of soil ero.ion as 'nothing less 
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than terrifying' (36). It was estimated that by the end of the war some 85% 
of the reservists' income came from wages and that at anyone time some 45% 
of african men and 15% of african women were away from the reserves. 
Official figures show a decline of the african peasantry between 1936 and 
1946 frOM almost 2.5 million or over 50~ of the economically active 
population to just over 832,000 or 17.5~ (37), This decline was exaggerated 
by changes in tha way in which african women were classified (the earlier 
figures were based on a policy of classifying all african women in the 
reserves as peasants while the later figures were based on the self-
definition of african women), but the decline of male peasants from 814,000 
or 34% of the economically male active population in 1936 to 526,000 or 21% 
in 1946 may be taken as a better indicator of the fate befalling the 
african peasantry in this period, Since access to the new urban middle 
classes was barred to all but a few black people, drawn mainly from the 
children of the more prosperous peasantry, we may speak of a rapid process 
of black proletarianisation, so that by the 1940s the great majority of 
africans were dependent on the sale of labour power for wages in kind or 
money, 
Enough of thase figures lest they blind us, They point to great changes in 
South African capitalism as three key markers of Modern capitalism -
proletarianisation, urbanisation and industrialisation - ware laid, What 
is Missing frOM these statistics, however, is an appreciation that the 
period under review represented only the beginnings of aodarn industry in 
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South Africa and the genesis of the black industrial proletariat, Read in 
their context the figures reveal that. as an independent force in its own 
right. the social weight of the black working class was insubstantial, 
First. we should not exaggerate the extent of proletarianisation among 
black people, The survival of over three quarters of a million african 
peasants was testimony not only to their extraordinary endurance but also 
to the continued relevance of the 'peasant question' to the deMocratic 
struggle, Nor should we exaggerate the extent of urbanisation, In the 1940s 
South Africa remained a overwhelmingly rural society. with the great 
majority of black people living and labouring on the land, They were 
scattered over vast areas under conditions of terrible servility and 
backwardness, At the same time. the huge black population in the reserves 
continued to expand and over-crowding was a perpetual refrain of all 
reports on the reserves, By far the major part of the black proletariat 
still had one or both feet planted on the land, under conditions which were 
extremely unfavourable to working class organisation, 
The greatest concentrations of black wage labour were among the roughly 
320,000 black migrants contracted to the minas. Here the conditions of 
working class organisation were far more favourable than in agriculture. 
but obstacles were posed by the fact that black miners were hived off from 
the wider society as a kind of enclave labour force for the duration of 
their contracts. subjected to the draconian discipline of Masters and 
Servants legislation and the co.pound systaM, unfree to .ove job or place, 
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They were locked by law in unskilled labour and supervised by a large 
stratum of white skilled workers well incorporated into the structures of 
racial management, Many miners were foreign workers from outside the 
borders of the country and the proportion of foreign migrants increased as 
industry attracted South African blacks, Turnover of labour was high, due 
both to the migrant labour system and to appalling conditions of work, (38) 
In the towns large numbers of black workers, male and female, were 
scattered over white households, employed unproductively as domestic 
work~s with little bargaining power. In 1941 there were estimated to be 
around 42,000 black domestic workers in Johannesburg and servants still 
outnumbered factory workers among blacks on the Witwatersrand as a whole 
(39), Most black women were virtually excluded from manufacture, the number 
of bLacK female industrial workers rising from a mere 921 in 1936 to only 
3314 in 1946. Most were employed or self-employed in the so-called hidden 
sector of the economy as beer-brewers, shabeen-keepers, washerwomen, 
hawkers, prostitutes and the like with limited c~city for labour 
organisation. 
What is Most striking about the black industrial workforce it.elf in this 
period is how limited its numbers were: whether in relation to the black 
population as a whole or the millions of black workers on the land or to 
the size of industrial labour force. in the more advanced industrialised 
countri... It peaked at around only a quarter of a .illion workers out of a 
total of around five Million econo.ically active black people, Manufacture 
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did not of course start from scratch in 1934. small concerns having existed 
since before the First World War. yet the small base from which industrial 
growth took off may be revealed by the fact that between 1924 and 1933 
industrial output rose very slowly from £65 million in 1924-25 to £77 
million in 1932-33. These figures are skewed by the impact of the 
Depression on manufacture between 1929 and 1933 but they indicate how far 
industrialisation was a child of the post-Depression era. Many of the 
histories of South African industrialisation have been too ready to accept 
the industrialists' own assessments of their economic importance. (40) 
The concentration of labour in manufacture was limited: in the garment 
industry. for instance. there was only a handful of factories with more 
than 100 employees and the great majority had more like five to ten 
workers. Where there were larger concentrations of black labour, 
particularly in the docks. railroad and metal. black workers were as far as 
possible hived off in compounds. drawn fro. rurally-based migrants and 
eMployed as contract workers under Masters and Servants discipline. 
Turnover of labour in industry was high due to the casualness of Most black 
unskilled employment: in metal. for instance. black labour turnover was 
said to be over 1001 a year (41), Most industries had little Mechanisation 
or capital 'investMent: in the building industry there were barely any 
cranes: in the garMent industry tools COMprised the Singer sewing Machine 
and scissors, Even in the steel and emgineering industry, Mas. production 
and the appearance of the ... i-skilled machine operator was in its infancy, 
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Lastly, the power elf bla.:k workers was limited by a racial division of 
labour in industry which, while being less acute than in mining, still 
reserved m.:>st skille.j jobs for white workers, Under other circumstances, 
this aristocracy might have been expected to give a lead to the working 
class as a whole, as was often the case among skilled metal workers in 
Europe, This role was not entirely absent in South Africa, but the colonial 
heritage of racism meant that skilled nletal workers, though to a lesser 
extent than in mining, were alienated from the black workers who laboured 
under them and therefore less able or willing to transfer their trade union 
skills and solidarities, 
The conditions in which black workers lived in town were better than in the 
countryside but nonetheless reminiscent of the condition of the working 
class described by Engels in the early years of the industrial revolution 
in England, The towns were grossly overcrowded and impoverished: on the 
Witwatersrand only 18~ of the total black population were known to be 
housed and 31~ were known not to be housed, Even though black industrial 
wages were said to have risen substantially during the war, poverty wages 
led to severe malnutrition as many black workers kept alive but only just, 
According to one study of Johannesburg a very small proportion of black 
workers received a wage sufficient to support a family, even at a Iminiaal 
scale of urban life l , A sample of urban black families in Johannesburg in 
1940 revealed that 86,81 fell below the poverty datum line and a social 
survey in Cape Town revealed that 551 of coloured workers fell below this 
line (42), "any urban blaCk workers were forced into single sex compounds 
and those not confined to compounds were often little better off; .any were 
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illegally resident and faced dep,)rtation if caught and many were not 
permitted to live with their families, Since the income earned by women in 
the 'hidden' economy was essential to survival, legal prohibitions on their 
entry into the t,)wns, co-habitation and beer-brewing were as severe in 
their economic effects as in the personal tragedies they created for black 
families, The struggle for survival in such harsh and insecure conditions 
of existence made the self-organisation of urban workers no easy road, 
A focus on the proletarianisation, industrialisation and urbanisation of 
black people in the 1940s has tended to exaggerate the potential and 
conceal the weaknesses of the black working class as a whole in this 
period, The impressive percentage increases which we ha,ve recorded hide the 
very small base from which they started, The lack of numbers, concentration 
and bargaining power of the black industrial proletariat were witness to 
the fact that, just as the industrial revolution was in its infancy, so too 
was the industrial working class it spawned, These economic factors imposed 
definite constraints, independent of consciousness, on what black workers 
could achieve in the 19405 as a political force in their own right. They 
begin to explain why, as in the 19205, so too in the 1940s another wave of 
black working class organisation could not sustain itself. 
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The state response 
From above, the main e~<ternal reason for the decline of black trade 
unions lay in the growth of state repression and the corresponding 
poli tical ,:ollapse of the liberal wing of the ruling c lass, Until 1942 -
43 the rise of black unions was fa,:ilitated by a period ,:>f relative 
liberalisation as one section of the bourgeOisie, responding to the 
development of modern industry, sought a new kind of accomodation to the 
expanding black proletariat, What was called 'liberalism' was not a 
homogeneous entity but rather a spectrum of poli ti,:al thought ranging 
from Smuts on the extreme right to Hofmeyr in the centre and Marquard 
and Saffery on the left; but what united the liberal bourgeoisie was the 
view that the racial political super-structure of South Africa posed 
obstacles to the growth of modern industry and needed some degree of 
relaxation (43), Taken as a whole the reform programme may be summed up 
as follows: 
1) the relaxation of influx controls and the pass laws in order 
to create a more stabilised workforce and a reserve army of 
labour among black workers in the urban areas, to reduce the 
~ocial costs consequent upon the ma~s arrest of african. for 
pa •• law offence. and to extend exeMPtions for middle cla •• 
african.; 
2) the relaxation of job reservation based on colour in order to 
create open COMPetition for jobs, Meet expanding requir ... nt. 
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for skilled and semi-skilled labour and cheapen overall labour 
costs; 
3) the extension of black representation through legally 
recognised unions and political bodies in order to 
institutionalise industrial relations and political protest 
under a legal umbrella: 
4) the extension of property rights to black people in their 
'own' areas in order t,) build a black middle dass as a buffer 
between white society and black workers; 
s) the encouragelllent of higher wages for black workers in order 
to extend the black conSUMer lllarket, decrease state expenditure 
on welfare and offset labour unrest, 
The weaknesses of South African liberaliSM have been well rehearsed in 
the literature (44), Many of its protagonists embraced the racial idaas 
of segregationism, too often believing that a change in the n .. e of a 
thing - frOM race to culture, from segregation to trust, frOM prejudice 
to pluraliSM - changed the nature of the thing itself, The continuities 
between liberalism and apartheid were recognised by SMuts when he 
declared that 'there is a great deal about apartheid which is Co.MOn to 
all partie. in this country', Liberalism was a pre-eminently bourgeois 
forM of politics whose commitment to liberty was tempered by the need to 
protect property, its greatest fear being that moderate reform from 
above might unleash a tidal wave of protest frOM below, The support 
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which it re.:eived fr.)m industry was limited by the high level of 
inte.~rati.)n between industry and the two sectors of capital which relied 
on unfree black labour, mining and agriculture. It was subject to the 
pressures of white labour leaders suspicious that behind the rhetoric of 
progressive capital lay a design to replace white workers with cheaper 
and less organised black labour. It lacked an independent political 
base, appended instead to a bourgeois segregationist party - the United 
Party .)f Smuts - whose own history was imbricated in both racialism and 
the most illiberal responses to all forms of labour organisation, Most 
important of all, many liberal politicians, administrators and 
businessmen shared the generalised racialism of white society. 
These factors combined to make liberalisM a compromised and wavering 
force in the 1940s. Nonetheless it would be a great mistake to see 
liberalism simply as a subterfuge for segregationism or as a blood-
brother to the afrikaner nationalisM to come, The liberal strategy 
offered to black workers the prospect of a more favourable terrain of 
struggle than the apartheid alternative, revealing a willingness on the 
part of sections of the ruling class to accomodate to black labour, As 
industrialisation gatherered pace, there were practical as well as 
rhetorical signs of liberal influence at work within the state, Tn. 
space which reform opened up played a crucial role in the building of 
the young black labour move.ent. 
-76-
Thus the Wage Boards established under the Department of Labour provided 
a legal framework through which trade unions could apply for 'wage 
determinations' for their members. Set up in 1925 as part of the Pact 
government's civilized labour policy to raise the wages of white workers 
to a 'civilized level', wage boards had always been formally available 
to workers of all races, but the e}<:c lusion from its provisions of 
agricultural, domestic and mineworkers excluded in practice the vast 
majority of black w,::>rkers. As black workers entered industry, however, 
this legal machinel'y was re-structured to cater for their wage issues 
and was used to good effect by black unions to secure wage increases for 
their members (45). 
In 1937 the Industrial Conciliation Act was amended, partly to tighten 
up on the exclusion of africans frOM state-recognised trade unions but 
also to allow for the extension of Industrial Council agreements to 
african workers. The same year the Department of Labour reported its 
'increasing appreciation of the necessity of improving the wages and 
other conditions of employment of unskilled workers', given that 'the 
labour requirements of our ever-growing manufacturing industries 
necessitated the establishment of a MOre settled labour supply', It was 
attentive to the fact that 'the native unskilled worker, after a period 
of quiescence following the native trade union Movement of a few years 
ago, is again organising his forces' (46), The Secretary of Labour, Ivan 
Walker, wrote in 1937 that consideration would have to be given to some 
kind of state recognition: 'unless these organisations are subject to 
supervision siMilar to that applicable to registered unions, there is an 
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ever-present danger of the native worker being exploited for 
subversive ends', The Secretary of Native Affairs, 0 L Smit, wrote in 
1939 that consideration would have to be given to some kind of state 
recognition of black unions so as to bring them under the control and 
supervision of the department (47), 
The 1939-40 Native Affairs Commission accepted this recommendation, 
concluding that 'the existence of a number of Native trade unions 
demands some form of recognition, The Commission has", advised that 
this should be given, " What is necessary is that some official channel 
be established through which Native trade unions can bring into official 
organizance any grievances they are labouring under and, if well 
founded, have them remedied', rather than 'leave them to adopt the 
dangerous advice of some unbalanced, semi-educated Native or the 
promptings of disreputable Europeans who batten on Native ignorance and 
cupidity' (48), In 1939 and again in 1942 substantial wage increases for 
large bodies of workers were agreed by the Department of Labour in the 
form of Wage Determinations, 
In 1941 the Minister of Justice sent a circular to the police, following 
protests from the Institute of Race Relations in the aftermath of the 
coalworkers' strike, instructing them neither to arrest nor prosecute 
africans on strike until the matter had been reported to the DepartMents 
of Labour and of Native Affairs and worker representatives were given 
the opportunity of .. ttling the dispute (49), In 1942 S.uts • • s ever 
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playing t,j his audience, was ,-eported in a speech to the Institute of 
Race Relations to have repudiated segregationism in favour of 
'trusteeship', 'Segregation has fallen on evil days', he said and asked 
'how can it be otherwise? The whole trend both in this country and the 
African continent has been in the opposite direction' (50), The same 
year the Smi t C,:>mmi ttee recommended the abol i ti'jn of the pass laws, the 
recognition of african trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation 
Act and the abolition of the economic colour bar (51), In an interview 
with Ballinger, both the Departmental Secretaries for Labour and Native 
Affairs declared their own conviction of the need for the recognition of 
black unions (52), The Labour Party Minister of Labour, Madeley, opened 
the first conference of the Council of Non-European Trade Unions 
(CNETU), indicating that there was a possibility of government 
registration being opened up to black unions, His speech was reported 
favourably in the Guardia~ a paper connected with the Communist Party, 
under the headline 'Thank you Mr Madley!', the article claiming tht 
Madeley had persuaded the government to accept the recognition of black 
trade unions (53), 
Early in 1942 the Minister for Native Affairs called for permissive 
legislation to allow for 'native representation' on MUnicipal councils 
and for the reforM of the pass laws, Arguing that 'nothing was so 
conducive to '" di.turbing race relations as the Pass Laws' and calling 
it 'an appalling indictment' that between 1939 and 1941 297,695 arrest. 
had been made under the Pas. Laws, he declared that he would i._ 
instructions 'that no native .hould be arrested unl ••• there was 
-79-
,'eas.:mable ground f'Jr suspecting that he had committed an offence' (54). 
He deplored the vast numbers of african. arrested and convicted under 
the pass lalAls and the fact that fives times that number lAIere accosted by 
the police. The case reveals the presence of a liberal discourse in the 
highest offices of state but equally perhaps the profoundly oppressive 
reality of lAIorking class life. 
The government p.:>licy can be seen as designed to co-opt one section of 
the black lAIorking class, urban lAIorkers, at the expense of the majority 
of migrant and agricultural lAIorkers. Both these latter groups lAIere 
excluded from the cost of living allolAlances and from Wage Board 
determinations received by white workers and by black workers in 
commerce and industry, Both were excluded from any prospect of state 
recognition of their rights as organised workers, The co-optive policy 
was modelled on a lAIeak version of the corporatist approach taken toward 
IAIhite, coloured and indian workers, It was possible because of the 
relatively small numbers of african IAIOrkers involved and it appeared 
necessary to stabilise industrial relations and pre-empt organised 
resistance, 
The government's policy was, however. flawed in its own term., The 
incorporation of white workers, was itself IAIOrk1ng unevenly 1n this 
period and the expectation that it would work in the sue way for urban 
black workers was unfounded. not least because white. had the vote and 
blacks did not. The separation of black urban frOM aigrant work.r. was 
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much harder tel secure in practice than to state in theory, liince many 
industrial and commercial workers were themselves migrants, Finally, far 
from being lulled into palisivity by concessions from above, many 
industrial and commercial workers were motivated to exploit for their 
own purposes the space made available to them by reform, As is often the 
case, the libe,'alisati.)n of a labour-repressive re.;Jime acted as a spur 
to working class resistance (55). 
The process may be illustrated by the most important of the Wage Board 
determinations into unskilled labour in Witwatersrand and Pretoria which 
white liberals had been requesting since 1936 (S6), Commencing in mid-
1941, this investigation covered 47,000 workers in 34 industries and 
ended in Wage Determination lOS which fixed a miniMUM wage of 25/- a 
week, rising to 27/- over two years, to come into force on the 30 
November 1942. This wage was almost double the average black wage on the 
gold mines but it fell well below the wage of 37/6 a week which the Smit 
Report at the end of 1942 calculated as the poverty datum line for the 
average urban family, 
Contrary to government plans, this wage determination was a aajor factor 
in the provocation of the strike wave of O.cember 1942, The lowness of 
the poverty wages fixed by the Wage Board, which for SOMe better paid 
workers represented no incr.a •• , failed to satisfy the worker., 
Increa •• s for certatn groups, notably dairy and MUnicipal workers, were 
revoked: the for.r because of the danger that they Might also apply to 
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farmworkel's in the dairy industry and the latter because the municipal 
authorities suc.:essfully argued that they could not bear the cost 
involved. This naturally led to considerable frustration. Many groups of 
impoverished migrant workers, like those in mining, timber, power and 
water, were particularly incensed by their ex.:lusion from the wage 
determination, while other unskilled migrants in industry and commerce 
were included (57), 
The policy of a.:comodation was destined to be explosive under the 
circumstances, with the bargaining power of black workers increased by 
war-time conditions and high demand for labour. Unemployment was 
relatively low, many white workers were away on military service, many 
black workers were acquiring industrial skills which were needed by the 
eMployers. During the dairy strike, for instance, Die Tr.ansvaltlr 
commented that 'it will be anything but easy to replace the milkboys' 
since 'a native who does not know the town needs about three weeks to 
learn his round'(SS). Many workers were prepared for aggressive and 
sometimes violent picketing, while the need for black support for the 
war effort made the government cautious about the use of force, The main 
exception to this policy, heralding what was soon to become the more 
normal state response, was during the municipal workers' protests in 
December 1942 in Pretoria when sixteen black workers w.re shot dead by 
troops, This was followed by a COMMission of inquiry which condemned the 
shootings and reco.mended coepensation to the families of the victims, 
MOst of the strikes were strictly economic and of short duration, 
followed by unions negotiating on their members' behalf, They resulted 
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in several groups of workers - including those in dairy, municipal, 
clay, timber and water - winning significant wage increases, 
The shootings in December 1942 were the first marker of a definite turn 
in state policy from a policy of reform to one of repression of the 
black working class, The new climate was symbolised by the extension of 
War Measure 9, which prohibited strikes in essential industries, to War 
Measure 145, which made all strikes by black workers illegal in all 
circumstances, inflicted heavy penalties of three years imprisonment 
and/or £50 fine and introduced compulsory arbitration, The measures 
designed to recognise black unions were dropped, since in the words of a 
government commission, 'the natives were no longer prepared to accept 
anything short of full statutory recognition under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act'(59), Henceforth the government and employers cracked 
down with ever greater force against industrial action by black workers, 
They used arMed soldiers and police against iron and steel workers in 
1942, municipal workers in 1943 and power workers in 1944, The state 
atteMpted to impose a general wage freeze and prosecuted hundreds of 
black strikers every year, The Wage Board continued to function but 
apart from one or two exceptions agreed to no MOre large increa •• s, The 
Board used every davice to avoid arriving at wage determinations, citing 
for example the failure of employers and unions to agree on what wages 
they wanted the Board to fix, In 1946 War Measure 1426 effectively 
blocked the legal organisation of black mineworkers and the ChaMber of 
"ines refused to offer any hint of recognition of the African 
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Mineworkers' Union. In 1946 the miners' strike was violently suppressed 
at the cost of 12 workers killed and 1200 injured. 
State policy was not free of c'Jntradictions between its residual 
liberalism and its iron fist. This was evident in the 1948 Fagan 
Commission whi,:h refused t'J re.:ommend the abolition of all 
discriminatory laws or the removal of restrictions on the movements of 
africans, arguing that 'the Natives a\"e by no means a homogeneous group. 
Side by side with the settled Natives, there are very many who are 
simply migrants. Among these are numbers of raw kraal natives who are 
strangers to European morals and customs'. On the other hand it 
concluded that the permanent settlement of africans had to be 
'recognised'. Its b'Jldest recommendation was that the law ought to 'r.)ake 
it possible for some responsibility in connection with certain 
administrative matters and in the maintenance of law and order in native 
villages within the jurisdiction of a European urban authority to be 
delegated to the Natives themselves' (60), 
The same ambivalences were present in regard to trade union recognition. 
It was not until 1947 that the Smuts government finally published a bill 
proposing the recognition of african unions. It excluded workers in the 
Mines, domestic labour, farm labour and state emplOYMent (including the 
nationalised industries), It prohibited any unregistered union frOM 
'holding it.elf out in any Manner whatsoever as being able to further 
the intere.t. of the _RIbar. thereof or some of the. in relation to 
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their employel's or to ':olleet any contributions, IIIhether in money or 
kind, for the purpose of carrying out any function of a native trade 
union' (61). The bill ,~ave the Industrial Registrar extensive pOlllers of 
control over registered unions, The election of a 'non-Native' to a 
posi tion ,)f off i,:e in a 'native' union lIIas made subje,:t to the approval 
of the Minister of Labour, All disputes had to be settled through a 
statutory mediation board and strikes lIIera made illegal. the penalty 
being a £500 fine or three years in gaol, CNETU expressed profound 
disappointment lIIi th a bi 11 IIIhi,:h lIIas based on rae ial diser imination. 
denied african lIIorkers the right of collective bargaining, barred strike 
action and excluded all but urban. industrial lIIorkers, It saw the bill 
rightly as 'a clear indication that the government is determined to 
perpetuate its present policy of cheap labour' (62), 
In an article published in 1945 entitled 'The tlllO voices within the 
United Party', Rene de Villiers wrote that anyone IIIho listened to the 
debate on native affairs at the 1945 Transvaal Congress of the United 
Party 'must have been distressed and despondent about the future of 
progressive thought and action in South Africa' (63), He bemoaned the 
fact that the Congress 'demanded that the authorities expel natives from 
urban and peri-urban areas, restrict their freedom of MOvement by 
stricter application of the pass laws and generally get tough with 
them', At the end of the 1947 session of parliament Senator Basner 
captured the mood of white politics when he wrote that 'the s ... ion was 
an ignominious one for the governMent because the PriM "inister was 
deterMined to appeas. the Nationalist Party on all iMpOrtant fore1gn and 
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domesti,: issues, This policy ,:>f appeasement paralysed his party and 
stultified the progress of our country', Senator Edgar Brookes wrote in 
the same year that 'the pass laws remain af tel" a decade of agi tati'Jn and 
protest', the housing shortage was disastrous and 'most of all the 
general status of the African remains virtually unaltered", he meets 
the intense frustration of barriers depending on race and colour alone 
from which there seems to be no escape' (64), 
What especially worried liberal opinion was what the Institute for Race 
Relations called in 1945 'the profound concern that '" there is a 
growing tendency among younger people in all the Non-European groups to 
despair of conciliatory methods and to believe that only hatred, 
employing the method of direct action and, if need be, culminating in 
revolution, can bring about the fundamental changes in status which we 
desire' (65), The same point was echoed in an editorial in Inkundla Va 
Bantu by Ngubane when he wrote in March 1945 that 'if the African is 
going to be denied the all'eady much whittled down'right of assembly, he 
will next work underground for the realisation of those ideals he has up 
to now fought for constitutionally' (66), 
w. May only speculate here about why liberalism collapsed as a political 
force in this period. There was the question of the war. The position of 
the alli.s, including that of the South African government, turned in 
their favour after 1942 with the successful resistance of the Russians 
against the German invasion and the entry into tha war of the A .. ricans. 
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At h.jme the g.:>vernment· s support f.:>r the war placed it under pressure 
from afrikaner nationalists opposed to British imperialism, whose 
h.)sti li ty the government sought to appease by tak il1g a tough stand 
against black protest. The government felt and was stronger after 1943 
than it had been il' the earlier years of the war. Crucially, the strike 
wave of 1942-43 did enough to frighten the ruling class into withdrawing 
concessions but not enough to force it to accomodate to the p.:>wer of 
labour, as its rapid exhaustion in early 1943 revealed the vulnerability 
of this young labour movement. Behind the timidity of bourgeois 
liberalism lay the fear that moderate reform from above would unleash a 
tidal wave of protest from below and the conviction that repression 
could contain the threat from below. It may appear at first sight that 
the abandonment of reform was provoked by the militancy of workers, but 
it makes more sense to see it as a response to the perceived weaknesses 
which accompanied the militancy. 
The liberal bourgeOisie either endorsed or had no power to stop the 
government's attacks on the working class, thus paving the way for the 
rise of apartheid and their own removal from office. If there was to be 
a democratic revolution in South Africa, the liberal bourgeoisie proved 
itself incapable of leading it but vital in facilitating the growth of 
those forces which could lead it. The working class was the motor of 
democratic change, yet long before the rise of apartheid this turn in 
state policy away from liberaliSM had a profoundly disintegrative effect 
on its organisation and capacities, 
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Trade uni.on strategy: the containment of industrial action 
The structural lIIeaknesses of the black lIIol'k ing c lass and the 
marginalisation of liberal forces lIIilling to make an accomodation lIIith 
secti.)ns of the black lIIorking .:lass lIIere .:losely linked phenomena. The 
soc ial f.:.rces behind the black labour movement lIIere not such as to 
induce the need f.)r a.:,:omodation on the part ,;,f capital. This relation 
of f.:.rces, hOlllever, lIIas not simply determined by structural 
considerations. What lIIas also at issue lIIas the conscious element: how 
the black trade unions responded to these rapidly deteriorating 
conditions of struggle. 
The growth of black unions had been heavily dependent on the use of 
legal methods and on the state's willingness to make concessions, As the 
element of reform receded, the unions lIIere faced with an uphill task of 
adapting their forms of organisation and action to a new and hostile 
climate. Until 1942, some progress could be aChieved without recourse to 
strike action through appeals to bodies like the Wage Board, When the 
state refused to co-operate, this strategy lost its utility, To sustain 
their advance, the unions had little choice but to turn to industrial 
action and in the context of the war this meant turning to illegality, 
Many trade unionists whose experience was grounded in the us. of legal 
.. thads found this turn difficult to Make, They continued to function in 
-88-
the paradigm of an industrial relations h\odel which required a consensus 
wi th the bour'Je,)isie, while the bourgeoisie i tsel f was ever more ')pposed 
to the granting of any c,)ncessions tel the black unions. While the rulers 
of South Africa resolved to make no further accomodations to black 
labour, many black trade unions continued to channel the struggles of 
black workers into a framework ,:.f lobbying and legal reform, 
This policy was in evidence during the strike wave of 1942-43. At the 
CNETIJ annual conference held in February 1943, the Guardian reported 
that, while delegate after delegate pointed to the abominable pay and 
conditions of the African workers, they deplored any stoppage which 
might hinder the war effort, Leading trade unionists proposed instead a 
campaign to educate the public in the need for a minimum wage 'to arouse 
morale on the home front' (67), Similarly when iron and steel workers 
protested that they were starving and called for immediate industrial 
action, the union leadership prevailed upon them to refrain fro. 
striking for the sake of the war effort (68), 
This policy was also evident in the trade union response to strikes of 
migrant workers in the power industry, In 1942, 1943 and 1944, migrant 
workers at the VPF Power Company took strike action, Some of these 
workers had previously been organised in Gordon's General Workers' Union 
but since its collapse were not unionised, In the course of the strike 
of 1944, SeeMingly at the request of the government, Makabeni formed on 
behalf of theSe workers the African Gas and Power Workers Union, The 
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uni.:>11 reported ';Jraphi.:ally on the terrible .:.:>ndi tions IiIhich gave rise to 
the strike and on the use of troops to break the strike and added 
c.)ncernin';J its oliln role that it liIas • to the undying .:redi t of the 
strikel's at Brakpen that they categorically refused to return to liIork 
until their oliln trade union arrived at the scene and advised them to go 
back t.) liIork' (69). The union's account of its relation to the 
g.)vernment illustrates liIe11 its oliln attitude: 
Tlilelve months ago liIe settled a strike ... on the understanding 
that the VFP liIould negotiate an agreement. .. When the 
neg.)tiations started, the company refused any concessions ... Six 
months ago liIe stated our case to the Mine Native Wages 
Commission ... We liIere told that liIe did not fall liIithin its terms 
of reference ... Five months ago liIe IiIrote to the Minister of 
Labour asking for arbitration ... We liIere told the matter liIas 
receiving attention. .. We told the Minister of Native Labour 
that unless the government appointed an arbitrator, the union 
officials could not hold the liIorkers back ... If the government 
liIould not act, liIe told the government liIe could do nothing ... 
Notlilithstanding the government·s intranSigence in the face of repeated 
petitions, Makabeni re-affirmed the union's official policy of opposing 
strike action: 
We have endeavoured for over a year to hold the workers back 
frOM striking, We did so because it is the accepted policy of 
the trade union movement to support the government in their war 
effort and to avoid anything which liIill embarass them. We are 
still determined to pursue this policy in the future. 
The workers ware not apparently consulted in this decision. The ter •• on 
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which the str ike was called off were that the recommendations of the 
Mines Natives Wages COI\\mission under Lansdown. set up in response to 
strikes of migrant workers on the mines, be extended to power workers, 
that they be acted upon immediately and that they be backdated, The 
Lansdown Commission was later to commend thi restraining role played by 
Gana Makabeni. the chairperson of CNETU, as well as CNETU itself: 
The C':lmmission apprec iates the discretion and moderation which 
characterise Mr Makabeni's submission of the case for workers", 
CNETU wisely exerted its influence to restrain excessive demands 
and induce the workers to suspend further action pending the 
determination of their claiMS after inquiry by a COMMission 
(70), 
The Commission did not. however, meet the power workers' claims, the 
union collapsed and later Makabeni bitterly recalled his own 
disillusionment, The Progressive Trade Union Group (PTU), set up in 1944 
as a left opposition to the CNETU leadership, fulminated against CNETU's 
pacifying role in this strike: 
It was not a mistake that the Commission '" had to commend the 
good work done by Makabeni in breaking the VFP strike .,' Tha 
VFP strike was a challenge to the cheap labour policy of the 
Chamber of Mines, The success would have had repercussions on 
the whole mining industry, and, powerless to do anything by 
it •• lf, the Government had to employ somebody to 'DISCIPLINE ' 
the workers, Therefor. this ComMendation of Makabeni by the 
Commission was in respect of services rendered (71), 
"-kabeni's actions aay well have been aotivated by tactical 
considerations concerning the weakness of the workers' organisation and 
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the improbability of success through strike action. The fact that his 
own m,Jderate approach failed did not mean that the more militant 
appr'Jach favoured by the PTU would have succeeded. In the event, 
however, not only was the strike l')st and its demands not met, but the 
workers appear to have rapidly lost faith in the union. 
Baruch Hirson's account of the emergence of the Progressive Trade Union 
Group in 1944 is instructive in highlighting CNETU's attitude toward 
militant trade unionism (72). The African Milling Workers Union put in a 
demand for a minimum wage of £2 a week. When this was refused, 2000 
workers came out on strike for ten days. To circumvent the ban on 
strikes, organisation was put in the hands of an ad hoc group of union 
officials, known as the 'General Staff', The strike was beaten through 
the arrest of some 600 workers, the criminal prosecution of 16 workers 
and two officials, and the use of scab labour, CNETU supported the 
union's demand but opposed strike action. Before the strike, it issued a 
statement saying: 
Since "ay the union, knowing that it was the accepted policy of 
the Non-European trade union movement to support the 
Government's war effort, had been holding back the workers 
" , 
The African trade unions were still determined to pursue this 
policy in the future, 
In response to the government's suppression of the strike, CNETU 
declared its 'gravest alarm '" at the concerted govern.ent offensive 
against the trade union MOvement' but re-affirMd its 'endeavour", to 
avoid strike actton' (73), The 'General Staff', who sought the 
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assistance of the trotskyite Workers International League (WIL) - the 
secretary of the union, Molefi, was a member - was vilified as 
'trotskyist' and the spectre of a 'general strike' incited by 
trotskyists was raised in apprehension by the leadership of CNETU, A 
certain R Fleet, Communist Party member and trade union official, warned 
that trotskyists 'had even a so-called general staff meeting in the 
offices of CNETU at which, if it had not been for the intervention of 
the lelcal committee, the possibil i ty existed of a general strike of the 
African unions taking place' (74), 
The strike was defeated but a left oppOSition within CNETU, known as the 
Progressive Trade Union Group, was formed out of the 'General Staff' in 
response to CNETU's lack of support, Stating that 'the salvation of the 
workers lies in a strong, powerful council', it called for a new 
leadership in CNETU and an 'All-Embracing Emergency Conference' to 
discuss the strike, In response CNETU warned its members to have nothing 
to do with the conference and denounced the PTU, 'Fellow workers', it 
wrote, 'forces of reaction and disruption at work', A pamphlet was 
written for CNETU on the PTU by Hymie Basner called 'wreckers at work', 
which argued that 'in the larger field of national liberation and 
democratic rights such adventures may lead the non-European Masses into 
costly and fruitless adventures, unless responsible leadars of the 
African and other non-European sections take energetiC steps to 
organise', What truth there was to the charge of adventurism lavelled 
against the PTU is a question to which we shall return balow, As the 
Milling strike revealed, militant leadership did not guarantee victory, 
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The m.~st revealing example of the relation .::>f unions to industrial 
acti.::>n is provided by the african mineworkers strike of 1946, The 
African Mineworkers Union, set up in 1941, was dominated by the 
Communist Party, In 1942-43 there was a series of l.::>cal stoppages on the 
mines, serious enough to lead to the appointment of the Min~s Native 
Wages Commission, better known as the Lansdown C,:)mmission, The African 
Mineworkers Union (AMWU) welcomed the appOintment of the Commission 'as 
a token of earnestness on the part of the government' (75) and put the 
miners' grievances to the Commission, It was a long list, concerning 
starvation wages, the contract-labour system, the compounds described as 
'sleeping coffins', long hours, accident, assaults by white supervisors, 
and the lack and poor quality of food, The union complained about the 
refusal of the Chamber of Mines to recognise its existence, but its 
policy was to desist from any industrial action pending the Commission's 
report (76), It continued to build the membership of the union, 
according to its own estimate from 1827 members in 1943 to around 25,000 
in 1944 or about 81 of the total black labour force of over 300,000, 
Calls for strike action at the 1944 conference of the AMWU resulted from 
further cuts in rations and severe food shortages. They were Met by the 
union leadership under J.B. Marks, a COMmunist Party n~mber, with a 
further plea for patience while it sought to have the findings of the 
Lansdown Commission accepted by the government. One participant recalled 
two years later that 'over 1000 delegates •.• were present. They wanted 
III to strike there and then, and on the other hand you had officials 
WlO wanted to know whether we had exhausted all channels of negotiation 
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for coming to an amicable settlement' (77), After an exhaustive 
examination of wage scales in the mines lasting more than a year, the 
Lansdown Commission recommended a small cost of living increase, a boot 
allowance, 150% overtime rates and a minimum wage for surface workers, 
It did not meet the wage demands of the workers and left the compound 
system, the pass laws, the colour bar, white domination in the workplace 
and the illegality of black trade unionism untouched, 'Ordinary mine 
natives', the Report read, 'coming as they did from the reserves and the 
tribal areas '" had not reached the development necessary for trade 
unionism' (78), 
In 1945 Inkululeko announced that the African Mineworkers' Union was 
shortly to meet the Prime Minister in Pretoria, It said that the union 
leaders would 'put forward the demands of African workers on the mines 
for more pay in accordance with the mine Native Wages Commission, and 
for the right of the union to hold meetings of the workers - at present 
prevented by regulation 1425' (79), The union met with total rejection 
from the Acting Prime Minister, Hofmeyr, The chamber refused to 
negotiate with the AMWU, ignored all correspondence with the union, and 
was busy victi.ising its organisers, With further cuts in rations (301 
in 1944), there were demonstrations, hunger strikes, work stoppages and 
seizure of stores, organised by ad hoc Workers' Committees, demanding 
aore and better food, The union, however, continued in its efforts to 
n8g0tiate a settleMent without supporting industrial action, J.B, Karks 
caeeanted on the union'. ability to taMper it. MaMbers' anger, when he 
told a •• ss EMergency Conferance of the AMWU that 'the Mine officials 
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and compound managers admit that our meetings encouraged discipline 
amongst the workers, Far fewer cases of such actions as the stoning of 
compound managers' houses have occurred since these meetings were in 
progress' (SO), 
In January 1946, the AMWU warned that 'the African miners are saturated 
with grievances and unless something is done immediately to ameliorate 
their conditions, there is sure to be a series of sporadic and 
spontaneous revolts' (81), Food shortages were a cause of deep unrest, 
On one mine 'the mine manager told the workers that there was not enough 
food owing to the draught' to which the miners replied by 'raiding the 
compound kitchen and all the food' (82), The government put up posters 
in the mine compounds, 'explaining to the Natives the reasons for the 
shortages of meat, milie meal and kaffir beer, and pointing out that 
such deficiencies arose through no fault on the part of the Mining 
Industry' (83), but the workers were not assuaged, Majoro and Marks 
warned that 'a most serious situation is emerging ... not only on the 
Crown mines. At Spring mines, for example, dissatisfaction has baan 
aggravated by the recant interference of the police against the workers, 
when they expressed their resentment at ration cuts'. 
In April of 1946, the AMWU addressed four letters to the ChaMber of 
Mines stating its deMands for a Rl miniMum per shift for black workers. 
The letters went unanswered except for one declaring that 'the .atter 
was receiving attention'. As spontaneous strikes broke out, the union 
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issued a statement declaring that the strikers were 'not acting on the 
advice of the leadership' and that 'despite the difficulties placed in 
our way by both employers and government, our organiser succeeded in 
contacting these workers and impressing upon them the need for 
discipline and restraint' (84), Finally, the union was impelled to take 
action, On Sunday 4th of August 1946 some 1000 delegates attended a 
meeting at which the decision to call a strike was taken, According to 
Diamond, the unknown miner from the floor who demanded the strike said: 
'it is better to die here than to go home empty-handed', to which an old 
miner shouted: 'we on the mines are dead men already' (8S), Simons and 
Simons wrote that 'the proceedings were widely published. but mine 
owners and government refused to credit Africans with the capacity to 
organise concerted action on a large scale in defiance of the elaborate 
system of surveillance, intimidation and espionage that operated in the 
compounds' (86), In evidence at his trial, charged with sedition for 
among other things engineering the strike, Communist Party member Bram 
Fisher told of how he had decided to go on holiday during August 1946, 
believing that no major crisis would occur, He conceded - though we 
should of course be cautious of evidence drawn frOM a state trial - that 
the ComMunist Party had been caught off guard and had not expected the 
strike to occur (87). 
The union took a cautious approach to the strike. As J.B.Marks put it 
when discussing his rola: 
I explained to theM what a strike would involve, sacrifice. 
would have to be Mada, to refrain from falling for any 
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provocation, to be non-violent. To do nothing on the day of the 
strike but to remain in their rooms. (88) 
The strike began on 12th August with some 70.000 workers participating. 
support from CNETU came on the afternoon of the second day of the strike 
when it resolved that if the Chamber of Mines was not prepared t,) open 
negotiations with the African Mine Workers Union by 15th August, the 
fourth day of the strike, they would call a sympathy strike (89). The 
strike, however. was of short duration and by the fourth day more than 
half the mineworkers had already returned to work. Nabuth Mokgatle, a 
member of CNETU's executive, was critical of CNETU's lack of practical 
support for the strike. He wrote that 'the day before the strike I was 
summoned to be in Johannesburg to plan what was to be done to see the 
strike through ... The meeting had to find ways of contacting the 
workers and providing them with money and food and found that none of 
this had been planned' (90), The miners were immediately exposed to 
ruthless attack. The union offices were raided and its leaders arrested. 
An attempt by workers to stage a sit-down strike at the rockface was 
stopped by the police with the miners being baton-charged and driven up 
stope by stope to the surface, Similarly, a March by workers to the 
office of the Chief Native Commissioner in Johannesburg was dispersed by 
the police with considerable violence. At least 12 Africans were killed 
and SOMe 1200 injurl1Ci, 
The .iners lost their i.ediate de_nds, the AMWU was crushed and trade 
unioniSM in general suffered a aajor defeat, At first sight this result 
aight appear to endorse the wisdoM of CNETU's war-tiMe opposition to 
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industrial action in a period when black workers were too weak 
effectively to confront the employers and the state. This seems to have 
been the lesson drawn by a number of leading trade unionists at the 
time, including Makabeni, who blamed the Communist Party for leading the 
unions down the path of adventurism in 1946. Yet the strike also 
highlighted the inefficacy of the liberal model of industrial relations 
held by the union leadership in the face of the ruthlessness of the 
state and mineowners on one side and the desperate rebell iousness ,:.f the 
mineworkers on the other. Year after year appeals to the state and 
employers landed on deaf ears, while the mineworkers exhausted 
themselves in copious heroic but isolated acts of resistance. 
We may only speculate about what might have been different if the strike 
had been called during the war, linking up with other industrial and 
community struggles and exploiting the vulnerability of the state. By 
the time that the union leadership relaxed its oppOSition to industrial 
action, the balance of forces between the state and black labour had 
shiftly significantly in favour of the state, The labour move .. nt had 
lost its way and there were visible signs of disintegration, It is not 
possible to say whether more militant policies would have produced 
batter immediate results as far as the workers' own deMands were 
concerned, only that the legal policies which were pursued both failed 
in this respect and contributed to the collapse of the union moveunt 
itself, Mor. militant policies might at least have left, as a heritage 
for the future, a MOre organic relationship between unions and workers 
and a .ore favourable foundation for post-war union organisation, 
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Legalism in the unions 
The prominent feature of strikes between 1941 and 1945 was that they 
were generally conducted by rank and file workers reliant on their own 
resources, while union officials sought to restrain them within the 
bounds of legality and substituted appeals to the state for direct 
action, That unions and workers were often to be found pushing in 
different directions was a recipe for the decomposition of the movement, 
Strike action, however, carried real risks to unions given the weak 
state of their organisation and the ruthlessness of the state, Many 
trade unionists were for good reason reluctant to embark on a course of 
illegal action with uncertain prospects of success, especially as there 
appeared to be other avenues of negotiation still open. 
For example, War Measure 145, at the same time as prohibiting strikes, 
also made available arbitration which could then serve as a focus of 
union demands. The state's policy was to counterpose arbitration to 
strike action, warning that it would not be prepared to grant 
arbitration if members of a black union went illegally on strike. The 
Wage Boards though largely emptied of content remained in forM and SOMe 
.. ployers still offered a degree of inforMal recognition to 
'responsible' union leaders, This attitude was exemplified by a Meeting 
between the African Cement Workers Union and the Pretoria C8M8nt Coapany 
in March 1943, when the aanagnant stated that it would not formally 
recognise a black union until such ti .. as the government recognised it, 
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but agreed to permit union organisers access to the workers. saying that 
it would 'look to the union for collaboration in preventing disputes 
arising as a result of the mischievous activities of irresponsible 
persons' (91), 
Over and above these considerations. there apppear to have been internal 
divisions in the unions which led officials to oppose strikes even when 
their members called for or embarked upon them, The reason lay in part 
in the relations between the workers and the officials, There were of 
course differences of class background with many officials COMing from 
the intelligentsia or the petty bourgeoisie and entering the workers' 
MOvement from the outside, Even the most committed and militant trade 
union leaders were very much an elite. saparated from their members by 
class, culture and often language, In general, however, this meeting of 
the radical intelligentsia and black workers should be seen not as a 
problem but as an advance for both sides: a vital ingredient in the 
building of any workers' movement, The real question was not that of 
class origins but rather of the class relations between trade union 
officials and their members, Was there a problem of bureaucratisation in 
the union leadership which accounted for the policies it pursued? 
OUr answer must be tentative given the underdeveloped state of re.earch 
into CNETU, It seems to have been the case that in many instances unions 
did not have structures to enforce democratic accountability on their 
officials or to allow shop stawards and other workers to partiCipate in 
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union decision-making, Union education programmes were rare, The 
personalisation of unions around particular individuals symptomised the 
spec ial ,'ole they played in the absence of strong collective 
organisation, Discussion of trade union democracy was notable mainly for 
its absence (92), In a number of cases trade union officials were 
accused ,:>f placing their ,:areers before the interests of their members 
and critics of the CNETU leadership often raised the issue of careerism 
as a problem, The,'e was some evidence of c,:;)rruption with several cases 
of embezzlement recorded, In some instances union members gave ~p their 
union ,:ards ,:;)ut of disgust wi th ,:orrupt leaders while in othei's union 
members were able to expel the malefactors, There was a lack of basic 
skills in book-keeping, negotiating and organising which was one of the 
problems addressed by the African Trade Union Technical Advisory 
COMMittee, formed in 1947 by liberals and officials from the 
'registered' trade union movement to provide classes for union officials 
in CNETU (93), 
commenting in its prejudicial way on the decline of the trade union 
MOvement in 1951, the Botha Commission into Industrial Legislation 
argued that 'the Native trade union movement over-reached itself", 
There were few trained leaders", The affairs of many unions fell into a 
state of confusion', It pointed to the 'expulsion of European leaders 
whO had done much to organise unions on sound lines' and declared that 
SOlIe of the 'Native leade1's who succeeded them", became dictators who 
i~d thei1' own desires on the 1'ank and file', It cited the evidence 
of 6ana "akabeni bafo1'. the COMMission that the failure to recognise 
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afril:an trade uniclns in law lelj tQ 'irresponsible people taking 
advantage IJf that", There were pel)ple who could be got rid of, but 
thel'e was nlJ ()thel' machinel'Y tlJ I~et rid of them' (94), Racist 
been true that the affairs I)f many unions fell into confusion, even 
though its SIJurce had nothing t,) do with whether its leaders were white 
or not. 
Superf ic ially it may appear possible to trace the source IJf legalism in 
the unions to the legal IIlethlJds successfully employed by Gordon, Koza 
and their fellow trade unionists in the Joint Committee in the latter 
years of the 1930s, when they fought for material improvements for 
workers through the state wage boards rather than through strike action. 
The problem of legalism, however, lay not in the exploitation 'Jf legal 
openings in the earlier period, which proved effective, but rather in 
the continuation of these methods under no longer propitious 
circumstances. The trotkysant practioners of legal methods in the 1930s 
like Dan Koza often formed the More militant leaders of unions after 
1942, while the ComMunist Party trade unionists who had been critical of 
Kax Gordon's legaliSM in the 1930. took the lead in adopting a 
legalistic approach aftar 1941, 
Fro. the evidence we have available, the relation of trade union 
officials to their .-.bers does not suffice to explain the legali .. of 
~ unions nor their reluctance to support industrial action. The aajor 
.·Sif;i;~:·~ . 
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factor behind the determination of union policy lay outside of the 
uni.:ons themselves and in the relati.jn .:of trade uni.jnisl\\ to politics. It 
was a !=1I;)litical .je.:isi.;)n t.;) c.;)ntain the uni.)ns as far as possible within 
constitutional, no-strH:e b.;)unds, It was n.;)t a decision arrived at, as 
it wel'e, auton.jmously wi thin the unions, TI'ade unions do not live in a 
p.)l i tical cocoon and even the most • independent· unions are not 
independent of politics, In this particular period, political 
organisations played a decisive role in the establishment and 
.jevel.)pment of bla.:k unions and had a direct influence .;)vel' the paths 
they pursued. The crisis after the war manifested itself as a crisis of 
trade unionism but its roots lay in a political crisis far beyond the 
sphere of trade unionism alone. 
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The ril.::ast irilPQ1'tant detel'rilinants ,:,f the p'Jl i,: ies 'Jf the bla,:k labQul' 
movement aftel' 1941 al")Se ,:out ,:of the libel'al dem'Jcl'ati,: alliance fo::arge,j 
between the CPSA and the ANC, These two othel'wise divergent political 
ol'ganisations came togethel' from vel'y diffel'ent startin9 points to 
c,:onsti tute the (,jpe elements ,:,f what the Corllmunist Pal'ty ca.lle,j trle 
'people's fr':'nt' ,;:01' 'national frQnt', (1) 
In trle mid-19:30s the CPSA was an extl'emely weak ')1'9anisati'::an, its ranks 
,jeo:imated by the purl~e 1)1' v1)luntary ,jeparture 'Jf its best mi li tants 
durin'~ trle e;(,:esses of its Third Period betweem 1929 and 1934 (2), 
During th,)se years the party was 'bolshevised', which meant in reality 
that it was bl',)ught under tight ,:ontrol f I',)m Moscow. The l,ext dozen 'Jr 
so years were t'J see a Inarked revival and then decline of the fortunes 
of the party as it adopted a series of sharp strategic 'turns': in 1935 
it turned away from the sectarianism of the third period to adopt a 
popular front poli,:y against the threat of fascism; in 1939 with the 
signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact it reverted back to a left period of 
class struggle on the home front and opposition to imperialist war; in 
1941 with the German invasion of Russia it turned to its national front 
policy of support for the war and opposition to industrial action; in 
1946 it took. Mini-left turn, relaxing its opposition to industrial 
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al:tion now that the war was over; in 1947 it adopted what it called its 
I broad dem,)cratic front I poli,:y to keep the I Nats 'out Ijf power. We 
shall see in our disl:ussion of the 19505 that such e)scillations 
.:ontinued into the next decade: a left period between 1949 and 1952, 
followelj by a sharp move to the right between 1953 and 1959 under the 
umbrella e,f a I uni ted front I and then an abrupt lef t turn to armed 
struggle at the close of the decade. 
Once the party had been 'bolshevised ' , a rythmic rotation from what we 
might call Communist sectarianism to africanised opportunism was set in 
Motion at the outset and carried on throughout this period. As the 
fluctuations continued, however, so the periodic rediscovery of an 
indigenous african nationalism grew stronger and Communist sectarianisM 
weaker. Superficially this appeared to represent the growth of an 
independent policy for the South African Communist Party, which appeared 
not only faithful to an international COMmUnist movement but also to an 
authentic african radicalisM in the South African context. The CPSA 
certainly did develop its own national character and did not blindly 
respond to external stimuli from the Soviet Union. Vet all the strategic 
turns adopted by the COMmUnist Party in South Africa corresponded with 
the fluctuations of Soviet foreign policy, whether or not they also 
obeyed co..,elling needs within the South African ComMUnists theMselves, 
The turn to african nationalism in this regard did not represent merely 
a sensitivity to local conditions but was another type of C~ist 
response to a Russtan sttllUlus, The party's lurches were not in response 
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to internal ,:han';jes in the South African .:lass struggle nor in the party 
itself, but refle.:ted the push and pull c,f an e~<ternal force. (3) 
This is n'Jt to say that South African Communists unthinkingly responded 
t,) Russian orders. Rather what we find is a profound loyalty to the 
Soviet Union as the motherland 'Jf socialism and a conviction that the 
,jefen,:e .:.f the S'Jviet Union as the only socialist state was the first 
duty 'Jf every Communist. S'Juth African C'J/'IImunists were not puppets of 
the Soviet Union wi thout independent thoughts ,:>f their own, but whatever 
independent thoughts they had, it was their fealty to the Soviet Union 
which prevailed. Local initiative had to be employed in applying 
according to their own intelligence the general line dictated from 
Mosc,:>w to national .:ondi tions: a distinction ak in to the difference 
between strategy and tactics. In this application there were exceptions, 
lags, misunderstandings and personal refusals, but through the 19405 and 
1950s the general line of South African ComMunist policy was determined 
in Moscow with little regard for local conditions, (4) 
The oscillation. of CPSA policy corresponded with the turns taken by 
practically all Communist Parties throughout the world, even though they 
were given thair own national hallmark in each case, This general 
• 
approach was theori.ed by Stalin in 1930 in a speech on A .. rican 
CoMMunism, It would be wrong, h. argued, 
to ignore the specific peculiarities of AMerican capitaliSM, The 
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would be sti 11 Inore wrong to base the acti vi ties of· the 
ComMunist Party on these spe.: if i.: features. since the foundation 
o:)f the activities .:Jf evel'y Communist Party, including the 
American Communist Party, on which it must base itself, must be 
the general features ':Jf capi tali Sin which are the saMe for all 
.:ountries, and n':Jt its specific features in any given country, 
It is precisely on this that the internationalism of the 
C':JfI\l\'\unist Parties rests, The specific features are merely 
supplementary to the general features, (5) 
This .:cmception "f the world economy as simply a sum of national parts 
of the same type. whose specific features are merely supplementary to 
the general features, is what justified the enforcement of the same 
general policies for all national parties. including the South African, 
regardless of national conditions, The one great exception was the USSR 
whose peculiarity was so potent as to make possible the growth of 
socialism in one country, regardless of what happened in the rest of the 
world just so long as its borders could be effectively secured, In this 
theory an alMOst .essianic Soviet nationalism was COMbined with a 
buraucratically imposed abstract internationalism, The task of the 
Comintern was sean primarily as one of protecting the frontiers of 
socialism frOM foreign intervention, (6) 
"any south African COMMUnists undoubtedly thought that they could 
reconcile thair duties to the 'international COMUntst IIOveMnt' and to 
the indigenous traditions of black radicalisM in South Africa. Kany saw 
1n one turn or another ,the possibiliti .. of such an integration. The 
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p.jpUlal' fl'.)nt .:ame as a I'elief fl'om the virulent sectarianism of the 
thi rd per ic.d; Communists fel t that they .:.juld start relating to people 
again, n-Iough the anti-imperialist period of the Hi tIer-Stalin pact .:ame 
as a shock t.j many C'jmmunists. at least it allowed them t,::> relate both 
t,::> black wOI'kers and to militant afrikaner workers in ways which the 
popular front periQt;j had blocked, Then the national front period in its 
tUI'n l'esolved the shock I)f endorsing the division ,::>f Europe by the great 
.ji.:tators an,j all'jwe,j S,::>uth African Communists to participate in the 
w.jrld struggle against nazism abroad and afrikaner nationalism at home, 
And so em, Each new line could be desi red ·jr rationalised because it 
provided 'jne of the ingredients that the other had lacked, Anyone who 
stayed within the party for more than five years was ,:ertain to live 
through a change I)f line and have to adapt his or her conscience or 
consciousness accordingly, (7) 
What usually appears in the literature as the golden period of the 
people's front, seen to loosen the rigid ideological bonds of previous 
years as well as break from the excruciating pain of siding with Hitler 
against 'imparialism', was one mOMent within the multiple fluctuations 
of party policy, The party's first loyalty was not to the people'. front 
but to the Soviet Union and it was ready to abandon the people's front 
whan enjoined so to do, The people's front was the policy of COMMUnists 
but it was not a COMMunist policy; indeed it was not even a very radical 
policy, its Main function being to draw the working class behind the war 
effort of the government 1n the hope and expectation that it would be 
rewarded with reforM and deMocratic concessions, When this policy was 
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first instituted. many C,:ammunists were .j()ubtless convinced that it lIIas a 
viable and ,:.:arre.:t strate'3Y lIIi th a good ,:hance of success, When it 
be,:ame quite apparent to anyone lIIi th eyes to look that it lIIas not 
1II.:>rkiI1'3 in the latter yeal's c,f the lIIar. that far from lIIinning liberal 
,'eforms state pol b:y lIIas turning ever more reactionary. the party could 
n'jt and did not change its pol icy unti 1 it lIIas allollled to do so too late 
after the war was over, This is IIIhy the people's front could not and did 
not devel,:ap into an authentic South African soc ialisll) , The people's 
f r,)nt should be seen as the people's front of the C'jMmunist Party and 
not as a people' 5 f r,jnt sui generis, 
Let us examine this history in more detail, Betllleen 1936 and 1939, the 
CPSA supported what it called a 'people's united front against 
imperialiSM, fascism and war', as part of the Comintern's policy of 
allying with 'progressive' forces opposed to German expansionism, In the 
South Afri,:an context the people's front policy looked to three 
progressive forces: african nationalism, the IIIhite labour organisations 
and progressive capital, seeking a com.on front on the principle of 'no 
criticism' of potential allies (8), This policy, first aired in 1936, 
introduced a breath of fresh political air after the sactarian politics 
of the third period but it did little to advance the party's relation to 
the black IIIOrking class, 
There I118re two basic reasons for this, First. the CPSA's search for an 
alliance with the leadership of the Labour Party and the Trades and 
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LaboUl' C,juncil (TLC) , the political and e,:onomic \\lings respectively I:>f 
the white labour movement, entai led defini te c.)mpr,:>mises with its 
\'a.: ism, FQr e}<ample, a resl)lution of the P.)li tical BUl'eau .:alled for a 
united frljnt .)f the CPSA, the segregationist Labour Party and the rank 
and file .)f the Af r ikaner Nationalist Party as a first step to building 
a bro:oader popular front, This proposal was based inter alia on demands 
for a racially differentiated minimum \\Iage of 10/- a day f,)r whites and 
S/- a day f.jr africans (9), The concession to \\Ihite labourism was re-
iterated by CPS A representatives on the TLC and in the party's 19313 
Manifesto, 
SOMetimes party propaganda to white workers was couched in raCially 
charged language, as when the civilised labour policy was criticised on 
the ground that 'the natives are." getting far more than their share 
in the number of j'Jbs' and white workers were assured that labour 
equality would not lead to marrying natives' (10), In its own terms the 
policy met with limited success, In neither of the two front 
organisations througn which the CPSA pursued its alliance with white 
labour leaders - the Friends of the Soviet Union and the League Against 
War and Fascism - could it secure the affiliation of the Labour Party or 
the TLC, but the party did win representation on the TLC regional 
executives, The cost incurred, however, by this policy was the 
difficulty in relating to black workers which stemmed from the party's 
conc •• sions to the racialism of white labour, Although the CPSA was 
coMaitted in principle to drawing black and white into one MOveMent, in 
practice it was forced to divide its popular front activities into two 
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segments. There were even mClves. f in_lly rejected, tCI separate the party 
organisation itself into two racially defined sectors. 
The second reason why the popular front did little to advance the CPSA's 
relation to black workers was that its orientation to blacks was 
mediated thr,)ugh the all iance it sought to c'jnstruct with the national 
liberation organisations: at first the All Africa Convention (AAC) and 
then the ANC. First to Jabavu and then to Seme. the two liberal leaders 
of the AAC and ANC \"espectively, the Party said: 'Let us put away the 
differences of the way toward national liberation. All of u. have one 
common cause' (11), Since neither the AAC nor the ANC were at the time 
at all interested in building a labour movement, the result was that in 
work among black people the priority of the CPSA was to attract the 
middle class nationalists rather than organise workers, This did not 
mean that selme individual CPSA members and groups ,jid not become 
involved in the organisation of black unions, particularly in those 
regions where the party's national line was least dominant. Notably Ray 
Alexander played a leading role in the formation of the South African 
Railway and Harbour Workers Union in the Cape, On the Witwatersrand, 
however, the CPSA verbally supported Makabeni'. Co-ordlnating Committee 
of African Unions but was itself largely inactive, 
Further, the party's hostility to trotskyis. cut it off frOM the main 
organising focus of the black trade union movement, Max Sordon's Joint 
CoMMittee. Thus when important unity talks were held between the Joint 
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and C.j-.jrdinatin.; C'j£flmittees in 1938 and Makabeni resisted unification 
I):' the .~r.Jund that the sel:I'etal'ies .)f black tl'ade un1oJl1s must n'Jt be 
!,I.t-lite - in etfe.:t an ultimatum that unity would .Jnly be possible on 
clJn.ji ti.Jn tr.at Max G'Jrd.)n played n.J leading rlJle - the CPSA supp'JI'ted 
Makabeni' s p.)si tion n'Jtwi thstanding its 0I0Il11 p'Jl icy .)f advocating the 
aft i liation of blad unions t'J the whi te-·jominated Tl'ades and Labour 
Counci I . (1 2 ) 
At the international level it was di fficul t to recon.: ile the CPSA' s 
espousal 'Jf liberal-democ,'ati.: goals in South Africa with its 
endorsement .jf the show-trials and off ic ial hlurders committed by 
Stalin's ,'egime against all manner of 'Jpponents. One mi li tant. N. 
Mokgatle, wh'J was later t'J join the Party, expressed the ,'epugnance that 
many 'Jthel's must have felt in the 1931)s in the following te1"ms: 
While I was rlesitating whether I should apply for membership of 
the Communist Party. newspapers came along with 1"eports that the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union was being purged of its best 
and leading figures,., Some were sentenced to death by firing 
squads, After reading the verdicts, I remember asking myself, 
how can I join the party which destroys its cream? (13) 
The popular front period lasted from 1935 to 1939, It introduced a fresh 
poli tical a,ir after the sectarianism of the preceeding third period, but 
unlike France or Spain the party did not find itself at the head of any 
.. ss upsurge, To the extent that class militancy and organisation aMOng 
black workers were escalating, the CPSA was largely divorced from these 
deVelopaents, The party could not claim to have made a Major break-
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thr,)u,~h, The p,)pular fr':mt pe\~iod ,:ame t,) an en,j when the battle-ground 
of Europe brought about a new turn in Soviet foreign policy and with it 
a radical change in the CPSA's internal orientation in South Africa, 
In August 19:39 the n,:on-aggressi,:on pact between Hi tler and Stalin was 
signed, P'Jland was divided up between German and S':oviet f')rces, Finland 
was rlan,jed over t,) the S,:oviet occupation and the (:':'mintern turned its 
ba.:k ,)\1 popular fronts against fascism and embrace,j instead a poli.:y .:>f 
')pp,)si ti,)n t,) what it sometimes characterised as an inter-imperialist 
war and sometimes as an imperialist war by France and Britain against 
Germany and the Soviet Union, It called off its anti-Hitler crusade at 
the very moment when the nazi legions marched to enslave Europe, The 
Comintern's rhetoric was couched in leninist language, for the working 
class to 'put an end to the war after its own fashion", to destroy 
.)nce and f.:>r all the fundamental causes giving rise t·;) imperialist war', 
but its content was an agreement between the dictators to share the 
spoils of Europe together (14), The Comintern's new instructions to its 
member parties around the world were that both belligerent camps. the 
nazi and the democratic, pursued imperialist aims, Either there was 
nothing to choose between them or the democracies were presented as the 
major enemy, 
Among CPSA members in South Africa there was shock and confusion at 
first but the party soon acceded to the new line and found a nuMber of 
secondary benefits flowing frOM it. In opposition to the South African 
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'3.jvernment· s parti.: ipation in the \liar a.~ainst Hitler I the party could 
f.jCUS on a pel'.:eptive critique .:>f the .:.::mtradi.:ti.jns bet\lleen the I'a.:ism 
(If tr,e ::;.juth Afri.:an state and its \liar .jn the side of I.jemocracy', The 
c.jntrast \lias PQse.j in p.j\llel"ful terms: 
Let us not .jream about break i ng the c r,ai ns of Nazism overseas, 
\IIhen \lie .jul'selves are ,:hained like r,el.)ts in our o\lln .:Ijuntry 
HO\llever much 1 \IIestern democracy' endeavours t.) rid the \IIor ld I)f 
the barbar.jus .:reed I:.f Nazism, they cannot fi.~ht \IIi th .:lean 
rlands, (1 5 ) 
The CPSA declared that the war against racism and fascism must start at 
home in the fight for the demo.:ratic l'ights of the black majority. 
Ed\llard Roux e~:empl i f ied the approach \IIhen he argued that: 
to European \II'Jrkel'S \IIho have enjoyed the benef its of democracy 
... this may seem a fairly good reason for supporting democratic 
governments \IIaging war against fascist governments", for the 
oppressed N.:>n-Europeans in the c"lonies. these arguments \IIill 
seem unnecessary, for we in the colonies have suffered for years 
under a governnlent which seems to us little different from 
f asc ism, (16) 
The idea that • the \liar for democracy begins at home' was coupled \IIith a 
commitment to republicanism, It was stressed that 'the main struggle 
which confronts the party is the anti-imperialist struggle' for the 
establishment of an independent republic in South Africa not under the 
control of British imperialism (17), The party conceded that this policy 
caused probl..s as far as its relation to right-wing afrikaner 
nationalists was concerned, noting at its 1940 conference that the 
dil .... of 'oppose the war and support the pro-Nazi nationalists' could 
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n,)t be aVlJided even th,)ugh this p'Jlicy did n'Jt have universal support 
amc,n'd the members, (18) 
The CPSA's turn put great pressure ,)n its 1 inks with its erstwhile 
pr,j,~ressi ve all ies all ,)f whom wel'e strongly pro-war, TLC bureaucrats 
dubbed them 'Communazis' and accused them 'Jf establishing' a new god 
called Sta.lin' and Bill Andrews was not re-ele,:ted to 'Jffice in the TLC 
(19), n'Ie ANC and the AAC, after initial hesitation about supporting a 
war in whi.:h bl~ck sol.jiel·s were n.jt even permitted t,;, carry arms, gave 
their full support tel the war effort and declared their joint intention 
to • counterac t the mis,:hievous (anti-war) doctr ines that are being 
disseminated among Africans' (20), The governnlent was intensely hostile 
to anti-war a.ctivity, charging Yusuf Oadoo under the war emergency 
regulations for publishing a leaflet addressed to 'non-Europeans' which 
de.:lared: 
You are being asked to support the war for freedom. justice and 
democracy. 00 you enjoy the fruits of freedom, justice and 
deMOcracy? What you do enjoy is pass and poll-tax laws. 
segregation. white labour policy, low wages, high rents. 
poverty, unemployment and vicious colour-bar laws. (21) 
On the other hand, the CPSA's turn away fro. the popular front freed the 
it frOM its policy of lno public criticism' of potential alii •• and 
allowed it to appeal directly to black workers. The CPSA could now begin 
to organise black worker. in earnest, arguing that I the people's 
interests w1l1 be safeguarded against the evil. of war economy only by 
... ns of an independent .truggle for rights ••• There are the i ... diate 
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e.:.)nQmi.: demands al"isin.;! out of the increased .:ost of living", There 
al'e imme.jiate PQl i ti.:al .jeman.js al" isin.~ out 'Jf the GQvernment· s attack 
upon £IIi 1 i tant trade union leaders and Comll\unists. These demands n\ust be 
taken up' (22). 
It was in this period accordingly that initiatives to form the African 
Minewol"kel"s' Union and CNETU were taken by the CPSA and a working 
relation wi tt"l trotskyist trade union organisers like Max Gordon was 
f.)rll"led. At the 1940 party ':'Jnference the executive warned that the 
government would gain black support for its war-effort unless 'the 
people are led in a struggle for their own rights and economic 
improvement, unless they are made t'J see that the war provides an 
opportunity for a strong forward movement' (23), For the party the 
struggle at home was determined primarily as a means to obstruct the war 
against fascism abroad, but the anti-war line gave free rein to 
militants in the party who were chafing at the bit in their endeavour to 
turn to black workers for their own sake and in their own right, 
One of these was Ray Alexander who used the political space aade 
available to criticise the Johannasburg branch for its lack of work in 
trade unions generally and its neglect of the aineworkers, She urged the 
organisation of African Miners: 'it is not impossible, It can be done, 
It Must be done. All obstacles MUSt be overcome by Bolsheviks' (24), At 
the 1940 CPSA conference, W, Kalk, a trade union organiser in the TLC, 
could now say what would have been impossible a year earlier: 
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The trotskyists in JClhannesburl~ can call a meeting clf 10,000 
Afri,:ans, but the Party ,:an't. The Party has n'jt the elementary 
cncepticl\i ,:;n h'jw to clrganise tl'ade unions. We had strong unions 
in 192:3. Whel'e al'e they tQ,jay? The Party had a sectarian left 
outlook - strike, strike, strike - that is all they heard and 
the I'esul t was that the Afri·:an unions believed that the 
CQmmunists brou'~ht thel'll into trouble. The TI'otskyist unions can 
paise the m"ney. They have neg'Jtiated with the employers an,j the 
Labour Department. So the Trotskyists have succeeded because 
they had "ne man with ,:"nsiderable influence. (25) 
This view was supported at the c'jnference by Edwin Mofutsanyana who 
agreed that Gordon was 'a leading figure among the Africans t,:lday' and 
that although he went to the Labour Department and the employers to 
'settle the question ina pea,:eful manner.,. he kept on organising the 
workers. Therefore he succeeded' (26). 
The 'anti-imperialist' period was a productive time for the CPSA in 
relation to black working class organisation, Just as popular frontisM 
had been a release from the excesses of sectarianiSM, so too anti-
imperialiSM was a release frOM the liMitations of popular frontisM, The 
fundamental question facing the CPSA wa~ how to integrate its rapidly 
developing working class base in South Africa with its fealty for the 
policy imperatives of the stalinist state in Russia. For militants like 
N Mokgatle the pact with Hitler was too much to swallow whatever the 
secndary benefits were for the CPSA's orienation to black labour, 
rIokgaile recounted that he was ready to join the Party when 
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another st'Jrm .:ame al.)ng t.) blow Il'e off, It was the arrival .)f 
M'Jlot.)v in Bed in to sign a n.)n-aggresion pact with Ribbentrop, 
Fas.:ism j.)ining hands with Communism, enemies becoming friends: 
• N'J', I said, • not for me'", I was disappointed to hear that 
Communists allover the world, including the Soviet Union, were 
not supporting the war", I was sure that if Hitler won, fascism 
in South Africa would have w.)n, (2.7) 
In June 1'341 the German invasion .)f Russia il,augurated another 
dramatically new turn for the CPSA, 
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Frm,) the CPSA's viewpl::>int the entry of the S'::>viet IJnion into tt-nli war 
transf,)rmed its natUl"e fr,jm an intel'-impel'ialist 1:I)nflict to a genuine 
strul;:jgle f,::>r democracy against fascism, As one wl"iter reasoned in the 
thel)retical JOUl'nal Freedom, I the S,)viet state is not an imperialist 
state; it is the first socialist state, A war fought by the Soviet Union 
is a just war, a progressive war, which must be supported by every 
se,:tiOI1 of the wOI'king .:lass and by all '::>ppressed peoples, Only pe,::>ple 
who deny that the Soviet Union is a socialist state and who refuse to 
a.ccept the statement that a victory of the Soviet Unil::>n wi 11 be a mighty 
blow fl::>r the international working class can label the war as an 
imperialist struggle ' (28), 
After a short interval the CPSA declared its full support for the war 
and f,)r the Smuts I~overnment'$ participation in it, It now took the view 
that the patriotic duty of workers was to increase production for the 
war effort: I the war si~uation', the Central Committee declared, 'calls 
for the full and uninterrupted mobilisation of all labour reserve. and 
that the working class as a whole is solid in its determination to take 
all the action necessary for the defeat of Hitlerism' (29), The party 
called for 'total war', by which it Meant arming black soldiers. 
stopping inessential production on the gold aines and transferring it to 
war-related industry, putting an end to war-profiteering, the 
suppression of pro-German elements within afrikaner nationalism and MOst 
of all for 'all-out production for Victory', It suggested the creation 
of workers' production coeMittees to I increase output, safeguard the 
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workers' interests and prevent sabotage', in return for which it sought 
an improvement in the standard of living of black workers and the 
rec.:.gni ti.,n .:.f black trade unions in .:.rder t.:. mClbilise the hUinan and 
material I'esources .:.f S.;:)uth Afd.:a behin.j the war eff'Jrt, (30) 
T.:. the workers the party sai.j that their fate depended on victory in the 
war, I t called upon workers t.:. tl'y 'all ways ,;:)f settling disputes wi th 
the bosses before .:a11 ing strikes' and dec lared that strike action 
sh.juld be employed .jnly as a last resort, It l,)bbied the government • t,j 
remove the conditions that are driving workers into measures injurious 
to the war effort', saying that 'where section~ of the working class 
resort to strike action, it is because conditions are forcing them to 
obtain relief from the crushing burden imposed upon them and no 
alternative means of gaining some improvement appear to be open to 
them', It defined the role of the workers as being 'the driving force 
behind the whole-hearted war effort and its most vigilant guarantors, 
Their contribution is to bring about the greatest possible production of 
goods required for the war' (31), To the government the party said that 
'the Communist Party is fully aware of strengthening the governMent in 
its war effort, Our criticisms of the government are positive, designed 
to awaken enthusiasm, obtain popular support and enable all forces to be 
utilised for victory', In this spirit it chastised the governMent only 
for its failure to adopt a resolute policy, blaMing those interests 
which 'desire victory but are not prepared to change the social and 
economic structur. of South Africa in order to secure victory', The CPSA 
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saw i tsel f as the brl;)ker I::.f the overriding nati.)nal interest: • the most 
determine.j an,j unl:ompromisin9 fi.~hter against fascism' (32). 
The CPSA's strategy was to build a national front of all anti-fascist 
for.:es, 1 which wi 11 force on the government the changes that are 
ne.:essary'. The appeal went again to the white labour bureaucracy, the 
nati.)nal 1 iberati.;)n movement and the • progressi ve' sections of .:api tal. 
Excluded were 'the critics of our policy of supporting the war effort. 
They are the F.;)urth International ists, Trotskyists, the poisonous 
enemies of the S.;)viet Union ,., who refuse to regard the Soviet Union as 
a socialist state' (33), Their external criMe was criticism of Stalin, 
their internal .:rime was support for direct action by workers. 
In its ,)wn terms the national front approach proved far More successful 
during the war than the popular front had been before, partly because 
the CPSA started the period with a base already constructed within the 
black labour movement in its previous 'anti-imperialist' pariod. With 
leading trotskyist organisers like Max Gordon immobilised by the state 
on account of thair continued anti-war activities, the CPSA soon 
consolidated its influence over tha black trade unions: of the fifteen-
aan comMittee initially chosen to develop tha Mineworkars' Union eight 
ware frOM the Party and with the detention of Gordon the party's control 
was secured, rn. Chairman of the union was a Communist, J B Marks. and 
Marks was to beco.e Chair.n of CNETU in 1945 in place of l'IaIcabani. The 
Party was also able to recover its standing in the Trades and LaboUr 
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Couno:l 1 hiel'al":l'w ';:tn a ':';:tmmon pr'J-lIIar and anti-str ike posi tion. In the 
eyes ,)f the government, the C:PSA won a degree .;)f respectabi li ty as the 
lQcal repI'esentative c,f the Russian war-effol't. The Minister of Justice 
became the patr.;)n ,;)f the Fdends .:of the S,;:)viet Union and Mrs Smuts 
becal .... e patron 'Jf Medi,:.l Aid to Russia, both Comll\unist fronts. Whi te 
Communists were elected as members of the Johannesburg and Cape TOllln 
City c,;)uncils. The Party press was allollled extra nelllsprint and the 
': i rculation ,;)f its two nelllspapers. Guardian and Inkululeko, were said to 
reach a t,;:)tal Qf 67,000. (:34) 
Most significantly of all, the p~rty was able to con~truct an alliance 
with the ANC on the basis of their comlllon support for the w~r eff'Jrt and 
common policy of subsuming mass action to legal lobbying. The ANC's own 
view on industrial a,:tion w.s illustrated by a letter sent by Dr XUll'la, 
President General o:d trle ANC, to General Smuts in 1942 just after the 
shooting of black municipal workers at Marabast.d. He wrote: 
We are al.rmed at the number of avoidable ~trikes that have 
taken place racently. It al~o seems to us that the .. thod~ used 
to deal with some of the participants in the.e strikes are not 
calculated to improve the situation ••• The use of soldiers and 
arMOured cars against unarmed strikers .ay be wrongly 
.isconstrued by the rank and file of our people ... We deplore 
the occurrence of any strike at the present time, as w. real is. 
that they tend to impede the national war effort as well as to 
strain race relations between whites and black~ ... We are 
anxious not to Hbarass the governMnt... We hullbl Y and 
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I"espe,:tfully \"equest the P,"ime Minister t'J receive a ,::Ieputati'Jn 
f rorn the ANC and CNETI) ... tc, assist y,:ou toward settlement of 
re,:ent strikes and prevention of future strikes, (35) 
Fr'Jm the CPSA's pel"spective its alliance with the ANC leadership was a 
crucial pr'Jp f'Jr its 'national fl"Ont' poli,:y and it allowed the party to 
win a definite influence within the Transvaal region of the ANC and on 
the ANC Nati'Jnal E;<:ecutive, In 1945 three leading C'Jn~munists - Moses 
Kotane. J B Marks and Dan Thl'Jome - were members of it and through men 
like '(usuf Dad'Jo the CPSA also won a str'Jng p'Jsi tion wi thin the Indian 
C'Jn'1ress, From the ANC's perspective, its alliance with the CPSA 
facilitate.::1 its ba.::Ily needed a.:cess to the african working .:lass, In 
this convergence of interests was to be found the political force which 
above all determined the direction of the black laboUl" Movement, 
Thli ~NC 
The route by whi.:h the ANC reached this position was of an entirely 
different nature from that taken by the CPSA. Prior to the. 1940s, with 
the possible exception of two brief periods of radic.lis.tion in the 
19205, the Afric.n N.tional Congress had represented more or le.s 
exclusively the aspir.tions of the .frican middle cl.s.e., It was a 
liber.l organisation, favouring the gradual extension of the suffrage to 
'civilized' african •• lone, fearful both of the blanket african from the 
reserves and the working class african in the towns, its Methods limited 
to peaceful petition. and deputations (36), The social schism between 
the 'civilised' and 'blanket' african in the early days of this century 
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was cau';Jrlt well toy Macah Kunene when he sp,)ke ,)n behal f ,)f the peasant 
middle classes in 1905: 
I f the whi te pe')ple and the Kin'~ were t,) desert us 11')1,11, " there 
is a great se,:tion of us who have appl',)~dmated to", the white 
Nlan's way ,)f living", and there is a large number of us who 
have not advanced at all,.. I am afraid that those who have 
remained in their former state would kill us all, particularly 
civilised natives, because we have bought land, they ,j,) n,)t 
approve of the ownership of lands, They know too that whenever 
there ha.s toeen a war, against Natives like ourselves, we have 
allllays been with the government, (37) 
By the mid-1930s the ANC lIIas a terribly weak organisation. J B Marks ,)f 
the Communist Party pronounced it 'literally dead' in 1935 and the 
questi,)n posed among ANC veterans was whether ')1' not attempts should be 
made t" resusc i tate it. 
The reason why the ANC was in such poor shape lIIas not because its 
leaders were cowardly, as the CPSA had charged in its sectarian moments, 
but because the social base of the ANC had eroded beneath it. Its main 
source of support for the first twenty five years of its existence came 
from the relatively privileged stratum of independent african peasants, 
By the mid-1930s, how.ver, particularly after the collapse of 
agricultural COMmOdity prices in the Depression, the independent african 
peasantry was severely reduced in numbers and power, The ANC had 
received soae support from the african aristocracy of chiefs and 
headmen, bu~ with thair absorption into the state administration the 
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ANC' s Council of Chiefs, .)n which the hereditary arist.:)cra.:y had an 
automati.: ri.~ht t.:. sit, had n.:.-.:.ne to fill its seats, 
The third group from which the ANC drew support was the urban 
intelligentsia, in the main the children of the african peasantry, whose 
':'Jmmi tment t.) edu.:ation allowed them to escape the fate awaiting the 
peasantry itself, They became ministers. clerks, teachers and civil 
sevants; a few of the more privileged became do.:tors and lawyers; some 
entered pre.:ariously int.) small manufacture as blacksmiths, printers, 
wagon-builders and the like, More educated, worldly and strategicailly 
located in the centres of urban life, they were in the 1930s in the 
process of becoming the natural leaders of the african nationalist 
movement (38), They were however a small group only beginning t.:;, assert 
their political identity, No l.:mger did they distance themselves 
entirely from the blanket and working class african, but they tended to 
see themselves as a mediation between the white ruler and the uneducated 
african, Or Xuma revealed this attitude of mind when he wrote in 1930 
that 'the educated African is our hope, our bridge." He should be 
brought into close contact and co-operation with the thinking European, 
He must be consulted in all matters affecting the African COMMUnity. It 
is he and he alone who can best interpret the Europaan to the African 
and ~e African to the European' (39), 
At this ti .. the ANt had little support outside a SMall .iddle class 
circle, Mahatu Sandhi caught an aspect of this probl_ when he told the 
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Rev :;S Tema in 19:39 that • whi le most .)f your leaders are Christians, the 
vast mass (.f the Bantu are n.)t Christians;, You have adopted European 
dress and manners and have as a result become s trangel's in the midst of 
y.)ur .jWI1 pe.)ple, P.)litically that is a disadvantage, It makes it 
difficult for you t.) l'each the heart .)f the masses' (40), African 
national ism had to adapt or die and a.japtation meant reaching out t.) the 
masses, This was the hist.)ric I'ole c.f the urban african intelli.~entsia, 
whose own radical ism was born .)ut of tt-.e indignities and f rustrati')11 
they suffere.j at the t-.ands of white s.).:iety, the yawning .~ap between the 
liberal ideals in which they were s·:hooled and the racist reali ties of 
South African life and their hard battle to survive as a middle class 
against the competition of the whi te petty b.)urgeoisie, 
The first tentative sign of the new radicalism in the ANC came in 1935-
36, that is, before the revival of working class militancy, when the ANC 
partiCipated in the All Africa Convention (AAC) to express its 
opposition to the Hertzog Bills, The bills further restricted the 
electoral and property rights of africans, undercutting lib.ral 
expectations of the gradual integration of educated africans into the 
body politic, Th. new radicalism reflected a growing belief that the 
ruling class was no longer interested in an accamodation with the 
african middle clas.es, Joining the AAC was a radical step for the ANt, 
since the AAC comprised coloureds as well as africans, COMMUnists and 
trotskyists as wall as nationalists, and since it declared its 
uncoMpromi.ing hostility to the government's attack on tha black middle 
cia ••••. On the other hand, the radicalisa of the AAC was limit.d. The 
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method of protest it employed was still based on deputations to 
1~1:)Vernment affirminl~ loyalty tl:O the crown and IJn ,:hristian e~<hortation 
to prayer, The aspirations of the AAC were for a qualified franchise 
base,j IJn a ',:ivilisation test' ,:of edueatil:on and prlJperty, The AAC was 
not opposed to separate development in the sOI:ial sphere and no effort 
was made in the Ijirection of working dass l:organisation, (41) 
The willinl~ness ,:of the government to nel;Jotiate kept aliVe the hope of 
aCI:omoljation, As a substi tute for the loss of suffrage by Cape africans, 
it conceded the formation of an advisory body for africans , the Native 
Representative C'Juncil (NRC), and created a separate voters I roll for 
propertied Cape africans which all'Jwed them to elect three white Members 
of Parliament and two white Provincial Councillors, Additional land was 
promised f'Jr the reserves, though seemingly not delivered, and the 
powers of chiefs and headmen were reinforced, Legal rights to the 
purchase of land by africans were formalised, proving attractive to 
landowners who hoped that segregation would open the door to acquisition 
of more land, For the members of this class, segregation could be lived 
with as long as they had access to wealth and power within their own 
segregated areas, Although the AAC initially passed radical resolutions, 
including the call to boycott the NRC, a deal was struck and the NRC was 
not boycotted, The role of the AAC has bean idealised by some of its 
participants, notably I B Tabata, the later founder of the Non-European 
Unity Mov .. ent, as the definitive political expression of the turn to 
.a. militancy, It was not this but it was a tentative first step in a 
new direction, (42) 
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At the Qutset Qf WQrl.j War Two. the annual cQnference of the ANC 
i'es.::.lved tt-,at it would advise africans not tQ partkipate in the war 
until the ',;jcJVernment granted • full democratic I'ights', When the 
I~ovel'nment promised t,j reform segre,~ationism a.f ter the war was over, 
both the ANC and the AAC offered full support for the war effort, In the 
,:ourse of the war, the ANC responded in some measure t,j the new 
mi li tancy ,:oming f rom below, 111 Africans I Claims, its I\\ani fest,::. base,j ,jn 
the Atlantic Charter, it called fQr 'the extension to all adults 
I'egardless of race of the right to vote' (43), This was i. m'jve in the 
directi,jn clf universal suffrage although still ':onsistent with a nem-
racial property franchise and with a separate roll for africans, Formal 
authorisation was given to the establishment of the ANC youth League and 
Women's League. but the radicalism of the former was kept in check under 
the paternalistic eye ,)f Or Xuma. while the Women's League was run by 
the wife of Or Xuma with an emphasis on its 'tea-and-typing' functions. 
Women were allowed full membership of the ANC for the first time and the 
restriction on membership to persons 'belonging to the aboriginal races 
of Africa' was scrapped. Racial restrictions. however. were retained for 
officers of the ANC. The Upper House of Chiefs in the ANC government was 
formally abolished though it had long been defunct. 
The ANC leadership during the war was still a cautious and aiddle cIa •• 
political body, coaaittad to a liberal-nationalist constitutionalism, 
This was the organi.ation whose alliance the Ca.aunist Party sought with 
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limited suc,:ess in the 'popular frcmt' peri'Jd c~f 1935-39. The 'anti-
imper ial ist' peri.Jd 'Jf the CPSA disrupted this arrangement but between 
1941 and the end of the war, for all their profound difteren,:es of 
Ijl'i'~il1 and ideology, the ANC and CPSA were able to work together 'In a 
programme which might be summed up in shorthand as one of liberal-
democratic reform and restraint. 
Two key p'Jints emerge from this history, The first is that, contrary to 
most Qf the Qrthod'Jx accounts, for much of the 19405 consti tutional isn) 
was just as much the preserve of the Communist Party as that of the Xuma 
leadership of the ANC. What has been called 'the pure class organisation 
and mobilisation of the proletariat', was not in fact on the agenda of 
the CPSA, Within the literature the defects of the politics of 
'petitions and deputations' are often laid upon the shoulders of african 
nationalism alone, but this was not true. During the fateful years 
between 1941 and 1945 the CPSA was a crucial prop and active protagonist 
for this policy, 
The second point concerns the direction of change in the ANC, Compared 
with its policies and practices in the 19305 the ANC had in fact moved a 
long way from a liberal elitism which almost entirely reMOved it frOM 
the masses toward a liberal democratic reformiSM which in its own way 
related to the aass of africans, For the young intelligentsia who forMed 
the ANC youth League, these advances in the leadership of african 
nationalis .. ~ar.d totally inadequate, What was needed in ttwlr eye. 
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was a much firmer '::'1' ientati,:m t'J mass struggle and the capture ,:.f power. 
'RetUl'n trle land t'J the people' was the m.;:.ti fit .;:.ffered in contrast to 
what was seen as the leadership's servile and illusory dependency on the 
false pr,:omises ,:)f liberalism. The I":ole played by the C.::.mlnunist Party was 
t., support the old leadership against this new radicalism. Not only did 
this a,:t as a block .:m the poli tical ascendence ,::.f the afl'iean radicals 
dur ing the war, but it also .:ut the Communist Party of f from inf luene ing 
this powerful new f.:.rce in a s':II:ialist directi,:m. Indeed the CPSA's 
policy during the war helped to identify socialism in the eyes of the 
membel's ''Jf the Y.;:.uth League as essentially an ·;:.bstac Ie to a mol'e I'adical 
form of political leadership. 
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As th~ prosp~ct of liberal r~form visibly receded in the latter years of 
the war, the people's f r.)nt p.)l icy entered very choppy lIIaters. The CPSA 
responded to) the o~r')lIIth ,jf state repression with its own ,:ampaigns: the 
Anti-Pass Campaign of 1944, the League for Rights and Justice also in 
1944, the People's Conventi'jn Can\paign in 1945. These initiatives 
remained within the same liberal-democratic framework, an alternative to 
direo:t a.:tiojn by w.)rkers. The Anti-Pass ,:ampaign, f.:.,' example, initiated 
by the CPSA and eventually supported by the ANC, ')"ganised its own 
successful dem.)nstl'ation in 1944 as a prelude to a peti tion of one 
millit)n signatures calling for the end of the pass laws. At the same 
time in Alexandra the CPSA j.)ined with the ANC in opposing calls frOM 
the 1 ef t to extend the bus boycott to other towns and f .)1' CNETU to 
organise a general strike in support of the Alexandra residents. The 
anti-pass .:ampaign f.)undered, the mill ion signatures were never 
collected, the Prime Minister refused t.) see the leaders and when SOOt) 
supporters demonstrated outside parliament they were arrested and fined. 
An attempt to revive the campaign in 1946 through the burning of passes 
and a one-day general strike was postponed indefinitely after the defeat 
of the miners. 
Increasingly spurned by progressive capital and white labour and faced 
with a black labour movement in disarray, the CPSA was forced to turn 
increasingly to the third lag of its national front alliance, the ANt. 
Even the ANC, however, pres.ed by the rise of anti-communis. within both 
its radical and conservative wings, began to distance itself at the end 
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of the war from its erstwhile ally in order to assert the prior claim of 
afri.:an nationalism e,ver cc,n\n\unism, A key m'Jn\ent was when Xuma addressed 
the CNETtJ cont erence of 1945 tel stress the pr imacy 'Jf nation .)ver class, 
ar'~Ull1'~ that • '10 \"'a.:e that believes that salvation wi 11 .:ome f r.)n\ 
outside its ranks .)r through outside leadership is worthy of man's 
estate, No race that expects others t.J think f.)r it, that expe,:ts spoon-
feeding by 'Jthers, .:an deserve freedom', Warning against ',:hasing 
i.jeoi')';jical theoretical party I'ainb,)ws'. Xuma de.:lared that' it is ,)f 
less importance te, us whether .:api talism is sn\ashed or not, I t is of 
.~reater importan.:e t.J us that whi 1e .:api talism e~<ists. we must f i.~ht and 
stru.;jg1e to get .:.ur full share and benefit from the system' (44), Xuma's 
assertion 'Jf the hegemony ,)f african nationalism over socialism was 
aimed immediately at the trotskyists rather than the CPSA but it served 
as it warning t.) the CPSA t'JO that it had to recognise the primacy 'Jf 
afri,:an nationalism over ComMunism, 
In the eyes of the radicals in the Youth League, the CPSA was seen as 
the main ally of the traditional ANC leadership and as having encouraged 
or been responsible for the policy of 'submissiveness'. The Youth 
League's own form of african nationalism, based on a doctrine of 'raee-
pride' for the african nation, left little roo. for a class politics 
which threatened to fragment the unity of the african nation and 
diainish its separate identity fro. the other nations said to inhabit 
South Africa, The Youth League at ti ... displayed a paSSionate hostility 
to Communists who w.re presented as 'vendors of a foreign method ... 
(whose> cut-and-dried forMUla •••• only served to obscure the fundaMental 
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fact that lNe are .;:Ippresse.j n.:.t as a class but as a People, as a Nation' 
(45), Mandela was ,:me .jf the '31,.jUP which v'jted unsuc,:essfully for the 
e)c:pulsi'jn ,;:If C';:Immunists from the ANC in 1944, L,)oking back to his 
Y'jun'3er ,jays f I',:>m the docl< in 1964, he said: 
I held the view that the policy of admitting Communists to the 
ANC and the ': lose .:o-operation ""hich existed at times .)n 
spec i fi,: issues between the ANC and the Communist Party, would 
lead t.) a ""aterin';j down cd the ,:cln,:ept ,:>f Afri,:an nationalism, 
(46) 
The Y,juth League's hostility to the CPSA, however, should not be 
understood merely as an opposition of nationalists to socialism but also 
as an opposition of radicals to those ""ho ""ere seen as the the prop of 
the old liberal democratic establishment. 
Within the CPSA, the party's adherence to the national front policy in 
the latter years of the ""aI', long after its ineffectiveness ""as revealed 
in practice, led to growing discontent. At the CPSA's 1945 conference, a 
Communist dissident by the name of 6eorge Findlay described the party's 
national convention campaign as a 'complete flop', commenting thus: 
The 'progressive forces' are heartily sick of us '" Our line is 
a wash-out '" Our COMrades tried desperately to argue away the 
facts ". 'People all happen to be busy on a Sunday' '" We 
cannot go on flogging a dead horse and then explain its 
inactivity by saying that we are not flogging hard enough " , 
The People's Convention is of course the tactic of the United 
Front, 01.i trovi .. , This is the tactic that has not succeeded 1n 
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South Afril:a. If the Party goes on united fronting ... if it 
stresses its identi ty wi th Ijther .jrganisations... the party 
I:eases to have any apparent reason for existence. If YI)U want to 
have a United Front with the Labouri tes ... why m:lt dissl)lve YClur 
party and join theirs? .. Then you will have unity! The l.::>gi.: .::>f 
this position is so strong that in America we actually had 
Browder dissolving the Party, simply in I)\'der to stand cheering 
on Relosvel tl s bandwa,~on ... United F,'ontism misl:arrie,::i inti) 
liquidationism ... And very nearly the same thing has happened in 
South Africa ... There is a world of a difference between 
fighting alliances and the sinking of differences which takes 
place in a United Front. (47) 
'Browderism ' had becl~e a significant minority current in the CPSA. Earl 
Browder was the leader of the American Communist Party who at the behest 
of Moscow dissolved the the American Communist Party as a sign of its 
support for Roosevelt's new deal and the war effort. In the CPSA some 
individuals went down the same road of self-liquidation. 'Call me a 
Browderite ' , wrote one member, 'it won't be resented. If there exists a 
type of MarxiSM which requires us to weaken the war effort at this final 
and critical stage in order to uphold the sanctity of stale texts, then 
that type of "Marxism" must be discarded ' (48). The Browderite tendency 
did not succeed in the CPSA but Findlay was right that it reflected in 
extreme form the political liquidationism which prevailed in the party 
!lOre generall y I 
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Findlay attacked the .::.ppo,'tunism of the CPSA in embracing african 
nati.jnalisrt\ simply because the other parts .::.f the 'united front' fiJere 
not fiJi 11 ing to j.)in, though he misconstrued its S'Jurce as deriving from 
the entry of Labour Party members: 
We have a Labour Party, opportunistic, gradualist and 
comprort\ising enough, but hundreds fiJho fiJould like that fiJe11 
enough, are put off by the disgusting filth of its anti-
kaffi"ism. And that is fiJhy we get a good rt\any Labourites 
masquerading as Communists ... A very li ttle ref lection wi 11 show 
that a united front tactic cannot avail against an internal 
fascist development. . . unless you want to collaborate with 
opportunisti.: labour elements who will readily betray you. There 
is no ground for collaboration. (49) 
It was not, however, because labourites had entered the party 
unreconstructed that the CPSA supported 'united frontism', but rather it 
was because the CPSA embraced 'united frontism' that labourites were 
able to enter the party unreconstructed. The party line did not derive 
from the composition of the party, though the cOMposition of the party 
was doubtless a crucial factor in the application of the line. 
Nonetheless Findlay offered a penetrating critique of the party from 
within, even if hi. solution was restricted to a return to study 
circle •• 
Within the ter •• of r.ference originally set out for the national front 
in 1941-42, ~ CPSA MOVed to the right in the course of the war. In 
1942, for exuple, the CPSA had argued that I the governMnt for the salce 
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o)f the '3reat mining interests sidetracks enormous productive resources 
and the labour power cd 400,001) men for the production of a commodi ty 
1 ike 9':lld, which is practically valueless in the present war emergency' 
(SO). Yet as we have seen, in the following years the CPSA sought to 
restrain industrial action in the gold mines and even in 1944-45, when 
industrial action in South Africa could hardly affect the outcome ,:If the 
war, the CPSA sought to restrain calls for a national strike citing 
supp"rt f':lr a second front in Europe. It was only in 1946 that the CPSA 
rela~<ed its opposition to industrial action and belatedly gave its 
support t'J the miners's strike of that year. 
This was enough to alienate Dr Xuma who, according to J B "arks, 'just 
didn't show any interest' in directly confronting the government or in 
breaking from the war-time policy (51). It also incurred the w~ath of 
the Smuts government, which erroneously blamed the strike on Communist 
agitators. Many leading MeMbers of the Communist Party - including Kose. 
Kotane, Danie du Plessis, Yusuf Dadoo, Hilda Watts and Brian Bunting -
were among the over fifty persons accused of conspiracy and infringement 
of War Measur. 145 and convicted of the latter charge. Ther. were police 
raids on the offices of the Caa.unist Party, the 6uardi~n and .any of 
the trade unions. In Noveaber 1946 the authorities arrested the whole of 
the National Executive eo..ittae of the CPSA under a charge of sedition, 
while the afrikaner Nationalist opposition attacked the governMent for 
baing soft on cOllllUniu, allowing for exaMple a COMUnist, SU Kahn, 'to 
beCome a Member of Parli ... nt for Cape Western. As ~ cold war cliMate 
woruned, governMent reports invoked the spectre of COMUntst-inspirecl 
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subversion, one result of which was to confuse future historians over 
the actual historical role of the party, (52) 
With fingers burnt from its turn to militancy in 1946. the CPSA seems 
quickly to have returned to its former approach under the slogan of • 
broad democratic front against the Nationalists, This was a confused 
time for the Communist Party, with dissent within its own ranks. new 
pressures coming from Moscow and the impending collapse of everything 
which it had built up during the war, The policy it adopted was to call 
for an electoral pact with the United Party and the Labour Party and a 
common front with the ANC and the Indian Congress, the aim being to 
'keep the Nats out' and 'unite all sections of the people against the 
fascist menace', The party was critical of the United Party for its 
failure to provide 'a clear-cut alternative to the fascist aspirations 
of the Nationalists', but called on voters to 'deal a death blow to the 
Malanazis' by voting United Party wherever the CPSA and the Labour Party 
were not standing candidates, It called for 'the return to power of a 
government under which it is possible to work for progress and 
deaocratic advance', which meant in effect the United Party, and to 
include within the broad deMOCratic front 'every South African who is 
not in the Nationalist Party' (53), 
By now, however, the people's front policy had alMOSt entirely lost its 
purchase on reality, It Made good sense to prioritise the electoral 
daf.at of the Nationalists and therefore the electoral victory of the 
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United Party, but the reconstruction of a broad democratic front was a 
':hirne\~a, Despe\'ate times ,:alled for far fllore \~adical measures. The CPSA 
appealed again to the progressive wing of capital on the grounds that 
the Nationalists would 'sacrifice its profits to appease their g,)d of 
race and c,)lour' (54). Imagining the United Party as the pOlitical 
expression ,)f progressive capital. torn between the c')nf li,:ting aims of 
preserving white domination and of increasing profits by removing the 
colour bar fr,)m industry, the party drew the ',)bvious ,:on.: lusion' that 
its task was to transform this section into active adherents of the 
struggle against the ,:,)lour bar. Within the ranks of the United Party 
itself, however, the liberal wing under Leo Marquard had given up any 
hope of reforming it and was taking steps to forM a new and independent 
liberal party, The leadership of the United Party was far more 
interested in outdoing the Nationalists in anti-Communist and 
segregationist fervour than in joining a broad deMOCratic front with the 
Communists, A symptOM of the times was the Communist Party's lack of 
interest in black trade unionism. indicated by the nUMber of its trade 
union organisers who moved to politics, 
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In its relati.:::>n t., the ANC, the Communist Party .:hased the shadow of the 
Xuma leadership even as from within the ANC itself di5illusionment was 
setting in an.j far more I'adical voices coming to the fore, One ,:::>f the 
leaders of the Youth League, A P Mda. was writing about 'creating a 
revolutionary national front' at the same time as the CPSA was still 
holding onto its alliance with Xuma (55), The si tuation was not helped f.:::>r 
the C.jmmunist Party by the fa.:t that XUA)a himself wa5 mobilising in 
opposi tion t., Communist Party inf luence wi thin the ANC. 
For the ANC leadership the post-war years were ones of profound 
disillusionment, The Rev Calata wrote to XUM. in 1946 saying that General 
Smuts 'has disappointed us," because he must have known that we looked to 
him to give us freedom' (56), Z K Matthews l.-ented a yaar later the tragic 
weakness of South African liberali.m and Dr Moroka deprecated the 
government's post-war policy of fasciSM which he described as the 
antithesis of the Atlantic Charter (57), The crisis of confidance 
manifested itself most sharply in the ANC's attitude to the Native 
Representative Council, The youth League called for a boycott of the NRC 
and all other 'duMmy institutions' of this segregationist type, as a first 
step toward turning to MS. struggle and away f 1'011 dependency on the 
government, Within the ANC leadership too there was grOWing frustration 
with the failure of the NRC to influence government policy and the 
governMent's failure to honour its 'solemn pledge' to consult the NRC, In 
1944 the NRC coaplained about the governMent's failure to purchase Mora 
land for the reserves and about lack of freehold tenure for africans in the 
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urban areas. Relations got worse when the NRC was largely ignored over the 
1945 Native (I),'ban Areas) C,:msolidation A,:t which tightened up influx 
,:ontr"ls and when the government did nothing to ref or 1\\ the pass laws, grant 
re,:o,~ni tion to african trade unions or provide for african representation 
in local government. 
In June 1946 Xu.a initiated a Move for the suspension of the NRC in protest 
at the government's rejection of the anti-pass petition. The final straw in 
this 'breach of faith to the African people' came with the suppression of 
the miners' strike, which coin,:ided with the 1946 MeQting of the NRC (58). 
The government ignored NRC calls for the withdrawal of the use of force and 
for negotiations or arbitration. Pushed froM within by its own youth League 
to boycott the NRC. the ANC passed a compromise resolution calling for the 
council's temporary adjournment. Smuts tried to rescue the situation by 
meeting members of the NRC. including three elected ANC representatives. 
and offered the prospect of the NRC baing given more authority in the 
reserves some tiM in the future. Smuts wanted to give the NRC what he 
termed' a bona to chaw at' and strnsed the co..on interest which bound all 
the people of South Africa together. 'It is our country', he said. 'it is 
your country, •• We are all together in one society", You cannot have good 
government in the country and ignore the opinion of the uss of the people 
in it •.. This young child, South Africa, is growing up and the old clothH 
do not fit the growing boy' (59). And so the platitudes poured out. 
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Mosaka sUD\med up the grolNing dismay of the ANC leadership INhen he ~aid that 
durin'~ the INar the government 
did a good deal to create a new hope and faith in the Mood of the 
African people. We felt that new forces INere at INork as industry 
swept throughout the country ... causing the movement of people 
from one place to another. Throughout the late stages of the war 
a lot of legislation INas passed which made things more and more 
intolerable for us. We would like a new policy to be outlined 
which will give us hope and make for a better foundation for the 
future. (60) 
Even Xuma described Smuts' response as vague and disappointing and called 
for a further suspension of the NRC, concerned that 'the African INorker has 
become bitter and sullen' and might threaten to undermine the ideals of 
'democracy, christianity and human decency' (61). The issue was finally 
resolved by the ANC, with the support of the Communist Party, deciding in 
favour of contesting the NRC elections to be held in March 1948. Smuts, 
hOINever, refused to reconvene the adjourned NRC and it was not long before 
the new Nationalist gov.rnment resolved the boycott debate in its own 
fashion by disbanding the NRC frOM above, For the black INOrking class. the 
boycott debate was mainly a side-sholN. becOMing the Main act of african 
poli tics lat. in 1946 only becaus. the workers theHelves had been forced 
to the back of the political stage. Fro. this standpoint. the main issue 
confronting the political leaderShip was not whether or not to boycott the 
NRC, i tsel f a dying institution. but rather INhether and when and how it .s 
to turn to the .asses theMselves. 
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Ass~ssing th~ p~opl~'s front 
The first point is that thge people's front led the blacK working class and 
the liberation movement more generally to defeat in the 1940s. This is not 
to say that some other more radical policy would have succeeded where the 
people's front failed, but it is to say that we need to engage with the 
reality of its failure. The liberal-democratic paradigm in which the CPSA-
ANC alliance was framed pre-supposed that the rulers 'Jf South Africa were 
ready to reach an aeeomodation with the black working class and that the 
black working class had the social weight to force an accornodation 'In the 
rulers. On both counts the policy was mistaken. The state turned against 
consensual politics, directing its fire instead to extinguishing the threat 
posed by black workers, while black workers themselves lacked the power to 
resist the attacks mounted on them. When the militant wing of black labour 
responded through the language of direct action, their struggles also 
lacked the support of the trade union and political leadership. The balance 
of forces between labour and capital was such that they may well have ended 
in defeat whatever their leadership, but they were certainly weakened and 
demoralised by the leadership they had. The leadership failed to support 
workers in their illegal struggles and failed to win theM benefits through 
their own constitutional uthods. ,..... rewards for restraint failed to 
uterialiH. Instad the r.solve of the labour IftOv ... nt was underMined frOli 
within as the sjaMbok landed on the backs of the workers fro. without. 
The weaknesses of the people's front policy were well r.nearsed at t~ ti .. 
by all sections of the l.ft opposition, We shall turn to their critiques in 
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the next section, but here we must ask why the Communist Party held onto 
this perspective long after its problems had been revealed in practice, In 
its original f'Jrm the people's front policy made sense in its own terms: to 
support the war against nazism whatever qualms were held about the forces 
of ',jemocracy'; to adopt a strategy of gradual democratisation since there 
was both theoretical and practical evidence that the tensions between 
segregation and industrialisation were leading to liberal solutions by 
sections of the bourgeoisie; to advocate restraint by black workers since 
industrial action carried with it great risks for a young and relatively 
weak labour movel'l\ent and since direct action might frighten off the 
reforming wing of the state, It was for good reason that many militants 
were at first attracted to this consensual scenario, 
We said earlier, however, that we are not addressing a people's front sui 
~neris but a people's front of the Communist Party, determined by stimuli 
from the Soviet Union which had little to do with the struggle inside South 
Africa, This is important because it meant that until the line changed frOM 
Moscow, the CPSA could not learn fro. experience or at least could not 
apply the les.on. which it learnt from experience, So when the evidence was 
pre.ented in vi.ible and concrete fora that the people's front policy was 
not working, the leader.hip had both to persi.t and develop a fraM of aind 
to justify the unjustifiable, to turn failure. into succ ..... and to 
discredit criticism and critics, For the future of South African .ocialisa 
this was 'the raal defeat, 
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Chapter 4 
LatllJur .=tnd P"liti.-s' The Left nppo5itioo 
Thr.,ugh the 19405 there were p.,litical .:urreots on the left ':I"itical .:of 
what appeared t.:o them as the knavish attitude of self-restraint 
.:hal"a.:tel"isti.: .:.f the leadership .:.f the pe',ple' s front, A.jv.Jcatin.~ mass 
a.:ti.,n I"athel" than .:c.nsti tuti.)nal pressure an.j the .:apture .:.f pc,wel' 
rather than liberal I"efol"m, the .:ri tiques mounted by the left 'Jpposi tion 
.:aflle t., a head in 1943-44 with the f.)rmation of the Youth League in the 
ANC, the Progl'essive Trade Union Group in CNETU, the Workers 
International League in trotskyist circles and the Non-European Unity 
Movement as an alternative axis of bla.:k nationalism, Less important was 
als.:. the f'Jrmation .,f the African Democrati.: Party ref lecting the 
experien.:e .Jf .:ommunity a.:tivism, As a whole the left opposition sought 
to give political expression to what we might call the heroic wing of 
the movement but its component parts were deeply divided over thair 
diagnosis of the problem and prognosis of what was to be done, 
Within the black unions the Main opposition to the CPSA-ANC leadership 
came from trotskyists in the Workers' International League (WIL) and 
other militants in the Progr ••• ive Trade Union Group (PTU), We have .een 
-145-
that tr.:-tskyists were deeply inv.::>lved in the f.::.rmation and development 
.::.t tr,,'? bla.:k tra.je uni'Jn movement: they ini tiated its ,'e,:ove,'y in the 
late 1'330s and f.::>rmed the nucleus of the left wing in the black trade 
uni.:-n m.Jvement .jurin,;! the wa,', Dan t(,:)za le.j the Afri.:an Commer.:ial and 
Dlst"lbutive Workers' Union, 'Jne .,f the most ,:ombatative and best 
':)"';jal1lsed unions on the Rand, In 1944 tNtskyists f rom the new 1 y-f'Jrmed 
Workers' International League (WIU joined with Koza in building the F'TU 
as a left wing caucus within CNETU and callin.~ f·Jr a new lea.jership in 
CNETU, 
TM WIL-PTU offered a trenchant critique of the policies of CNETU and 
the ComMunist Party, It. general po.ition may be illustrated by the 
foll.::>wing statement issued in 1945 by the Provisional Committee of 
Mil i tant T,"ade Unions in its .: r i tique of dass collaborati'::>nism: 
As the · war f'Jr democra.cy' becon\es more and more markedly what 
it always was, namely an imperialist war for world domination by 
the imperial powers. and the imperiali.t. in the allied camp 
show that they are treating the people. of Greece, Italy, 
France, Belgium and occupied Germany ju.t a •• avagely a. the 
Nazi. did, .0 the rul.rs of South Africa COMe out more and more 
openly a. the .ubjugator. of toiler.", Gone are the fin. 
phra ••• of Smut.", In.tead he COMe. out openly with the 
doctrine of pr ••• rving 'whit •• upremacy, (1) 
What was needed, it was argued, was strong lead.rship 
to l.ad .truggl •• again.t the bos.... •• who wi 11 not .. 11 out 
the work.r., not cOMPrOMi •• it. principl •• ". not go down on 
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r\,)b wi th the bosses and tt".e g'jvernment ... ,:rawl t,j the pea,:eful 
fr'jn\ the Minister ,:,f Labour ... But when they have t,) dea.l with 
the pr')gressive 'jpposi tion t,) their spineless policies they ':OR\e 
down with force and decision. (2) 
The f'J,)tS t)f the pr,)blem we,'e traced t,) stal ini.n\! 
• 
eve,' Slnce RU5sia entered the war in 1941, stalinism has '::lan\pe,j 
,j()wn any mi 1 i tant ae ti,)n on the part ,)f the wor":el's, has played 
the ,',)le Qf str ike-breaker. (3) 
The starting point of the trotskyist critique of stalinism lay in a far 
more realistic appraisal of the tyrannical nature of the Soviet state 
and of the policies which that state enjoined for Communist Parties 
i ntlirnat iona 11 y, 
The question .rises •• to why the trotskyists proved unable to 
consolidate and extend their influence within the l.bour moveMant, There 
were many external factors at work here: it was no easy Matter to 
confront at the same ti •• a ruthless state and the opposition of the 
leadership of the liberation movement on the basis of the relatively 
undeveloped social forces available to the working class, The 
trotskyists' los. of mas. resonance was by itself no proof of error but 
there were major internal deficiencies in the alternatives which it put 
forward, Although the trotskyist critique of staliniSM was MOre profound 
and consistent than the other currents which broke from the stalinist 
MOnolith. in South Africa trotskyisM never fully eMancipated it .. lf frOM 
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its orIgins and r~main~d to a greater or lesser extent parasitic on that 
which It most f~rvently opposed. 
C.:,Immunists dId not have a 1'I\.:,Inopoly .:,In soft-peddling and legalistic trade 
uniomsl'l). Some 'jf the mel'l\bers of the PTIJ i tsel f were n.:,It immune tc, these 
pressures: for example, one of its number, A Segwai, was exposed for 
':'jrruption (4)ano another, C. F'h.:,Iffu, was attacked in Socialist Action, 
the paper .)1 the WIL, for his • weak and cowardly leadership' .:of the wood 
workers strike of 1945 (5), The key political issues, however, relating 
the Commu"ists and the trotskyists wet"e more fundamental, relatin';J in 
particular to the question of the war, In spite of its subjective 
intentions, the practi.:al effe.:t of the anti-war stance taken by the 
South Af r iean trotskyists was a form of poli tical indi fferentism: the 
reduction of fascism and social democracy to two parallel wings of 
imperial ism between which thet"s was little to choose, The trotskyists 
were .)f course fClr the defeat ':,If Hitler but there was a certain 
paro.:hial ism in the view that black workers should concern themselves 
only with their immediate economic struggles while the war was burning 
outside and millions were being murdered in the concentration camps, 
There was a certain gap in logic to say that the best and only way to 
fight Hiilerism abroad was to concentrate exclusively on the war at 
home, 
The trotskyist respons. to the war negated rather than transcended that 
of the CPSA: when the CPSA declared that support for the war agaiMt 
-148-
fascism meant '11) strikes, tr,e S,juth African trotskyists replied that 
suppljrt f"" strikes meant \11) support for the war against fascisrti. Some 
1 iberation movements in Ij,:,:upied Europe showed that it was possible fl)r 
mi 11 ions of WI)r\c:ers to find • way both tl, wage war Ijn Hi Uer 1 s armies 
and at the same time to fight their own national and often very 
\'eactionary b,)urgeoisies: t" fight in othe,' words on two fronts, This is 
not tl) ide.lise the libention movements in Europe but simply to affirm 
the p"ssibi 1 i ty of uniting the internal and external Ijimensions ,:,f the 
.:lass strul~gle, F"r the tNtskyists in South Africa, the fight against 
f.sc isl'l\ abroad and the fight against segregationism at home were 
artifi,:ially,:ounterposed, just as they were also ,:ounterposed in 
reverse fashion by the CPSA .fter 1941, For the CPSA, a united front to 
fight Hitlerism entailed that the working class capitulate to bourgeois 
liberalism, For the trotskyists, if the working class were not to 
capitulate to bourgeois liberalism, this demanded that it had to 
withdraw from the war against Hitler, 
The PTU-WIL responded to what it perceived as the class treachery of the 
ComMUnist Party leadership with calls for more militancy and no 
compromise within the trade union movement, The advocacy of militant 
trade unionis., however, was combined with abstract SOCialist propaganda 
without forging a viable link between them, The key probleM was a 
failure to integrate the deMOCratic aspect of the struggle with the 
ecOnoMiC struggle for socialiSM, The PTU agreed that the workers' 
iMMediate struggle was for c..ocracy: 'the dynaMisM of our struggle', it 
wrote, 'is clearly s .. n to be the struggle of 8 .illion people for ~ir 
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.jem.j.:l'ati.: \'ights' (6), At the same time it I'edu,:e.j the question ,)t 
derll.xl'aa:y t" that of so,:ialisrl), a.rgulng that short of socialisrt) trlere 
,:,)ul,j be no m,)vement t,)wal'd ,jemo':I'acy: 'the only ,:,)nceivable delllo,:racy 
will be the w.jrkel's' democl'acy', Revolution was ':'junterposed to the 
f i,~ht f,)r imrtlediate reforms: 'the days of ,:,)n,:ession to the proletariat 
are over .. , no single itelll ,:an be f'jught without fighting them all' 0), 
Its justificati,jn was based on a f'jrmalistic s,:hema according to which 
industrialisation was deemed impossible without the end of 
institutionalised I'acisll"l, the el1,j 'j1 il1stitutl'jnalised racism was 
Impossible without land reform and land reform was impossible without 
so': ialism, Ergo thi ,:ondi tion of industr ialisation was democracy and the 
o:ondi tion ,)f democracy was soc ialism: 'without the redivision of the 
land, the pre-requisite of an internal market, and abolition of the 
O:'Jlour bu, industrialisation ,:annot OCCUI', Only under socialism can 
this be achieved' (8), This view was to prove badly mistaken. It rested 
,jn the collapse clf the dem'Jcratic aspect ,)f the struggle into the 
socialist, based on an idealised view of the revolutionary potential of 
the black working class, 
The WIL fiercely rejected the CPSAI S policy of 'subordinating .... 
struggle to that of the capitalists under the pretext that w. MUSt not 
antagonise poliiical friends', but in response it tended to e.chaw all 
alliances, treating the workers as 'the one force capable of ca.pelllng 
the fulfilMent of deMOCratic aiMS' (9). In opposition to the CoMMunist 
Party'. 11beral-~rat1c approach to refor., ~ WILls tena.ncy was to 
pr .. ent the achiev ... nt of sociali .. a. the pre-condition of any ref ora, 
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turnl119 the idea of 'permanent revolution' inti::' Ii kind ,::.1 ultimatum, 
accordin9 to which nothing was possible prior to socialism and socialism 
made all things p,::.ssible. This f,)rm t)f p,)litical propat;1anda was combined 
with appeals f'Jr militant:V on the trade union and ,:ommunity fr.::mts but 
,:,)ul,j ntJt have been of much help tt) those \,.IlL activists involved in 
tl'ade ul1lon an,j c,::.mmuni ty 'JI";Janisati'Jn, ftJr whtJffi the immediate pra,:tical 
questi,)n was; not the capture 'Jf power but the s;urvival of the young and 
vulne,'able lablJur ffil)Vement. 
The \,.IlL emphas;ised the building of a genuinely revolutionary party as an 
.1 ternative til the CPSA, but the ,'evolutionary consciousness which it 
ascribed to the masses was largely a projection of the party itself with 
little relation to the actual array I)f class fllrces in South Africa. The 
tasks facing the weak and divided working class movement in the 1940s 
were momentous enough: to establish its own organisation and 
independence, to carve out for itself a space in SOCiety and to win 
political recognition from the state. The revolutionary syndicalisM 
espoused by the WIL represented the most concerted and deterMined 
attempt in the 1940s to reorient the black labour movement on class 
struggle lines, but politically it substituted the image of the October 
revolution for a concrete delineation of the democratic tasks ahead. 
If one pole of trotskyism was to subordinate deMocracy to socialis., the 
oppOSite pole was to subordinate socialiSM to deMocracy in the for. of a 
radical black nationalism organised under theu.brella of thl Non-
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EUN!="aan Unity M"vement, The pl'oblems t aced by tt".e WIL-PTI) in det ining a 
s'j,:ialist politics wel'e n.)t made easier by the Inore general climate .:.f 
national ism whict". had C')lI'Ie to pl'edominate among South African 
trotskyists at the time, Just as the C'jmmunist Party in the 1940s 
increasingly turned t" the afri.:an nationalism ,)f the ANC. so too the 
mainstreams ,)f the tl'otskyist m.)vement also turned t,j nationalism in the 
shape ,:,f the NEUM, At first sight this convergen.:e of both ends of the 
5')': ial ist spe.:truM t,)ward ')ne ,:or .:othel' kind ,:of blad: nationalism w.)uld 
seem tc. indicate the rec.:ognition ,:,f ne.:essity in South Afri,:an society 
,)f me.jiating ': lass p,)l i tics through a national ist lense, This was not 
the case, For the trotskyist mOVe£l\ent no less than for the ComMunist 
Party, the abandonment .:of the attempt to construct an independent class 
politics in favour of black nationalism was not a product of the 
imperatives .)f the racial social structul'e in South Africa but rather .:of 
the failure of the actually existing socialist movements to construct a 
c,:oherent socialist opposition to I'ac ialism, F,:or the trotskyists the 
journey from revolutionary socialism to nationaliSM followed a different 
road frOM that of the Communist Party - in their case rooted in their 
specific interpretation of the theory of permanent revolution ratnar 
than in the exigencies of general policies centered around the defence 
of the Soviet Union - but tr.. roads were parallel, 
In 1934 the Cape Town-based Lenin Club. the fount of South African 
trotskyism, divided into two main political organisations: the Workefs 
Party of South Africa (WPSA) and the Fourth International Organisation 
of South Africa (FIOSA), Despite differenc .. over the role of Afrikaner 
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nati,:onalism, they share,j a ,:,)mmon 'jpposition to the CPSA's slogan 'jf the 
'Native Republic' T';)I' its 'subordinating the class stl'uggle to the 
national struggle ignol'ing the white workers ... and e~(cluding the 
possibility of a united revolutionary working class'. While rejecting 
the Labour Party's racist vision of South Africa as 'a white man's 
':':luntry', the W,)rkel's Party dec lal'ed that the CPSA's 'Native Republic' 
slogan 'flows from the tilqually false assumption that South Africa is 
ex,:lusively a bla,:k man's ,:cluntry ... b,)und tlJ antagonise one section ,)f 
the wl)rking class against another'. FIOSA f,;)r its part decl.red that the 
'Native Republic I slogan ',:an Ijo nothing but harm. Its il\\mediate effect 
would be to split the working class ... It will repel large nUMbers of 
militant white workers ... A revolution which does not include the white 
workers as well as the black is doomed to failure' (10). 
The Workers Party approach to nation.lism was opposed by Trotsky, who 
wrote in reply in 1935: 
The proletarian party should. .. take the solution of the 
national (racial) question in it. own hands ... When the the.es 
say that the slogan of a 'black republic' is equally harMful for 
the revolutionary cause as is the slogan of a 'South Africa for 
the whit •• ', then we cannot agree ... In the latter there is the 
ca.e of supporting complete oppre.sion, in the for .. r there i. 
the ca.e of taking the first steps toward liberation ••• The 
proletarian r.volutionarie. must never forget the right of the 
oppr •••• d nationalities to .elf-deterMination. (11) 
The Worker. Party rapidly shifted ground. By 1936 it pointed to the 
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,:entroal i ty .:,f the • nat i ve p,·.;:,blem', l'J.:atln.~ it as an 'agrar ian' 
problem: 'this agrarian question ... is tt-Ie alpha and ol\\ega of the 
j'ev.:oluti.:.n' (12). It al·.~ued that the eno:>rmity .:of the land problel\\, with 
tt-Ie whi te 10% .:of the p.;:,pulation owning 0: lose t.;:, 91)~ of the land, meant 
that only s.:u:ialist ,'evolution .:ould s.:)lve it. At a time when bh.ck 
urban wo:orkers were beginning tc. discover their c·:)lle.:tive identity and 
dema\1.j ,·e.:.;:,gni tion .:;.f it, the W.:;.rke,·s Party turned its face t.) the land 
and III its mind metan\orphosed trle black w.jrkin.~ class (both in the t.:::>wns 
and ,)\1 tt-Ie whi te-.:owned farms) i nt.j • landless peasants'. Since it now saw 
n·) p.:.ssibility of socialism en\erging f".:::>I\\ white workers because of their 
"acism ')r iNm black w.jrk,irs because they were I'eally landless peasants. 
the W.jrkers Party thereupon adopted a two stage theory, the f ir'it stage 
.jf whi.:h was the national struggle for land re-distribution t.) the 
african peasantry, while SOCialist forn\s of struggle were relegated to a 
second stage sometime in the future. 
The thi rd-wor Id nationalism i"to which the Workers Party had assimilated 
was evident in the international contributions of its newspaper, T~ 
Sp~rk (13), One vivid example of this may be taken from its writings on 
the Palestine question, In 1939 it wrote that the deMands of the arab 
nationalist move.ent were • very modest': that all further iMaigration by 
jaws should be stopped, that further sale of arab land to jews should be 
prohibited and that an arab national governMent should be set UP. The 
problem as S~rk saw it was that as long as the arab nationalist 
MOveMent was led by the 'treacherous' arab bourgeoisie and clergy 'it 
will terMinate in foul COMprOMise' with zionis., In fact this anti-
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semiti.: landownin'~ class, whi,:h had led the p')groms against the jews 
and was at the time al'med by Mussolini. was bein.~ sUPP'jrted by the 
Palestinian C.)mmunist Party. What was needed in Spark' 5 eyes was a Illore 
I'escllute al'ab nati.jnal ist leadership I'eady t,) fight harder against 
jewish imrtHgrati.:m into Palestine and jewish occupation of Palestinian 
land. 
Spark put forwar,j a mb: ,)f abstract soc ialism and nati,)nalislIl. On the 
,:me side. jewish nationalism or zionism was described by Spark as the 
'direct pNduct' and 'playball' ,)t British imperialism. It was trying to 
'cash in on the sufferings of persecuted jews in Europe' for whom there 
was 'no special remedy except advance in union with the working class 
along the revolutionary road, .. The solution to the jewish problem lies 
in socialism' (14), On the other hand. Spark'saw it as the duty of 
mal'xists t,) take I a c lear. unambiguous stand in support of the colonial 
people in their struggle against imperialislll', that is, arab 
nationalism, What this meant in particular was a call for marxists to 
oppose any and all jewish immigration into Palestine. The prObl •• with 
the Palestine COmMunist Party, as Spark saw it, was that it was ready to 
compromise and allow some jewish imMigration. In general sp.rk declared 
that it was in favour of 'complete freedOM of Movement as part of our 
democratic rights', but 'jewish iMMigration into Palestine is SOMething 
entirely different' since zionists sought to use jewish iMMigration as a 
lever to win a Majority, 
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I t is an il1terestil1l~ ,:,)mrllent CI\1 h,)w oji fferentl y the international 
trl)tskyist m,)vement viewed the matter that when Spark published its 
views in The New International, the journal I)f the American Socialist 
Workers Party, it was met with a. volley of criticism from trotskyists 
seekinl~ an independent cla.ss p,)sition ra.ther than a submersion into arab 
nati,)nalism (15), L, R,)ck, f,:or example, wrote fr,)m Palestine that Spark 
':')mmitted a "~\'ave error ' in speaking 'with l;Jreat satisfacti,)n and 
enthus iasm of Arabia.n nat i,)nal uni ty I given the rac i st and reac tionary 
nature ,:of its leadership, The jewish p,)pulati.)n and zionism c,)uld not be 
identi f ie.j: I we must win the toi ling jewish n\asses for the anti-
imperialist struggle... any struggle against jewish immigration would 
.)nly strengthen Zionist chauvinisM an\ong the Jewish masses, .. The 
complete Victory of the movement f,)r independence in Palestine is 
in\p.)ssible wi thout the support of the Jewish toi lers, ,. The liberation 
moven\e"t will not receive this support so long as anti-Jewish terror 
exists and so long as the Arabian toiling masses will struggle agaInst 
Jewish immigration' (16). Other contributors looked to different 
solutions to the national divisions between arabs and jews, for exaaple, 
to the establishment of two separate states as the most democratic 
solution possible under the circumstances. What they shared in COMMOn 
was a rejection of what Rock called 'Arabian defansiva chauvinism' as an 
a.nswer to 'Jewish a.ggressive chauvinism', 
Returning to South Africa, in that same year of 1939 tha Workers Party 
formally dissolved it.elf and closed rhe Sp.,./t:, claiming that open, 
legal organisation would no longer be possible during the war, It argued 
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that · the w')I'kel's movemel1t fa.:es a new rt)C~d." It is necess~ry t,:> cease 
publication ,:>f Spark I'athel' than to submit to the enemy' (17), In its 
·)wn tel'rr.s this was a prematul'e response to a future threat, which saved 
the state the tr"uble elf c losing the paper down, The f,:>rmal 
organisational dissolution of the Workers Party (which apparently 
continued to exist in secret but without a public voice) mirrored its 
pol i ti,:al dissolution ,:>f soc ialism int,:> nationalism, The two-stage 
theory evaporated into a no-stage theory when the secret Workers Party 
played a vi tal role in forming the N,:>n-Eul'opean Unity Movement in 1943, 
The nati.)nal question was re-defined: away f rom a c lass struggle tor 
land I'e-distribution to the winning of political democracy as a pre-
condition for state-directed land reform, Land reform itself was 
increasingly conceived in terms of the extension of private ownership. 
Socialism was pushed off the agenda altogether as Non-European Unity 
against the 'herrenvolk' (whites) was counterposed to working class 
organisation and as the Unity Movement's 'minimum prograMme' of 
democratic demands was abstracted from any hint of a maxiMal program .. , 
The practical expression of the Workers Party's political drift from 
socialiSM to nationalisM was that it played little part as an 
organisation in the development of the trade union moveMent after 1936, 
It had t~k.n to heart one aspect of Trotsky's critique, his eMPhasis on 
socialists fighting against naiional oppression but Missed Trotsky's 
socialist approach to the question when he wrote: 
The proletarian party can and Must solve the national probleM by 
its own Methods. The historical weapon of national liberation 
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,:an .:mly be the .:lass stl'ul~gle ... The (:o:>mintel'n transformed the 
pro.~ra£t\me O:lf national libel'ation into:. an empty .jemocrati.: 
abstl'a.: ti.:.n that is elevated above the reali ty .jf .:lass 
relations. In the struggle against national oppression, 
di ffel'ent .:lasses liberate themselves (temporarily) froll 
material interests and becon\e sin\ply I anti-imperialist· forces. 
In order that these spiritual • forces' bravely fulfil the task 
assigned to them by the Comintern. they are promised a~ a reward 
a spi I'i tual • national-dem.,.:ratic' state ... The pol icy "f Lenin 
in regar.j to the oppressed nations did n.,t ... have anything to 
do with the epigones. The Bolshevik Party defended the right of 
the oppressed nations to sel f-detern\ination wi th the methods of 
proletarian .:lass struggle, entirely rejecting the charlatan 
'anti-imperialist· blocs with the numerous petty bourgeOis 
'national' parties of ,:zarist Russia. (18) 
The formation .,f the Unity M.)vement represented prec isely the • anti-
imperialist' bloc with numerous petty bourgeois 'national' parties that 
Trotsky warned against. 
FIOSA, the other major trotskyist grouping, rejected the idea that 
social revolution in South Africa could be achieved through isolating 
the 'so-called peasant struggle for land from the fight whieh confronts 
the proletarian, especially the non-white proletarian, in the citi.s and 
farMS' (19), It rejected the practical conclusion of the Work.r. Party 
prograMMe, that it 'lays little str ••• on trade union rights, wage 
question., on labour conditions, etc', FIOSA held to the notion of a 
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socialist movement centered around the unity of black workers, but 
tl'eate.j working .:lass .)r';lanisati':ln more as an abstraction than an 
immediate practice. Hosea Jaffe expressed this spirit of abstentionism 
il1 his nitical .:,:;,mments about the WIL il1 1'345: 'what l'ight·, he aske.j, 
• ha,::! WIL t.:;, ';10 t.) the masses bef,:;,re liavin';I discussed and decided a 
PI'(j';lI'amme?'. The p,'()blem wi th the WIL, as he saw it, was that it 
'plunged int.) w.:;,rk' (:20)! This was the same attitude of purism which 
had left Max Gor.j.,n politi,:ally isolated when he too 'plunged int" work' 
wi trl·)ut having dee ided a p,'ogramme, FIOSA too, however, was also drawn 
int.) trle N,:m-European I)ni ty M,)vement, 
The p.:>l i tical magnet of Non-European Uni ty against the 'herrenvolk' also 
attracted the WIL-PTIJ militants, They moved toward a generally 
uncritical support of the Unity Movement, describing it as a 'deterMined 
and solid or'~anisation whi,:h strives to unite the three oppressed groups 
of the Non-Europeans in an unbreakable united front' (21), Its real 
eff ee t, however, was n,:;,t only to cut the n,i li tants of f froM whi te 
workers, treated as just another part of the 'Herrenvolk', but also to 
draw them into the explicitly non-socialist politics of non-european 
nationalism, The WILls .earch for a political home with other 
trotskyists in the Unity Movement undermined its most positive aspect, 
an orientation to working class action and organisation, The WIL its.lf 
fell apart when one .ection demanded a withdrawal frOM trade union work 
into study groups, a logical outcom. of the abstentionist politics rife 
in the Unity Movement, The historian Baruch Hirson was aMOng the ... 11 
group who tri~ unsucce.fully to re.ist this self-disintegration. The 
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WIL a':quired the Unity MQvement's ultimatist attitude to other '~roups, 
deman,jil1':;j ANC entl'y into the AAC as a ,:,:mdi tion f.)r common action and 
sayino;j t,:, internal cl'iti,:s ,)f the CPSA like Findlay that' the only way 
CP militants can show that they are sincere is to join the Unity 
Movement' (22), 
The two p,)les ,:.f the S,)uth Af r ican trotskyist mOVefl\ent, the syndicalist 
and the radical national ist, were ref lected in the two sides ,)f its 
l'en,ji tion of the the,)ry ,)f permanent revolution. Either the race 
questi,)n was subsumed beneath the workers' struggle for s.xialism or 
vice versa. In the latter ,:ase trotskyists could, if they wished, make 
their peace with the non-socialist programme of the nationalist movement 
on the understanding that, since South African capitalism could not 
survive without racism, the process of history would by its own devices 
transform national liberation into socialism regardless of the 
,:,)nsciousness of the masses, From this premise, the point was to perfect 
nationalism and not to transcend it (23), In its vacillations between 
'pure socialism' and radical black nationalism, the trotskyist movement 
in its entirety - though with differing degrees of enthusiasm and 
longevity - landed on the nationalist terrain of the Unity Movement, 
If we can speak of the South African trotskyist MOVeMent as a whole, its 
major defect lay in its parasitism on what it Moat fervently opposed: 
the politics of stalinism, Many of its Members were schooled in politics 
by the COMMunist Party and were drawn to trotskyis. by quite different 
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I'ea.:ti.jns against stalinism: s.)me against the I native republi.:' period 
of sectarianism and others against the turn to popular frontism. As a 
result trotskyism gre~ up without a coherent centre, its tendency being 
to react to stalinism rathel' than to transcend it. When the CPSA 
ec;p"jused the "Native Republi.:'. trotskyism countered with the neelj fl:or 
class unity. When the CPSA turned to a popular front of all progressive 
for,:es. black and whi te, trotskyisM turned its back on white workers. 
When the CPSA turned t.) urban MI:ovements, l:one wing I)f trotskyism turned 
t.) the land. When the CF'SA l()bbied fl:or support fl'om the liberal 
bourl;je.)isie. trotskyisM turned anti-liberalisFI) into a credo, When the 
CPSA was pl'o-war, trl:otskyism was anti-war. When the CPSA l:opposed strike 
acti.)n in favour of legal trade unionisFl), one wing of trotskyisFI) 
idealised strike actil:on as the alpha and oFllega l:of revolutionary pol i tics 
and the o:)ther wing rejected trade unionism in toto as inherently 
reformist. Anti-stalinism was the negative starting point of South 
Afril:an trotskyists but no substi tute for a soc ialist alternative. 
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The Non-Eul'op~an Unity /'1ovem~nt 
The l'ol'l'nation Ijf the N,jn-European Unity Movel'l)ent (NEUM) in 194:3 
represented a blol: of nationalist organisations - notably the All Africa 
C'jnvention (AAC), the Af r i,:an People's Organisati'jn, the Transkei 
Organised Bodies la loose federation of chiefs, welfare organisations, 
women's organisations, and voters' associations set up to fight for 
0:1\111 rights and against the s,::o-calle,j 'rehabilitation sche ... ,ss' in the 
Transkei), the Anti-CAD m'jvement (an ,jrganisati,:.n set up t,) oppose the 
establishment of the segregationist Coloured Affairs Department in 1943) 
and the trotskyist groups. 
The NEUM ,jf fered a con)pell ing indictn)ent of the 'knavish' aUi tude of 
the '::old liberal-dem,jcratic leadership of the liberation moven)ent, 
symb,jlised by their sUPP'jrt for the war effort and their reliance on the 
empty promises of the liberal bourgeoisie. Thus I B Tabata, a founding 
member of the Unity Movement and former member of the Workers Party, 
cri tic ised the baadership' s perspective with grea.t force in 1943: 
We have been fooling around with dummies, with meaningless mock-
elections and mock councils .. , Great promises were given us. The 
poll tax was to be investigated and the gaoling of defa.ulters 
was to be stopped, The pass system, which was later to be 
abolished altogether, was to be relaxed immediately." Our trade 
unions were to be recognised by law". The Prime Mintster and 
the Secretary for Native Affairs, Mr S.it, publicly acknowledged 
-162-
that the se.;tre9ati.:m pol icv had f ai led and they promised a New 
Deal f'Jr Afri.:ans, That was a time Qf ,;!reat PI,,)ftlises by the 
Rulers and 'Jf ';;JI'eat h':'pes f 'Jr the N.jn-Europeans, " But we were 
boun,j t'J be disapp'Jinted more bi tterly than before, As S,jon as 
the enemy was thrown out of Afri.:a, all talk of these promises 
,:eased al t.).;!ether; but even bef ore then it became .)bvi.)us that 
they were empty promises never to be fulfilled, Tens of 
thousano:js ,)f .)ur people al'e still bein,;! imprisoned f,)r their 
inability t,) pay trle heavy ta~<:", The pass system is today as 
vicious, tyrannical and humiliating as it ever was, Thousands 
have been I'ounded up in the Rand alone, Today General Smuts no 
longer says that segregati,)n has failed". The African trade 
unions are still illegal.,. African workers were shot when they 
ventured to strike", This, then, is our reward for loyalty to 
the country, for our great war effort". We get promises, 
':ommissions ,)f enquiry, inter-departmental commissions, wage 
commissions, and it all ends with white-washing the culprits and 
condemning the victims, (24) 
Here was a sharp snapshot of the problem, Tabata's solution was to focus 
,)n what he saw as a crisis of leadership, He advo.:ated a doctrinaire 
pol icy c,f 'non-collaboration' with the state's segregationist 
institutions of rapresentation, especially the NRC, to purge the 
movement of the 'meek, humiliating language' of the Native 
Representatives, 'Non-collaboration' was presented as a kind of rite of 
self-purification, the means by which the nationalist leadership would 
clean.e itself of all liberal taints, The doctrine was predicated on an 
idealised view of ma •• Militancy held back only by a treacherous 
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l~ad~rship. Non-collaborationism as a programme was the practical 
expr~ssion of betrayal theory as a generic tool of analysis. 
As early as 1941, when Tabata reflected on 'six years of disaPPointments 
and failures, setbacks and outright defeats', he traced their cause 
enti I'ely to betrayals of leadel'ship. The logic .:-f this position was that 
if the leadership were cleansed. the masses would look after themselves: 
The fault was n.::>t with Illasses. Wherever it was in their power 
they ,~ave unmistakeable pl";:)'Jf 'Jf theil' I .... ili tancy ... They made it 
unmistakeably clear that the time when the rulers could bluff 
them with promises is ,::>ver ... The masses will have nothing to do 
with the war, because they know by experience what thi5 
,jemocracy is, for whit:h South Africa is fighting... It is not 
the masses who can be blall\ed for these six years of defeats, but 
the leaders. Whenever anything depended 011 the spontanaous 
action of the ma55es, it was all right. Whenever anything 
depended on the 'wi5e' deliberation of tha laaders, it wa5 all 
wrong. (25) 
The idea of 'collaboration' in this theory wa5 a fU5ion of two quite 
di5tinct idea5: one referring to political independence frOM the rulers 
and the other to the boycott of state institution5. The a5sumption wa5 
that if the movement wa5 non-collaborationist in the 5&cond 5en.e, that 
i5, if it boycotted the NRC and parallel bodie5, then it would a150 b. 
non-collaborationi5t in the 5en5e of developing an independent and 
militant political programme, The idea that the NEUM could buy it •• lf 
political independence by cutting it.elf off frOM any contact with the 
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state was entirely false. Political autarchy of this sort was a recipe 
only for sectarianism. 
In its application of betrayal theory, the principal ta~k facing the 
NEUM appeared n,jt s() much that 'Jf w'jl'k in'~ ': lass ,jl'ganisation 'jr 
educati'Jn 'Jr even mobilisation but simply that 0:1f removing the barrier~ 
to mass militancy ':,:mstructed by the ":'jllab'Jrators'. The exor,:ism 'Jf 
.:,jllab'jration fr,jm the leadership went along with a f'jrmal and passive 
,:,l'ientat i'Jn t,) the mass, the tenden,:y beil1'~ t,) e~<t')l its Fili li tancy 
rather than partic ipate in its developnlent. Thus the NEUM was 
,:onsistentl y ,)pposed to any involvement in trade union 'Jrganisation or 
other 'partial' struggles, since this was not the job of a national 
movement. The major exception to this abstentionist rule was among some 
NEUM militants in the Transkei who participated in the rural struggles 
.:.f l'eservists, Tt-Ie NEIJM's 'jve"all abstenti,)"isM as far as work ing ': lass 
organisation was concerned wa~ easy prey for ANC and CPSA critics. More 
importantly, 'non-collaborationism' wa~ not a principle which workers 
could possibly observe, since 'collaboration l with their employers at 
the point of the production I)f surplus value was the essential starting-
point of their working lives and no trade union except the MOst extreme 
syndicalists could forego some kind of partiCipation in negotiating 
forums with the employers, I Non-col laborationism l came to .. an a 
sectarian refusal not only to participate in state institutions but to 
co-operate with all those perceived as Iliberals l , 
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The practical proof that sectarianism was no guarantee of political 
indepen.jence was provi.jed in the NEIJM' s Ten-F'.:)int F'l'.:).~ramme, whi.:h 
itself offered a 1 iberal .ji s.:.:ourse .:.f uni vel'sal franchise, equal rights, 
freedom of speech and movement, individual privacy and compulsory, free 
an.j uni form education. Beyond its .:omR\i tment tc. state education, its 
so.:ial .:lauses were limited t.:o va.~ue .:lauses .::on the • I'evision' .:of the 
land question, the .:ivil an.j .:riminal c.::ode, the system cd taxation and 
laboul' le.~islatio:on (2E.). The NEUM' s denunc iati.)ns ·:)f 1 ibel'alism wel'e n.:)t 
accompanied by its pr.:)grammati.: transcendence. The set .::of • minimum 
demands' arti.:ulated in the NEIJM's Ten F'Qint F'rQ'~I'amme was nevertheless 
treated as an absolute Ultimatum, the acceptance of which in toto was 
presented as the .:.:ondi tion f.::or any all iance .::or .:ommon action wi th .:other 
political organisations or individuals. In the absence of a maximum 
programme, the language of the • minimum pI'.::ogr,uI1R\e' was little mOl'e than 
a sop t.::o soc ial ists in the movement or a hangover f rom a marxist past. 
The two issues whi.:h proved .je.: isive in scuppering the unity talks 
between the Unity Movement and the ANC in 1949 were first the definition 
of the oppressed nation and second the organisational structure of the 
national movement. The NEUM counterposed non-european nationalism to 
what it saw as the racist assumptions behind african nationalism, non-
european unity being seen not just as a useful strategy but as an 
essential political principle. The basic argument was spelt out in the 
preamble to the 1943 10-Point Programme: 
Division, strife and suspicion aMongst the Non-European groups 
theMselves are artificially fostered by the ruling cla ••••• No 
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eft e.: ti ve fight agai nst se.~regation is p.jssible by people whc, 
ta·:i tly ac.:ept se.;jre.;jation am'Jngst themselves ... The acceptan.:e 
of segregation... serves only the interests of the oppressors ... 
Our fight against segl'e.~ation must be dire.:ted against the 
segregati'Jnists wi thin as well as wi thout. ,. The uni ty of all 
Non-European .~r'Jups is a ne.:essary pl'e-':'Jndi tion f'Jr this t.jtal 
fight a.~ainst segregation. (27) 
In its ':I'i tique Qf segregati.jnist ten.jen.:ies wi thin african an.j indian 
11ati.:.nalisFllS, h'Jwever, the NEIJM failed t'J .jver':'Jme the same prQOlem in 
its clwn b'Jdy. Its f'Jl'rnal p'Jli.:y was that • the IJnity Movement cann'Jt and 
must not .. , be cCll1sidered as directed against the Europeans' (28), but 
in pl'a.:ti.:e there was a marked tendency t.J designate whites in general 
as the • Herrenvolk , enemy and liberal whites as 'in reality only the 
instruments cd the ruling .:lass'. Furthermore, the narrow racial 
.:haracter of the NEUM's member organisations - in particular, the 
':'JbJured anti-CAD and the afri.:an AAC - was left entirely intact in its 
federal f.Jrm .)f organisation, In all these ways, the Unity Movement's 
own brand of non-european nationalism replicated rather than transcended 
the segregationist consciousness attributed to african nationalism, 
Although the ANC and the AAC were progammatically akin to one another 
and the Unity Movement was critical of the political record of both 
organisations, its response was to idealise the organisational form of 
the AAC and repudiate that of the Congress, Tabata treated the AAC as 
the ideal expreSSion of national consciousness and the ANC a. an 
instrument sent by the oppressors to 'sew dissension ' , The crucial 
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distinction between them was said to lie in the superiority of the 
federal structure of the AAC over the centralised structure of the ANC, 
Political content was subsumed to the fetish of organisational form, The 
federal structure of the AAC, replicated in the Unity Movement, was said 
to allow for the expression of all different currents of political 
thQU'3ht wi thin the n.:.n-eur"pean p"pulation; the ':entralised structure I,f 
the ANC was said to be inherently dictatorial, Thus in the unity talks 
wi th trle ANC Tabata turned federal ism into am)thel' inviolable pnn,: iple: 
CI'eating a uni tary I,rganisatic,n would mean ,:reating .,ne mass 
poli tical party dil:tating t() the Afri':an p.,pulati,'11, We wl,uld be 
arrl";Jating kl ourselves the right t" dictate that no African 
shall have ideas different fr.:lm our ':lwn , .. We want the greatest 
amount of unity among the Africans ... No political party could 
dic tate to all I,f the people. (29) 
The problem which Tabata addressed wa. a real and important one: to 
construct a form of political organisation which in its quest for unity 
expressed rather than suppressed the diversity l:lf political ideas among 
the oppressed. As a solution, however, his fetish l:lf federalism proved 
to be an easy target for ANC critics arguing for the advantages of 
unitary organisation. 
Beyond Tabata's elevation of superficial distinctions into absolute 
pOints of principle, the organisational doctrine he espoused for the 
Unity Movement had a basic premise in common with that of the ANt: 
namely their mutual commitment to organising in national movements 
rather than political parties. In the naMe of national unity and the 
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trans,:enden,:e of I: lass divisions wi thin the I,ppressed nation, Tabata not 
.:.nl y subsumed o:1ass p.,li ti.:s t.:;. third w.,r Id national ism but also party 
pol i ti.:s t., nati.:;.nal fIi.,vements. n".us the Minimum Prl)gramme, which was in 
fact the programme of a particular political party, was presented as if 
it were the dire,:t e}c:pression I,f trle will of the non-european nation as 
a whole. The Unity M"vement failed t" address the strengths I,f party 
politics vis-a-vis national movements:- that the grounds of affiliation 
lie in "ne's beliefs as a ,:itizen and n"t ,)ne's \1ational origins; that 
the views of a particular group appear for what they are, as part of the 
whl,le and not in place .:;.f the wh"le: that the particular interest .joes 
not parade as the universal and that the real universal, SOCiety, is not 
segmented into the sum of nationally defined particularisms, This w •• a 
fateful omission f"r the development elf a democratic pllli tical culture 
0\1 the left, 
The hallmarks of the Unity Movement were sectarianism, abstentionism and 
absolute principle, The one flowed into the other, since any course of 
action or any alliance with another group was likely to involve 
compromise with an eternal principle supposedly enshrined in the Ten-
Point Programme, whether it be that of anti-collaborationism, anti-
centralism, anti-segregationism or anti-liberalism, We are reminded of 
the butt of Marx's satirical comments on 'political indifferentism': 
The working class must not constitute itself a political party, 
for to combat the state is to recognise the state and this is 
contrary to an eternal principle, II If in the political 
struggles against the bourgeoiS state, the workers succ.ed only 
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in e~:tra.:tin.~ .:.:.n.:e55i.:on5, then they are .~uilty .)f .:ompromise 
and this is ':'Jntrary t'J eternal pl"in.:iple5, (:30) 
Marx'5 .:.wn.:.:.nclusion is equally pertinent: 
while we .:annot repudiate these patria,·.:rls ':If socialism, just as 
chemists cannot repudiate their f·::orbears the alchemists, we must 
at least avoid falling back into their mistakes, which, if we 
were t':I c.:ommit them, would be inexcusable, 
In the 1940s the Unity Movement was a significant force on the left, 
.:hallen.~in';1 both trle rlegem':lny .:of trle liberal-dem.:ocrati.: current within 
the liberation movement and the divisi.:m .::of the I\\ovement into separate 
national organisations. Its doctrines had an important formative 
influence ':In the political .:ul ture of the liberation movement as a whole 
even though the Unity Movement itself was destined by its own growing 
steri li ty to play n.) m.)re than a bit part in the struggles to .:ome. Its 
principal function was to channel trotskyism in particular and the left 
oppositio::o" more generally away frol\\ the development of a South African 
socialist tradition and into what it misconceived as a perfected form of 
black nationalism. 
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Th~ ANC Youth L~agu~ 
If trl~ radical n,)n-european nati'jnalism of the IJnity Movement was to be 
rel~gated to the Margins of the poli tical stage, the radical afri,:an 
natic,nalism ,)f the ANC y"uth League was to playa historic role in the 
reforMation of the liberation MoveMent after its defeats in the 1~40s, In 
terms of pol i tical s"phistication. the Youth League was no Match f"r the 
trotskyists and ex-trotskysant intellectuals of the I)"i ty MoveMent, but in 
terms ,)f pol i tical effectivity the scales were reversed, The young radicals 
repr~sented by the youth League were equally critical "f the liberal 
deMocratic framework of the official ANC-CPSA leadership, In the words of A 
P Mda, the President of the Youth League. they characterised the ANC 
establishment as 'an organisation of gentleMen with clean hands' (31), They 
chara,:terised the Communists as the beuers of a 'foreign ideology' that 
watered down the Militancy and popular resonance of african nationalisM, 
Invoking the memory of Garveyis. through the slogan of 'Africa for the 
Africans', the youth League put on the political agenda the return of the 
land to the african people as the primary objective of the movement and 
mass struggle by the african people as its means, The youth League 
channelled its radical is. into a fiercely nationalistic framework, hostile 
both to the class politics of socialism and to liberal individualisM, It 
idealised the unity of the african nation, rooting it in a ComMOn Ifeeling 
of blackness' irrespective of all other social distinctions, It put forward 
'rac.-pride' as the supreme virtue for africans, representing it as 'the 
self-realisation of the African spirit' and the antidote to 'the MOral 
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degenera.tion' ,)f the a.frican IoIIrlO suffered fl'om I the worship and idolisation 
,:of white men, foreign leaders and ideologies' (32), 
T,:>m Nai rn has c,;)mpared nationalism t,) the Re,man ';Jc,d, Janus. who stands 
ab'Jve ';jatelollays with one face l'Joking f'Jrlollard and 'Jne backwards (33), 
African nationalism had this Janus quality, The liberal establishment 
l'J,;)ked t'J a future transcendence ,jf primitivism and the c'Jrlling of what it 
ca.lled 'civilisation'; the radical Y'juth looked to the restoration of a 
past age when the african was the sole posssessor of the land and the 
invading european had no claim to ownership or power, Each side 
problematised african nationalism in different ways: the image of an 
integrated future challenged the separation of africans from the other 
nations said t'J inhabit South Africa: the restoration of the past raised 
the spectre not of a primordial unity of the african nation but of a 
multiplidty of often warring clans and kingdoms, In rejecting the 
conservatism of the ANC establishment, the radicals in the youth League 
also rejected its progressivism, The programme of the youth League was not 
designed to push the forward looking progr .... of the african nationalist 
establishment beyond its liberal limits but rather to recapture the past in 
the naMe of an iMagined COMMunity of africans. 
The youth League stood for the right of the african nation both to lead the 
liberation struggle and to rule the new society which would e .. rge out of 
this struggle: it. claia basad on the characteristics of the african nation 
a. the indigM1OU., the .. jority and the MOSt oppr .... d nation of South 
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Africa. It was an empowering disc,:.urse f,:>r african people habituated to an 
ideology of whi te suprelnacy and t,j the association cd the european with 
':'jl'jnial 'Jppression. It was also a discourse which reflected in inverse 
f,jrm the '~athering racislll of the state. 
Breuilly has made the perceptive comment that 'nationalism is a parasitic 
movemen t and i ,jeo l'Jgy shaped by what i t opposes' <34 ). Th i s was in s,:>me 
respects true of the formal relation between african nationalism and 
afrikaner nationalism. Both looked to the capture of the state by their own 
particular national group and justified the right of their nation to power 
by virtue of special qualities belonging to their '1ation. Both espoused 
idealistic notions of the essential unity of their nation and viewed 
nationalism as the highest form of political consciousness and 
organisation. Both were hostile to socialism seen as on the one hand 
dividing the nation along lines of dass and on the other of obscuring the 
boundaries between the nations through its endeavours to construct class 
unities, Both sought to mobilise their respective components of the working 
class as a Mass base for their nationalist objectives. baing hostile to 
socialists for the additional reason that they were competing for the 
allegiance of the same workers. Both were hostile to liberalism for 
disaggregating national unity in the name of individual autonomy and right. 
The content of afrikaner and african nationalism was vastly different. tha 
one representing ~ nationaliSM of the oppressor and tha other the 
nationali •• of t~ oppressed, but their forMal siMilarities poin~ to the 
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I imi tati.:ons "f radical af ri.:an nationalism as the basis .:of a consistently 
.jem.:II:I'atb: .;:.pp()sition t.;:. state racisnl. The \'ise of afrik.ner natio\,alism in 
the 1940s ':orrob'Jrated the african nationalist view .;:.f the world: as the 
paro,jy ,;:.f a 1.;:.ng g,;:.ne ':'::llonialism was mythically \'e-ena,:ted by the Boer 
nationalists, from below the struggle for democracy took cm the illusory 
and in,:onsistent f'::lrm of an anti-c'::llonial 1 iberati':m struggle of the 
afri,:an pe'::lple. 
In the 1940s the radical african nationalists of the Youth League had 
little relation to working class organisation. They stood for a turn to 
mass struggle: not by reconstructing the existing labour movement but by 
constru,:ting a new national movement in its place. The Youth Loa ague saw 
itself as 'the brains trust and power station of the spirit of African 
nationalism' whose role was to prepare the future leaders of the people and 
rouse popular consciousness through the example of their 'high ethical 
standards' (35), They assigned to the consciousness of the masse. a 
'natural nationalism', sometimes revealed on the surface but more often 
repres.ed beneath the demoralised outlook of the urban african or 
suppressed by the foreign ideologies of socialiSM, 
PI" ior to 1948 the ideology of the Youth League did not have much re.onance 
outside the radical intelligentsia, What made it possible for the Youth 
League to reach out to the mas.e. in practice as well a. in theory was the 
defeat and fragMentation of the working cIa •• MOvament. It wa. not at all 
the ca.a that african nationali .. de-railed the working cIa •• MOYaMeni, as 
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s.Jme .:ritics 'In the left have .:laimed; nor was it the case that the rise of 
a radicalised african nationalism represented a step forward in the march 
,:.f p'Jliti,:al reason, as the 'Jrthodox historians have seen it: ,'ather it was 
the f'Jrced retreat of the w'Jrk ing class to the back of the pol i tical stage 
combined with the self-dissolution of socialist politics which allowed 
african nationalism to fill the space made available. The dissolution of 
the labour movell,ent prepal'ed the ground f'Jr each communal section ,:of the 
working ,:lass to protect its ollln national interest and rally behind the 
banner ,:.f its nati'Jnalist leaders. At the Sall\e time, socialist voices were 
either silenced by external repression or themselves subordinated to one or 
other fOT'm ,:of black nationalism. 
It was only with the moderation of the Youth League's extreme nationalism 
after the war, which coincided with the stemming of the tide of lIIorking 
class resistance. that it began to win significant support beyond its own 
ranks. The 'new spirit of African nationalism' split into two camps in this 
period: the 'moderate' and the 'extreme ultra-revolutionary' to use the 
terminology of the foraer, Rejecting the slogan of 'Africa for the 
Africans' and the cry of 'hurl the white man into the sea', the Moderates 
conceived of South Africa as a country of four chief nationalities - white, 
coloured, indian and african - the last three of which suffered national 
oppression (36), It was 'not against the European as a tuun baing but 
irrevocably opposed to white doaination', It sought to tie african self-
sufficiency to an alliance with other national groups, including 
progressive whites, aiMed at the attainment of 'true deMOCracy", and the 
r..oval of all discriMinatory laws and colour bars', Its policy looked 
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forwal'.j m)w t,) the admission of the african into' full ,:itizenship of the 
country so that he had direct representation in parliament on a democratic 
basis', It was based ')n the appre.:iation that the hist')rical omlette ,:ould 
not be unscrambled. whatever the injustices of european colonialism: 'the 
different racial groups have .:onle to stay' (37), The Y.)uth League's 
specifi.: form of african nationalism survived in the idea that africans 
should ')r.~anise separately from the other national .~roups and that the 
african nation ha.j the right to lead the struggle f.)r liberation as a 
whole, The liberalisation of the d,)minant faction in the Y.)uth League made 
it M.)re ')pen to democ ratic ideas but at the same time watered down its 
radicalism, This antinomy between racialism and radicalism on the 'extreme' 
side .jf the Y'juth League and mul ti-racialism and liberalism on the 
'moderate' side was to become the hallmark african nationalism in the next 
decade (38), 
Radicalised african nationalism was an open-ended movement. fluid in its 
political commitments, youthful and angry, rebellious and impatient. It 
both expanded the democratic potential of african nationalism and immer .. d 
it in dangerous racial phantasies mirroring the very forces of afrikanar 
nationalism against which it was pitted. The defeat and fragmentation of 
the labour moveMent, coupled with the profound crisis of socialist thought 
which aCCOMpanied it, laid the ground for the rise of african nationalis. 
in the 1950s as the hagelllOnic ideology of the left. 
-176-
The limits of the left opposi tion 
The lef t ')pposi ti.:m failed t.) provide an alternative axis .::>f pol i tica.l 
leadership to black labour in the 1940s, This was due n.::>t simply to 
external pressures but to the inner ·:haracter .::>f the left, First. the most 
apparent weakness of the left opposition lay in the multiple divisions 
which ran thr.::>ugh it: between nati.::>nalists and socialists. between 
different varieties of black nationalism and different varieties of 
SOl: ialisll1, These poli tical diVisions were .:ombined wi th ethnic divisions in 
such a way as to make overall cohesion very difficult to achieve, 
Second. as the labour movement itself fragmented in the course of its 
decline. the left opposition was deeply affected by and often led the drift 
away from .:lass politics to nationalism, The syndicalist wing of the left 
opposition made the most seriOUS effort to re-construct the black labour 
MOvement from within but as the trade unions fell apart the left opposition 
as a whole with only one or two marginal exceptions oriented itself to the 
building of an alternative social movement under one or other form of black 
nationalist leadership, 
The left opposition's strength lay in its negative critique of the liberal-
deMocratic strategy of the ANC-CPSA leadershipi its weakness lay in 
providing any positive alternative in the 19405, It tended to reject any 
strategy of ~ratisation, any orientation to reform, any participation 
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in state structures, any ne';Jotiation with the state or the employers, any 
relati.::on to liberalism and finally perhaps any.: lass perspective. Most 
turned their radicalism into a rejecti.)n of white sQ.:iety as such. 
The defeat of the labour movement, the fragmentation of the working class, 
the .:risis .)f South African socialism, the ascendancy of afrikaner 
nationalism - all these factors combined to shape the contours of the left 
opposition in the 1940s in ways which were profoundly to influence the 
ev.)lution of the 1 iberation movement. They certainly did not augur weU for 
the building of a non-racial and democratic workers' Movement in opposition 
to apartheid. 
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The white lab'Jur m'Jvement 
The black lab'Jur m'Jvement in the 1940s was t'J'J weak t,) fight the battle f'JI' 
democracy on the basis of its own resources alone and without the support 
(,f allies bey,:on,j its o:,wn I'anks. In ,jifferent ways trlis pero:epti,:on f,)rmed 
the i'ati,:onal ':')I'e o'jth .:.f the p.;;ii,:y .:.f the pe'Jple's fl'ont put fOl'ward by 
the (:'JfMllunist Party and of the val" i'juS f.jrms of black natic.nalism. The 
issue f'Jr black workers. h.jwever. was not whether to form alliances beyond 
its .jwn ranks but h.)w and wi th whom. While both afr ican and non-eur.:opean 
nati,:malism necessal'ily 10'Jked away fl'om the white wOl'king ,:lass. the 
pe'Jple's front p.jlicy l.Joked to the building of a 'united front· between 
the blad: and white se.:ti·)ns of the .)r.~anised w.:ork ing .: lass. In the 
hist'Jri'Jgraphy 'Jf the national liberation movement the 'Jrientation of the 
CPSA t'J white labour has usually appeared as a symptom of the growing pains 
IJf the party, a vestige of the origins of .:ommunism in the white labour 
Alovement which led to unnecessary concessions to white .:hauvinism and which 
was only resolved in the 19505 when the CPSA finally accepted the hegemony 
of african nationalism, (l) 
Within this Model racialism has been seen as such a deeply embedded 
attribute of white workers in the 19405 - ideologically reflective of their 
colonial mentality toward black people and economically rooted in their 
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dass p'JsiticlO a.s an arlstoCl'acy ,)f lab'jur perf'Jrming a policing r'jle over 
black laboUl' - that their la,:k ,:,f s,::>lidari ty with bla,:k workel~s and their 
receptivity to the appeals of afrikaner nationalism need little further 
explanati,:m. 0' Meal'a, f,)r instance, wl'i tes that 'the ,~acial ,jivisi,::>n of 
labout' between sk i lled and unsk i lled was f i naIl y laid d'jwn by the intense 
dass ':'jnflict 1900-22' and that by the 19:30s 'the leildership of the white 
trade union movement had been incorporilted into the formal structures of 
power with the Pact government ilnd continued in this position under the 
I)ni ted Party regime c,f General Hertzog. Conf rontations b~tween capi tal and 
'Jrganised white labour were thus ruled out'. He ,:ono: luded that 'whi te and 
black fractions of the working class hav~ been irreconcilably divided, to 
the point where the economic and s'jcial position 'jf the f'Jrmer rests on the 
economic exploitation of the latter' (2). In similar vein Rob Davies has 
argued tM~t by the end of the 1930s 'the poor white problem has ceased to 
exist'. industrialisation had created 82,000 new jobs for white workers. 
with colour bars, high minimum wages, state subsidised employment and 
public works projects, ensuring that white workers were the beneficiary of 
industrial growth. Davies ,:onc luded that 'white workers benef it f rom the 
surplus value created by blacks; in other words, they indirectly share in 
the exploitation of blacks, via their political support for the state and 
the economic privileges they receive from it in return' (3), 
The idea, however, that one group of workers receives ecOnoMic privileges 
only by sharing in the exploitation of another group of workers, is 
questionable ecOnoMics, It would appear to assume a finite wage fund, 
meaning that SOMa workers can only receive more wages 1f others receive 
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less, an.j trll~I'eby i',;In':I\'es the capa.: i ty .:.f the v,h:.rk in9 c lass as a wh.:>le t., 
wi 11 a ';lreater shal'e .:.f the nat i.:.n' s weal th at the e}<:pense .:.f the surplus 
value e::·::propriated by .:apital. The f.,cus .:on tt-Ie quantitative aspe.:t of 
wa.~es als.j i',;In'JI'es trle qualitative aspe.:t .:.f sub'JI'dinati.jn inhel'ent in the 
wage slavery itself. Historically better-paid skilled workers who might 
appear tc. have .:.:msti tuted lab.:>ur ar ist"':I'a.: ies have .,f ten been am.:>ng the 
leaders c.f workin';1 .:1ass h',ovements, belying an e.:on.:omi.: .jeterminishl which 
assumes a link between privile';Ied ec.:onomi.: .:.,n.jiti'Jns and political 
conservatism. The CPSA in the 1940s was not wrong to orient to the unity of 
whi te and bla.:k laboul'! the questi'Jn was h.:>w. 
A rigid rae ial division of labour between white ski lled and black unsk i lled 
was laid down in the mines between 1900 and 1922. but' this was not true .:of 
the m.jre fluid racial divisit:on .:>f labour in the expanding industrial 
se.:tol'. In this al'ea of producti.:on in the 19405. thel'e were gl'owing numbers 
(.f s~:illed and semi-skilled blad: workers (particularly if we include 
.:.:oloureds) and lar.;Je numbers ·Jf unsk i lled white workel's (parti.:ular 1 y 
afrikaner women). The industrial boom during the war and the absense of 
I'l\any white workers .:on mil i tary service hastened the entry of blacks into 
skilled and semi-skilled employment. Colour and privilege were by no means 
precisely correlated. Nor was it the case in the 1940s that the black and 
white labour movements were totally insulated from each other. Though 
having a relative autonomy, they were not contained in water-tight 
compartments. Significant organic links between white and black workers 
were established in the labour movement in this period, certainly in 
comparison with any that had been constructed before. The question which 
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fao:es us is why trle ,:lass so:,lidarities, fl'agmentaryand limited as they 
were, whi,:h wel'e f ':0 rrl)ed in the 1940s wel'e shattered by the end ,:of the 
The re';1istere,j trade union fI),:ovement was divide,j by fier':e battles between 
the lef t an,j l'i'~ht, On the lef t thel'e wel'e many whi te tl'a,je uni,:oni sts 'Nho 
':"flibatted the I'a,:ism ,:of 'Nhite 'Norkers, 'Nere fiel',:ely indepen,jent ,:of trle 
state an,j s':)metimes S':OU';1ht t.:) ally white an,j blad: w,:)rkel's, The lef twas 
genel'ally assclo:iated with the new industrial unions, 'Jrganising b'jth the 
unskille.j and th'Jse ,:raft workers who in I'esponse t'J the er,:osi,:on of theil' 
skills turned to "Jpen' industrial unions I'ather than t.J racial 
exclusivism. On the right wing of the trade union movement, the leadership 
.,f the TI'ades and Lab'Jur Council (TLC), 'Nas dominated by a thoroughly 
racist and ':'Jnservative bureau,:ra,:y who were generally asso,:iated with 
English-speakin,;! ':l'aft uni'Jns, Their predominant response t,:o skill erosion 
was t" search for rae ially defined privile';1es under the political wing of 
the segregationist Labour Party. It participated in Smuts' war-time cabinet 
and provided its Minister of Labour, Walter Madeley. On the extreme right, 
afrikaner nationalism offered a yet more racist form of Christian National 
unionism for the generally unskilled afrikaner workers, playing in 
particular on their alie~ation from the labour bureaucracy from which they 
.. 
were excluded. The outcome of thts political battle between left and right 
,.: 
was not written in advance. (4) 
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F'Jr tile t'il'St twenty five years .:,.f this century l\'I';)St white w.,rkers had been 
";;oake.j in I'a.: ial pl'eJudice 5':' tt-Iat thei r n':"I'mal atti tude to black w.jrkers 
was .Jile of e;<:.:lusi.:,.n •• j"l'l'Iinati'::'\1 ail.j .::.pen hc)stility, The m.;)st militant .:,.f 
whi te ";tr ikes c.f the ear lie\' per i'J.j, the Rand Rev.:> 1 t of 1922 among white 
minewoI'kel's, was airiled b.:,. tt-l at tt-It:~ riline b'Jsses and at trle e:(.:lusi.:,.n .)f 
black workers, its leadership's mix of socialism and racism vividly 
.:nara,:tel'ised by the sl.:,.gan • w'Jrkers .:,.f the worl.j unite for a white S.:,.uth 
Africa', The racial division of labour turned many white workers into a 
pl'ivile';led al'ist,)cl'acy and trle ":lvilised laboul" poli,:ies pursued by the 
state re-inforced the racial division of labour in the 1920s, Many white 
w.;)rkel's had bla.:k .j.:,.mesti.: sel'vants, thus establishing in the hClme a 
relationship of racial servility, The Botha Commission reported that in 
1936 the 86% .;)f the total workforce that was black earnt only 25. S% of the 
nati.;)nal income. The per capita incon\e of a black worker was e~ of that 
received by white workers; the per .:api tal inc';)I\\& of asians was three times 
that IJf africans and col,)ured. were midway between african. and asians, (5) 
Industrialisation at first only partiallyreproduced this racial division of 
labour. Within the white section of the working class, there were 
considerable disparities: between miners and industrial workers, craft 
workers and the unskilled, english-speaking workers and afrikaners, the 
well-paid and the poor. The vast gap by European standards between the 
wages of the skilled and unskilled not only divided white from black but 
also white frOM white, Many newly proletarianised afrikaners, e_peeially 
women workers, were poor and had few skills, The privileges of craft 
workers were under threat as mechanisation and de-skilling frOM above and 
-183-
the entry of black and afrikaner workers from below into skilled and semi-
.;~: i llelj ':1I:.:upatil:,ns rl:n:ked thei r .: raf t-baselj ,:ontr'jls over labour 
re,:rultment and tt-ie lab,jur prljl:ess. 
Alth,jugrl the wage gap between white an,j black industrial workers narr,jwed 
.jurinl~ tt-Ie war, industrial wages in gene,'al "Ijse and the fears Ijf white 
loI.hjrkers that bla.:i<s wQrke,'s w.jul,j take away thei r jobs were allayed as the 
fIJI 1 empl.jyment .)f whi tes prove,j cClmpatible wi th, if n'ji depen1jent Ijn, the 
increase,j employment Ijf afri,:ans il1 this time .:,f il1dust"ial e;<pansion. 
~3.Jlly Sachs, the slj.:ialist leader Qf the Garment Worke,'s l)niol1, .:.)mmented 
alon.~ tt-Iese 1 ines that as industry began to grow in the late 19:30s I race 
.:onfli,:ts in the factol'ies became less mal'ked, The bitterness between white 
and bla,:k since 1936 was engendered mainly by outside b.)dies, such as the 
NatiQnalist Party ... There was no scramble f.j1' jobs and in times .jf 
unempl.:.yment bl)th whites and blacks lost their livelihood' (6), 
Many independent s.)eialists, like Solly Sachs and Johanna Cornelius of the 
Garment Workers Union (GWU) and Communists like Bill Andrews and Bennie 
Weinbren espoused socialist ideas in the Trades and Labour Council, Sachs 
in particular believed that the anti-imperialism of poor afrikaner workers 
could be redirected in a deMocratic direction, With both the CPSA and the 
independent socialists offering themselves as a political alternative to 
the Labour Party and afrikaner nationalist leaderships. Solly Sachs sum.ed 
up their attempt to e~plain and combat the racism of white workers in class 
terms: 
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Apologlsts for the capltalist system in South Africa try to put 
the blame tor the Colour Bar upon the white workers, It is 
perfectly true tt-Iat c,nly a (,:omparatively small 11umbel' ,:,f white 
workers are free from racial prejudice and that many white trade 
union leaders are stooges of the Nationalist Party", Of course. 
a bounden duty rests upon all trade uni,:onists to f i,~ht al~ainst 
the curse ,:of l' a,: ial ism in the II,/tJrkers' ranks an.j for a united 
trade union movement, The so-called' liberals', however, who put 
the enti re blame f.,r the C"l.:our Bar in industry upon the whi te 
workers are insidiously trying to exonerate the real culprits, 
The people responsible f'Jr spreading race hatred are the 
land'Jwners and mineownel's '" The w'Jrkers al'e the dupes. n'Jt the 
authors. 'Jf race hatred, Race hatred is a powerful weapon in the 
hands 'Jf those who always seek .:heap labour; it is a curse to 
whi te workers '" The enemie •• ,f black workers. the Nationalist 
Party, the United Party. the Chamber .:of Mines. are also the sworn 
enemies of the white workers, (7) 
Although the TLC nationally was dominated by a racist bureaucracy, local 
.:ommi ttees .,f the TLC were c loser to the rank and file and more .upportive 
of black workers, Thus local Witwatersrand and Vereeniging committees of 
the TLC gave support to the 1946 African Mineworkers' Strike. while the TLC 
national leadership fully endorsed police action against the strikers, The 
TLC itself, though dominated by conservative craft unions, was established 
in 1930 on a non-racial basis and called for the legal recognition of 
african trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. For the 
leadership of the TLC, this verbal COMmitment to non-racialisM was 
maintained largely through fudge and hyprocricy, but it provided a 
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frart'n?w('I'k whi,:1"1 allowed the left tl;' l'Ii,jbilise, The I'apid '~rowth Ijf the TLC 
between 1'3:37 ami 1947, fl'l,m:32 unions tl) 117, and the ,;)r,)wing wei';)ht of 
industrial unionism, were grounds for optimism among the activists, 
Durin,~ the wal', a number I)f left win';J TLC unil)ns (t,)ba,:co, sweets. f')od anlj 
,:annin';l, tin, te~:tiles, laundering and o:lothin';J) began tlj admit afl'i,:ans tl;' 
rllembel'ship. They oelieved that. since bla,:k w.)rkel's in these industries 
were doing semi-skilled or skilled work, it was imperative to organise them 
if the e(0)\10lnio: ·;tl'u.;J';Jles "f whi te, asian and col.)ure.j workers wel'e nl)t t.) 
be underl:ut by .:heap black laboul'. At least two unions. Toba.:c.) and F,)od 
and Canning. insisted upon having "nly one uni.)n f.)r all • I'aces I and the 
Labour Department resisted registration f.,r this reason, The government· s 
pol i.:y was to dere';Jister any registered union whi.:h admi tted blaCKS to 
mer.\bel'ship. 51) depriving them of rights to bargain collectively or call a 
legal strike, The majority of registered unions felt constrained to recruit 
black wl:>rkers int.:> separate parallel unions. but in some cases. like that 
of the Garment Workers. the white and black unions worked closely together. 
In 1944 the Garment Workers Union used a loophoole in the law to establish 
the right of african women t., become members of a registered union. 
Lewis reports that in 1949 there were still some elaven registered unions 
resisting the Labour Department·s instructions to exclude 'natives' (8). 
These unions obtained, by negotiation or in soma casas by strike action, 
aajor increases in the very low levels of semi-skilled wages, and semi-
skilled black workers in these industries became the highest paid workers 
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·)n the.- Ran.j, The.-re wel'e at least three strikes .jurint;J which bla.:k an.j whi te 
worke.-rs worked toge.-ther, Johanna Cornelius. for example. the Secretary of 
the Tobacco Workers Union. testified to the det;Jre.-e of inter-racial 
solidarity displayed in the September 1940 tobacco strike: 
The uni.:m put up a wcmderful fight wrlen the employers wel'e 
prepare.j t.) .~ive the 5/- War B.,nus t.) the European w.,rl::ers and 
the No:m-Eur'Jpean w.,rkers a mud-, smaller b.,nus. 600 t.,bac.:c, 
workers irrespective of race.- or colour demonstrated in the 
;treets .:.1 Johannesbu1"~ demanding a 5/- Wal' Bonus f'Jr aU 
w(>1'kers, The future poli.:y ·)f the union is that no at;Jreement will 
be signed .. , unless it included all workers. (9) 
The J.)hannesburg Star in its paternal ist style identified as a cause .)f the 
December 1942 strike wave the example set by 'European trade unionists,., 
especially the sweetmakers' strike. when the native employees formed their 
.)wn pr.,cession t., mar.:h behind that of the Europeans in the industry' (10), 
And during the 1942 sweet strike the union secretary. E J Burf.,rd. was 
amazed t., see white afrikaner women sitting down next t., black workers at 
strike ,:oll\l\'li ttee meetint;Js and inSisting that blacks and whites should .;et 
the same pay, even though in their daily marches through the streets .,f 
Johannesburg white and black went in s!!parate .:olumns. 
One of the most important wage increase after 1942 for black workers was 
achieved in co-operation with white workers, At a meeting of the Industrial 
Conciliation board in 1943, the union representing white shopworkers, the 
National Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW), supported the demand of the 
black union, African Commercial and Distributive Workers Union (ACDWU) 
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under the leadership of Dan Koza, for a minimum wage of £2 a week. This 
we,uld have been the highest laboUl"erS ' wa';;Je ,:,n the Witwatersrand. The NUDW 
prlJmised the black union that it would not come te, any al;;Jreement that was 
OI:)t a,:,:eptable to both unions and secured the presence of black union 
.:off idals at the C.:)OI: i liation meetings. When the whi te lI,hJrkers were refused 
an inl:rease, the ACDWlJ pledged solidarity and threatened strike action 
shoul,j trle negotiatilJns f ai 1. A separate agreenlent was n\ade between the 
ACDWlJ and the empl,:>yers which was strongly supported by the presiljent IJf 
the NlJDW, M'Jrris Kagan. He wrote that 1 the wages of the African workers are 
at present SIJ ItJW that no delay should be permitted in bringing about an 
improvement, ,. It would be asking the African workers too much to come out 
in i11el;lal sympathy strike under such .:ircumstances , .. The African trade 
unions have some justifiable complaints against the treatment meted out to 
them in the past by certain trade unions. who had unfortunately so often 
used the African unions to their own advantage ' . (11) The Conciliation Board 
agreement was rejected by the Minister of Labour on the ground that the 
uni'Jns were n'Jt representative but a Wage Board inquiry was ordered for the 
commercial distributive trade. Once the Conciliation Board was dissolved. 
white workers were legally free to strike and did so at O,K,8azaars, After 
a fierce battle, the strike was successful and most of the NUDW's demands 
were met, The Wage Board granted substantial wage increases to ~lack and 
white workers and the right to stop-orders was extended to the ACDWU, This 
put the ACDWU on a far fir .. r financial footing than MOst black ,unions and 
released its officials fro. the huge burden of collecting individual 
subsc r iptions, 
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The complexity of craft workers' response to deskilling. mechanisation and 
,:raft uni'Jnisr,\ was revealed in the 1947 strike of craft w'Jrkers in the 
building trade. Denied an increase in their basic rates of pay for fourteen 
yeal's, threatened with .jiluti'Jn of I:raft skills. employe.j on a .:asual basis 
wi th inevi table perio,js ()f unemployment made worse by the poverty ,Jf the 
,~overnment IS hljuse-bui 1ding pr')gramme, hemmed in during the war by anti-
strike le'~is1ation, I)ver 10,1)00 white workers finally .:ame out on strike 
fClr nine weeks. The base o)f thei r 'Jrganisati'Jn was a rank and file movement 
of joint job steward committees formed during the war, and an industrial 
unil:ln.. the Bui 1ding I,t,IIJrkel'S I Industr ial Union, whicr, sought tlJ replace the 
plural i ty 'Jf .: raf t uni.)ns 'Jperating wi thi n the industry, 
The str ike soon acqui red an poli tical .:omplexion as the str ike bulletins 
repudiated government attacks. In an~wer to press attacks hypocritically 
blaming the building workers for the housing crisis. the strike bulletins 
argued that lit is not the building workers, Mr Editor, who are responsible 
fl::lr the terrible housing conditions for the Masses l::If the common people. It 
is the land speculators. merchants and other profiteers. The building 
workers are fighting determinedly for a living wage so as to abolish 
poverty and SIUMS I (12). As the police attacked the strikers. the bulletins 
ealled for the removal of lall the reactionary anti-labour laws I and 
propaganda was put out outlining the Ifour freedoms I of workers in 
capitalism: Ito starve." to pay taxes .• , to die for their country. ,. and 
to serve their masters I , There were violent attempts by stormtroopers frOM 
Pretoria and by craft unions in the building industry and in the TLC mol'. 
generally to break the strike under the cover of the bogey of communism. 
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Yet tr,e .jclb stewar.js .:.)mmi ttees an.j the 8uildin.~ W.)rkers' Industrial I)nion 
rlel.j out, They re.:eived active supp.)rt fr.:>m a number of industrial unions 
in the TLC, especially Sa.:hs' Garment Workers, and ac.:ording to Lewis from 
s.)me .:.)l,jured and afri.:an unions in the building industry, The strike ended 
in a notable victory (13), Simons' retrospective view of the strike as one 
,:entered ex.:lusively ar.:>und trle pl'otection .jf white privileges does not 
convey the whole story (14), 
The e.ther maj.)1' s.jur.:e of white w.:>rking .:lass militancy .:ame from poor and 
unsk i Ued afrikaner workel's whose .jiscontents soc ialists sought to channel 
in opposition to the Nationalists, In 1939, one communist activist, David 
Cohen, wrote about the th.)usands clf whi te workers living 'below the bread 
line' : 
You find them living in great poverty in the slums, you find them 
on the irrigation schemes, living in tin shelters built by the 
government '" They are deprived of their homes, separated from 
their women and children '" Should these people refuse to take 
on government jobs of this nature, they would starve. Their wages 
are small. Their children get no education, ,. Every day they 
become More desperate, " Many of them now begin to realise that 
the slogan of the robber class 'White South Africa' is one which 
benefits that class only and impoverishes all the other people in 
South Africa, (15) 
Many of these white workers, aspecially woman, joined militant trade unions 
like the the GarMent Workers Union (GWU), They fought courageous and often 
successful battles against sweating labour and exploitation, They stayed 
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loyal to their union in the face of jew-baiting and anti-communist attacks 
laun,:tle.j t.y the atrikaner nati.)nalists, They w.),'ked as .)peratives alongsi.je 
black workers, receiving comparable wages, Indeed wage differentials were 
as .~reat in terms .)f .~ende,· as .)t ,'a':e, The GWlJ sustained thei,' l.)yal ty .J" 
the basis elf a c.)nsi.jerable de.~ree .)t internal demo.:racy with strong shop 
stewa".j .)r'Janisati.:m, Whi le its f.j.:us was .jn winning brea.j-an.j-butte,' 
deman.js, it also appeale.j t.j tr.e spirlt .:.f anti-British imperialism amon.~ 
atrikaner workers t.) pedil'e.:t nationalist sentiment to a m'Jl'e pro.~ressive 
eml, It a.jmitted c.jloured, asian and african women workers, though it 
.)r.~anised them in separate bran.:hes, and it gave support to Gana Makabeni 's 
Afri,:an Clothing Workers Uni.jn as well as other black unions, Its 
membe,'ship r'Jse between 1937 and 1947 from 2000 to almost 12, 000 becol\\ing 
the sec.)nd largest union in the TLC after the Mineworkers, The GWlJ was not 
immune to racist ideas, as indicated perhaps by some of the concessions 
made to parallel unionism and separate o"ganisation f.:>r black workers, 
parti.:ula,'y after 1945 when internal pressures toward ra.: ism al'l\on.~ whi te 
workers became m.jre pronounced, but it fought racism within and without as 
part and parcel of the independent trade Unionism it espoused (16), 
The union leadership made serious attempts to build a socialist political 
organisation beyond the trade union sphere, Sachs sought to find 'a 
political hOMe", for the thousands of politically hOMeless European 
workers and poor people' and saw this as • the major immediate task for the 
Trade Union Movement and all progressives' (17), Sachs himself had been a 
member of the Communist Party and in 1930 was on the Central COMMittee, 
With the Party's turn, at the direction of the Comintarn, to an ultra-left 
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form of Afl'i,:an nati,:.nalism under the slo';Jan of tr,e 'Native Republi,:', 
~::a,:r.s was am.:,n.;! the many pur';Jed in 19:31 in • an ':.rgy of self-destl'u,:ti'Jn' 
for holding onto a class perspective of workers' unity. Seeing the 
Communist Party as having turned its back on white workers, Sachs' response 
was n'Jt to retreat t,:. the unions al,:.ne but I'ather t,:, l'Jok to the C I'eation 
'Jf an alternative s'J,:ialist platf'Jrm. In 1943 he wl'ote in the Klerewerker' 
We have never played int'J the hands of the capital ists by 
shout in.;!: 'we have m, p'Jlitical princlples'. On the ':'Jntrary, we 
have stated all along that the political struggle of the workers 
'~'Jes wi th thei r e,:on'Jmi.: struggle... As lc,ng as pol i tical p'Jwer 
is in the hands ,::>f the enemies 'Jf the workers, the workers wi 11 
never enjoy the things to which they are entitled. (19) 
The yarstick 'Jf a pol i tical home f'Jr workers was a party prepared to 
'protect and further the interests 'Jf the masses of workers'. The qUlistio" 
Sachs and the GWU faced was how t'J build it. 
Until 1943 the GWU supported the Labour Party while fighting to change it 
from within. When the war broke out, relations between the union and the 
Labour Party deteriorated, as the Labour Party entered into government and 
Walter Madeley became Minister of Labour. Madeley's anti-trade union 
policies hit the GWU directly: maternity leave allowances were not paid, 
sections of the GWU were not registered, Industrial Conciliation agreements 
were held uP. Sachs characterised the Labour Party as 'a collection of 
nincompoops and job hunters', When in 1943 the governMent introduced War 
Measures making strikes illegal and imposing compulsory arbitration and 
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when the Labour Pal'ty entere,j int,) an ele,:tion pa,:t with the IJni ted Party, 
'the Party of Mining and Finance Capital', the dle was cast, 
The aWl) ,:alled a NatiQnal Labour C,)ngress t,) create an alternative party 
l'o.)te,j in 'tt-Ie tl'ue prin.:iples of Laboul', Democracy and Socialism', The 
uni,)n' s rnotion t,) the TLC to terminate ,:,:;)llaborati.)n with the Labour Party 
was defeate,j by the bureaucra,:y but the Congress went ai"lead with 120 
de 1e9a tes ·;ai.j t,) l'epresent s,::ome 120, 000 w')l'kers. It ad')pted a i,tJ,)rkel's 
Charter, ,:all in'~ f.::or a 40 t-Iour week, a minimum wage f.)r the unsk i lled, a 
month's rl,::oliday ,)n full pay. more democratic labour laws and prote.:tion for 
women, Out .)1 the Congress, the Independent Labour Party (ILP) was f,)rmed 
to c.)ntest the 1943 election as 'a virulent and potent force in the .:ause 
.)1 work ing .: lass ideals', In its election ':ampaign the ILP stressed a 
.jecent wage f.:;)r all w'Jrkers, women's I'ights and w'Jrkers' unity in 
')pposi ti,)n t.) tt-Ie jQb c'::olour bar, As Anna 8cheepers, .)ne of the lLP 
candi.jates put it, • they are trying to irnprove the standards of the 
unskilled workers at the e~<pensli of the skilled artisans, ThliY want to 
divide the workers, We will not stand for it, A reduction in the standards 
of skilled workers means a general lowering of wages, Let the employers 
bear the burden, not the artisans' (19), In an article in Trek Sachs 
bitterly criticised South African liberaliSM which, he argued was doomed 
'unless and until it learns to understand the workers' proble .. and finds a 
concrete basis of co-operation with the masses of workers. European and 
Non-European,' Sachs was convinced that the inactivity and deliberate 
inattention to the workers' complaints by the United Party-supporting 
unions 'drive the workers into the camp of the fascists' (20), 
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In ~1I:'1 i tical terms the ILF' was a small and transi t,:>ry v,:>ice. In the 
elel: tilJns. :3a,:hs himsel f IJnl y W'Jn 6.9% IJf the vl:>tes ,:ast in Jeppe, behind 
the United Party with 70.:3% and the HNF' with 18%. It was the same story 
with the ILF"s 'Jther tW'J ,:andi,jates. After the elel:ti,:>n, the ILF' fused with 
trle F'l'o,;!ressive Labou\' GI'OUp t'J f'Jrm trle S;'Jcialist Party, but this t'j'j had 
IiI) mope SI.JI:I:ess. The ele,:t'jral re,:,)rd was bad and ':':>mmentators have n.::>te,j 
the ';,:rlizprlrenia 1 shown by members of the GWU who strongly supported the 
uni'jn out not its p,:>litical IJffsprinl~. Sachs has Qften been p,:)\'traved as 
naive In his belief that white workers could be won to socialiSM as well as 
tralje unilJnism. The imp'Jrtance Ijf the ILP was that it represented an 
atteMpt to tackle the probleM of building a workers ' party out of a trade 
union base. The attempt failed but its failure requires further 
explanation. 
Its I:entral weakness lay not in seeking to 'Jrganise white workers 
p'Jlitil:ally behind a working ,:lass banner but in doing so in isolation from 
bla,:k workers. In his own aC1:ount written in 1952. Sa.chs presented an 
uneasy c,:>mpromise between union and party politics. While espousing the 
cause of non-racial socialism. he argued that 'the bala.nce of political 
power and the political future of South Africa lie largely in the hands of 
the Afrikaner workers of the urban areas ... The shrewd politicians of the 
Nationalist Party realise full well that they can retain their power only 
by having the support of the majority of European workers and have 
concentrated tremendous efforts on securing that support' (21), In 
focussing on bread and butter issues, however, Sachs did little to develop 
a political programme to counter that of the Nationalists, 
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Criticism of the isolation of Sachs' project froM black workers was voiced 
at the time by th~ COlllmunist Party in Inkulul~ko when in a review 'Jf the 
194:;: ele.:ti.jns it wl'cJte that Sa,:hs' party • f.)u.~ht the ele.:ticm cm a 
programme whit:h appealed t.:::> the m':::>st reactionary and backward secti.jn of 
the EUNpean w'Jrkers by 'Jmi tting any l'eference t.) the burning .~rievan.:es of 
the n.jn-European people, " The results have .:learly shown that an appeal to 
the European workers to support a "socialist party" without reference to 
the .jemands .)f the n.:on-European people, is n'Jt the easy way t'J power that 
the ILP imagined' (22), This was fair criticism, but it should be put in 
the context of the CPSA's own alliance with the official Labour Party as 
part .:.f its people's front poli,:y, which made the CPSA h,:::>stile to the 
mi 1 i tant break-away led by Sachs, The opposi tion of the CPSA was one IJf the 
factors which ':ontributed to the failure ,:::>f the ILP initiative and to the 
I~rowing alienation ,:::>f afrikane1' workers from soc ial ist poli tics, Sachs 
himself, revealing his own political origins, was hamstrung by his own 
tendency t,) ideal ise the Soviet state and to subsume the c lass struggle in 
South Africa to the defence of the Soviet Union. The evidence available to 
us is incomplete, but it would appear that his decision to organise the 
left politically in 1943 was associated with his own reluctance to endorse 
industrial action that would disrupt war production, 
The success of Afrikaner nationaliSM in winning the allegiance of white 
workers depended on its ability to exploit the weaknesses of the existing 
labour Movement. Before the war, attempts by nationalists to wean afrikaner 
workers toward their own brand of Christian-National trade unionisM were 
generally unsuccessful, except in the case of the white railway workers 
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.j\,.~alli·;ed ill Di~ SDoorbond, where nati.:malists were able t.j e)<:ploi t the 
exclusion of unskilled afrikaners from the dominant craft unions, 
It was only in trle course of the war that afdkaner nationalists f.::.r the 
first time seriously oriented to the mass organisation of workers, Its two 
main p.::.l i tical c.rganisations, the 08 and trle HNP, each f.::.rmed trade union 
win.~s: the ~rbeidsfro"t an.j the 81ankewerk"ersoesk"ernig in 1942 and 1'34:3 
respectively, The receptivity of afrikaner workers to nationalist ·trade 
uni.::.ns' was sti 11 limited, but the nationalists were able tl::' e}<:ploi t strong 
discontent amon.~ afrikaner wOl'kers with the alien English-speaking 
bureau1:racies which ran the craft unions and dominated the TLC and with the 
collaborationist • nest '::.f .:areerists' who ran the Labour Party, Thus their 
first success was tl::' instigate a rank and file \'evolt among afrikaner 
mineworkers against a union leadership whose main function durin.~ the war 
was tel resist its own members' wage demands and prevent strike action, Two 
rank and file strikes in 1946 and 1947 against the closed shop engineered 
by the employers and the Mine Workers Union resulted in a nationalist take-
over of the union (23). The Afrikaner nationalists were able to take 
advantage of the disintegration of the Labour Party from 1943, as the 
latter dug its own grave through its participation in the SMuts government 
and its direct involveMent in the suppression of trade unionism. They were 
better able to exploit the bankruptcy of labourisM and craft unionisM than 
were any of the socialists. 
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As tt-,e I'ot set in, national ist a'3i tati'Jn even mana'3ed t.J take I")'jt amon9 
some members cd tt-,e Garment IJ,Io::orkers, with an unsuccessful revolt a9ainst 
Sachs' leadership coming from its Germiston branch in 1944: particularly as 
the centre clf gravi ty IJf the ';Jarment industry rli.Jved away from whi te w'Jrkel's 
in the Transvaal toward coloured workers in the Cape, Sachs attempted to 
I'esp.:md t.::. this new situatic.ln, sendin9 or'3anisers t,) the Cape, but 
seemin.~l y wi th,)ut much success, 
After 1946, the TLC I\\embership declined from 184,000 in 1947 to 82,0(1) in 
1952 and the .Jrganisation spl it up, In 1947 a number of Pretoria uni.)ns led 
by the Iron and Steel Trades Association split off over the issue of 
Afri.:an unions being allowed to affiliate, The f.)l1.:)wing year, they were 
joined by the Mineworkers, who t':)gether f.jrmed the ra.:ially-based C,:)-
ordinating C.)uncil .)f South African Trade Unions, In 1950, the final b'Jdy 
blow came when the c r aft un ions Ij i sa ff ilia ted and es tab li shed the S'Jutt-; 
African Federati.:m of Trade Unions, while the TLC itself voted f.Jr pa:oallel 
unionism for Africans workers, During this period of ~ccline, the left 
fought a rearguard action. In 1946 Sachs and othar TLC members established 
a Technical Advisory Committee to help the ailing CNETU unions, The same 
year a call from the TLC f~r a ballot among its member unions for a general 
strike over food price increases and shortages was sabotaged by the craft 
union bureaucracy, In 1947 a motion in the TLC to exclude africans was 
def.ated; Sachs' motion to elect the NEC by the delegate vote, designed to 
break the stranglehold of the craft unions over the TLC, was defeated by a 
narrow margin; and the left increased its representation on the NEC, In 
1948 the Communist Party proclaimed that the left had won control of the 
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TLC, but the lef twas ,jependent ,:m the support ,:,f moderate un i,:>ns , 1 ike the 
En,~i neers, whicr. i tsel f practi,:e,j a ,:,::olour bar and proved to be an 
unreliable ally (it supported the Suppression ,::of C':>mmunism Bill in 1950 
which was aimed especially at the left in the TLC), 
One cd the major factors behind the decline IJf independent trade unionism 
among whi te wClrkers lay in thei r failure to turn the fragmentary links they 
r.ad with black uni,:ms into a f i rl'l\er IJrganisational unity, Commenting 1)11 why 
this was the case, JI:>n Lewis has pl:>inted t,:> the ,:hangin';j rae ial ':'jmposi tion 
of the productive workforce in industry as one of the factors which led to 
the growth of racism within the industrial unions themselves and the 
decline of CNETU as an alternative centre of gravity for trade union 
organisation, He wrote: 
The established industrial unions lacked the confidence to break 
cOMpletely with the increaSingly racist craft unions and to ally 
instead with the independent African unions", In the first 
place, left wing leaders were having to fight off racist 
opposition groups within their own unions", Most important, the 
post-war decline of the independent African trade union movement 
reduced the incentive to split frOM the TLC and the possibility 
of a re-aligneMment on the left as Sachs had once proposed, (24) 
There were in addition specific political obstacles COMing from the left, 
The CPSA argued strongly for trade union unity betwe.n white and black 
workers but sought to realise it under the aegis of the TLC, arguing that 
they wanted it to beeo .. I the MOUthpiece of all workers i1'respective of 
rice, colour 01' creed' (25), The CPSA recognised the I reactionary policy of 
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the le~v:lership' but U'lclught tt-Iat the admission o:of black uni,::tns Ilh::tuld force 
it to) 1:llonge intlJ 'a real, militant workel"s' Qrganisation ' . This approach 
to:o tile questi,:on Ijf unity, a heritage o:of tt"le wt"lite labour traditi'Jn, 
misc'Jm;trued where the I:entre Qf '~ravi ty ,:,f the laboul" movement was t,;, be 
flJund. It was als,:o unrealistio: sin,:e the bUI'eaucl'a,:y I)f the TLC would not 
all,:ow its 'jwn grave t'j tie dug through the admissi,:>n ,:>f blal:k unions an,j 
since few black unions prc,ved willinl~ to subf\\it themselves t,:o the 
discipline o:of the TLC bureaucracy. 
The the'jreti,:al perspec ti ve put f,::trward by Sachs was better founded, 
calling for the wi thdrawal IJf progressive unions from the TLC and their 
affiliation to CNETU, but none of the registered unions, including the 
Garment !J'Jrkers, in practice followed this course 'Jf a,:tion. This was 
relate,j t,:) the weakening of CNETI) and the growth of rae ialism wi thin the 
industrial unions, but also, I think, to a lack of poli tical nerve c.n the 
part Ijf the leadership. The opposition 'Jf the CPS A to the lef t industr ial 
unions leaving the TLC and joining CNETU must have added a further 
poli tical obstacle of some weight given the party's leading ,role in CNETU 
and influence within the left of the registered unions, Further, Most of 
the left opposition inside CNETU had written off white labour as a lost 
cause, Dan I(oza arguing instead for the development of the black trade 
union movement under the aegis of the national liberation organisations (at 
first the ANC and later the All Africa Convention), This was a reaction 
against the CPSA's image of unification under the TLC, seen as a covert 
form of white patronage, but just as effectively eschewed the possibility 
of a non-racial trade union movement. Koza worked with white trade 
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unionists in specific instances but his search for a political voice for 
bla·:k \.h),'kers le,j him t.) ar9ue f.J\' the affiliation 'Jf the black t\'ade 
l..mi':'l1s t.:. the pol i tical movement f.)\' nati'Jnal liberaticm (26), Face.j wi th 
these different forms of opposition from the left in addition to the 
c·bstacles p'Jsed t.y the right, it was perhaps n.:. surprise that dreams of 
non-racial unification did not materialise, 
Similar divisions within the left were present in debates over state 
recognition (27), White, coloured, asian workers and for a time african 
women .:.)uld belong legally to unions registered under the Industrial 
CI)nl:iliation AI:t, Registration br,)ught real legal advantages f'Jr unions but 
at the 1:,)St I)f work ing through the bureaul:ratic and restrictive ma.chinery 
I)f inljustrial ,:,)uncils, Sachs fought for the j'ight of registered unions to 
be racially mixed and against the restrictions on the right to strike 
imp,)sed by the ICA, He argued that in spite IJf the benefits of registration 
the lCA had been damaging to white unions, so that the correct approach wa.s 
nl)t tl) impose this framework on black workers as well but for black and 
white workers alike to fight for the right to free collective bargaining, 
independent union ,)rganisation and the right to strike, On the left IJf 
CNETU Dan Koza rejected the whole framework of registration, arguing that 
the liberals of the Department of Labour would prove no less inimical to 
black trade unionism than the Native Affairs Department and demanding the 
unfettered right to strike without restriction, 
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The approach adopted by the CPSA corresponded precisely to that of the 
Labour Party in its 1945 Manifesto on Native Policy and the TLC. It called 
for the recognition of african unions but under the existing leA as a first 
stage toward fuller recognition but did not couple this demand with the 
reform of the legal framework itself. Consequently its campaign offered no 
immediate incentives to registered unions already hemmed in by the 
restrictive terms of the ICA and must have had limited appeal to black 
workers unenchanted by the prospect of registration on this basis. While 
the chance to build a .:ommon front between CNETU and the left in the TLC 
around the extension and democratic reform of the ICA slipped away, the 
Smuts government after years of procrastination finally introduced its 
Industrial Conciliation (Natives) Bill in 1947, the terms of which were so 
restrictive that CNETU repudiated the reform, The election victory of the 
Afrikaijer Nationalists in 1948 put a closure on any possibility of 
progressive reform of trade union law. 
The defeat .:,f independent trade unionism among white workers increase·:! 
thei r I'eceptivi ty t.J the appeals elf afr ikaner nationalism and allowed them 
to be.:ome an important prop for the apartheid state. It represented a heavy 
blow for the black labour movement as well. As the fragmentary links 
between black and white workers were severed, so too the structural 
position of both black and white workers changed, Significant numbers of 
white workers began to be drawn into the ranks of the middle classes and 
black workers began to form a bigger majority of the industrial working 
class as a whole,' These structural changes meant that the future of non-
racial trade unionism lay increasingly in the hands of black workers alone. 
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Cbapter " 
A Clinl-ludinl~ Corllment 
In f,)cussing on the relation between trade unions and p.)li tics, we have 
.:omi tted important areas of work ing I:lass organisation and resistance in the 
1940s: not least the ,:olllmunity movements in the black t.)wnships and the 
sporadic protests of rural workers, Whether these sites of struggle reveal 
a similar relationship of the political leaders to the working class as we 
found in the trade union sphere is a vital question but not to be addressed 
in the body of the text (see appendix 2), My view is that such further 
research reinforces rather than undercuts our basic conclusions, We may 
summarise them thus, 
1, We need to engage with the fact that the class struggles of the period 
ended in defeat for the working class and that the emergence of apartheid 
occurred in the context of the prior defeat inflicted on labour. There can 
be no doubt that the defeats suffered by the labour moveMent significantly 
demoralised workers. We have to abandon the siMPlified image of the 
organisation and ca.bativity of black workers ever escalating in the 19.0. 
and of the defeats inflicted on labour struggles (like the .iners' strike) 
serving only as a catalyst for yet MOre militancy frOM below. L. lutti 
continua but not in this ..chanistic for •• 
-202-
2, In evaluating why the labour movement was defeated in the 19405, two 
fa.:t.jrs .jutside the .:.:mtr.::.l .::.f the labour movement itself stand Clut. The 
first lay in the class structure of South African society. which was such 
that • .11 though the mass of the populati.::.n was ei ther proleta'~ianised or 
well on the way t.j proletarianisation. the social weight of the proletariat 
as a f.jrce f.:>" democrati.: .:hange was as yet insubstantial, The se.:.jnd 
factor lay in the weakness of liberalism as a p.::.li tical force wi thin the 
rulin.~ o:1ass and the dec isiveness with whi.:h the pulin.;} .: lass as a whole 
attacked the .jr.~anised labour movement, These two factors were linked. It 
was in part because .::.f the lack .:>f independent power .::.f the pr.::>letariat. 
that the strategy of accomodation within official circles was at first 
Marginal and then jettisoned. 
3, The strategies and tactics pursued by the leadership of the labour 
movernent in the 1940s ':ontributed to the defeats suffered by the m.:>vement, 
The consensual approach followed by most of the black union officialdom, 
the white labour bureaucracy. the Communist Party. the African National 
Congress and the liberal intelligentsia failed in its own terms, Based on a 
policy of self-imposed constraint from below and reform frOM above. it 
became increasingly alienated from both sides, Its lack of support for 
direct industrial and community action by workers led to a stiffening of 
the joints and a dulling of the reflexes of the labour move.ent, Its 
petitions and deputations for democratic reform fell on the closed ears of 
the governMent and eMPloyers, At first this leadership was tolerated and 
given rOOM to breathe as long .s the rulers felt that it WAS perfor.ing a 
useful function in restraining the power of labour, Later, after the threat 
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froffi labour receded, the politic~l le~dership itself was attacked from 
ab.)ve an.j was t.y then incapable of mountin.~ ~n effective \'esistance. It 
1iI.)uld be wron.~, rl.)WeVe\', to see this p'Jli tic~l leadership as • responsible' 
f'Jr the fai IUl'e 'Jf the labour ffi.JVement. It is mOl'e 1 ikely that the labour 
movement would have ltJst this r'Jund of the c lass struggle whatevel' pOlic ies 
its leade\'ship f'Jll'Jwed. 
4. The growth 0 f the 1 ef t .JppOS i t i'Jn sh'JU I d be seen as a \'esponse t.j the 
perceived failures of the prevailin.~ p.)litical leadership and as the 
poli ti.:al expl'ession of the more heroic and mil i tant side of the labour 
movement. The left opposition itself. however, was deeply fragmented 
between radi.:al nationalists and soc ialists and between r ivai forms of 
nationalism and so.:ialism. There were eff'Jrts to save and reconstruct the 
labour movement made by socialists within the trotskyist movement 
(espe.:ially in the WIL and PTU), the Communist Party (especially when it 
veere.j t'J the left in 1946) and the extreme left of the white labour 
movement (especially S'Jlly Sachs and his .:omrades), but in general the left 
opposition was less interested in serving and re-building the existing 
labour movement than in replacing it with a new social movement under the 
leadership of this or that form of radical nationalism. 
5. The conjunctural defeat of the labour movement in the 1940. was 
accompanied by a more profound and lasting d.feat of socialist idaas as a 
material force within the working class, Thera were two 'external' caus •• 
of the crisis of South African socialisa: the racial fragMentation of the 
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w.)rking .:lass which al:companied the decline of the lab.)ur M.)Vement and the 
rise of confident and aggressive nationalist parties opposed to socialism. 
Over and above these ,:,)nsiderations, h.)weve,', were the defects of the 
a.:tually existing soc ial isms .)f the time. Rather than ,'esist the pressures 
tOlAlar.j nationalism, m.)st soc ia1ists buck led under these pressures: the 
Comll)unist Party be.:ause .)f the dynamics Ijf its externally-imposed popular 
front p')licy, the tr.)tskyist M.jVement because Qf trle incolI\pleteness of its 
break fr')II) stalinism and the IAIhite labour left because .)f the 
incompleteness .)f its break frQM IAIhite labourism. Linking these different 
paths .jf transi ti,)n frl)m SQC ialism tQ nati.:malisll\ lAIas a comMon pl~Qblem of 
tying sQcialisll) t.) the democratic tasks of the South African revolution. 
6. The rise .)f a radicalised african nationalism to the leadership .)f the 
.jemo.:ratic movement was not accomplished prior t., 1948. It should be seen 
not as a natural progression of the liberation n\ovement to a higher f,)rm of 
political consciousness but rather as the product of defeat: both of the 
conjunctural crisis of the workers' movement and the organic criSis of 
socialist politics. African nationalism reflected the racial fragmentation 
of the working class and the force of nationalist ideas emanating from the 
state. It empowered black people in a nationalist Mode but it did not 
transcend the virulent growth of racial ways of thinking. It was not the 
case, as certain left critics of nationalism have argued, that african 
nationaliSM derailed the working class MOvement. Rather the derailing of 
the Movement and the political collapse of socialism Made possible the 
hegeMOnic rise of african nationalism, African nationalism was a definite 
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historical response to the crisis of socialism whose idealisation within 
SCIC i ali S t though trias been (me i nde::.: ':. f trle dep ths 'J fit s c r is is. 
In some respects sQcial ists ill the 1940s wel'e well placed to foster the 
growth clf the young labour n\.)vement. They were present at its birth: they 
were l'ec ipients of the ideas Qf SQ.: ialism internationally; they had a 
heroic tradition of black resistance to white rule on which to build; they 
were linked t.) a w.jrking .:las5 whose f,)rces wel'e small but growing. They 
functioned in an increasingly proletarianise.j society and faced a ruling 
.:las. whose capacity t,) govern was undermined by its deep imbrication in 
rae ial i rrati.)nalism. With the d.)wnturn .)f the I: lass struggle in the latter 
half Ijf the 19405, s.)cialists were put under intense pressure as the 
working class spontaneously fragmented into its • national' component parts 
and radical black and white nationalisms seized the time to appeal to their 
respective sections of the working class. The inability of socialists to 
respond in a socialist way to these pressures represented the 1055 of ~ 
historical opportunity to lead the struggle for liberation. 
Bit by bit, the space for building an independent ~orking class movement 
was closed off; there was to be no easy road to re-building a socialist 
political culture in South Africa. Henceforth nothing could appear more 
natural than the notion tnat nationalism was the appropriate political form 
of the battle for democracy in South Africa, The failure of South African 
socialiSM to attach itself to the organic development of the proletariat, 
through both its defeats and victories, did not derive frOM the inherent 
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irrationality of socialist politics in a racially divided society but 
I'ather from the defects clf S'juth Afri,:an sljcialisrl) itself. Faced lIIith 
terrible pressures, sljl:ialisfll lIIas torn asunder by its Ijllln antinomies: 
betllleen liberalism and revolutionary romanticism, stalinisM and trotskyism, 
nationalism and I pure' socialism. The historic role of social democracy, 
that is, the combined struggle for an independent lIIorking class movement 
an,j f'jr the democrati,: reform Ijf the state, was abandoned by S'juth African 
so.: ial ists: ei the,' because they had nClt yet reached this level of political 
independence .jr be.:ause they prematurely imagined themselves t'j have 
trans,:ended its 1 imi tations. Ei ther lIIay they l'jst sight of the protracted 
tasks of IIIhat Might be called South Africa's proletarian reformation. 
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Ch, 7 
The turn to Mi$$ $tryggle 
The Afrikaner Nationalists were elected to government in 1948 on the basis 
.)f I.Jn.jel' 40~ ,)f the whi te and ,:.:,loured vote an,j a maJ'::>l"i ty ,::>f f,::>ul' seats. 
As tr,e .;).)vernment of a fail'ly a,jvance,j ,:apitalist state, the Nati,)nalists 
were lmmediately ir .... pelled t,::> find ways .:.f adaptin'3 their dispal'ate i,jeas ,jn 
apartheld ana their popUlist anti-capitalism to the realities of 'economic 
integration', that is, the dependence of capital on black labour. The 
directors of afrikaner bUsinesses like Banlam and Rembrandt could now 
ackn'::>wle,j,~e theil' 'e':'jn'jmi,: ':'Jnsciousness' wi thout havin'~ to ,:ower bef,::>re 
the accusati,:ons ,)f emulating 'Hoggenheimer' (1), while Verwoed, the 
Minister of Native Affairs, I'e-assured the Chambers of C.jmmerce and 
Industry that 'the implenlentation of apartheid w,;)uld take acc,;)unt of 
economic I'eali ty', in,:luding the fact that 'a little less than one-third 
(of the afri,:an p'Jpulation) lives and wQrks in the cities, ,:of whom a 
secti'jn have become de-tribalised'. Holding the reins of political powlir, 
the Nationalists soon capitalised on their new status, eschewing 'outdated 
sentimentalism' and embracing the new religion of big business (2), 
A question-Mark hung over the stability of the new regiMIi. a. it sought to 
resolve in practice the tensions between ideologies of apartheid and the 
deMands of capital. Sections of big business were wary of the costs that 
would fall upon theM if acce •• to cheap black labour in the urban areas 
were limited or the preference policy for expensive white labour were 
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expanaed, ~ectlons of the state machinery, especlally in local government 
and the Judiciary, were opposea to some of the key policies and procedures 
~.dv(lI:ate,j t.y the i'Jati(,nal ists. '::ections .:.f the 1"Jili te ele,:torate wel~e n,:.t at 
all enamoured with the prospect of Nationalist rule. The Nationalists 
theriiselv8S .:.:.ntained deep p.)l iti.:al and ide.:al.:..~ical divisi.:.ns witt-lin trleir 
own ranks, n.Jt least O:'Jncernin.~ the ,jevelopment cd the l~eserves al,d trie 
influx of blacks into the urban areas 
Popular protest in the early 1950s 
From below it did n'Jt take 1.Jn,~ f'Jr f ragll\ents I:.f p'Jpular resistance to re-
emerge in oppositi'Jn to the new apartheid 'Jrder. They had little 1:IJhesion 
but revealed that the base for mass struggle was still extant. In Port 
Elizabeth in April 1948 there was a month-long strike of 200 black laundry 
workers whose pursuit of higher wages involved them in fierce battles with 
the police and black legs; in 1949 there was a fOUr-month long bus and train 
boycott against rising fares. There were rearguard actions in both the 
Trades and Labour Council and CNETU to keep independent trade unioniSM 
alive. In the TLC Solly Sachs, facing virulent attacks on his leadarship 
frOM the Nationalists, including a series of libels in a Nationalist 
newspaper set up for garment workers, won re-election in 1950 to leadarship 
of the Garment Workers Union with only 15 vot .. cast against hia at a 
IAHting of over 2000 delegates. In 1952 there was a strike allOng organised 
garment workers in protest against Sachs' banning froa trade union work 
under tNt provisions of the 1950 Suppression of COMMUni •• Act. Banningtl 
under the Act was also directed at the l •• dership of what was ... rging .s 
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th~ Most solid of the Clack unIons coming out at CNETU, the African Food 
and Canning Workers Union, which was fighting wIth some success to secure 
management recognition and wage increases through grass roots organisation 
In the reserves there was bitter resentment at the Stock Limitation and the 
i::aI1tf..l Autt-I.:.rities A.:ts, ~::t.jd: limitati.:.n was presented by the state as a 
Ijevi':e fiji' lan.j bettel'ment but its pl'acti.:al si.~nfi.:an.:e was the f.:)r':ed 
removal or slaughter of cattle belonging to african resel'vists, Bantu 
authc.l\'i ties l'epresente.j, f .. mder the .;;Juise of l'e-furbishin';;J tl'adi tional iSI\\, a 
furthe\' attempt t.j sub.:)rljinate afri.:an I:hiefs and headmen tl::> the state 
administration, The sporadic emergence .;:.f intense and sometimes violent 
l'esistance was illustrated by the rebell il:)n of the • tribespe':)ple l .)f 
Witziehoek in the Ol'ange Fl'ee State in 1950, when they rose up against the 
.:ull i ng .:.f thei r .:attle, the treachery .;:.1 thei r state-app.::>inted ',:hie1' and 
the bl'utality of the poli,:e (4), The ,jepths elf feeling shared by the 
reservi sts as well as the sever i ty I:)f .~overnment .:ounter-measures was 
revealed in one battle in which two policemen were killed and 16 wounded, 
13 africans were killed, up t.::> a hundred wounded and 75 sub~.quently 
brought to trial. In the Ciskei, too, where the effects of land shortage 
were particularly acute, there was deep resentment against the 
• rehabilitation' measures. Tom Lodge has recorded the complaints of members 
of the Ciskei Bunga of an 'ugly spirit of hostility' among the youth. The 
annual reports of the Native Affairs Department wrote of considerable 
organised opposition to cattle culling and Bantu authorities and of serious 
retardation of their plans due to 'Malicious agitators' (5). 
-210-
~he extenslon of the pass laws to africans previously exempt in the 
freehold locatlons of Alexandra, Sophiatown and 8enoni ~as opposed in 
olOOdY battles between the police and the residents. These came to a head 
in 1950 during a number of municipal tram and bus boycotts and then during 
tt-ie Ma.y Oay stay-a.way. Wi th the leak in.~ of '~OVel'l1ment pl'op.:>sal·:; t,:> ti'~hten 
up c,:,ntr,:,ls ,:>ver the fiK'Vemel1t of wc,men tCI t,:,wns and the speed"i ,:,f trie 
Minlster of Native Affairs blaming the deterioration of the conditions of 
; nat i ves iii tt-ie ': it i es ' t.:> the p I'ese",: e c, f W'jfl,,?n wh.j '1 ea ve the i r tK'mes 
contrary to the wlshes of their fathers or guardians and contrary to tribal 
,:ust,:,fij', a spate ,:,f pl'otest dem':>l1stl'ati,:>ns b"lj~:e out am.jnl~ afri,:an \'I,hjmen in 
many i.JI'ban centres. With the ti'~hteni"g I:>f i I,f lux cl:>ntrl,ls i'1 1952 u".jel' 
the Native Laws Amenljment A.:t and the absur.jly-called Natives (Aboli tion 1:>1 
Passes and Cc,-IJrdinatio:m of O'J.:uments) Act, protests from afril:an wl:>men 
turned in at least I:me I:ase in the Odendaalsrus distril:t into a major riClt 
(6) • 
Newspapers of the time were replete with stories of discontent among 
african far.workers on white farms over the virtual serfdom to which they 
were subjected. Their average wages were well below those even of black 
mineworkers, which were themselves well below those of industrial workers, 
and their conditions of service were desperately servile. lacking even the 
rights of legal contract held by black minaworkers. The expansion of 
eMPlOYMent possibilities in the towns provided an attractive escape route 
for farm labourers. so that it comas as no surprise that the predoMinant 
form of protest in the absence of collective organtsation was individual 
desertion on a .. ss scale, The pre.s carried numerous reports of labour 
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shortages on the farms ana of farmers meeting theIr shortfalls only by 
means 0f prison labour. 
ArIIC,n'd ci:,lojure,js in the Cape ttweatened wi th 'Jisent\'anchiserllent, there was 
energetic apPOSition to their plummeting status, First, the Population 
RegIstration Act of 1950 presented the coloureds as a distinct racial group 
oefined negatively i~ relation to the other racial groups; then the 
Nationalists called for segregation for coloureds in all spheres of social 
life, in':lu,jin'~ \'esi.jen,:e thl"Jugrl trle GI"JUp Areas Act an,j mal'l'ia';je thl'ough 
the MiKed Marl'iages Act: and crucially in 1951 the government sought to 
disenfranchise coloureds under the Voters' Representation Bill. deSigned to 
\'era\ove them from the ,:.JMMOn v'Jters r.:oll and provide in its stead a separate 
voters Nil f'Jr ':'jloul'eds to elect three white MPs to represent thei I' 
interests in parliament (7), C'jloured I'adicals ,:organised under the umbrella 
,:.f trlt? Fl'anchise A,:ti':'n CQmmittee (FRAC) a nati')nal ,:ampai'~n a,~ainst the 
1J,:,tel's' Representati'jn A,:t and ,:alled a one-day 'p,)li ti,:al strike' cln May 7 
1951 in Cape T,)wn under the slogan 'v,)tes for all'. This was supported by 
many coloured and african workers, Basil Davidson writing that 'the strike 
was a marked success. In a tour of the industrial suburbs of Cape Town .. , I 
saw factory after factory with its gates fast closed' (8), The interests of 
coloured workers were deeply affected by protectionist job polici.s 
instituted by the government in favour of whites and thay gave strong 
support to the strike, Some thousands of coloureds marched in prot.st on 
the House of Assembly, only to be violently repulsed by the police, 
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The c~mpalgn was t&ken up by the Torcn Commandos, ~n amaigam of mainlv 
~hit8 left-wing ana 8ritlsn-palrtot 8x-s8rvicem8n, They organised two mass 
MeetIngs on the 4th Mav 1951 1n JohannesDurg in which over 25,000 people 
partlclpat8d, designed to protest agains~ the government's 
violate the spirit of the constitution' and to 'enforce an immediate 
General E18ction', Later that month, in what was kno~n as the 'Steel 
Commando' drive to Cape Town. jeeps and v8hicles from seventeen towns set 
off in convoy to m8et in Cape Town on the 28 May, After an orderly 
demonstration outside Parliament, a violent clash WIth the police ensued in 
which about 160 people were injured, A Conference of Coloureds called for 
organisations and in opposition to all discriminatory legislation (9), The 
Torch C'jmmandos were t.:,rn bet~een hal f-bake.j insurrecti.::onary ideas .,n the 
.)ne si.je and an all ian.:e ~i th the !Jni ted Party .:.n the other, The .jeman.j put 
by T.,rch for tl"le .;.:,vernnlent to resign was abandoned ~hen GI'aaf f and 
iJppenheifller f"r the Uni ted Pal'ty insisted that the Uni ted Party elect.jl'ai 
machinery ~as in no position to organise a General Election, This 
predi.:ament becaflle Rlore marked after a f.)rmal pact ~as concluded in April 
1952 between the Torch, the Labour Party and the United Party, known as the 
Uni ted Democratic Front, to fight the .:.)ming election. When Kane-Bernlan for 
the Torch threatened a day of protest ·to bring the country to a virtual 
standstill', the United Party and the Labour Party imNediately dissociatad 
themselves. and when Gillie Ford. the Natal leader of Torch. raised the 
spectre of secession for Natal in an address to a crowd of about 35.000. 
the National Executive of Torch repudiated Ford's • extreme I ideas. 
Nonetheless both FRAC and Torch were able to fuel the parliAmentary and 
·-.1'-' 
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~~g&l (~mpaign wagea agalnst t~e unconstitutionai ways in wniCh coloured 
oeopie were being s~rippec of their political rlghts by the government, 
ror the popular movement the early 19505 was a period not only of 
fragmented revival but also of the revival of fragmentation. The most 
crowa attacked the indian communlty leaving 142 people dead, 1087 injured 
and vast numbers of homes and stores looted and burnt, Fed by what Shula 
Marks has identified as 'a Zulu nationalism focussed around the Zulu 
entrep,'eneurs and their Indian ,:.:,unterparts and a ,:ontinu,)us stream I;)f 
whi te invective against Indians' (10) - and lNe sh"uld a,jd anti-imiian 
sentiment lNi thin se,:ti,:ms ,)f african national iSII) - it pointed t,) the deep 
Both the ComMUnist Party and the ANC, though for different reasons and in 
different ways, moved to the left in this period, In the ANC there occurred 
what has come to be known as its 'turn to Mass struggle', The old 
leadership headed by Or, XUMa was ousted and in its place. more ,'.dical 
leadership was elected, including representatives of the Youth League like 
Mandela, Sisulu, Ta~ and Jo Matthews. This change of leadership was 
significant but the radicaliSM of the break frOM the past has often bean 
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2~aggeratea In the liter~tura, ~he 'moderate' maJority in the foutn ~eague 
had c0nsider~bly softened theIr Views sinca t~e heady days of 1943-44, Men 
like ~rofesor Matthews, Chief Lutull, Dr, Molema and Ur, Moroka representee 
~QntLnulty wlth the liberal tradition of old, Men like Kotane ana 80pape 
were ComMunlst Party members wno had been allies of the old ANt leadership 
~gainst the radicals of the Y0utn League, Among the old guard it was only 
conservatives like Dr Xuma and the Rev Calata who excluded themselves and 
~ere to form the right-wing National-Minded Bloc, Among the youth, the 
'extreme' Afrlcan15ts in the ANt remained a faction outside the national 
leadership circles, 
The ANC's adoptic,n in 1949 .)f the Programl'lle of Action indicated its shift 
t.) trle left by cClmmitting the ANC t.) a .:ourse .'jf ·jire.:t a·:tion an,] mass 
mobilisation, The programl'lle upnel.j the .:laim of the african pe')ple t.) 
'self-determination', 'national freedom' and 'political independence', 
'..Isin.~ the language .)f anti-c.:.l')nialism but .jefining its ':'Jntent in liberal 
.jemocratic terms of 'freedom from white domination". the right of direct 
representation in all the governing bodies of the country.,. and the 
aboli ti,:m of all differential institutions". especially erected for 
Africans' (11), In some respects the Progral'lwe of Action reflected the 
specific aspirations of the african middle class, notably calling for 'the 
establishment of COMMercial, industrial, transport and other enterprises' 
by and for africans and mirroring the economic programme of afrikaner 
nationalism but with far less prospect of success, It called for a study of 
'the economic and social conditions in the reserves", to devise ways and 
means for thair development' but did not challenge the existence of the 
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~2s~r,2S themS21ves, ~" called for' :he establIshment of natIonal centres 
a natlonal fund and a national press. but made no further proposals for the 
~ullding of a mass political organisation. 
~ith ~egard to african workers, the Programme limited itself to a call for 
'the consolidation of the industrial organisation of workers for the 
improvement ,:of their standal,.j .:of livin.~' and e~<:p\'essed the h')pe that 
,jevelopment in the reserves and t()w\1ships • may .Jive empl':>yment t.) a numbel' 
,::of people', It was a ri\odest set .:of demands which held back from the 
• e:<:tremism' of the afl'i.:anists. The shal'p ed'Je .:.f the Y.)uth League's 
earlier radicalisM was blunted along with the bitter edge of its racialism. 
In strate'Ji': terms, the Pl'ogramme .jf A.:tion .:alled for n\a.ss action, 
including • the appointment ,jf a council of action,., to work for", the 
aboli tion ,:>f all ,ji fferential political institutions the boycotting ,:>f 
which we accept .•. and to employ the following weapons: imMediate and 
active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation." and plans 
for a national stoppage of work for ona day', These methods were too 
briefly stated to reveal much about the nature of the mass struggles 
conceived in the programme, but the important point was that the PrograMMe 
paved the way for bolder political action than had been considered possible 
or desirable by the old guard of the ANC, 
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lhe cali for a 'boycott of ail differentIal ~oiltical institutions' 
reflected the aoproacn of tne Unity Movement but became Lncreaslngly 
redundant as a strategy when the maJor dlfferentlal political institutions. 
like tne Native Representative CounCil, ~ere abolished by the government. 
In spite of the moderation of its aemands ana the brevity of its discussion 
on action. the Programme represented a definite turning point for the ANC 
~n its \'elati.:;n to the 'masses'. Its de.:l".I'e.j aim was that "..Iltimately the 
oeoOle will be brought together by Insolred leadership under the banner of 
~frican nationalism'. Before this aim could be realised, there was a rival 
banner also wooing the african working class and still to be contended 
wi th: the i"'e.j f lag (If the t.attere.j but by 11.:. means t.eaten CQmmunist Pal'ty, 
The ANC ha.j turned t.J the masses but the masses had \1I:)t yet tUI'ne.j t.j the 
ANC. 
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The COfl)lDun:ist Party turns left 
The new direCtIOn of ~he Communist Party reflected the Wlder left turn 
taken by the international Communist movement at the onset of the Cold 
Wal' anlj trle f,jrmatil:ln of trll: C'jmintc'I'I'I'1. In SI:lutrl Africa, tar fl'ljm trle 
t,attle lines ,:>T EUi'ope, the CPSA' S turn tl) the left was PI)stpone,j until 
after the 1948 election and afforded doctrinal expression in January 
1950 when the report of the Central Committee to the National Conference 
.:.f trle CPSA launche,j l..Ip")n a srlal'p I: I' i tique c,f at I' iean natil:mal ism and in 
part iculal' the ANC (12). 
In direct ')PPosition t'J the Programme of Acticln elf trle pI'evious year, 
whil:h ,:alled f.:;or the afri,:an masses t,) rally behind the flag of afl'ican 
nationalism. the centl'al ':'JI'tlmittee c.)untered that I the .:lass ,:.jnscious 
prol.:,tariat cannot I'ally under the "national" flag of the bour,;eoisie', 
sine.:, in its w,::>rds: 
Thare is a fundamental difference between their ultimate aims: 
~ bourgeois leaders striving for the 'freedom of the market' 
under capitalism, the class conscious workers fighting for the 
overthrow of capitaliSM itself .•• The bourgeoisie of the 
oppressed nationality develop an interest in the perpetuation of 
national differences, even while fighting against the 
discriMination imposed on their national group •.• Cia •• 
conscious workers, who wish to remove the grounds of hostility 
between the national group., .... t strive to bring about unity 
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between the workers of the oppresslng nation and the oppressed 
peop18 ana put an end to conflicting nationalisms, At most, the 
class conscious workers can enter Into a united front with the 
natIonal bourgeoisie (13), 
Wi th s.)me e::(.:epti.)n bein.~ made f.)r the indian petty b.:>ur.~e.:.isie 
(doubtless related to the fact that the Communist Dadoo was President of 
:::Alc), the blad: petty b,)ul',~eoisie in S.)uth Afri.:a was castigated as 
bein.;) incapaOle of pi'.)vidin.;;! effe.:tive leadel'ship, This was attributli'.j 
to trie inse.:urity .)f a class trtat was • small. fl'agmental'Y, pinned down 
in the pCII)rest al'eas. f()rce.j t.:> use subtel'fI.A.~e, " and starved .:>f 
.:api tal' and wh.:>se leaders were with few e~<ceptions • not a bour.~eclisie 
but tea.:hel's •• :hurch ministel's and professi';lIlal men", employed in state 
.)r European-doillinated il,sti tuti.:>ns, " handicapped by thei I' depen.jent 
economic status' (14), 
The central committee argued that the 'petty bourgeois' character of the 
nationalist leadership was I'eflected in its pl'e-1940s demand fc.r a 
• weighted' Non-European franchise but also that the radiealisation of 
african nationalisa did not fundamentally change the ANC's middle elass 
colouration, Referring to the 'evasiveness and aabiguity • of the 
PrograMme of Action, the Central CoMMittee attacked its demand for the 
'right of self-determination for the African people', arguing that it 
meant the right of political secession and therefore 'the dividing of 
South Africa into a "black" and "white" state - which would IIHn 
~rtMid'. The report criticised the 'meagre.,... and crudity 'of the 
aconoaic daands of the Pl'ogrUM of Action, which contained only two 
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~aragraphs pertinent to workers: one calling for I the estabLishment of 
people's co-operatIves' and the o1her for '~he consolidation of the 
industrial organisation of the workers as a wing of the National 
bourgeois character, its economic dependence on the white ruling cl~ss 
and its isolation from the workers, the leadership of the national 
org~n1sations tends to t~ke refuge in negative and defeatist tactics 
WhlCh, for mass consumption, are wrapped up 1n tierce-sounding 
i'ev.)luti.)nal'Y phrases' (16), 
Picked .jut f'Jr spec ial .:ensure was the boycott pol i.:y which both the 
lJni ty M.)vement and the Youth League saw • as the .:mly "salvation" 
p,)ssiole ,f.jr the Non-European peoples', It was argued - with some 
bl'azenness .~iven the p.jlicy .:>f tt-u~ CPSA during the war - that a boycott 
coul.j ')l1ly be effective • when the rulin.~ .: lass wants. Must have .:.)-
,)peratiol1, as in war' I but in the ,:ircunlstances of the time' the ruling 
.:lass itself wants t.:> abolish the institutions concerned', Far from 
arousing the people against oppreSSion, the boycott movement w~s 
criticised as 'an onslaught on those Africans who do carryon active 
struggle' in these institutions, Instead of exposing appeasers and 
conciliators in these bodies and 'forcing them to carry out a militant 
line of action, the boycotters shout to all, militant fighters and 
appeasers alike, Withdraw I , " The essence of the campaign is that the 
non-Europeans should turn their backs on political struggle", and in 
short Accept &egregation', It was argued that 'behind this tendency to 
turn the back on the European' lurked a racial Is. which also affected 
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relations b~tween th~ Non-Europ~an groups themselves: 'so that Africans, 
that this racialism could only be av~rted by recognising the class 
alignments which cut across racial divisions, 
The CPSA's left critique of the defects of african nationalism offered 
an important counterweight to current orthodoxies about the fusion of 
socialism and nationalism, Some aspects of its critique, however, were 
sec tal'ian, F')I' instance, the arl~ument that the blcl.l:k II\iddle c lass was 
t,),) e,:,)n,)mit:ally dependent I)n the state t,) provide effective poli tical 
leadership, ')mi tted t.) menti.)n that some sec tions .)f the at r ican middle 
class such as doctors and la\!lyers \!lara not directly dependent on state 
employment and played a leading role in the ANC, Other leading figures 
in the ANC like Sisulu came from a \!Iorking class background. Socialist 
parties like the CPSA also had strong middle class representation within 
their leadership and indeed any working class movement requires a coming 
together of workers and the radical intelligentsia. The key issue w.s 
not the sociological composition of the leadership of african 
nationalism but its political relation to the working class. 
One passage in the report reduced the nattonalist struggle of the 
aspirant black bourgeoiSie to 'the liberty of squeezing profits out of 
the people', revaaling little understanding of the great advance which 
'bourgeois equality' would have represented for black worker •• s well. 
The right of self-determination for the african people ~nd8d 1n the 
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Programme of Action, thougn posed in the language of national 
lnceoendence, explicItly aid not mean the rlght of political secessIon 
Dut rather of a multi-racial democracy, Most important, the central 
committee failed to mention that It was the Communist Party itself which 
for most of the 1940s had allied itself with the old guard of the ANC on 
a patriotic programme of constitutional reform and the curtailment of 
ille.;jal f.,rms of dire.:t a.:ti"n, ':;.) that .)ne functi,)n .:of the j'aport was 
to displace all responsibility for this strategy frOM the shoulders of 
ttie C')flu'fIunist Party an,j ont,) those of afri':an nati,)\,alism, 
The CPSA's critique was n,)t presented in the name I)f socialism against 
the I imi ts .)f at 1" kan national iSM but rather in the name ,)f 
i'evoluti,)nary nationalisl\\, ,It argued that the national liberation 
,:organisations had to be transformed into 'a revolutionary party Qf 
workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, " in alliance 
with the ,:lass consci,)us European workers and intellectuals', It saw 
such a party as distinct from the C,)mmunist Party 'in that its objective 
is national liberation, that is, the abolition of race discriMination. 
but it would co-operate closely with the COMMUnist Party' (17), Thus 
while a socialist movement appeared as the appropriate political forM 
for the struggle for SOCialism, the iMMediate struggle for national 
liberation appeared as the province of revolutionary nationalist 
leadership, This distinction was vital for the forms of organisation and 
activity which the party was to support. it. effect being to divide 
artificially the deMocratic and socialist aspects of the struggle into 
two s~arat. cOMpartments: tha for .. r belonging to ~ terrain Of 
·-.. -t·'" -~..::..:.-
Gatlonai liberation and the latter remaining within the fold of the 
C,:,mmi.Jn i -; t Party I 
In spite of its criticisms, the central committee held the door open for 
~orklng class demands on issues like the pass laws, residential 
Europeans and therefore c.~nstitute netiC/oel issues'. In contrast to 
ear lier passages, i t .:.~nc luded trtat 'since the N'~n-EUI·,~pean bour'ijeoisie 
is weak, no serious divergencies can develop betwelin it and the Non-
European wl~rlc: il1g class'. The l'epol't ,jid n'jt make a coherent whole, but 
the sub-text of its last section spel t out the .:on,:H tions under which an 
all ian.:e between the ANC and the CPSA .:.juld be f ')l"ged. 
First, the struggle against racial discrimination must be related 
ideologically to the struggle against capitalism by 'showing that the 
colour bar is primarily a technique of explOitation', Second, the ANC 
should emphasise 'the unity of interests that exists between the workers 
of all races', and so concede the establishment of a non-racial trade 
union moveMent not tied to african nationalism, Third, it was necessary 
to insure 'the ~inant role of t~ class conscious workers in the 
national organisations' and so allow CPSA meMbers to take leadership 
1"01 .. in the nationalist .ove.ent, Finally, 'the bourgeois el ... nts 
~l~nln ~he nationai moveMents' Must no longer be allowed 'to attacK 
~Itnout challenge the working class moveMent, ~u slander the Party, and 
~o aaopt a negative or hostile attitude to the international working 
class f0rces ' , by which were presuMably Meant the Soviet Union and the 
COli",i nf o\'rn, 
These conditions for unity wIth the national liberation MoveMent were a 
far cry from the fundamental critique of bourgeois nationalism wlth 
wnier, the central ':ommi ttee started, The two wings I)f CPSA Pi) I icy were 
unintel~ratelj, Was "there tl) be an independent movement led by the work ing 
': lass wi th no IIlc,re than temporary uni ted f ,'onts wi th e><isting national 
liberation l)rganisati l)l1s or a fusi,::>n of national ist and work inl~ I: lass 
poli tics under the banner I)f natic,nal ism? In 1950 the ,'elation between 
the C,::.mmunist Party and the nati,)nal 1 iberation mQvement was unresQlved, 
The CPSA was committed to a leading role in the liberation movement, It 
acknowledged that the I)rganisational strength of the party left much to 
be desired, saying that 'we have not made the progress we should hava 
during the last few years, It is therefore nece.sary to taka stock of 
the position realistically, We cannot bluff oursel ve. , (18), Nonathele •• 
it claiMed that 'the Party organi.ation has rellained intact ••• Our 
prestige has grown, The people are turning to the Party in ever 
increasing nunbers.,. The African MeMbership is increasing by leaps and 
bounds' and it concluded on the note that 'the prospect of building our 
party into a Mighty weapon c~le of leading the lIas .. _ in their 
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struggle is excellent', The CPSA in fact comprised in 1950 under 2000 
fih?ffIOer-;, indu.jili'~ at least 1200 afl'i.:ans, '300 whites, 2.~,(l(l indians and 
discrimination such as the industrial colour bar', 
Hay Day 1950 
The f i pst attempt 1)f the CPSA ' s to inlplement this resolution canle with 
its call, ':;upported by the Transvaal ANC, f,)r a stay-away I)n May Day 
1950 in protest against the Suppression of COMMunism Act and in support 
of higher wages. Within the ANC, on the left around the Youth League and 
(In tria right around the National Minded Bloc, there \/Iere many who 
lPPosed the .:a11. May Oay was a day in the calendar of the international 
!,II1)rking class movement rather than african nationalisM. Most important, 
the stay-away was read as an attempt by the CPSA to challenge the 
t"legemony ,:.f african nationalism. In spite of this opposition. the CPSA ' Si 
initiative met with considerable success in the Johannesburg area where 
it \/las called. The costs. however, were high, In a number of townships 
fierce fighting with the police broke out. in which it is estimated that 
about 19 workers died and 38 were injured, There were severe reprisals 
frOM the employers and Many activists were arrested and lost their jobs, 
Wi thin the ANC response was mixed, 
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f eared that it was s~~k in.;! t,~ I'ally the masses behin.j the bannel' '~T 
communism, An ~ditorial by Jordan Ngubane, who was later to jOin the 
Liberal Party, in !nkundlaya Bantu atta.:ke.j the (:.;)f1\lIu.anists f.::or 
. stalllpedin.~ ':'U\' pec.ple int.) the May Day demonstrations' as part of a 
.: afllpai.~n 'en';jineere.j by C.::ommunists to) advance the .:ause .:.f Communism and 
n(j'l,; (If the ')ppl'es'=e'J Afl'i.:an' (1'3), He p.)rtl'a'le.j the stay-away as a pash 
a.:ti,:.n I'esulting in 'the 1.)ss ,:,T Afri.:an life wlth.)ut a.jvancin.~ the 
.:ause .:.f Afri.:a', E:y .:,)ntrast the I'esponse c,f the ANC Nati,::onal E~':e.:utive 
was t.) offer an e~:aggerated appraisal of the stay-at-home as a complete 
success and .:all its .)wn .::own stay-at-h')me .:;.n June 26 as a day elf 
f1)ourning f.::or those killed. It received the support of the CPSA and with 
.)nly two weeks notice to prepare the strike, .:ritics again accus.ad the 
ANC of an adventurism incited by the Communists, as evidenced in this 
letter t.::o Professor Matthews from the Rev, Slc:omol.::o: 
Through the May Day strikes, our people l.jst lives, properties 
and j.jbs, and have had no l'edress. 8ef.),'e these wounds are 
healed, we are again formulating another strike. The nation is 
not ready, •• We have to retreat according to plan and organise. 
That is strategy ••. If we are at the mercy of the COMMUnist 
Party, take it from me, the Congress hasn't got another year to 
1 ive. (20) 
The actual results of the second st&y-a.y were uneven, poor in the 
industr 1al hArtlands of the Transvaal but stronger in the Eastern Cape 
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and Natal. In Durban thousands of workers lost their jobs as a result of 
their ~articipation. Sisulu call~d it an 'outstanding success' but the 
ANC's own report was more circumspect on its limitations, Many workers 
\I.
'
':?I';? e:'-:r.austed by May Day an,j the reprisal':; wi'"'.i,:h f,:,ll'jwed, A':C':'I'dir1'~ t'j 
one of the organisers cited by Lambert, I there was a hell of a lot of 
intimidati':m an.j had its .;Jreat effe,:t. F'e'jple were lickin'~ theil' w,)unds. 
We had made a great effort for the May Day strike, This one followed too 
quickly. You can't just call the people out, you have to organise for 
it' (21), It was perhaps asking a lot of relatively disorganised workers 
a.~ain t.) risk theil' lives, liberties and livelihoods for the sake ,:11 
what was purely a demonstl'ative action, Whatever the strengths and 
limitations of the stay-aways as a specific form of mass mobilisation, 
they showed that under the right conditions substantial sections of the 
working class were prepared to take action and were a further sign, over 
and ab'jve the many 1 ')0:: a 1 f,:arms ,:af protest .jutlined earlier, of what 
w,)rk in'~ class mobil isation could achieve even in this period of mounting 
reao:: tion (22). 
On 20 June 1950, six days before the second stay-away, the CPSA forMally 
dissolved it .. lf, Shortly beforehand the government had announced the 
introduction of the Unlawful Organisations Bill, later to be changed to 
the Suppression of COMuni •• Act, The bill was designed to outlaw all 
political activity deeMed to fit into a widely defined category of 
'ca.auni'" and give the state .~utive great powers of discretion, 
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;dop~ea by the CPSA central committee at tha tlma was tnat tha 
dlssolution was the rasult of stata attacks, its dacision based on the 
\' ~,: O';lli 1 t i on trlat . trle ,jay trle ::;uppress i'::on .:.f (:omrilun i sm Bi 11 bel: .::oriles law, 
evel'y one l::of OIJr mer.lbers, merely by virtue .:.f theil' membel'ship, rllay be 
llable tc. be lmpl' i s.::oned !,IIi thc.ut the C.ptll:on ,:of a fine f ,:,1' a ma~:irilum 
::'i,H'i,::olj ·:·f ten veal's' (2:3). Theljretil:ally seif-diss,::oluti,:,n was n,::ot trle 
only option available. The alternative put forward retrospectively by 
the SACP In 1962 attributed the decision to dissolve to the' legalistic 
illUSions' !,IIhierl had 'penetrate,j into the ranks ,:.f trle Party, includin';J 
i ts leadinl~ pers'jnnel ' and argued that it was be,:ause ,::of this legalism 
that the Party had been unable to lIIork underground: 'these err'::ors 
,:ulminated in the dissolution of the Party (24), 
Other CPSA c,::ommentators have taken a less cri tical vielll, Jack and Ray 
Simons presented the dissolutic," in tactical terms, IIIri ting that while 
',jeep seated l"yal ties, ,:,:)mmunist tradition and fierce contempt for the 
,::oppressor urged them to defy, ,:ould the party make the transition to 
illegality without being annihilated? (25)' The party could not be 
expected to MOve from legality to t 11 ega 11 ty 'Jvernight, Moses Kotane 
endorsed the view that there was little alternative to dissolution at 
that stage, since the party could not go underground with the sort of 
membership which it had, 'Many of whom were totally unequipped both 
ideologically and practically for illegal struggle' (26), 
-228-
~ccordlng to Micnaei Harmel (27), CPSA leaders moved in at least three 
Jlfferent directIons: a mInority opposed to dissolution, those In the 
ti'e..I::litlc'n clf the E:i'I'lNdel'ites In the 1'340s Wt-II) 'rlad ,:"me t,j d"IJc.t the 
need for the very existence of the independent Marxist-LenInist Party', 
and an insurrectionary current calling for the withdrawal of Communists 
'from all public activities in such mass organisations as were still 
legallv permitted to concentrate on the underground'. The broader party 
:j,erflbersrlip ,:,i..ltsi.je "the Central C.)mmi ttee seems t.:. rlave t,een af f .:.r.je.~ lil, 
Yoice in the deCIsion, the first the members heard of the decision to 
,jiss.:,lve their party bein!;} trle announcement in parliament, Ac,:ol'din';J t" 
8untin.~, 'the maj')r i ty 'Jf the Party Inembe,'s lNe,'e ':'Jnvinl:ed that the 
diss.,luti.)n was merely a ruse' (28), It is an interesting f')otmlte that 
the judge presiding .)ver a .:ase to determine whether the CPSA still 
existe.j at the time .,f the passing I,f the AI:t and therefore whethel' it 
was still subject t.) stilte liquidation, f')und that the CPSA was nl)t 
legally dissolved since acc.)rding t.) its own I:onstitution it was b';)und 
to I:all a national conference to dissolve itself, (29) 
In the event none of these perspectives was followed in practice. By 
1953, the party was re-constituted in secret, It did not declare its re-
birth as an underground organisation, its me.bers working exclusively 
through the mediUM of the national liberation MOveMent. Through tha 
19605 the COMMUnist Party continued to function behind the scenes and 
without a public identity, Betw .. n June 20 1950 and July 14 1960 no 
statement was issued in its n .. a, even though for at least sevan of 
these year. the party wa. active and organised, An official hi.tory has 
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deci&red that I it was unaers~ood by evervoody that statements in the 
the issue under dlScussion' (30), but at the time it was re-iterated to 
critics of the CPSA in the national liberation movement that there was 
no secret organisation in existence and no hidden agenda, The Communist 
Party did not abandon the political stage to african nationalism but 
played its own definite role in nationalist dress, It was perhaps not 
surprising, given its ambiguous role, that the Communist Party was to 
generate all kinds of wild suspicion concerning what it was doing, 
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The Defiance canJpaign 
~l th;juqrl the ANC t:...II'ne,j to:, mass stru';;:Igle in 195(1, 1 twas 1'.Jt yet .:.. [,)ass 
MoveMent and for two years after the 1950 stay-aways it engaged in 
little activity nationally or locally, It was suffering from an acute 
financial crisis, it had no national newspaper of its own, there was 
little co-ordination at the national level and it was beset bv internal 
diVISions culminating In the expulsion of the conservative National 
Min.::Ied Blt:II:, In tt"lis ':':'nte~<:t, the Def ian,:e Campai,~n 'Jf 1952 r,as t,een 
generally recognised as a vital step first in winning mass support 
behind the banner 'Jf african nationalism (from a small organisatilJn of 
at mlJst some 7000 members, the ANC was said to have dramatil:ally "3rown 
by the end of the Defiance Campaign to some 100,1)00 members), il1 
implementing the Programme I:.f Action and in cementing 1 inks between the 
Iji f ferent I,atil:.nalist 'Jrganisations, The campaign has been seen in this 
light as a crucial moment in the making of the modern national 
liberation movement, On the other hand, none of the reforms it set out 
to achieve were won and the surge of new members who entered the ANt 
rapidly departed after the campaign had been called off, By the end of 
1953 the ANC claimed a total _Mber~ip of SOM 28,000, but judging froll 
its accounts its paid-up membership was back to around 7000, As one 
anonymous Congress writer put it, 'the building of the organisation did 
not correspond to the enthusiasm the campaign had aroused", As a result 
we did not consolidate our gains' (31), With these conflicting images in 
Mind we need to re-ass .. s the political significance of defiance, 
7he lmmedi~te aim of the c~mpalqn was to bring about certaIn sceclfic 
democratic reforms, namely the repeal of six 'unJust' laws whIch the 
nationalists had introduced or re-in1orcea since 1948: the Pass Laws, 
the Group Areas Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Voters' 
Representation Act, the Bantu Authorities Act and the StOCk Llmitation 
Policy, It sought to win these reforms by general ising at the national 
level the sectional struggles wage a locally in the early 19505. The idea 
~as to draw into one national campaign, directed centrally at tne 
';i')Vel'nment, UOle dispal'ate '31' ievan,:es .:,1 the pe'J!=ole. The metrll:IIJ was spel t 
.:,I.Jt by JQ SI,)v'J, a lealjin'~ member c.f the C,=,mnlunist Party, when rle wI'c,te 
Sl)me years latel': 
IJnti 1 the isolated '~I'ievances and the spontaneous ,)utburst are 
.:analised into an .)r.~anised realisation of the p'Jssibi li ties IJf 
sweeping away the unjust system, the powers that be will 
continue til have things their own way .. , Thus the Defiance 
Campail~n managed t.J create a drive throughout trle cljuntry around 
a common plan, It managed to link up all the current I~rievances 
and all isolated struggles into one national Movement which 
aimed at sllleeping away some of the More basic discriMinatory 
legislation ... It succeeded in linking up the general aims lIIith 
more specific and immediate local grievances, .. (32) 
According to the Planning Council, the first stage of the campaign lIIas 
to cOllPrise civil disobedience by select volunteers who were to refuse 
to carry passas, defy • European-only' signs in public places, ental' 
restricted areas without a permit, etc, In the second stage, the nUMber 
of volunteer corps as well as the nuMber of centres of operation were to 
be increased until the capaign clogged up the judicial and 
aamlnlstratlve macnlnerv of the state. fhe tnlra ana climactic s~age w~s 
to Involve mass participation. aurlng wnich lnaustrlal action -
descrlbed as 'the best ana most Important weapon In the struggle of the 
oeoole for the repeai of the unJust laws' (33) - WOUld combine wlth 
Vh?W tl"'tat 'lawful in.justrial a.:tion shl~uld n.:.t be ,'es.j,'te.J to 
lmme'::liatei y' . 
The carllpaign was ,jesigned t.~ be n'~n-violent thl'ou.~rlout. wi th ,'efel'en':e 
bein.~ made tel both ch"istian pacifisR\ and the 'soul-f')rce' .)r 
• Saty.~raha' I)f Ghan.ji, Their main perspective on fighting for l'efOl'ms 
was through winnin.~ a .:hange I)f haart on the part ,;,1 the rulers when 
.:onfl'onted by the PQwer of moral arguR\ent and exaR\ple, The ol'ganisation 
of the .:aMpaigl1 was put in the joint hands .)f the ANC and the South 
Afri':an Indian CQngress. symbolising the unity .)1 national .~roups in a 
I:.jml'l\on struggle a.~ainst apartheid, and volunteers were also to includa 
.:oloured and white contingents, 
Viewad in relation to the 1950 stay-aways. the Defiance CaMpaign 
represented a step back frOM working class participation. The lesson 
drawn by the political leaders fro. the June 26 stay-away was to 
quastion the readinass of the Masses for action. This was not 
unreasonable given the low level of organisation of the working class 
and the probl_ of adventuriSM which had been expr.ssed in 1960. The 
Manner in which the ANt. howev.r. chos. to prepare the ...... for action 
~as nat so mucn tnrough trade union and community organlsation nor 
through supportIng the local protests which were taking place, but 
rather througn exemplary action on the part of the leaaership to ralse 
the consciousness of the masses. Thus for the two years between 1950 and 
1952 the main focus of activity within the ANC was on planning for 
Defiance rather than on working class organisation. 
Campai'Jn tended t.j substi tute f.jr them rather than integrate them into a 
whole. As a refIJrm movement the Defiance Campaign was ':riticised fr.)m 
the sectarian left. espe.:ially those in the Unity M.)vement who 
identified all struggles for reform with reformism, for its illusion 
that reform was posssible under apartheid. The real problem, however, 
was n.jt that the ANC deManded particular reforms - which was in fact its 
strength - but rather the manner in which the battle for reform was 
waged, Its perspective was not so much to deploy pressure from below as 
to incite a 'moral re-awakening' from above. Lao Kuper has ably summed 
up the liberal presuppositions behind this view when he wrote that 'in a 
country with traditions of representative governing institutions, the 
possibility of the inner conscience baing pricked always existed, and 
that therefore our mass pressure and world opinion might be heeded even 
in South Africa' (34), The approach, as he put it. was founded on the 
belief that 'allegiance owed to Sod' might prevail over 'duty to 
Caesar', SUch an approach Might have had more purchase in a forMally 
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liberal-democratic polity like that of the USA, but under the apartheid 
state conditions were unfavouraole, There was nothing wrong in seeKing 
to oersuade even the Most obdurate racists of the error of their ways. 
but an orientation toward reform which depended on the moral 
enlightenment of the rulers rather than on Mass organisatlon. was on 
shaky foundatic .. ns in ~::':.uth Afri,:a, 
The limits of this perspective were illUstrated by the exchange aT 
letters tll:tweeen M')I',:,ka an,j Sisulu f':or the ANC an,j Dl' Malan. the PI'ime 
Mimster. which t(),)k place during the pl"eparation f,:or the ,:ampai,~n. 
Moro~:a and Sisulu inf')I"hle,j Malan ,)f the plight and restiveness ,)f 
africans. warning that if the Government .jid not .:ease from de,~rading 
the african people and ,jenying them basic human \'ights, then the ANC 
would proceed with its def ian,:e plan, The extensi,)n of democracy and 
1 iberty. they said. was vi tal t,) africans and they were determined t,) 
achieve them 'in our lifetime' (35), In reply the Prime Minister's 
office rebuked the Congress officials for being so 'presumptuous' as to 
communicate directly with the Prima Minister inste~d of the Minister of 
Native Affairs and declared that the call for the rep.~l of differential 
laws was 'self-contradictory' because 'the Bantu differ in many ways 
fro. the Europnns' and that it should be 'borne in mind that these 
differences are permanent and not Dan-made', 
The ANC's offer of co-operation was .een by Malan as 'an attempt to 
eMbark on the first steps towards supplanting European rule', The PriMe 
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MinIster reffiinaed the Congress leaaers wno wielded repressive power in 
South Africa and warnea tha1should the ANC proceed with its il1-
advised campaIgn, the government would not hesitate to us~ the full 
machinery of the state'. ~he ANC leaders pursued their corresooncence 
with the government. explaining that the issue was not one of biological 
differences but 'one of citizenshio rights ~hich are granted in full 
measure to one section of the population, and completely denied to the 
other by ffieans of man-maae laws artificially imoosed not to preserve the 
identi ty of EU1"jpeans as a sepa,'atel:'jmffiuni tv but to pe"petuate the 
=ystemati ,: e;<:pl'jitatim1 of trle African people ' (:36), The 1~I:;.ve"nment was 
move,j not an in,:h, e;(cept t,j prepa,'e for ,'epression, 
The method ,:;.t deliberate vlola.tions I)f the la~, 1:'JRlRli tted il1 public by 
vlJlunteers ~ho Ijtfered themselves to the pOlice f'Jr al'rest, ,'epre.ented 
a rllljre militant approa.l:h than the legalism ~hich characterised the ANC 
and CPSA f'Jr RIOSt IJf the 19405, but it also perpetuated a fetish of 
legality in a ne~ form. For black ~orker5, ~hose very conditions of life 
entailed constant defiance of the law as a pre-requiSite of survival, 
the essential point ~a5 to avoid detection. Since for volunteers the 
point ~as to court arrest. workers and volunteers had different 
relations to the same unjust laws (37), As the Hungarian marxist. Georg 
Lukacs put it. 'where it is resolved to break the law with a grand 
gesture, this suggests that the law has preserved its authority -
adMittedly in an inverted form - that it is still in a position inwardly 
to influence one's actions' (38), In the process of defiance, most 
workers could only be spectators even while in their thousands they 
Giten lived, moved and worked illegally. In his clans tor the caropaign, 
?rofessor Z,K, Matthews said that he wanted to organise this roass of 
individual illegalities into a broader collectivity but the purpose of 
the caropaign was not so rouch the building of working class collectivity 
but rather exeroplary defiance of the law by a select band of volunteers. 
it-Ie la.tent weaknesses in the campail~n ,:ame to the surfa,:e when s':'I'I',e 
black workers failed to follow the blueprint and wait their turn before 
tak inl~ al:tion. This was the case in tr,e Eastern Cape whi,:h played a 
maj'jr ,·"le in the .:ampaign i tsel f, acc"unting f"r .5941 I'esisters Ijut of 
a national total I,f 8326 (:39). In Port Elizabeth a series I,f lightning 
strikes o,:curred after employers refused to re-instate volunteers and a 
crowd responded to the killing of seven Africans by the p"lice, not just 
by stoning the police themselves, but also by killing four otherwise 
uninvolved whites, In East London hut burning, assaults on government 
employees and the destruction of fences occurred in opposition to rural 
'rehabilitation' measures in the Ciskei. Violent riots broke out in 
several urban centres. A crowd responded to the killing of at least 
eight black people by the police. after the police viciously attacked a 
legal and peaceful prayer Meting, by killing two bystanders and burning 
down a I1UMber of buildings, including a school and a church, 
Workers were fired to expres. ~lr own grievances - a testimony to the 
success of exeMPlary action - but not to accept the pa •• ive role at 
first expected of theII. For the ANt and it. alli .. , cOMittttd a. they 
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were to non-VIolence, this was a critical development, The ANC and the 
SAle accused the pOlice of uSIng agents-provocateurs to incite the 
people to vlolence, condemned the police intimldation which claimed 
blaCk lives and issued a joint statement dissociating themselves from 
the violence, Later, after the turn to armed struggle, the commitment to 
non-violence was justified by the ANC on tactical grounds: africans were 
unarmed and 'psychologically unprepared' for violent struggle, while the 
government was 'armed to the teeth' and 'it was a notorious fact that 
the 80ers are always ready and happy to shoot down Africans' (40), Since 
limited n,:.n-vi.:.lent f.:.rms of struggle were still available, it was ri,~ht 
t.J utilise them t'J the full, At the time, h'Jwever, many within the ANC 
·~aw non-violence n'Jt so fI\uch as a tactic but as a deeply felt moral 
principle, its choice based not on instrumental grounds but on an 
ethi,:al irt\perative that no end, however right, ,:ould justify violent 
means, A moral society could not be built on immoral grounds, Violence 
'Jnly begets more violence (41), The ethical argument offered a 
principled and c.;:,herent perspective but the tactical view that african 
workers were 'psychologically unprepared' for violence was less 
sustainable. Some workers were at least ready to defend themselves 
against the violence of tne police and others only too ready to lay 
their hands on any whi t8 person in sight, When violence did break out. 
the leader. of the campaign were confronted with the dil .... that they 
wanted mas. action to follow fro. exeMplary acts of defiance but they 
did not want the violence associated with mas. action and could find no 
way of generating the one without the other (42), 
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In the Eastern Cape the l.:u:al ANC leaderships - whi,:h in P()rt Elizabeth 
was nK\I'e in the hands cd the working class than any ,jther local area and 
which in East London was 1 inked t'J a radi.:al rural R\'Jvement under Y'Juth 
League leadership - responded in more I\\ilitant fashi'jn than the ANC 
nationally by calling for an in,jefinite ,~eneral strike (43), The ANC 
nationally intervened to block this call and substitute a one-day 
protest strike, This had widespread local SUppoI't but employers and the 
state were able to unleash an effective campaign 'jf victimisation 
against leading militants, Fearing the growth "f Violence and "f 
unplanned ma~s resistance, the national leadership sought compromise 
with the city authorities in Port Elizabeth against the opposition of 
local activists, At the national level it r~pondad by cutting down on 
incidents of defiance, while the left-wing called for the development of 
the campaign into its second stage: mass defiance aimed at filling up 
and blocking the state's machinery of 'justice', Mokgatle recalls in his 
autobiography hi~ dismay over the caution with which the ANC recruited 
volunteers and turned away thousands of potential resisters: 
I Aid to theM in Mandala's pr .. enc. that if they were serious 
and .nUd to break the Apartheid INChtne, the right way to 
break it was to throw into its spokes, its ""-Is and all its 
parts everything they could - sand, rags, .to"" - to Ju it, By 
that, I told that I ..ant that tlmdrads and thousands of 
volunteer. should flood polic. stations. courts and prisons. I 
told tha. further, that their .thods .r. not aiding the 
ptIOPl. but ... lan ' • gov.rn.nt, I Aid that their actions were 
I ik. throwing things into a MaChine, then allowing the owner to 
dluanU. it. clean it. sharpen it and put .~t~~ther before 
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throwing 1n another thing, My advice was ignored, (44) 
E:y trle en.j .:,f Da.:emc.el', s.::.me ':·000 volunteel's t-Ia.j .~.)ne t'J gaol fQr 
periQds of a week or ffiQnths and some 8400 had been arrested, But the 
flow of volunteers was already a trickle before early in 1953 it was 
br'Ju.~ht t.j an end by a g.)vel'nment response, \1':lt Qf m':lral I'e-awakenin.~ 
but .::.f repression, It passe.j the Cl'iminal Law Amendment Act whi.:h 
intr':I.juced whippin.~ an.j up to five years imprisonment f':lr even minor 
,:.ffences if the law was broken f.:,r p.)litical reasons, and the Public 
~:;afety A.:t whi.:h effe.:tively allowed the .~.:)Vel'nment t':I declare a state 
Qf emergency .~ivin,~ great p.)wers t.) the e)<:ecutive, At this pOint, the 
supply of volunteers finally dried up, State "&pression was undoubtedly 
the immediate cause of the campaign's termination but the mass violence 
brought to the fore the underlying weaknesses of its conception and 
execution, 
The key question facing the leadership was how to respond to the refusal 
or inability of workers to abide by the planned agenda, It is possible 
to discern three different perspectives emerging out of the confusion, 
The dominant current in the leadership rHponded to the violence of the 
u .... by withdrawing frOil both .... struggles and frOil further act. of 
defiance which might trigger Ma •• struggles, Behind thi. response lay 
the ANt's chri.tian tradition of pacifis. but there was a1.0 another 
factor concerning the role of the COMUnist Party which was far 1 ... 
vi.ible on the surface. 
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In late 1952 and early 1953 all Communist Parties still under the 
i nf ll~eno:e ·:·f the ~;oviet I.Inio:on, oambal'keoj upoJn a new turn: aw.y f roJrt\ the 
· left' period which was introduced in 1947-48 with the formation of the 
Cominform and toward a new period of popular frontism, Thus from about 
~::eptember 1'352 Stal in beo;;Jan to:' speak 'Jf 'peaceful ':'J-e)l:lsten.:e' wi th the 
west rathel' than ":'Jld war' and after his .jeath in 1953 trlis turn was 
o:'Jns.)liojated, In South Africa leading C.)mmunists h.d e.rly in 1952 .~iven 
theil' support toJ the defiance ,:ampaign in accoroj with the .~eneral left 
pel'speo:tive .')1 the party at the time, Thus in his preSidential address 
to) the Indian C.')ngress in J.nu.l'y 1952 Dr Oadoo, a le.din,~ Co)mmul1ist, 
st.ted that the plan for defiance did not arise exclusively fr':;)11\ the 
situ.tion in South Africa, but r.ther 'the pl.n ,.nnot be divorced from 
the most serious question which faces the whole of hum.nity, the 
question of peace or war, If indeed it were so divorced - and it is not 
- the plan would be unreal and most certainly ineffective'o In his 
presidential address to the Transvaal ANt, J B Marks, a leading 
Communist, called for a mass campaign to halt the Korean war and those 
who would plunge the world 'into the greatest blood-bath to satisfy 
their lust for profit and power', The war-mongers were the colonial 
powers who oppressed the people of Africa, Against thH ha issued the 
call: 'Defeat those who plan the new war and we will have defeated thou 
who adMinister our oppression' (46), In contrast. by late 1953 the South 
African eo.Munist Party had changed 'its line, Leading C~nists like 
Marks. Kotana and Oadoo were all calling for a United Party victory in 
the COIling elections and downplaying any action which Might aUenate 
.iddle class opinion, 
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There was a minority opposItion which ldealised the spontaneous 
militancv of the masses with little regard for organisation or the 
forces they confronted. Jo Matthews' letters to his father, Z,K, 
Matthews, the ini tiator .)T the campaign wh.) was in Ameri.:a f.)r its 
duration. offer a vivid glimpse of this youthful spontaneism (46). 
Durin.;! the en':Quntel's ill the Eastern Cape he WI,,)te that 'we al'e in the 
midst ,)f a del: idel:Hy l'evoluti,)nal'Y si tuatiQn' and 'we al'e a ';')I't ,)f 
';l,)vernment n,:,w', When lea,jel's were al'rested 1)1' banned, he s.:orned the 
.:apa,: i ty Qf the state t.) damage the m'Jvement: • the ';!')Vel'nment has 
':'Jmpletely misl'ealj the £t)Qod of the people, This seems to be that the 
campaign ,:an be headed of f with the arrest .:>f a few leaders", Such an 
atti tude does not take aceQunt ,)f the p'::lli tical eonse iousness "f the 
masses, I have complete faith in the ability of Africans to produce the 
necessary leadership', This view was reflected in the call for a 
national stoppage "f work at a youth rally in Alexandra in February 1953 
well after the potential unleashed by defiance had been exhausted (47), 
Finally there were individuals who sought to turn the ca~aign into a 
springboard for trade union and COMmunity organisation, This view was 
evident in the local leaderShip in the Eastern Capa and was afforded 
some political exp,osion, Writing in 1953 in Viewpoint • • nd 
~rsp«t1VH Dr Roux argued that the cupaign would have been '1101'. 
effective if it had the direct backing of", trade union organisations, 
and other contributors exprosed their concern about • the apathy of the 
trade union MOvaMnt', calling for a focus of 'working class forllll of 
organisation and struggle' (.a), One contributor, a Dr sanders, noted 
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that Port Eli=abeth had proauced aDout tnree quarters of the volunteers 
in the country and argued that this was mainly due to 'the relatively 
hignly organised state of the workers. The unions there are long and 
well establishe.j an.j s.) eiie.:tive pc.liti,:al a.:ti,)n en masse be.:,:omes 
pc,ssible' (49). 
The .:ampaign w.:m n,:.ne .:,t the reforMs it sought. As the ANC and SAlC wi th 
Communist support retreated frOM its initial radicaliSM into the quest 
for a broad demo.:ratic fro:ont aqainst the Nationalists in the 1953 
ele.:tic.ns, the men\bership cd the ANC soon dec lined froM its peak .)f 
100, 000 t.~ a figure around 28-29,000, many of whom appear not to have 
paid their dues, Working .:lass .~rganisation hit a trough, including most 
of the sectional struggles which preceeded defiance, Notwithstanding its 
visible failures, Nelson Mandela, then President of the ANC in the 
Transvaal, strongly defended its achievements: 
Defiance was a step of great political significance, It released 
strong social forces which affected thousands of our countrymen, 
It was an effective way of getting the masses to function 
politically; a powerful Method of voicing our indignation 
agatnst the reactionary polictes of the govarnllent. It was one 
of the best wayti of exerting pressure on the govarnMnt and 
extreMely dangerous to the stability and security of the state. 
It inspired and aroused our people fro. a co~red and servile 
cOMUni ty of yes .. n to a IIi li tant and uncOllPrOllising band of 
cOMrades-in-ar.. (SO) 
t1andela I. response to the clefeat of the cupaign, his so-called 11'1-
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Plan', was to re-organise the ANC on a cell system, designed according 
to ]0 Matthews to 'prepare for the continuation of the organisation 
under conditions of illegality' (51), Outside of Port Elizabeth it does 
i1()t;eem t.) rlave t,een implelnente.j, 
C.:)mpare.j with trle '.:::Ielegati.:on-.:.rientated', racially e)<:clusive and middle 
class politics of the old-style African nationalism, the Defiance 
Cal'l'lpaign undc.ubte.:::Ily represented a maj,)r advance f.)r the ANC and 
.:erhinly prc.lVed .:apable of releasing stron'iI s'),:ial ',)rces, Mandala's 
account, howeve,', whi Ie addressing the problem .)f repres5ion f rom above, 
failed to grapple with the class conflicts brewing from below. Though 
absent from the language of African nationalism, class relations were 
nonetheless ,'eal in their effects, Working class organisation w~s 
subsumed to exemplary action, working class power to Moral suasion and 
working class solidarity to non-violence. Fearing the irrational 
violence of the mob as a Frankenstein let loose by the non-violent and 
disciplined defiance of the volunteers, the leadership of the ANC 
recoiled frOM Mass Mobilisation and frOM any act of defiance which Might 
provoke further confrontation. 1'he COMUnists recoiled for their own 
externally-induced reaSOM. The MOfe radical Minority of ttw ANt 
rOManticised the violence of the mob as a revolutionary force but 
stopped there, There was a 'third road', which Hbracad neither the 
liberal pacifi •• of the majority nor the revolutionary roaantici •• of 
the minority but working cia •• organisation in order to build a MOre 
powerful ref or. IIOveMnt fro. balow, This road was not ruled out in 
advance but the political forcH supporting it were _rginal, 
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Re-stryctyring the liberatioD movement 
The Comn)(Jnist Party re-forms 
We i"1.ave al'gued trlat the pl;:.li tical reason f 1;:'1' steppinl~ back f I'om 
confrontation at the turn of 1952 to 1953 lay not only in the response 
(If Af\'i,:an nationalism tlJ the violen,:e of the masses but also ill the new 
turn taken by the Communist Party which coincided with this response, As 
trle (:;:.mmuni st Party be.dan tel I'e-.~roup undel'ground ill 1952-53, it 
f.:IlI.;:.wed the '3eneral line .)f the C')minform in I'everting alllay from its 
left turn ill the 1948-1952 period and tOlllard a renewed search f,;:.r a 
brl)a,j democratic fr,)nt, What this meant in practi,:e iAlas SUPPO\'t f"r the 
vict.)ry .)f the United Party in the 1953 ele,:tions on the one side and a 
dQ\rmplaying I)f cQnf rontatiQnal PQl i tics that might alienate liberal 
mi,jdle .:lass opinion on trill! other, 
The language ,)f 'the nation' displaced the language of class, In 
Viewpoints and Perspectives Michael HarMel, the former chairperson of 
the CPSA, put forlllard the 'tlllO nation theory' IIIhich lIIas to provide the 
foundation for the the Party's strategic approach: 
The relationship betllleen the white rulers of South Africa and 
the non-white masses is essentially imperialistic .•. There are 
two nations in South Africa occupying the same state, side by 
side in the same area, White South Africa is a semi-independent 
imperialistic state: black South Africa is its colony, (1) 
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HiHfllel's definition ,:,f a ',:,:.l.:my', in lil1e with the C.jminfo::orm's positi()I1 
at the time, was suffi.:iently e::<:pansive tQ in.:lude West Germany an.j 
Britain as CQlOnleS of USA. His strategic cQnclusion for South Africa 
was to support a two-stage struggle. The first stage was defined in 
tel'ms of national freed.jm frmi. colo:mial d'Jminatio:m, a sta.;Je in whi.:h it 
was nQt deemed desil'able t.j • f.jste,' and .jevelop the pr'Jletarian element 
of the liberatol'y mQvement'. S'jcialism an.j w()I'kin.~ class f.:orrl's .:of 
struggle were postponed to a second stage after the achievement of 
nati.:.nal 1 ibel'ation. FQI' the present, Harmel al,.~ued, c lass pol i tics were 
e}<:clu.jed.since 'Afri.:an workers al'e n'Jt yet class .:ons.:ious· and '.jne 
cann'Jt have a ': lass movement if there is no class consc iousness'. On the 
Afri,:an Liberatory Movement, Harmel's verdict was that: 
it is not dominated by the unstable and politically treacherous 
elements which have led similar movements elsewhere. It is a 
movement of workers and peasants. professional people, middle 
and commercial classes, in which the progressive working class 
tenden,:y plays an increasingly influential role. (2) 
The ': lass-based cri tic isms of the national liberation movement put 
forward during the CPSA's left period in 1950 were put well behind by 
1953, As one small instance. to a paper on rural struggles Jo Slovo made 
the objection that its perspective 'suggests that the proletarian is 
going to lead the struggle', 
The subordination of class politics to nationalism was resisted by SOMe 
contributors to Vi.~int.. A certain Dr Hathorn. for instance. argued 
that: 
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the fact that the ruling class is composed almost exclusively of 
Europeans and that the Africans compose the bulk of the working 
class, subjected to racial discrimination and oppression to 
boot, does not affect the conclusion that this is a class 
society and that it is a class struggle that is being waged, , , 
The attempt t.:. identi fy the p.)si tim! in S,)uth Afl'il:a wi th the 
movements of colonial liberation in other parts of the world in 
evel'Y i'espe,: tis mistaken, It is thi s i n,:,)rre,: t 1:11' ientat i,:)11 
whicri has ten,jed t,) play d,)wn the I',)le of tl'ade unions a\1lj othel' 
WI)rkel' 1)I'ganisations, (3) 
I t was one trl1nl;;! f,)r the C,)mmunists to identify state pac ism as a key 
target of the stru,~gle, but quite another t,) elevate it as the t?~·clusiv·tii 
tal'get at this stal;;!e cd the stl'uggle, I)r t,) pl',)ject a national I'athel' 
than a s,x ialist movement as the appropl'iate means of fighting state 
\'etC ism, IJr t,) i,jealise the existin'~ national ist movements as a,jequate t,) 
those tasks, Such, however, was the emel'ging view. 
The ,:ause I)f the S.::outh African Communists' • turn' in 1952-53 appears to 
have had as much to do with Moscow's change of line as with internal 
developments in South Africa, From 1953 the Cominform affirmed that 
Communist Parties would not challenge the leadership of the bourgeoisie 
in national struggles or fight for an alternative leadership by the 
working class (4), This view was summed up under the label of the 
'national democratic' strategy I Potekhin. Moscow's leading ideologue on 
African affairs. argued that opposition to imperialism 'cannot avoid 
involving the national bourgeoisie as well' and further that in the 
-247-
anti-colonial stage of 'the struggle against imperialist enslavement' 
the interests of the bourgeoisie coincide with those of the 
entire people, " The leading role of the national liberation 
movement, " is now performed by the national bourgeoisie and the 
na t ional i ntell i';jentsia, (.s) 
From the premise that the national bourgeoisie was inevitably involved 
in the fight for independence, Potekhin concluded that there was an 
identity of interests between the national bourgeoisie and the working 
class and that therefore socialist criticism of the bourgeois character 
of national liberation movements was ruled out. In assessing the 
e.:.:mtjfili.: tasks of I iberati,:m, emphasis was put ,jn the f lowel'ing of the 
nati,:.nal b'jur,;}e,jisie throu,;}h the develc.pment of pi' i vate ':api tal and 
state national isati'jn ,jn the f')rn\al istic ,~roul1ds that 'with a strol1';J 
bourgeoisie, there is a strong proletariat' (6). The political tasks of 
libel'ation wel'e ,:haracterised in I1'Jn-class terms: the ,:reation ,)f a 
state reflecting 'the interests not of anyone particular class, but of 
the widest stl'ata Qf the populati'Jn of the newly-free natit:ms' (7), 
In South Africa Rusty Bernstein wrote in a paper called 'The role of the 
bourgeoisie in the liberatory struggle' that 
the working class cannot fight alone, It Must fight with its 
allies and its allies are to be found in these broad petty 
bourgeois strata amongst the peasantry, the professionals, the 
petty traders and shopkeepers who though lacking the unity of 
interesis and aims of the proletariat can yet be won for whole 
hearted alliance in common actton wiih the proletariat, (8) 
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The struggles of the oppressed began to be couched 1n terms of 'internal 
colonialism': whites appearlng as a colonial nation and blacks as the 
,:,)loni·;e.j, It was a ";pecial type' of .:,::.b:miali·:;m sin.:e bClth the 
(010nising and colonised nations occupied the same territory, 
Nati()nalism be.:ame the lan.~uage and bam,er eof ,:,::.mmunism, FI)I'Fll.tlly, the 
slo.;jan .:.f 'national .jem.:II:ra,:y' ,'epresented a sel f-denying ')l'dinance fCIl' 
Communists. which declared in the naFile ,::.f 'unity' that Communists must 
not alienate the middle classes of the 'colonised' black people by 
putting forward socialist demands specific to the working class, The 
assumpti.:on behind tt-lis perspe.:tive was that the "h::.r~:in9 .:lass w.)uld n.:ot 
itself be al ienated f r"m a m"vement which tail.,red its deman,::js t" the 
': loth ,)f the middle classes, 
The spe,:ifi,: problem with this perspective in S,)uth Africa, in c')ntrast 
t., m.::ost '11,::ormal' ,:olonial ,:ontexts, was that first the greOlt major i ty ,)f 
the people ,:oppressed by apartheid were work ing class Olnd second in the 
ordinary sense of the term the colonial question hOld 1,::mg since been 
resolved by the withdrawal of British imperialisM, The idea of the 
'national democratic revolution' glossed over actual and potential class 
antagonisms within the liberation movement, between a national petty 
bourgeoisie interested economically in the emancipation of private 
property from racial restrictions and the mass of the working class 
interested 1n the inhibition of the power of private property, Between 
these social forces there was COMmon ground in their desire for the 
abolition of apartheid but there were also differences and in some cases 
conflicts of interest over ends and means, 
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In the South African context. in WhICh the working class formed the ffiass 
of the population, the instrumental consequences of subsuming working 
class interests were bound to be more severe than in colonial situations 
in which the working class formed a small enclave marginal to the great 
maJority of peasants, independent artisans, traders, etc, Further, since 
the colonial question in the normal sense of the term had been resolved, 
the effect of the internal colonial ffiodel was to re-inforce a perception 
of the dem.:u:rati,: mQvement in terms of ethni,:ally-def ined I national' 
i,::jenti ties and anta'~':)nisms, 8y fusin.;! trle I national' and I dem,:o.:ratic I 
aspects of the revolution into a single concept, the specificity of 
I nati,:)nalism' as a particular fc,,'m Qf e~<pression of the deMocratic 
nlovement was lQst f N:)m si,~ht, I t was as if the dem()cratic revoluti,:m in 
S,)uth Africa had n,:) choice but tQ be 'national' in form and content, In 
real i ty the persuas i veness ,:of this al'gument hung on the pol i ti':al 
decline of s,:)cialist alternatives, 
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The mul ti-racial all iance 
For the working class, the period after Defiance was one of relative 
quiescence. At the level of political leadership, however, major 
Qrqanisati;:mal chan.~es were intr.:.du.:e.j which wel'e t.:;, have a cl'ucial 
impa.:t on the den\,xl'ati.: movel'l'lent as a wh.:;,le. Thel'e wel'e m.::>ves tel 
':entl'alise the c,)mmand stru.:tUl'es .:.f the ANC in the fa.:e .:>f inel'ease.j 
repression of extra-parliamentary opposition. In 1954 the National 
E;:<e.:utive C.)£I)mi ttee .)f the ANC analyse.j the situation thus: 
It is quite deal' that C.Jn';Jress cannot sUl'vive unless it I:hanges 
its present structure. If it is not yet clear, it should be made 
abundantly clear to all .:oncerned that the Nationalists are 
determined and mean to deprive us of ... the elementary human 
rights of freedoom .:;,f speech, freedom ,:;,f assembly, freed.::>m of 
.:>rganisation and freedom of movement. TIJ be able to meet these 
stringent and h':;,stile conditions, therefore, the Congress fJ\ust 
be placed on an entirely new organisational footing ... The 
organisation should be highly centralised on the national and 
provinCial places but highly decentralised on the branch and 
membership levels. (9) 
Sister-organisations to the ANC and the SAIC were set up in 1953 among 
Coloureds and Whites in the form of the South African Coloured People's 
Organisation (SACPO) and the Congress of Democrats (COO) respectively. 
Although both were formally open to meMbers of all • races', they were 
designed to organise people and to engage in political activity within 
their ')wn 'national' groups. Thus by 1954 there were e.tablished four 
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'national' organisations claiming to represent the four 'nations' that 
together constituted ~Juth Africa, Former and current members of the 
CommunIst Party were allocated to their various 'national' organisations 
and the now covert Party strongly supported the organisation of the 
1 iberati.::on I'tl,::overl,ent in these tel'ms, 
Trle all iance between trlese naticJl1al or';lanisations was fl::o'~mal ise,:i by the 
establ ishment in 1'354 ,::of the Natil)nai A,:ti,::on (:ol'tul)i ttee (NAC) Qf the 
COIl'Jress ''Jf the F'ec'ple, as a templ'Jrary and ad hljc ,jr'Janisin';j tll;:.dy fl::or 
the pl~,)duc til::on .::of the Freedom Chal~ter, and then in 1956 by the 
establ i shrnent ,::of the (:I::ongress All iance as a lQng-term all ianl:e of the 
four nati'jnal organisati,jns led by its National C.::msul tative C'Jmmi ttee 
(NCC) on which representatives from each ,::of the f,Jur national 
,::organisations sat, The formal arrangement was that each ,::of the component 
'Jroups in the All iance was to keep its autonc,my i ntac t wi th the 
Consultative Committee having no powers to intervene in the internal 
affairs of the separate national ,::organisations, In addition tc, the four 
national organisations, the South African C.:mgress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) was also represented on the NeC, It is interesting that as a 
workers' organisation SACTU was the only truly non-racial affiliate, Its 
members, however, were enjoined to direct their political, as opposed to 
trade union, activity through one or other of the racially defined 
national liberation organisations. 
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The idea of 'multi-racialism' was given ideological underpinning by 
Communist theoreticians, The Soviet expert on Africa. Potekhin, wrote in 
19.':,6 a tl'eatise.:on The FOl'matlOI1 of a Nati.ol1al COlllfllUl1lt.\/ Among thi2 S·outh 
Afl"lean Bantu. putting f'Jrwar.j trle view that nati'Jnaiism in .~enel'al was 
a socialist sentiment compatible with or essential to internationaiism : 
In a S.JC ial ist s.: .. : iety, each pers':ill ad:n'Jw1edges a b':ind between 
t-limse1 f an.j his nation al1.j takes pl'ide in this" F'JI' the 
proletariat, national self-consciousness is one of the facets of 
an ideology of intel'nati'Jnal ism ", The natiQn pl"Jvides a 
,:onsc i'Jusness .)f uni ty ", a feel ing c.f bel.Jngin.~, (10) 
He al,.~ued that ill South Africa there were four nations, or proto-nations 
since the Bantu • were not yet uni ted as a nation', which .:omprised the 
elements al'ound which the national ism both ':if the .:::>ppress.:::>rs and 
.)ppressed necessarily circulated, F":ltekhin hedged his bets ovel' whether 
there were rather only two nations in South Africa. the 'Angl,)-
Afrikaner' and the '8antu', Multi-racialism was pl'esented as the natural 
and ratiQnal f':irm I)f .)rganisatiQn Qf the demo,:ratic n\,)vement in the 
South African context. I'et lecting the spontaneous c,)nsc iousness of the 
masses who saw themselves. so it was said, or should have seen 
themselves first as africans, asians, coloureds or whites, 
All of these innovations were hotly contested at the time of the 
Kliptown conference in 1955, Criticism came from a number of different 
quarters, but for the Most part in this period debates were conducted 
aMOng the political elites without imMediate pressure coming from the 
working class, Consequently the dabate. were given far more intensity 
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iater 1n the 19505 with the revIval of working class struggle from 
The ,jl'ive t'J centl'alise the ANC was ccontested in the name 'Jf re'~i':.ol1al 
~ol.Jt'Jno:orIIY and dem'J':I'a,:y by some cof the 'Jlder lea,jel's, pal'ticulal'l y th')se 
(,utsi.je the Transvaal, A,:.:.)rdi n'~ t.) t(ar is an.j Carter, Lutuli PI' i vatel y 
threatene,j t,) l'esi'~n as F'resi,jent-General ,)f the ANC if the 
,:,)nsti t'-~tic.nal ,:hano;jes went ahead, o:;ayin.;J that 'p'JWel' II\USt be sital'ed C'I' 
else y,:.I.J cl'eate di.:tat'Jl's' (11), Oe.:lal'in';J with l'efel'en.:e t.) 'left 
elements' in tt-Ie Tl'ansvaal that rle was • very uneasy about certain new 
trends cor cliques in C1Jngl'ess'. Lutuli I'epeated his threat to I'esi.~n 
after the C1Jngress of the People, if inter ~li~ 'over-centralisati.jn' 
was introduced, Pl'.;)fess.;)r Matthews also wal'ned that • too much 
.:entralisati'Jn, " will kill the whole organisation' (12) , 
The establishment ,;)f CIJO met with strong opposition f rom the Liberal 
Party which was formed the same year and was in direct competition for 
the support of anti-apartheid whites (13), The Liberal Party was united 
in its criticism of the influence of Communists in COD, which they saw 
as no more than a Communist front. The Liberals' anti-communism was 
coupled with a rejection by many, though not all, of its MeMbers of 
COO's COMMitment to extra-parliamentary protest and to universal, 
unqualified suffrage. On the other hand, the Liberal Party itself took 
m .. bers regardless of race and despite its conservatism rejected the d. 
f.cto whitas-only policy pursued by COO in regard to its MeMbership and 
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sphere of political activity, Apart from the Liberals, there were a 
number of white soclalists - including both Communists and trotskysant 
militants - who also rejected the idea that they should work in what was 
in effect an exclusively 'white' organisation confined to work a~Jng 
'Europeans', At least ,:,ne well-known I\'uambel' ,)f the C'Jmmunist Party is 
rep'Ji'te.j t.) have resi'Jned ,:.ver the i';sue, a\,.~uin';J f.'I' .:me n',n-l'acia1 
Congress, COD's policy of adherence to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights to the exclusion of socialist demands was a related source 
of alienation for many socialists, 
The establ ishl\\ent .,f SACPI) also met with strong 'Jpposi tion f N)m C'JIOU1'ed 
radi.:als and tl"Jtskyists in the Unity Movement, who were not .:mly in 
,jirect politi.:al ,:.,mpetiti'Jn with SACPO but rejected the i.jea that 
.:IJloure.js shoul.j be l:organised separately fl'OM othel' 1 non-europeans 1 . 
FI'I)M theil' poil,t of view the ':'Jl'JUI'ed exo:lusivi ty IJf SACPI) I'eflected the 
segregatilJnist 1:')\'SI: iousness of the state in the heart of the 1 iberation 
movement i tsel f. 
Regarding the ANC itself, opposition to its links with other • national , 
organisations. as well as to a perceived growth of Communist influence 
within the ANC. came from two quarters. On the right. the National-
Minded Bloc under the leadership of Salope Thema opposed the ANC's links 
with indians and whites. seen as nations with antagonistic econoMic 
interests to those of africans. and with Communists generally seen a. 
drawing the,ANC down a road of suicidal militancy, FrOM the left. a MOre 
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potent and enduring critique came from Africanists under the leadership 
of ANC members like Potlako Leballo and Robert Sobukwe, opposed to what 
they saw as the sucsumption of the revolutionary fervour of African 
nationalism to the liberal influence of 'multi-racialism', The 
Africanists were becoming a powerful current in the ANC, with a key base 
in Ol'lan,jo, and fl'om 1'3,s4 issued theil' c,wn in,jependent j'Jul'nal ':alle,j 
Tht? At"I',U:al1ist, The Afl'i,:anists' ,:obje,:tions to the 'multi-I'a':ialism' of 
the Congress Alliance were elaborated in the course of the following 
years, as the limitations of Congress in the face of an upsurge in 
working class militancy became more apparent, so we shall reserve more 
detailed discussion till later, Within the ANC 'multi-racialism' was 
als,;) questione.j fl',:om the 'Jpposi te vantage-p'Jint, n'Jt that 'Jf pur if ied 
Afri.:an natilJnalism but of nt:m-racialism. Lutuli himself was rep'Jrted t'J 
have shown signs of unease over 'multi-racialism' , preferring the term 
'nIJn-racialism' and defining 'all-inclusive' African nationalism to 
en\bra,:e perslJns ot all I'al:e; who made Africa their home (14). In 
Lutul i IS eyes mul ti-rac ialism seel\\ed t'J be a necessary but regrettable 
and temporary expedient and SUppOI·t f'Jr this view came frORl the Natal 
executive of the ANC, 
The COMMunist Party fully endorsed the structures and principles of the 
Congress Alliance, but a number of independent socialists within and 
outside of Congress questioned its 'multi-racialisM', Since the Congress 
Alliance was defined in racial rather than class terms, its class 
character was buried beneath the surface, Socialists had to be disparsed 
aMong the different organisations, Race not class was entrenched as both 
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'nationally' deflned llberation organIsation was meant to represent its 
nation as a whole and not Merelv one part of it, a strong emphasls was 
placed on downplaying what was seen as the sectional politics of 
socialism in favour of a broad national policy around which the vast 
majority of the 'nation' might coalesce. This in effect meant that a 
specifically working class political profile was self-consciously ruled 
out of the agenda of each of the national organisations. 
The nO:'I,-ra,:ial ,:riti,:s .~f 'multi-I'a,:ialism' al',~ued, fil'St, that the 
fight a.~ainst apal'thei,j llo/l)ubj be weakene.j if racial divisions were 
entren.:hed within the libe,'ati.::m m'Jvement i.tself; se':,~nd, that the 
,jivision of the 1 ibeNltion movement il,to f·)ur separate secti.:>ns was 
ne,:essa"ily wasteful of s,:ar,:e ,'es'Jurces; thit'd that the subsuming of 
s,~cialist to 'nati'Jnal' c.bjectives would lead t,) the a.liena.tion of the 
great majori ty of black wOI'kat's in S.~uth Africa; and f'Jurth that while 
the leadership met ,:me another in ot'ganisations 1 ike the National 
Consultative Committee which crossed c'~mmunal lines, the rank and file 
were corralled in their own ethnic groupings, 
An articulate example of this line of argument was offered by a SMall 
group outside Congress organised around a newspaper called Th. Cifiz.n, 
They had this to say about 'multi-racialism'in 1956: 
FrOM the point of view of the democratic movement, it is 
iMpermis.ible to organi.e the people of South Africa along 
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raclal lines or lines of legal stigma", It is anti-democratic 
to bUlld up among the oeople a racial consciousness, wnether 
that consciousness be 'Non-European', 'European', 'Coloured', 
'Indian' 01' 'Afl'i.:an'. In un.jel'takili'~ trle" struggle ,:,f trle pe'Jple 
against racial discrimination, we must break down and not build 
on the reactionary racial consciousness built up by the rulers 
, " The business of dem'J':I'ats is n.jt to a.:.:ept the I'a.:ial 
i llusi.:ons c,t the ~'Iasses. (1.5) 
What was neede.j instea.j, a,:c':OI,.jing t.j Th~ C"i tiz~n, was a ffi,jdel'n 
democratic movement based on the 'creation of a South African 
A more practical expression of conflict over multi-racialism arose in 
the relationship that was forged between Congress and its women's 
organisations. There were two women's organisations within Congress. the 
ANC Women's Lea,;!ue (ANCWU and the Federation of South Afri,:an Women 
(FSAW), each of which had its 'Jwn perspectives on this issue deriving 
from their different origins. 
The ANC Women's League had been formed in 1943 as part of the general 
radiealisation of the ANC, when women were for the first tiMe granted 
forMally equal status within the organisation, Its distinguishing 
feature was that it was set up al a wing of the ANC, subject to ~ 
discipline of the ANC leadership, designed to draw african WOMen into 
the ANC and limited to the organisation of african WOMan alone. As a 
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women's organisation lCS 8ffectivlty was restricted by the general level 
of consciousness within the ANC of women's specific oppression as women. 
This proved to be uneven. Men like Lutuli paid tribute to the 'effective 
part in politics' played by women and argued for equality between the 
sexes within the organisation of the ANC but more conventional views on 
the role of women were also expressed within the movement. Hilda 
Bernstein, at the time Hilda Watts, a leading member of the Women's 
Federatlon, described the ANC Women's League as 'a means of organising 
women for the national liberation struggle' and' a means of obtaining 
tth= usual wc,rk ,:out of tria w,:,men - feedinq an,j f indin.,;:l a,:,:omodati':on for 
delegates to conferences and similar work' (16), What Cheryl Walker 
called its 'tea and typing' fUn,:tion was part of the picture but the 
!"J.)men's League was als.) drawn into a more assertive defence ,:of women's 
rights in the early 19505 under the pressure of the government's 
threatene.j extension of passes to african women and ';Jrass roots pr,)tests 
which f .)1 lowed, 
The Federation of South African Women was set up in 1954 at the First 
National Conference of Women 'for the purpose of uniting all WOMen in 
common action for the removal of all political, legal, economic and 
social disabilities' (17), rhe impetus behind it came from women closely 
connected with the emerging Congress Alliance and in particular from 
members of the Communist Party like Ray Alexander and Hilda Watts, It 
sought to COMbine the defence of women's rights with the larger national 
struggle against apartheid, declaring: 
Whilst our aain struggle is with men against racialiSM and the 
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COlour Dar, to make our national struggle More effectlve, we ask 
that Men support us in our tight tor 8quality, (18) 
The ~oMen's Charter, endorsed at the inaugural meeting, stressed the 
comMunlty of interest between men and women ana between the national and 
women's struggles: 
As members of the national liberation movements and trade unions 
, " we march forward with our men in the struggle for 
libel'ati,:,n, (19) 
On trle "the,' han,j, it als,) stresse,j trle nee.j tc •• :ovel'come the' ancient 
and revered traditions' which had justifiea the subordination of african 
w.)men. the refusal wi thil, the national 1 ibel'ati.::sn movement of • a large 
se.:ti.)n of .)Ul' menfolk", to c')ncede t.) us women the "i.~hts an.j 
privileges wr,ich they demand for themselves' and the attitu.je .)f many 
women wh.) ',:ontinue t,) be b'Jund by t,'adi ti'Jnal p,'actices and .:.:mventions 
and fail t'J realise that these have become obsolete and a brake on 
pl'.)'~ress'. The key i.jea was that the strug.;jle t'J enlancipate W'Jmen f,)rmed 
an intl'insic part of any 1 iberatory struggle: 'freedol'l\ cannot be won for 
anyone se.:tion 0" f'Jr the people as a whole as long as we women are in 
bondage.' ( 20 ) 
The fact that women organised as women. on WOMen's issues and in 
opposition from the start to patriarchal attitudes within Congress. 
placed the Women's Federation in a position of some conflict with the 
Congress leadership, the first instance of which was over multi-
racialism. A leading group of WOMen in the Federaiion. led by the trade 
union organiseI' and Communist Party meMber, Ray Alexander, wanted the 
-260-
Federation to 6e a non-racial body which any woman, regardless of race, 
could jOln as an lndividual, Alexander argued that if the Federation's 
membership were based only on affiliated organisations, it would exclude 
Many women who were not members of these organisations, The Congress 
leaders strongly opposed individual membership, seen as a recipe for 
building a mass non-racial body in competition with its own nationallv 
,jeT i ne,j ,)\,.~ani sations and espe.: iall y the ANC' s We)men' s League, I n Ida 
t'ltwana's WQl'ds, it would 'dl'aw w.;)men away Tl'om the ANC' (21), The 
Congress view was finally accepted by the Federation, According to 
Walker, Ray Alexander and the supporters of individual membership 
,:,)n.:e,jed • n.)t be.:ause they had been c.)nvin.:ed , " but because they 
real ised that wi th,)ut the support .)f the ANC the wonlen' s movement would 
be isolated', We may spe,:ulate that in addition t.) this fa.:tor the 
Comnu.lnist Party members who led the Fede,'ati,)n, like Ray Alexa.nder, were 
under the discipline of the Party leadership which supported the 'multi-
racial' approach, 
The Congress of DeMocrats even objected to the Federation's right to 
adopt a constitution f.)r i tsal f before each of the Federation's national 
. affiliates had first ratified it, The federal constitution of the 
Federation won it the support of Congress, but it also limited its scope 
for organisation.l development. This was compounded by the slow 
affiliation of Congress organisations to the Federation, which was not 
completed until April 1967, and by the failure of SACTU'. preponderantly 
male unions, with the exception of Food and Canning, to affiliate. The 
Federation'. aceass to working class coloured and indian women was Made 
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harder by the fact that few of them belonged to or supported the small 
'national' organisations. SACPO and NIC, which were meant to represent 
them in Congress. The refusal of Congress to grant the Federation 
representation on its National Consultative Committee. on the grounds 
that it already had representation through each of its national 
organisations. meant that at the same time that Congress asserted its 
authority over the Women's Federation. the Federation was denied 
independent a,:,:ess to the main de.:ision-mak ing ':'jfllrni ttee .jf C.jn.~,'ess, 
The formation of the Congress Alliance as a multi-racial alliance broke 
from the exclusivity and isolation of the african and indian 
nationalisms of old, but it also reflected and re-inforced the ethnic 
fragmentatil)n of the work ing I: lass on ,:olo)u,' lines, The work ing class 
first had to be separated before it could then be brought together again 
through the mediation of the Congress leadership, In this multi-racial 
f.jrm I)f .,rganisation, den\oc,'atic dec ision-mak ing was; bound t.j becon\e 
problematic and did in fact give "ise t.j many suspicil:ms as to who were 
really making decisions, Multi-racialism quadruplicated the requirements 
of organisation at a time when resources were scarce in the extreme. 
Most important of all, multi-racialism reflected the racial categories 
of the state within the democratic MOvement itself. All these probleMS 
were present in embryo at the time of the formation of the Congress 
Alliance but arose More urgently when what was at issue was how to 
r.spond to tne upsurge in working class militancy in the latier half of 
the 1950s. 
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The Freedbm Charier 
If the organisational development of the Congress Alliance was the first 
aspect of the political re-structuring of the liberation movement in the 
mid-1950s. the second was the re-formulation of the aims of the liberation 
movement through the adoption of the Freedom Charter, In the aftermath of 
the Def ian,:e Campai';!n there were m'~ves t,~ ,jevelop new g'~als to meet the 
threat of 'fascism'. Moses Kotane spoke of the need for a new intiative to 
unite 'the great majority of the people of this country against Fascism' 
and t,j ,jpen 'the way f'~ward t,) a demo':I'atic S,juth Africa' (22), He wrote ,:,.f 
'the absence of a gl'eat ,:entl'al pol i ti,:al task ,:,)mmon t,j all ,jem'jcrats' as 
'a retarding fact'j\' during the past year', At the time. the ANC did not 
have a clearly articulated ideology, The Programme of Action emphasised 
meth,jds \'athel' than goals; its political content was vague and 
inc'j\1sistently democratic, 
It was within this context that at the Cape Provincial Congress of August 
1953. Professor Z K Matthews first suggested the summoning of 'a national 
convention at which all groups might be represented to consider our 
national problems on an all-inclusive basis' and to 'draw up a Freedom 
Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future' (23), The purpose of 
the Congress of the People in Z K Matthews' original conception was to 
'galvani •• the people of South Africa into action and make them go over to 
the offensive against the reactionary forces at work within this country, 
instead of being perpetually on the defensive' (24), On Karch 23 1964 the 
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executives '::if the ANC, ::;AIC, COD and ::;ACPO met t,) ,jiscuss plans f,:,r the 
national convention, It was decided to establish a National Action Council 
consisting of representatives from the four national groups to organise the 
'Congress of the People', Provincial Committees were to be established and 
through them the recruitment of 'Freedom Volunteers' to publicise the 
C'Jn';;!I'ess and c'Jlle,:t .jemands f.::>1' the Chal'te1' from .::>rdinal'Y people, The 
F'r.:)vinc ial C':'Riftii ttees were then t.:) establ ish .:ommi ttees in every workplace, 
vi lla.;;!e and t.jwnship t.::> work 'Jut and send fUI'ther .jemands t'J the NAC which 
would trten c'Jllate them into a. dl'aft charter, The final stage w.Juld involve 
the ele.:tion 'jf dele.;;!ates fr,)m ea,:h l'J,:ality who w,)uld meet and aSSist in 
the adoption of the Charter at the Congress ,)f the People, 
As Walter Sisulu put it, 'the purpose is to get the people them~elve5, by 
means of a mass campaign in which they themselves participate, to say how 
they sh.)uld be governed in the new democratic South Afri.:a they are a.ll 
striving for' (25), In a letter inviting the Liberal Party to pa.rticipate, 
the NAC stressed that it did not intend: 
to put a preconceived 'Charter' before tt-t. hand-picked 
'As~embly'. We seek rather to canvaS5 the entire country asking 
ordinary people everywhere in every walk of life, to say in their 
own words what they need to make thea fr .. and happy'. (26) 
Unlike the ANC'~ 'Africans' Claims' of 1943. a docUMent forMUlatad frOM 
above by intellactuals and leaders at the behest of Dr Xuma. the Freedoa 
Charter was intended to e.erge frOM below as a r.flection of the deMands of 
the people, Both at the tiM of it. for.tion and .usaquanily aMOng hair. 
to the Congr ••• tradition. the Charier has b .. n pre.entad a. the authentic 
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'voice of the people', allowing 'ordinary citizens' to speak for 
themselves. Two recent commentators, Suttner and Cronin, have claimed that 
the Congress of the People was 'certainly the most representative gathering 
there has ever been in South Africa. It was a real people's parliament' 
(27), S,jme thil·ty yeal's later the F'reed.:om Chal'tel' still appeal'ed as an 
immediate e::<:pressic1n of the apparently unchanl~inl~ will Ijf the people, 
witness this recent assessment by Popo Molefe, the General Secretary of the 
UDF: 
The Free,j,)ril Charter is a unique ,j'Jcument. it was cI'eated by the 
people, It is not the vision of anyone individual or group of 
individuals IJr anyone organisation or group Ijf organisations, It 
emerl~elj from the dreams and ideas of IJI'dina\'y people, The Charter 
is authoritative because of its birth, (28) 
A m'j\'e s,:epti,:al view IJf what actually transpired has been taken by the 
hist'Jrian T'Jm Lodge: 
The formulation of the Charter involved only a limited amount of 
consultation; certainly popular demands were canv~ssed but the 
ultimate form the document assumed was decided by a small 
committee and there were no subsequent attempts to alter it 1n 
the light of wider discussion, (29) 
As a political campaign designed to mobilise people around a given 
ideological position. the caMpaign was a remarkable achievement which 
allowed the ANC and its allies to spread their political message. The 
historical evidence, however, does.not support the further claiM that the 
Charter simply emerged out of the dreams and aspirations of ordinary South 
Africans or that its authority can ~ based on this preMi •• , 
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There were major difficulties in implementing the deslgn, some ot them 
bevona the capacity of the Congress Alliance to affect. State repression 
t.:u:,k its t,:,ll. New Age, f,)1' e){ample. c,)nce.:Jed that' it w.)ul,j be f,)()lish t,) 
deny that the plans fol' the Congl'ess of the People had not suffered as a 
result of the Government's attacks. They have.' (30) . 8annings undel' the 
Suppl'ession of Communism Act severely limited the activities of some of the 
most expel'ienced actlvists, including nearly the entire executive of the 
Natal In,jian (:on';]I'ess and leadel's .:,f the ?4NC 1 ike Lutuli, :::isulu and Tambo. 
While the process ,)f electing dele.;Jates at publi.: meetin';Js .:alled in 
dif fel'ent .:entres was tak il1g place in Apri 1 1955, sub-,:ommi ttees of the NAC 
be';JaI1 s.)rtin';J out the various demands and suggestions that flowed iI" In 
February 1955 New Age had reported with enthusiasm that 'demands for the 
Freed'Jm Charter have been pouI'ing into the headquarters of the C.;)nl~ress of 
the Pe.::ople, Simply phrased, they nevertheless t.::ouch .)n the m')st pressing 
nee.js ,)f the people' (:31). For months now, it wrote, • the demands have been 
flooding to COP headquarters on sheets torn from school exercise books, on 
little d'Jg-eared scraps elf papal', on slips torn from COP leaflets', It is 
difficult to assess this view since only few of the demands are available 
for scrutiny in the Karis-Carter Microfilms (32), but the enthusiastic 
claims of New Age should be conirasted with more cauiious commentaries at 
the time, 
In May 1955 a Directive issued by ihe Naiional Action Council complained 
that 'not enough de.ands are flowing in' (33), Lutuli wrote in his 
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autobiograpny that 'the main disadvantage' in the preparation of the 
Charter 'was that local branches submittec their material for the Charter 
.;t ~. very late hOf.JI' ..• tOQ late iil face fOl' the statements t,:, be pi'c'pel'ly 
t,oile,j .jown into one (ofilpl'ehensive statement, It was not even possibl.e fO!' 
the National Action Committee tQ circularise the dl'aft Charter fully' (34), 
After the Congress was over, the NAC offered a highly self-cl'itical report 
on its pl'eparation: 
We failed to set up an effective ol'ganisational machinel'Y to make 
propel' use of the Volunteers ... After the initial ceriQd, there 
was a lapse ,:.f time .jul'in.;! whio:h very 1 i ttle work was done 
The core of the leadership of the campaign was immobilised as a 
resul t c.f gl;)vernment bans. .. The pel;)ple must be shown that there 
is a dil'ect .:I:mne.:ti.)n between the more lo:mg tel'm aims oJf the 
Freedom Charter and trlei r struggles and immediate thl'eats. Your 
NAC and tr,e f.)ur sponsoring .)rganisations at no stage mana.~ed 
successfully t.;) link COP with the day-to-day struggles of the 
people. .. Only a negl igible nUR\ber of local .:ommi ttees were set 
uP. Our failure to do so resulted in the Congress of the People 
not being as representative as it might otherwise have been, •. It 
must be noted that the overwhelming majority of the delegates 
came from the main urban centres, that is, from areas where the 
Congress branch had been operating for many years, '0 It was a 
concern that the movement." had not taken strong enough roots in 
the smaller towns and the vast and thickly populated 
countryside, .. Furthermore, only a minute proportion came from 
the factories and the mines, This fact illustrates the low level 
of trade union organisation aMongst the workers, (35) 
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We receive here from the organisers themselves a rather different picture 
of events than the idealised image of the origins of the Charter allows, 
Among the exhibits nanded in to the court during the 1956 Treason Trial was 
one which was headed 'Freedom Charter: General Remarks', It continued: This 
is ')nly a first ,jl'aft: no time t'J tie up S()I'I\e ends, I have in ea,:h section 
drafted a general clause of rights followed by the more particular detailed 
demands' (36), This document was unsigned but the draft is close to the 
final vel'si.:m of the Charter and iI1,ji.:ates that an individual (II' a small 
gr(lup (If individuals had a profound influence over the content of the 
Charter, J.:J Sl'Jv'J, a leading ft\ember of the S'Juth African Communist Party, 
has ': laimed to be ,:me 'Jf the people ,'esponsible for dl'afting the Charter 
(37), How many IJthel's were involve,j and what politi,:al ~IIJsiti'Jns were held 
by those l'esp,:msible for drafting rel\\ains an unanswered quasti,)n. It would 
seeft\ tr.at a small ,:ll'afting c,:.ft\ft\i ttee was eventu.lly t'J produce the Ch.rter, 
,::Irawing on the matel'ial prepal'ed by the sub-':IJmmi ttees. The Charter was 
presented to seven members of the ANC's National E~<ecutive on the eve of 
the Congress of the Pe'Jple, but nei ther Lutuli (immobi lised by his ban) nor 
Profesor Matthews saw it at this stage (38). 
A statement by Moses Kotana, who had been General Secretary of the CPSA 
until 1950, published in May 1954 in Advance (the successor to the banned 
Guardian) and republished in a widely distributed booklet called South 
Africa's Way Forward, laid out tha basic contours of what ha thought the 
Freedom Charter should include if it was to be 'the faithful expression of 
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the vaice of the people', He wrote: 
The people must write into this Charter their claim to equality 
of rights for all men and women, The people must proclaim through 
the Freedom Charter their demands: That freedom of speeCh", 
movement, " association", and assembly be guaranteed, That the 
rich farmlands", be shared among their rightful owners.,. That 
the bil~ mininl~ and othel' m'jn')p'jly-owned inljustries , .. becc,me the 
property of the people: That the working people be guaranteed by 
law their rights to free, recognised trade unions. " That urgent 
steps be taken to provide houses for the homeless, schools for 
the children and hospitals for the sick without discrimination, , , 
These demands will be l'ealised Ijnly when the basic .:,;)10U1' bar 
structure of South Afri.:a has been abolished and replaced by a 
peop le' s den).;)c r a,: y . (:39 ) 
Kotane ' s idea I;)f a I people's demo,:I'acy', written bef.;)re the Chal'ter, was 
cl,;)se to what was eventually wl'itten into this charter. The pre-
suppositions of those who initiated the Charter were also suggested by an 
edi t,;)r ial in Liberation in March 1955, written by two leading Communists, 
Mid-Iael Harmel and Dan Tloome, emphasiSing that • the den)ands, every ':)I1e, 
reject the hated principles of apartheid and the colour bar and speak up 
for a conception of freedom and human rights broad enough to include 
everyone in South Africa of whatever race, colour or creed' (40), The 
authors seemed to feel that they knew what all right-thinking people would 
wish to demand. 
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The people were guided carefully in tne framIng of their demands, A letter, 
for example, of the Transvaal ProvincIal CommIttee of the Congress of the 
People of May 1955 contained the follOWIng: 
The voice of the People must be heard demanding: the rIght to 
skille,j w')I'k,., the ri,~ht o',,)ve fi'eely inside an,j ,:,utsi,je the 
country .. , the right to live and own homes wherever we wish .. , 
the right to equal education." full and equal democratic rights, 
(41 ) 
8et':I\'e volunteel's Ql'ganise,j meetings, tr,ey wel'e ';Jiven le,:tures ,)n the 
';;igl1i f i,:an,:e of the ,:ampai,~n, The Midlands Re,~i':ona1 C,::ommi ttee .::of the 
C':>I1gl'ess ,:,f the Pe')ple instru,:ted its v,:olunteel's as fo)l1o:ows: 'It is 
essential for each and every volunteer to attend these lectures where they 
will be traine,j t,::o understand, analyse and .:orrectly assess the l,:ocal and 
natb:mal situati'::ons", so that they will be able to ,~ive the ,:,:orrect lead 
to the pec'ple', In a series of lectures delivered t,::o v'::olunteers who were 
sent t.) canvass demans fr,:om the people, Rusty 8ernstein set .::out what was t.::o 
be at the heart of the Charter, Thus in answer to the question 'what is 
people's democracy?', he wrote that 'for South Africa it is suggested: 
1, Everyone must have an equal right to vote for and be elected to 
all official pOSitions in the State, 
2, The police force and army must be replaced by a genuine 
people's armed guard to uphold the rights of the people, 
3, The biggest imperialist monopolies and industries and minas and 
factories Must becOMe the property of the people, 
4. The farming lands must be shared on an equitable basis amongst 
all who work the land, 
5, The equality of all races and sexes must be guaranteed by laws 
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and all discrimination must be declared a crime. 
6. The right to form trade unions, to enjoy living wages and 
securlty in old age, sickness and unemployment mus~ be guaranted 
tly law. 
7. The right to all citizens to speak. move. assemble ~nd organise 
freely must be guaranteed by law. 
:3. H)usin';j must be pr.:,vide,j fl)I' all trle rll)meless by a 
redistribution of present housing and schools and hospitals be 
equally opened to all without discrimination. (42) 
All these .:iauses mirl'.)red .:l.)sely the .:lauses eventually t.) be include,j in 
the Fl'eed,)m Chartel'. Viewed in this 1 ight, the C,)ngress ,:,1 the People 
should be seen as an imaginative and effective mobilising event behind an 
already established political programme I'ather than as an echo of the v'jice 
,:>f the pe'Jple. 
Professor Matthews' 'Jriginal proposal was that a cOlI\mon voters' roll of 
everyone 'Jver 21 be prepal'ed and that a general electi,:>n f'jr delegates to 
the Congress then be held. In April 1954 Walter Sisulu announded a general 
election to 'elect people's representatives to a Congress of the People' 
(43), but the scheme was dropped, due to the impracticalities of organising 
such a venture and the danger that the state would read this as an attempt 
to establish an alternative organ of government. In its place, a loose form 
of representation was introduced, allowing any group of any size to send 
one or 1I\0re delegates. The result was MOre like a rally than a delegates' 
conference. It allowed for a large attendance which would have been larger 
had the Security Police not intervened, 
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The Congress itself was a compelling occasion. It lasted two cays, neld in 
:;11 .jpen space nsCi.\"" ~:::liptown, d. COi.jUl'e.j townsiup near .].jl"'lannesbur.:;!. It was 
attendee by 2844 delegates. The various clauses of the Charter were 
lntroduced and there was an opportunity for impromptu speeches from various 
delegates before the clauses were read out and acclaimed by a show of 
hands. There were speeches but little debate; acclamation of clauses of the 
Chartel' but nc. I'ival resc.lutic.ns. Acc.jl'din.~ to the published pl,.jgramme, 
ead-, .:lause was intl,.j.juce.j in eil;}ht minutes f.jll,jwed by two minutes of 
translation and thirty minutes of discussion. According to A S Chetty, a 
pal'ticipant at the C.jl1.;}ress, each item of the dpaft Chapter was I'ead t.j the 
.: rowd af tel' whkh • any delel~ate wh'j had an amendrl\ent .:ame up the p.jljium t.j 
the rflike' (44). The p.jlice recljl'd Ijf the C.jngress, however, obvi,jusly to be 
read wi th cauti.jn, says that debate was not extensive. For example, the 
pl'eafl\ble to the Charter - ,:ontaining what was t.j the Afrb:al,ists a 
controversial clause saying that I S,juth Af rica belongs to all who live in 
it, black and white' - was introduced by P. Beyleveld, a leading member of 
the Communist Party, COD and SACTU, When he finished his speech, the 
I:hai rperson asked: 'Are there any other speakers 'jn the preamble? Ladies 
and gentlemen, if there are no other speakers and if we are satisfied that 
the preamble should be adopted I will formally ask you to accept the 
Preamble by raising up your hands, Thank you very Much' (45), The 
proceedings were brought to a dramatic close by a large detachment of 
policemen bearing sten guns who arrived in the afternoon of the second day 
after most of the clauses of the Freedom Charter were adopted by the 
Congress, 
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In the aftermath of the Congress of the People, when the question of the 
ANC's adoption of the Freedom Charter was on the agenaa, a call for full 
discussion and revision of the Charter prior to its acceptance by the ANC 
conference was made by Chief Lutuli, Professor Matthews and the Natal 
executive on the one side and the Africanist currents on the other. Concern 
was e)(pl'essed ab,)ut safe.;:luai'ding the ~.utl)nl:omy ,:of the ANC al;}ainst attempts 
to bulldoze the adoption of the Charter and the structure of the National 
Consultative Committee througn the ANC, particularly as an abortive 
campaign to collect a million signatures for the Charter was initiated by 
the NAC in advance of the ANC's endorsement. 
In the face of ,:,:mtinuing divisions, 110 decisi')n lIIas made at the December 
1955 national cl:onf erence of the ANC. It lIIas f ina11 y accepted at a spec ial 
ANC ,:c,nfel'ence designed t,) discuss tactics in the \/Jomen's anti-pass 
,:ampaign, Africanists charged that the meeting had been packed wi th non-
delegates to all')111 the Charter to be l'aill'l)aded through. Certainly there 
was 110 adequate discussion I)f the amendments put by Natal or of the 
reservations of the Africanist minority, but as Lutuli put it, 'ranks lIIere 
closed against what was regarded as the obstructionism of the Labailo 
group' (46), Lodge has suggested that it is likely that lack of interest 
was n~re widespread than antipathy toward the Charter, This view was borne 
out by the complaint of the National Executive in its annual report of 
1955: 
In the Congress of the People campaign, although the ANC was 
responsible for the creation of the Congress of the People, Many 
of its leaders and Many of its branches showed a complete lack of 
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activity as if some ot them regretted the birth of this great and 
\1.:001 e i ,jea. .. ( 47) 
There were misgivings about the Charter but most ANC members were reluctant 
to associate themselves with the advocacy of African exclusivlsm and 
hostility to 'foreign' allies and ideologies characteristic oi the 
Africanist opposition. The 1955 Report of the Joint Executives of the ANC, 
COD, :;:;ACPO and ::;AIC ll.:)te.j trlat trle campai.~n t.') .:olle.:t si';:jnatul'es was not 
up to expectation and as a result the ~reedom Charter was not popularised 
as desil'ed' (48). 
There can be 1 i ttle d.:)ubt that trle popular base of the Fl'eedom Charter has 
been i.jealised within the myth.)lo';:JY .)f the liberation m.)vement. The Charter 
was the imaginative Cl'eation and a fllobilising devi.:e .:of a parti.:ular 
political movement at a particular moment in time, It has been presented. 
h.)wever, as the c.:ondensed e)<:pressi.:Ol' of the will cd the people. Herein lay 
the seeds .)f an idealised and potentially undemocratic view of the • wi 11 of 
the pe.)ple'. 
There was disagreement over the form and content of the Charter at the ti.e 
of its formation, some critics arguing that there was little of universal 
application in the Charter, For example, an extremely hostile view was 
taken by the Liberal Party, who were invited to join the NAC of the 
Congress of the People but after an internal dispute the Party withdrew 
fro. any participation, They feared that the structure of the Congress was 
such that in spite of promises to the contrary their voice would not be 
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heard and arguea instead for a congress based on delegates from existinq 
organisations, In the words of one ieaolng memoer, Oscar Wollheim, the 
~artv was 'frankly frightened' that it would be drawn lnto a camDaign which 
it could not control ana which would leaa the liberals into a form of 
radicalism they did not want (49), Peter Hjul, one of the liberal memoers 
of the Cape Town local committee until his resignation at the beginning of 
1955, contended that his function along with other committee members was 
merely to endorse pre-arranged decisions (SO), 'A farce from beg1nnlng to 
end' was t-,ow he descl'ibe,j it, Kal'is and Gert-,art cite a ancl\,wm,:.us liberal's 
view of the Congress as 'a classical Communist frame-up' in which ANC 
leaders, confronted by a mass rally where discussion was impOSSible, had to 
ch,),)se between a,:,:epting ,:ertain demands I)r appeal'ing I'eactiona,'y' (.51), 
The 5')': ialist impl ications of part of the Charter seemed k' them to be a 
vindication of their apprehensions, 
In Liberal eyes, the dominant inf luence in the ,:ampaign was the Congress c,f 
Democrats! 'men and w,)men who set up bogus ,)rganisations as cover for the 
normal Communist aims, ., to rig control of the machinery of Congress, 
making it a pure Communist front organisation' (52), The left wing of the 
Liberal Party was equally cynical about the role played by COD, but saw 
participation in the Congress as an opportunity to strengthen Liberal 
influence aMong ANC members and take on 'a struggle with the Congress of 
Democrats which •.. would certainly be bitter and unprincipled on their 
side' (53). The force of anti-communisM, constitutionalism and gradualism 
within the liberal Party was, however, too strong for the left wing. The 
decision of the Liberal Party to take no part in the Congress of the People 
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summed UP the equivocations oi Liberalism and its failure to mount an 
effective challenge to the influence of the COMmunist Party. The 
Africanists held a similar view of the forces behind the Congress ot the 
The PAC channelle,j its c"itique "f C"ngress int., d critique .:.f party 
p.:>litics in ';Jenel'ai, drguin.~ that the ANC rld.j been tUl'ned f"',I\\ a nati.,ncd 
movemement into d political party by its adoption of the Fl'eedom Charter. 
~:;evel'al yea,'s late!', in 1959, it w,'.:>te that 
The ANC by ,:"ld-sh.,uldering the 1949 Pr.,gramme .:>f A.:tion ... 
aband.,ne.j the ,'oad .,t an African Nationalist Movement in favour 
.,f the ri.~id straight-jacket .,f a Party machine. The adoption of 
the Freedom Charter ... made the ANC a fully fledged political 
party, S,) that those 1 ike the Liberals who do not subscribe t.) 
the Freedm" Charter .:ann.,t be membe,'s .,t the ANC. (54) 
The Africanists t"uched on a vi tal issue but without exploring what lay 
behind it. The F,'eedom Charter appeal'ed as what it was not, the 
condensation of the will of the people, and not as what it was, the 
programme or vision of a particular organisation or sat of organisations. 
Anti-party feeling was central to the discourse of practically all sections 
of the liberation movement, The idea of a • party' was associated with 
representation of merely a part of the people and espeCially of a class 
within the people. Thus Moses Kotane, writing as a member of the Communist 
Party as well as a leading figure in the ANC, expressed the same view of 
political organisation as the Africanists: 
Congresses are not and should not be homogeneous bodies of people 
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who all belong to the same class ana share the same outlook, but 
are essentially United ~ronts of all sections ot an oppressed 
naiionalitv who ·:;eek lit.el'ty and derll!:II:I'acf, (SS) 
The idea of a 'party' was identified with divisiveness, rigidity and 
sectionalism, while the idea of a 'congress' by contrast with unity, 
universality and fluidity, We find these sentiments going back to the 1940s 
wrlen trle lJni ty M')Verllent a.:.:used the ANC of havinl;! be.:,jme a PI:' 1 i ti.:a1 party 
i'athel' than a na.tional ri,.::ovement when it reje.:ted fe.jera1 ism, 
Important democratic practices were lost froM sight with the rejection of 
party pl::>l i tics, A party.: laims t.::> represent n,) more than a part I)f the 
people and its prc.gramme is open to rational ,:riticism by .::othel' parties 
wi th other programmes, A party prol~ramme is determined according t.) the 
mOl'e 01' less Ijeml)crati.: decision-n\aking structures of the party and is 
.:apable .::>f being l'evised .)r s.:rapped as trle party develops, Indivi.juals 
join or support a party as citizens, not by virtue of any ascribed 
• national I status they hold in society but because of their indivi.jual 
beliefs, I:ommitments and il1terests, A party seeks not only to bring 
together as an aggregate a Multiplicity of separate interests around a body 
of shared demands but to fuse those interests into a cohesive whole, 
Notwithstanding the many constraints to which the bourgeois principle of 
party politics has been subjected - the incorporation of parties into the 
apparatus of the state, the suppression of intra-party democracy, the 
banning of opposition parties by the state, etc, - the principle itself has 
a democratic content which transcends its bourgeois origins, 
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in neIghbouring Angola one of the leading members of the MPLA later put his 
finger on the developmen~al relation between a national movement and a 
party when he said: 
10day we a just a mass movement, a popular movement, and not yet 
a peal pal'ty with the stl'u.:tul'e I)f a pal'ty, T·:om,)rr':ow trlere wi 11 
be a party with its philosophy, its determined ideology and its 
structure, And to reach that level we must begin to prepare the 
way fl'.:.rl\ t.:lljay, That is why trle 1'1PLA is very intel'este,j in .~ivin';;J 
ilje.)logical educatio:on t.) OU1' mili tal,ts, (,56) 
Neto too emphasised the importance of a party rather than 'simply a 
Ilol.)vement· (,57) for the demQ.:rati.: futul'e I)f AngQla. It is perhaps stran.;Je 
h,)w leadel's c.f the ANC, many I;)f whom thl)ught highly I)f the Westminster 
model .)f poli tics, lo:>st sight of the den\ocratic strengths .)f the party 
tradi tio:>n whi.:h al:companied it, and hOIll SI)uth African Communists, schooled 
in the party Pi) 1 i tics l:of Marx and Lenin, also es.:heliled all party 
organisaticIl1 .)ther than trlei r own, 
-2.1:::-
South Rfrica Belongs to Rll 
Whetner or not the Charter was inspired DV the CPSA, Its content was 
grounded tirmly in the social context of apartheia, Its clauses were a 
response to the long list of apartheid legislation passed by the 
Nationalist .Je.vernment, By 1'356 the list of statutes all'eady passe.j by 
tile ,.:!;)vernment n)akes '::leol'esinr;1 l'ea.jing: i'<:'.C ial c lassl f i.:ation an.j 
exciuSlon through the P8pulation Registration Act and Separate 
Representation of Voters Act; the tightening up of influx controls 
thl'()u.;!h tr,e Natives (Urban AI'eas) C.jns.jlidati·:·n A.:t; the e)<:tel,si.::rn .jf 
the pass laws thrc.ugh the Natives (Aboli tion .::rf Passes and C.j-.::rl'dinatir::an 
.::>f D.: .. :uments) A.: t; the tightening of pol i ti.:al cQntrol thl'oJugh the 
:;uppI'ession c.f C.:ommunism Act, the F'ubli.: Safety A·:t and the C!'iminal Law 
Amen.jment A.:t; the inc,'ease in segregation th",::augh the Reservati.::a11 of 
~;epal'ate Amenities A.:t, the F'l'.:.Mbition .::af Mi><:elj Marriages A.:t and the 
Immol'ali ty A,:t: and the ,'epression ,::af black trade unionism through the 
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes Act), 
The clauses of the Charter may be read as responses to one or more of 
these acts: South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, 
and no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the 
will of the people: all national groups shall have equal rights; the 
people shall share in the country's wealth; the land shall be shared 
among those who work it; all shall be equal before the law: all shall 
enjoy human rights; there shall be work and security, the right to for. 
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Laoaur unions, an end to contract labour and welfare legislation; the 
(K>Oi' of leal'ninq an,j ':1...11 tl...lre shall be ,:,pen€!.j; trn:!l'e srtall be rtouses, 
security and comfort. The debate about the ol'igins of the Charter 
notwithstanding, Lutl...lli was not far off the mark when he said that 'the 
Charter ... is line by line the direct ol...ltcome of conditions which 
obtain: harsh, opPl'essive and unjl...lst conditions. It is thus a practical 
an.j i'81evant .j.)cument. It attempted t'::l .~ive a flesh and blood meanin.~ in 
the -::,:,uth Af I' i.:an setting tel sl...I.:h w.)rds as derl\')': I'acy, freedom an,j 
libel'ty. If the Charter is examined, it will be seen that freedom means 
the .:.oening up of the ':'pp.)rtl...lnity t,::> all Soutrl Afl'i':ans t,::> live fl...l11 and 
abundant lives in tern\s of ,:cluntl'y, cOI'I\munityand individual. It means 
the end of legalised bullying, the rel\loval of sub-human .)utlook'. (58) 
The ';Jreat strength I)f the Freedom Charter was that it 'Jffered a pOlllerful 
visi.)n of a demo.:ratic al ternative tQ apartheid: a government based .)n 
the lIIi 11 of the pe'Jple as a IIIhole. universal suffrage. equal i ty before 
the lalli, civil liberties, freedom of movement, free trade unionism, re-
distribution of the land, state education and welfare, equal pay for 
equal work, the abolition of all apartheid legislation, transfer of the 
private monopolies in mining, industry and finance to the ownership of 
the people, The FreedoM Charter offered a far more consistent a.nd 
coherent vision of political deMOCracy than had previously been proposed 
by the liberation Movement in South Africa, but this should not blind us 
to the ambiguities and absence. which ran through the text, 
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The Charter declared that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
black an.:j white', It was c.:,mmitted to the establishment .:.f a '.jem,:u:rati.: 
state based on the will of the people without distinction of colour, 
,'a,:e, se}!: .:.r bel ief' and the r i9ht .,f · every man an,j woman t.j v"te f'jr 
and stan,j as candidates fOl' all b'Jdies which make laws' and t., 'take 
part in the administration of the country', What was not indicated in 
the text was whethel' it was to be a I,ne-pal'ty Qr mul ti-pal'ty state, The 
idea that 'all national ,;}roups shall have equal l'i';:Jhts ' offel'ed an 
impol'tant pr'Jtection I,f min'JI'i ties (through laws against discl'iminati"11 
and f 1:.1' the protec ti.,n 'Jf languages, religil,ns and cul tures) but it did 
not al'ticulate the buildin,~ a fully n'Jn-ra.:ial South Afl-ica in which all 
racial divisions and categories would be superseded, 
The opening of the state adMini~tration, the police and the army 'to all 
I,n an equal basis' would have been a great step forward but the 
africanisation of the state machine in and of itself did not challenge 
the structures of coercion on which the old state was built, The 
opportunity for every citizen to join the state bureaucracy could create 
an identity between the state and the people, but only in the sense of 
'an identity of two hostile arMies in which every citizen has the 
opportunity to join the hostile army' (59), The problem was sharpest in 
regard to the police and the army, The Chartar declared that they were 
to function as • protectors and helpers' of the people, but it did not 
address what changes were to be introduced in their powers, organisation 
and accountability if the aray and police were to belong to the people 
in .ore than n .... 
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The idea that I trie minel'al weal th, " the banks and n'i,::on'Jp,::olv industl''y' 
shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole ' was an 
ambiguous formulation which fell short of a commitment to national-
isation and said nothing about what form of nationalisation was 
envisa';;Jed, Unljel' the apal'theid state SIJuth Afd,:a enj,::)yed many 
nationalised industries (e,g, in steel, rail, electricity and oil), but 
this has halj pI'el:ious little t() do with the IjernocI'ati,: l'I)anagernent of 
industry, The freedom of 'all who work to form trade unions, to elect 
their offi':el's al1lj make wal~e al;jreements with theil' empl')yers' made n,) 
mention of the right to strike or of the right of unions to political 
affiliation 1)\' al:tivi ty, The principle that' men and w,)men shall I'eceive 
equal pay for equal work' did not guarantee W')Men access t,) equal work 
nor touch upon the nlany I::)ther forms of oppression facing women, The 
promise that 'the land should be shared among those who work it', that 
'all the land' should be 'I'e-divided aMongst those who work it' and that 
'the state shall help the peasants with implements, seeds, tractors and 
dams' did not expli,:i tly indicate what forms of landownership this re-
division would be based upon but intimated in its language of 'peasants' 
private ownership, 
Notwithstanding these substantive gaps, the FreedOM Charter represented 
a Major d..acratic advance I The fundamental probleM faced by Many of the 
anti-charterists was that their objections were raised not because they 
found the Charter insufficiently deMOCratic but becausa it was too 
~ratic. Thus the Africanists repudiated the clause that South Africa 
should belong to all who Ii va In it, black and wht te, s .. lng no rea.on 
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why the rights of the white Mlnorlty should be respected, The Liberals 
repudiated the economic clauses calling for a transfer to the people of 
fflinel'a.l wealth, banks and fI).:on()pc.ly industl'y, because their beliet in 
private property led them t.:o oppose the democratisation of economic 
life, A number of independent socialists who .:opposed the 'two-stage' 
philosophy of the C'jmmunist Party rejected the Chal'ter t.ecause trley 
countel'p.:ose,j s,xialism to the fight for bourge.jis democracy as if 
p.::.litical emancipati.jn were n.jt the precondition for social 
emancipati.jn, The' tw.j-sta';je' appr.jach .:·f the C.jMMUnist Party itself 
';Jave !'ise t.j the p.:ossibility that the democl'atic goals of the Chal'tel' 
Mi.~ht be undone I'athe,' than extended in the passage t'j the sec.jnd stage 
.jf s'jcialisM, given the influence which stalinism had at the time in the 
Communist Party's concepti.jn of socialism, 
The p.,l i tical meanin.~ of the Charter was not of course to be ~~rasped by 
deciphering the text alone but by exploring how it was interpreted, 
Among the Charterists themselves there were to be differing views, An 
author in NQw~, writing under the pseudonym of 1 Inkululeko', argued 
that 'super-profits are incompatible with a sharing by the people in the 
weal th of the country. Migratory labour and the COMpound system cannot 
go hand in hand with the right of the workers to raeaive equal pay for 
equal work, his right to organise in trade unions and so on", (But) 
whatever our views Might be as to the desirability of e.tablishing a 
socialist systea in South Africa the iMMediate aiM of the liberatory 
lftOV8INnt is not and cannot be the estabUshMnt of soctaUu' (60), The 
following year "andela characterised the Charter as la revolutionary 
,jOCI..lfilent Ol'ecisely be,:au";;e the ct-Iano;jes it envisaqes ,:ann,:ot be vK,n 
without breaking UP the economic and oolitical set-up of the present 
S':JUtt-1 Af r i,:a 1 and saw its eC':Jll':lmic clauses as demandi nq 'the 
nationalisation of the banks, the goldmines and the land' (61), 
Wi thin a few years, h':Jweve!', in 1959 the CI:Jn'~ress of Democ!'ats c1:Jnstrued 
the tWIJ eCI:m,Jmi,: I: lauses sai,j t.::. have had this l'evoluti,::.nal'Y 1:IJntent -
1 The pe,::.ple shall shal'e in the 1:1:,".mtry's weal tt-l , and 'The land shall be 
shared aml::>ng those who wlJ!'k it' - in such a way as to rule out any 
reference to social ownership. In thei!' eyes it was 'obvious' that 'the 
formel' refers to the elimination of rae ial rather than class 
restrictions. .. The term "people" cannot surely apply only to workers. 
The sel:ond ':lause surely does not I:all fIJI" the socialisatilJn ,)f 
land' (62). 
These various interpretations reveal the ambiguities present in the 
document. but to understand theM we need to explore the strategic place 
which the Freedom Charter occupied in the struggles which followed its 
adoption. One of the difficulties in assessing the Charter lay in its 
abstraction as a desirable end from the Means required for its 
realisation. since the Charter self-consciously offered no prograMMe of 
action. The deMOcracy of the future was suspended in Mid-air, divorced 
from the here-and-now of the earthly struggle. This relation between 
MHns and ends arOH sharply in the debates around the WoHn's Charter. 
Trle (lerl"lo:lI: r.::;.ti.: pl'oql'amme embc"jied in tt-Ie Women's Chal'tel' an.j passe.j at 
the founding congress of the Women's Feaeration a year before the 
passage of the Fl'eedom Charter. stressed full equality between the 
sexes: universal suffrage, equal pay. eaual possibility of promotion in 
work. equal l'ights in property, marriage and children. free compulsol'Y 
education for all, It made specific social demands 'for the protection 
of mother and child': maternity homes. welfare clinics, creches, nursery 
schools, as well as the provision of homes, water, light, sanitation, As 
Cheryl Walker rlas .:observed, the !".I.:omen's Federati.:,n was 'the f i ,'st 
11atic,nal w.)men' 5 ')"ga'1isati':)ll t.) include a ':Qmpl'ehensive pr()g,'amme fa" 
the emanc ipati.:m Qf women al.:on.~ wi th i ts .~eneral political p,'ogramme", 
It rep,'esented a real and serb)us attempt to inco"porate w.~men into the 
pol i ti.:al prog,'amme of the nati.)nal I iberation movement .:on an equal 
f 0') t i I1g with men I ( 63 ) . 
The list of demands the Federation wished to submit for inclusion within 
the FreedoM Charter were written up in a document called 'What Women 
Demand', In a draft ver9ion. the demand was made for the provision of 
basic 90cial amenities in the Reserves, 'more and better land •.. schools 
for children .•• maternity. medical and social services •.. shop9 and 
controlled price9 •.. planned agricultural development' as well as the 
abolition of the migratory labour system itself. It drew strong 
criticism from a group of Congress leaders who argued that iaplicit in 
this demand was an acceptance of the legitimacy of separate re.erves. 
The Federation accepted this criticism and withdrew the proposal. 
COMMenting on this Cheryl Walker's assessment of the Federatton as 
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'I..mnece-;:;sal'ily t-Iurlible' i-; in-;tpuctive. ::;t-Ie wI'ites: 
Merely ignoring those areas (resel'ves) because they formed part 
of an unacceptable policy did not solve the problems of basic 
sUl'vival confronting the people living there. Nor did it assist 
the,se pe.)ple develop theil' ()wn stl'ate.~ie-; for resistin';I the vel'Y 
1=") li.: i es Wt-I ido.l k ep t them in an i £lip')Ve I~ i shed and .jependen t 
position. (64) 
The pl'emise ber-lind the Fedel'ati'Jn's ori.~inal set .:,f demands was that tt-Ie 
f iqht t,) abol ish tt-II:? I bantf..lstans I -;h.juld l1.jt be c.jullterp,Jse.j t,) the 
struggles of those forced to live within them for immediate reform. By 
f.j.:ussin';I 011 the frau.julence of the bantustans. the C'jl1gress failed t.j 
see their signfi.:a",:e as far as p.jlitical a.:tion was ,:oncerne.j. Although 
it was vital to c,jndemn the 'h'jmelands' strategy. it was not te, be 
f,jrgotten that f'Jr many women the 'homelands' were b'Jth home and their 
pla.:e .,f mainly unwa,~ed w,'rk. (65) 
The Federation's perspective related not only to the position of women 
in the reserves but to the general political framework adopted by 
Congress, 'What Women Demand' posed immediate social demands, which 
could serve as the foci of particular reform movements. in addition to 
the more abstract vision of a futUre society put forward in the Freedom 
Charter, Its demands for the abolition of convict labour, minimUM wages, 
paid holidays, the inclusion of farmworkers in industrial legislation. 
national Medical services, cost of living allowances, birth control 
clinics, food subsidies, controlled prices, fair rationing, street 
lighting, parks, _indoor sanitation. day nurserilH. the abolition of 
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passes, etc, provided a concrete programme around which women could be 
!;IODilisetJ and a link between the tutui'e aSDiraiions e:<:pressed in the 
Freedom Charter and the current conditions of the people, The women 
proposed what the Freedom Charter lacked, namely a bridqe between the 
present an.j the futu,~e, between ref.,,'m an.j I ibel'ation, between .jemands 
on the e~{istin9 state and the tl'ansformatic.n .:.f the state i. tsel f. We ' .... ay 
speculate that one of the factors behind the 'humility' of the Women's 
Federation lay the party discipline imposed on its Communist leadership. 
The Nati'Jllal E~<:ecuti ve Qf the ANC .jec lared af tel' the C.,ngress !Jf the 
Pe.jple that • it is not en.,ugh to have adQpted the Freedom Charter. It 
Must Il.,t becon\e a .j.,.:ument framed and hanging on the wall. The Charter 
can and must be the inspiration .,f the people in their freedom fight: it 
AlUSt be their .,rganiser. .. It must be related to struggle, it must be 
illustrated by life itself'(66). How this vision of the future was in 
fa,:t related t'J the struggles Qf the latter half .,f the 19505 is a 
question to which we shall soon return. 
-287-
The revival of the working clas$ movement 
A class for itself? 
In the lattel' half ,:.f tt-Ie 1950s the 1/,II:.rking class m.:,vement began in 
earnest the difficult process of recovery, The struggle took off on a 
nurnbel' ,:.f I'elate,j but distinct sites: women a,~ainst the extension of 
passes, ':'::lmmuni ty movements a,~ai nst in,:reases in ,:,:.sts ,:.f so': ial 
consumpti,:tn, 'I'eservists' in the c,::.untryside against the imp,:)sition of 
'Bantu authol'ities' al1,j the state's so-called 'betterment' s,:hefl\es, 
wOI'kers in the fa.:tol'ies ,:,vel' wages, ,:,:.nditi,:.ns and tl'ade union 
recognition, At a national level, many workers participated in the stay-
aways and ,:ampai,~ns ,:alled by the C,:mgress All iance and more of ten than 
not went far beyond the template imposed by the politicians, 
As a class with its own independent interests, goals, methods of 
struggle and ways .:)f thinking, the working class remains ,:uriously 
invisible in the historiography of the period, appearing typically as 
the 'mass' wi thin the 'nation' rather than as a collective actor in its 
own right, This reflected the surface reality of the time, since in 
political terms working class identity was obscured under the mantel of 
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conflicting nationalisms, Beneath the surface, however, workers did re-
c;.s·;;el't in pl'a.:ti.:e thei!' C,WI' ,:lass interests an,j needs wlthin and 
wi thout the nati,:onal libel'ati,)n m,jvement, Class stru,~gles di,j not 
manifest themselves directly in the political conflicts of the 1950s, 
e:<:pressed as they wel'e in the langua'~e 'jf ra,:e al1,j nati,:on, but they 
n,)netr.eless I'emained their crlKial detel'minants, 
The invisibility of the working class was a function first and foremost 
,:,f its ,)wn inherent weeo.knesses inhel'ited fl'om the 19405, In genel'al the 
obstacles t,) the gr'jwth ojf wOI'king class c,)ns,:i,)usness in the 1950s 
arose ,:on the one hand from the internal fra~~mentatiljn of the wl)rking 
class, particularly but nl)t eXI:lusively on ral:ial lines, and on the 
othel' frclh\ the lal:k of distin,:tion I)f the wl)rking class as a party in 
its Ijwn I'ight from I) the I' I:lass forces, The rl)ots I)f wOI'king I:lass 
vulnel'ability lay in the e,:onomy, ,jerivin';J from the stru.:tural p'jsition 
of workers in produl:tion. In particular. the blal:k industl'ial labour 
f'jl'ce, as the most advanced sector of the workinl;! class as a whole, was 
still relatively small, dispersed and deskilled, Although the growth of 
the industr ial prl:oletariat had I:ontinued into the 1950s, the bargaining 
power of black workers was no stronger than it had been in the 1940s, 
Between 1950 and 1960 the contribution of manufacture to the Gross 
Domestic Product went up slowly from 17. 1~ to 21~ and averaged around 
20~ for the period a~ a whole. There were a few large indu~tries with 
substantial concentrations of workers particularly in iron, steel and 
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englneering but most industrial workers were emploved In small concerns, 
In 1953-4 65% of all industrial establishments employed fewer than nine 
workers and in 1959 the average number of workers oer factory was in the 
vicinity of 43, Most of the small manufactories were labour-intensive 
and very low-waged and partly as a consequence of state labour policies, 
the expansion of labour-intensive light industries (in food, paper, 
textiles, laundries etc, ) was faster than that of the more mechanisec 
capital goods sector, When growth slowed down in the later 1950s the 
The growth of industry in the 1950s was slowed down by the skewing of 
the ';K,~nljmy in favour Ijf the development ,~f mil,in9: espe,:ially with the 
disl:.)vel'Y of I~old-bearing ,jep'jsits in the Orange FI'ee State anlj the 
substantial payments paid by the Amel'i,:an and 8ri tish I;!overnments toj 
encourage the diversion of economic resources into the mining of 
uI'anium( 2), The maj'jl' ec()nomic obstal: Ie tl) R\e,:hanisati,:on and the I~l'owth 
I,f the ,:api tal-g,::>ods se·:t'::>r lay in the recurrent balance of payments 
,:rises which strud in 1948-9, 195:3-4 and particularly 1961)-61 when 1~ljld 
and fOI'eign e)<:,:hange reserves plummeted by Ijvel' SOX and 0 South Africa 
fa.:ed a balance of payments crisis more severe than al'y experienced 
since 1932' (3), This was exacerbated by l,)ss clf confidence in the 
political stability ,:;.f South Africa by overseas capitalists but the 
underlying cause lay in the low productivity of industrial labour in 
South Africa by international standards and South Afri,:a's dependence 'In 
the import of machinery and equipment from the more advanced capitalist 
countries, 
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The oroblems oresent in South Africa's industrial sector became worse as 
the decade Drogressed, From a growth rate of 7,2% in 1954, industrial 
output grew by 4,4% in 1955, 3,4% in 1956, 2.3% in 1957 and 1.7% in 
1'35:::, In 1959 a rilinu':; '~l'(.wth i'ate of -1,4% was PiKcl}'ded, Thus despite 
the substantial growth of national income in the 1950s (from £585.6m in 
1'349 t'J £9'35m in 1960 at .:.:;.nstant pl'ices) an,j the srl)all gr'jwtrl in the 
share of manufacturing industry, the industrial sector was (aught in a 
cycle of stagnation and backwardness, The numDer of workers emDloyed In 
manufacturing industrv remained small in reiation to the working 
population as a whole, In 1959 there were under 750.000 people employed 
in factories out of a total population of almost 16 mililon and an 
e,:,:,n':'fI'Ii.:ally a,:tive p,jpulation cd ,'vel' 5,5 r,)illi,:,", 
FUI'trn:!l', al though the Pl'"p"rti,jn of black to whi te w')l'kel's in 
manufactul'ing grew. in 1960 undel' 400,000 were african (out of a total 
african population of almost 11 million), just under 200,000 were white 
(, jut ,:,f a whi te p,jpulation I,f a,'ound three mi 11 ion), "Ve I' '100,000 wel'a 
coloured (out of a population of 1,5 million) and around 33,000 were 
indian (out of a population of half a million), Africans constituted 
accordingly a little over half the entire factory workforce and whites 
well over one quarter, In the ,:cIMmer.:lal sel:tol' there were as many white 
workers as afl'ican, coloured ani::! asian put together (about :255.000 each) 
and in transport more whi te workers thal1 black (about 116.000 t" 89,Oell) 
(4), The increased dependen,:y I:>f ""'hi te "",orke,'s on the Nationalist Party 
and the state I~ave its diminishing but sti 11 powerful presence i'1 
industr ial and commerc ial "",ork an added signi f ica.n.:e, 
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The vast maJority of afrlcan workers in factorles were still male, 8lack 
women were beginning to enter factory production, tor example 1n food 
and canning, but only a small mlnority of urban black women were 
i nljustl' i al 1:11' l:o:orM,)el'l: ia I wl:'I'kel's, "'ost wel'e sti 11 e i the I' i. n Ij,::omesti c 
labl)U1' 01' wOI'kin,;) in the hi,jO::1en ec,jn,)my as washeI'Wljf.\en, beer bl'ewel's, 
shabeen CIWnel'S, prl)sti tutes Co.nd tr,e 1 ike, wi th thei I' in':'::Off.e t,einq 11,01'e 
important than ever for the subsistence needs of an urban african 
familY, Well over six million africans still lived in the rural areas 
with farm laboul' on white farms accounting fol' about one-third of the 
economically active afl'ican popUlation, Some 1,5 million africans were 
re,~i·;;tel'ed as laboul'in'~ on whi te farms but when dependants of afl'icCo.n 
farmworkers are considered almost 3,5 million lived on white farms in 
1960, C,jl,)ure,j and asian fal""', workel's a,:,:,)unted f,)r an'jthel' 14% ,::of the 
workfol'ce 01' about 240,000 workers, The lives of grinding poverty and 
sel'vi 1 i ty 1 i ved t,y these wI)I'kel's seem if any thin,;) to have bel:,)me W')I'se 
in the l'3S0s Sl) that by the end I)f the del:ade the avel'a';Je earning ,:11 
african farm labourers was some £3 a month, Equally on the I'eserves all 
rep.;:,rts pointed t'j the 1:1::mtinued el'osion of subsisten.:e prl)ductio:m an,j 
gN)win,;) rural unempl.jyment with 95% of the unemployed ineligible f';)I' the 
dole, 
On the fI\ines some 430,000 african workers were recruited (1959 figures) 
and I:,)nsti tuted an ever-increasin.~ proportion of the mine workforce as a 
whole. Of these, however, only about 180,000 were South African in 
origin. Their dependency on the employers for housing an,j food, theil' 
subordination to Masters and Servants legislation and their legally 
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enforced immobility for the duration of their contracts were unabated, 
The turnover of african labour on the mines was high, not least because 
some 200 africans a week were estimated to have been sent home to die 
from diseases contracted in the mines, The great majority of africans 
employed in two of the main urban centres of production, the metal 
industry and the docks, were also contracted migrants housed in 
There were countervailing factors more conducive to workin9 class 
')1'galll'5ati.)n. Notwi thstan.jin.~ state p.)li.:y t.) the .:.:mtl'al'y, tne 
concentration of black workers in the urban areas continued unabated, 
From 1946 to 1960 the african popUlation in urban areas increased from 
just under two million (or 241 of the african population) to almost 3,5 
million (or 32%), The conditions of migrant labour which affected such a 
large proDortion of the african labour force - even in the mid-1960s 
second generation townspeople comprised only 151 of 80weto residents and 
14% .)f East Ujn.j,:.n residents (,5) - ,:.ften ma,je the ,:,:.nflict at trle place 
cd work that much the shal'per and I'elayed the e}<:per ien,:e ,:.f confl ic t at 
the pla,:e of work ba,:k int'j the ,:ountryside, Further, the migrant labour 
system was identified by important se,: ti'jns of ,:api tal with low levels 
of productivity by internati'jnal standards, The highel' skills 'jf black 
workers, though not f'Jrmally I'ecognised by management. were nonetheless 
I'eal in their ,:onsequences f'jr bargainin,~ power, Ovel'all, however. the 
economic power of the bla,:k work:in,~ class in the 19505 was not 
substantially ':han,~ed fl'om What it had been in the 19405 but the 
political conditions in which it functioned did change significantly for 
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the worse, It was only in tne 19605 that the growth of manufacturing 
industry gave birth to an industrial working ciass with an economic 
power more akin to those in advanced caPItalist societies and more 
capable of combatting a political super-structure which denied It 
1'el:
'
:";jnl tion. 
State policv in the 1950s functioned partly through direct repression. 
Trade unIonIsts were banned under the Suppression of CommunIsm Act, 
StrIkes by african workers were prohibited under the 1953 Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act and by its tougher amendment in 1959 which 
imp':.se,j a ma~:imum fine (If £500 Ij1' trlree years impl'isonment f',r j.::oini\1l;J 
01" sUPP,)rting an i llel~al str ike. The Nati va Lab,)u1' Act alsl' establ ishs.j 
an of f ic ial system of manal;jement-dominated c·)n.: i 1 iati.,n .:alle,j W.)rks 
Committees and a state bureaucracy of Bantu Labour Officers in place of 
trade unions for africans. In 1958 a directive was sent to all employers 
of 'native' labour , saying that any African discharged as a result of 
participation in strikes, demonstrations or absenteeism was not to be 
re-hired without official approval. In 1959 the Food and Canning 
industry was dec lared 'essential' and all wljrkers in the in,justry banned 
from striking. Restrictions were imposed on the deduction of stop-orders 
f"r afri,:an workers and many lel~al restricti,::ons were iFl\p,)selj (In trade 
union meetings under I~eneral laws of assembly. In 1956 23 SACTU trade 
unionists were ,:harged wi th High Treason in 1956 and SOFl\e cl)nvicted of 
incitement in 1958 
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AccomoanYlng direct repression was the state's encouragement of ethnic 
fragmentation within the working class: partly through general apartheid 
legIslation like Group Areas, Population Registration and Bantu 
Education Acts, and partly through labour laws which created a separate 
industrial relations machinery for africans. The 1956 Amendment to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act provided that no further 'mixed' unions 
would be allowed to register and sought to Impose racially separate 
branches and all-white executive committees on existing 'mixed' unions 
whicr! l'efuse,j to spl it. It PI'I)llibi telj all workel's, blad: and whi teo 
from striking in 'essential industries', banned unions from political 
affiliations and Clause 77 gave legal backing to the reservation of 
skilled Jobs to white workers, as the Native Building Workers Act of 
1951 had already ,j,)ne for white wl)I'kel'S in the builljinl~ tl'ade, I t'j 
insul'e that they will nl)t be e:<plcdted by the l»wel' standard ':af livinl~ 
of any other race' (6), 
The Ministel' ,:af Lab,)ur, Ben Schoeman, e~<pressed the hosti 1 i ty of the 
1~I)vernment to independent trade unions, desl:ribin'~ black workers as 
'p1'imitive I)r illite\'ate natives who have nl:at the faintest ,:oncepti')n of 
the reponsibilities of trade unionism' and expressing the fear that 'if 
we give them the incentive to organise they can use their trade 
unions as a poli ti':al weap.)n and they can I:reate chaos in South 
Afri,:a .. , We sh'juld probably be cljmmitting \'ace suicide if we gave them 
that incentive', He forecast that under his tutelage african trads 
unionism 'WOUld probably die a natural death I (7), 
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Aparth~id in general tended to militate against the delineation of a 
working class identity distinct from the 'people' as a wnole, In 
response to the dangers posed by the concentration of black workers and 
work-seekers in and around the urban areas, state policy was to try to 
develop a system of social control which permanently located the urban 
proletariat in the rural areas in terms of family, cultural and 
political ties, while continuing to reproduce its economic deoendence on 
urban wage labour, l'his involved not only the extension ot 
adminIstrative controls over black Industrial workers but also a process 
of social engineering which in its apartheid form affected all black 
pel)ple as n.:m-c i tizens .:.f S.)uth Afl'i.:a, F.)r such I'eas.)ns there was a 
buil t-in tendency for blad: w.j,'kel's' "esistan':e t·;) .:api tal and tel trle 
labour .:.)ntrols imp.)sed t.y the state to be swept up in the tide e.f a 
OlIJl'e .~enel'al popular I'esistan':e to apartheid am.)nQ 1'I'lany sel:ti.)ns of the 
blac~: ~1I:.pulat ieln, 
Furthel' obstac les to trle devel')prllent of a spec i f ica11 y work ing class 
I'I'II)vement ,:arne f rom wi thin the national liberati,)n rnovement itself, whose 
leaders enjl)ined wOI'kel'S n.)t to conceive I)f trlemselves as a class with 
its own distinct interests ,:utting anoss ,'acia1 lines, but rather to 
develop a 'national' consciousness of themselves as africans, indians. 
I:oloureds 1)1' whites (or al tel'nativel y as non-europeans in opposi ti.)n t.) 
the hel'renvolk) along wi th trle middle c lass of thei r own national group, 
Al though the 1 iberation m,)vement encouraged wl)rkers t.) unite as workel's 
in nl)n-rac ial unions througr. the South Af rican Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU), this was limi ted t,) the tl'ade uni.;)n sphel'e al,d not extendelj 
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into th8 po 1 it i,: a 1. WQI'~:: 81'S tie l.:,nq 1119 tCI Ij iff 81'8n t nat i I)na 1 9"I)UDS W81'8 
brou9ht togetnel' politically thl'ouqn the medium of the Congress Alliance 
but only after they wer8 first s8parated off into their national blocs. 
Their political identity was depicted ill national not class terms and 
both the main inheritors of the socialist political bannel', communists 
and trotskyists, themselves generally endorsed a nationalist 
pers!:181: t 1 ve, 
With ail these obstacles placed in the oath of the workin9 class In the 
19505, the advances which they nonetheless made are all the more 
remarkable, What was ~1I)ssible for the working class in the 19.505 was 
pel'haps I'elati vel y ml: .. ::iest: the establishmel1t I)f thei I' ()wn ol'ganisatil)ns 
and ideas and the battle for limited economic and political reforms, to 
serve as the foundation for pursuinl~ trle struq91e more effel:tively when 
vis capital, With the benefit of hindsight we know that within a 
I'elativel y sh':;'I't spa.:e ,:;.f time the e.:,:;.nomi,: base .:;.f wl:;.rk in9 class 
stl'u';jgle !Nas to be strengthened by the rapid e.:.::>n.::>mi,: upturn whi.:h took 
off in the early 19605 and in particular by the gro!Nth of manufacturing 
industry, 8y the time this b.::>om al'rived, hO!Never, the black labour 
n'I.)vement !Nas in no p.)sition t,) take advantage I)f it, 
Trade ul1ion organisation 
The revival of independent trade unIonism, after almost ten vears of 
decline and dispersal, was marked by the formation in i955 of the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), 80rn out of the remains of 
and was Its only fully non-racial component. At its birtn, it had some 
20,000 members in 19 affiliated unions and was to grow ~o 30,000 by i956 
and t.: .• jvel' 5.5,000 w(H'kel'S t,y i 961. Its main stl'ength lay in trlree 
I'eqistel'eo:j unions and thei r blad: countel'pal'ts: F')l:llj and Cannil1q, 
Textiles an,j Laun,jl'Y. Amon,;! the laundry w,jl'kers were ab,)ut 400 whites 
who wel'e the only whi te workel's l'epl'i1sented by SACTt) and played an 
impol'tant I'ole alonqside SACTU's white officials in symbolising the non-
racial chal'acter of the movement. With SACTU's fOl'mation a numbel' of new 
unions were formed and old unions I'evived in light industry, food 
pl'ocessing, stevedoring, I'ail, sel'vices and even metal. Although its 
numbel's wel'e relatively small and its Ijl'ganisati1jn relatively weak, the 
b i r th 0 f SACTIJ as a non"': I' a,: i a 1 trade un i Ijn n)ovemen t i ndependen t 0 f the 
state represented a major step forward. 
In the f,)ur years from 1955 to 1958 there was a significant rise in trle 
number cd industrial strikes. According to Depal'tment Ij1 Lab,)ul' Ijfficial 
statistics, the picture for the 1950s as a whole was as follows: (8) 
-2'38-
Year rotal Strikes ~hite Strikes 8lack Stl'ikes 
No, Participants 
1'350 .: .. :. ·oJ·.J a 878 2,5 2:399 10 40% 
t '351 :3E. .5 790 :31 7204 4 1 .-.• , .;.,. 
1952 54 f. 4·3f. 4::: 596:::: 1'-' ..::. 25i: 
19.5:::: 30 7 :::19 .-;,.:. ";"'.' 1479 IS 75% 
1954 60 2'1 10'36 39 461::: 22 5"\' . I I. 
195.5 102 20 :::::::4 ':""":. 9479 22 ~'C"i I_'~ ~.-.,. 
1'3,56 10.S 1 ':1 I'.' 40'3 '32 E.428 21 ·-.,-.vl "::''::'/f 
1957 1 1'3 Eo 664 1 1 .:. '-' 615::: 20 17% 
19,5::; 74 10 650 64 712::: .-.. -. ,".~ :36% 
1959 46 :;: 99 4···· .;. :3462 27 6::::% 
1960 42 9 2:34 :3:3 5266 I)nknQwn 
1'361 81 I: '-' 7S 46E·2 IJnknc.wn 
Industrial Militancy rose Markedly in the years 1955-5::: and there is 
S')fin? in.ji.:ation that the use of ,'ep,'essive legislati.)n against striking 
workers declined in this pel'i()d. with.)ut pl·esupp.:asin.~ a cause-and-effect 
relati.jnship between indust,'ial acti·jl1 and wage rates, there are prima 
faci~ grounds for believing that the increase in strike activity aMong 
black workers did have SOMe bearing by 1958/9 in halting the erosion of 
black workers' wages, as the following figures of wages in private 
manufactul'ing and .:onstruction indicate(9): 
Year Av Earnings p,a, Increase over prior year 
Whites E:lacks Whites E:la.:ks 
1'3.50 1499 :317 0,9 -0,6 
1951 1559 :316 4,0 -0,:3 
1952 1 ,5:::8 :31:3 1, '3 -0, .~ 
1'35:::: 16:34 :320 2, 9 .-;. .-:. .:.. . .;... 
1954 1709 .:"-:.':' '-J":",_I 4.6 O. '3 
1774 '-"-11-' ·:"~O 2,8 0.:::: 
195E, i :317 :3:31 2.4 0, 9 
1957 1817 :;:26 0.0 -1. 5 
1958 1836 .-,.-,.-, .j.;"';' 1.0 .... ~, 1 
1959 1872 348 2,0 4,5 
1960 1907 :365 1,9 4,9 
(n, b, in 1955, there wel'e crlanges in trle method ,:of ,:.:ompiling statisti.:s, ) 
It wl:ould appeal' that in the wake o:)f the 1955-58 str ike wave blad: 
workers in private industry made si9nificant advances on the wages f"ont 
f,jr the first time si\,,:e the war and won a faste\' I'ate ,:of wal~e increase 
than whi te wljrkers, 
It became allllost an Ijrthod,j}<:Y in Congress circles, reflected in later 
commentaries, that industr ial struggles cl:ould not be Wljn independently 
of political change at the national level, The main reason given for 
this was that the unfavou\'able political and economic terrain on which 
trade union disputes were waged usually pre-ordained their defeat, Ben 
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Turok, for example, at the time a leading member of tne Communlst Party 
and SACTU. argued that 'wage demands were very otten unrealizable in 
stl'ai';lht tl'ade uni>:ln terms. It a,jvance,j w,:,pke\,s made demano::ls, they I,IKluld 
be charged. The only way to take up wage issues was in the context of a 
national campaign.,. to create a climate which would force the 
government and employers to give concessions (10). It would be 
misleading, however, to conclude fpom the rep\'essive political and legal 
climate of the 1950s that effective industrial action was imoossible. 
Unsl..,fl'pr-i·;ingly in what was still a yOUlig movement many inlJivi,jual 
strikes ended in defeat: notably the violent repression of the textile 
workers' st\'ike at Amato in 1958 ended in the destruction of what had 
been a particularly well organised union branch (11). There were, 
h,jwever, ,:,ther instan·:es in wflich wage in.:reases, imprc.ved .:onditi.:ms 
and recognition were won through industrial action or the threat of 
industrial a>:tion. The results were uneven, but as SACTU offi>:ia1, Brian 
Bunting, a little over-optimistically put it: 'whe\'e workers' unity is 
complete. rep\'isals become impossible' (12), Bunting cited two examples 
of successful strike action, milling workers in Johannesburg in 1957 and 
clothing workers in Hammarsdale in 1959, 
In the >:ase c)f the milling well'kers, in November 1957 ()Ver 1500 african 
wor~:ers walked out .)f six Johannesburg flour roi Ils in protest against 
low wa'iJes, demanding the publi.:ation .:>f a Wage Board investigation, The 
strike led to a 12.5% wage increase, n,) prosecutions and no 
victimisation. SACTU' s I)ffil:ial biographel's, Luckhardt and Wall, 
commented that • the b')sses sensed the p,)tential danger of the sympathy 
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·;tl'ike·; tt-Iat Wel'e O:'(':UI'I'in';J il1 I'elate.j in.jusil'ies' (13), New Ilge 
(onsidel'ed this 'the most su(o:essful Afl'i(an strike for a long time' 
(14), in Februal'Y 19S9 at the Hammal's.jale Clothinq Fa,:t.~ry, set up 27 
rlli les t I'c,m OUl'ban as a • b'~I'del' in.justl'Y' ,jesiqne,j t,:o take a,jvanta';:Je o:,f 
trn? 1='0:11:,1 of .:heap lab,:,uI' available in the l'eserves, :388 aTI'i,::an workers 
walke.j out in SUPP':Ol't c,f a ,jeman,j f.~r hi';Jhel' wa';:Jes, They WQn an 
agreement gl'anting full reO:Qgnltion of the ATl'i(an Clothing WQl'kers 
Union (a SACTU affiliate), negotiations within the year tor bettel' wages 
an.j (.:ondi tiQns and permission to hold il'ade uni,:.n meetino;1s insi,je trle 
fao:tol'Y, Aftel' the management reneged 011 the agl'eement, making a 
'sweetheart' deal instead with the registered Garment Workers Union, the 
whole blao:k wQrkforce Qf 500 wQrkers walked out again, The strike 
o:,:ontinued despite the arrest of 137 w(.rkers., ino:luding rl'lembers ,:of the 
uni.:on o:omnn ttee, undel' the Native Lab.:our A.:t, Mana';:!ement threatene.j t.:o 
dose .j,:,wn the f ao: t,~ry but f i nall y re-,:opene.j it, 'dl'anti n'~ re,:,~qni ti,:,n t.~ 
the ACWI) an.j il1l:reased wages, but wi thout l'e-il1statinl;J the chai I' of trle 
union (15), 
The St,:,I'y of the F'~Qd and Cannin9 W'~rkel's Union (FCWU) and its african 
sister-uni,)n (AFCWU) is il1stl'uctive in this I:ontext (16), They were able 
to develop in the first half I)f the 1950s thanks to a rapidly expandin';:J 
food and canning industry, a relatively uni ted III01'kfol',:e and the 
bal'gaining pOlller which ,:arne from the need t,) process frui t and 
vegetables very quickly in the busy season, The union gained substantia.l 
lIIage increases largely through conciliation board agreements, It only 
once lIIent l::In official strike, at Spekenham's from August to October 
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1957, on wntch occaSlon it was defeated, Workers, however, often struck 
illegally and unofficially and sometimes with considerable success: as 
was the case in January 1954 at Wolsely Fruit Canning Company, where the 
inltial criminal convictions of strikers were overturned in the appeals 
CI::OUI't and wOI'kers won better cc,ndi tions, In SClme l:ases wOl'kel's stl'ikinq 
in the busy season won their demandS only for them to be rescinded in 
the slaCk season, With a number of employers the union obtained stop 
orders, the right of union orqanlsers to enter factories, re-employment 
based on senlority and the re-instatement of workers under unfair 
dismissal, The union organised study classes for workers, lncluding 
political education along lines 5uuported by the Congress Alliance, In 
51Jliie areas effe.:tive fal:tclry clJliimittees we\'e established and in in Sl::.me 
• the union was the focal point of the whole social life' (17), putting 
fl)I'Warlj politi.:al del'l'lan,js ,,:1\' the .:.)mmunity in qenel'al. In F'I::.rt 
Elizabeth and Paarl, where the union had a 1al'ge number of african women 
members, it played an impol'tant role in the women's anti-pass 
campaigning and succeeded in postponing the introduction of casses, (18) 
Thougrl the banning Ijf uni,::.n offil:ia1s dated back to that of Ray 
Alexandel' in 1953. there appears tl) have been a marked in,:rease in the 
state and management "ffensive fl'om 1958. Serious divisions al~ose in the 
union (f 01' reasons about whil:h we are unc lear but inc luded embezzlement 
of union funds by some offi,:ials) as unemployment rose and influ)<: 
controls were tightened up. Leadin,~ union membel's were victimised, not 
least because accordin,;! to one member • the bl:>sses' chosen leaders have 
beel' made supervisors to have the right tQ dismiss whoever they like ' 
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(19); some stop order facilities were withdrawn; some wage cuts 
l'o:Kommel1ded tly the Wa'3e 8.::.al'd were irllPlemente,j and in 1959 tt-Ie cannin,~ 
industry was declared an 'essential service ' thereby removing the rlght 
to strike, Even so, in at least two companies the union successfully 
resisted wage cuts in 1959, 
The F'l'esident of CNETl) cClmmentelj in 1954 tr-Iat I the Native Laboul' AI:t 
cannot kill unions which are based in factories rather than offices
' 
<: 20), Thi·:; seerl\S tl::' have been tl'ue I:.f uni.:,ns 1 ike FQI:llj anlj Canni n9, 
which I: i I',:umvente,j the lel;Jal ban ,::.n I mb:elj' uni,)ns thl',)u,~h separate but 
genuinely equal branl:hes 1)1' unions, By 196056 'mi}(ed ' unions still 
remainelj rel~istel'elj undel' the lndustl'ial CI:)\1I: il iatiQn A,: t, The Qff idal 
,:,)nc i I iati,)n mal:hinel'y was widely rejel:telj, wi th I)nly ten wl)rks 
cQmmittees successfully established, The reservation of 'skilled ' jobs 
f')I' white wl:,rkers I:ould n,:,t annul tt-Ie fal:t that thel'e were many skilled 
and semi-skilled black and cl)l,)ured wOI'ker5 whose skills, though n,)t 
rel:,::.gni5ed in law, were in fal:t requirelj f,)r the running of industry and 
f,)rmed the basis I)f their negl)tiating stl'enl~th, The attempt to draw the 
tee tt-l of mi 1 i tant unions thrl)ugh the terms of rel~istration under the 
Industrial Conci liation AI:t met wi th only partial success, SACTU ' s 
strongest aff i liates in f'jolj and canning, textiles and laundry all being 
registerelj unions, The ban Ijn str ikes by at rican wOl'kers did not prevent 
their oCI:urrence. In Sl)me ,:ases where workers refused to pay their 
fines, management was compelled to pay thelll in thai r stead for fear I)f 
losing their workforce through imprisonment, In other cases, unions won 
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legal battles against the conviction of their members, In others still, 
fines were paid and prison sentences endured, 
Notwithstanding these qualifications the context for industrial 
organisation and action was certainly difficult and after 1958 it became 
worse as unemployment rose and repression accelerated, Thus the 
proportion of strikes which resulted in criminal prosecutions of workers 
went up sharply, reaching 63% in 1959, A leading SACTU organiser, Leon 
Levv, dePIcted vividly the state response which many black strikers 
en.:ountere.:i: 
When a stl'ike o.:curs, it resembles a small-s.:ale civil war, 
LIJ1'I'y IIJads of pIJI ice al'med with bat.:ms, sten guns and tear-.~as 
bombs are rushed to the factory; great 'pick up' vans arrive and 
all tria str ikel's al'e al'l'ested, (21) 
In addi ti.jn to state repression, rlowevel', there were internal weaknesses 
in the tl'a,je uni.)n 1'l'I,)vement whi.:h prec ipi tate,j its l,)ss of momentum 
after 1'358, Fil'st and foremost was the problem .)f fragmentati,)n within 
the ')l,.~anise,j labour m,)vement, Most evident on the surface were the 
racial divisions whid"1 split the fl"lovement apart, but the pl'oblem ,)f 
rac ism was linked tIJ othel- divisi.:ms: between the sic: i lled and the 
unsle: i lle,j, between unions '~l-anted legal recogni ticn through registration 
under the Industrial Conciliati,)n A.:t and those denied the right t.j 
register, and n,)t least along cold-war lines between those unions which 
suppol-ted the 'west' a.nd the ICFTU, and those oriented to the 'east' and 
the s"viet international trade union bloc of WFTIJ, While the racial 
divide in the South Africa.n labour moveMent was unique in its intensity, 
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the split between the western unions and the communist was not peculiar 
t·) ~;.:.uth Af \' i,:a, In fl\I:'St Eur.::.pean cl::.untr ie5, wi th the e)(ception clf 
Britain, trade union movements were split asunder as the cold war 
between the 'west' and 'east' grew in virulence, In South Africa the 
congealing of these divisions around the axis of race proved damaging to 
the movement as a whl::.le. 
::;ACTU was not tr,e onl y tralje unil:ln f eljel'atil:ln to:l emerl~e i 11 tr,e mid-
19505, It was a small body, relative both to the organised labour 
ml)vement as a whl)le anlj t':1 the mass I::.f un,)rganised t,lal:k wClrke\'s, The 
majority of white unions were affiliated to the racially exclusive and 
right-winl~ Fedel'al Cl::tnsultative (:,:'\uncil, CI:'\-I:,\rdinating Council and 
Fedel'ation I:'\f TI'alje Unions, In 1958 they I:')mbinelj intI) the South African 
CI)nf eljeration of Laboul', wi th a memClership l::tf arl)und 1 50,000 whi te 
WI)\'kel'·; and a few I:,)l,)u,'eds and iI,dians, About the same size was the 
::;I)utr, African Trades I)l1il)n Cl::tuncil, ::;ATUC, fl,rmelj in 1954 and rena'l)ed 
TUCSA in 1962. It had 40 affiliated unions with 147,000 members. It 
accepted affiliation only from registered unions in this period, thus 
excluljing afril:an wOI'kel"s but inl:lu,jinl~ cl,loul'eds and indians, It was 
committed to the "western" side Ijf the cold war divide and had close 
ties wi th the IeFTU and natil,nal tl'alje union centres I ike the 81' i tish 
TUe. (22) 
In aljdi ticn, there were independent unions unaff i 1 iated tl, any co-
ordinating body which were said to represent around 85,000 workers. 
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N'Jtable .:1.m'Jn.,;J tt-Iem was tile NatiQnai Uni'Jn of Distl'ibutive WOI'Kel"5, whi.:h 
acted as a bridge between SATUC and SACTU, SACTU, accQrdingly, 
cQnstituted only a small part of tne Qrganised tl'ade union movement as a 
whole, a. lal'gel' but sti 11 small min':'l'i ty aOK.n.;.! or',;Janise.j c.j!ou!'e.j and 
in.jian I",hjl'kel's most of WhoJ£ll were in SATI)C uni.cms, and a hi.~he,' 
proportion of organised afl'ican workers althQugh there we!'e a 
sl.Jbstantial numbe,' wrltJ wel'e in in.jepen.jent unitJns or after 1958 .jQine.j 
african unions affiliated to FOFATUSA (the Fedel'ation Qf Fl'ee African 
Trade Unions), linKed tQ SATUC amd the PAC, The vast majtJ!'lty of african 
wQrke!'s were nQt o!'ganised, In manufacturing the!'e were in all around 
:300,000 african workers, in mining almQst half a milliQn. in transPQrt 
150,000, in sel'vices a,'.)und 8(1),000, in c.jmmel',:e 'Jver 1.50,000 an.j in 
agriculture at least one million, The prQblems involved in organising 
the unol";lanised wel'e vast enough in themselves, In tl-Ie .:ontext .:of a 
deepl y ,ji vi.jed tl'ade uni.::," mCNement, whe!'e the best .jl";janised wOI'kers 
we!'e tJf ten il1 tl'ade uni.jn b.jdies least i ntel'este.j in 'jrqanisi ng trle 
un,)r';lanise,j, they were all the more daunting, 
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Pol i tical ul1loni sm 
From its in.:eption, SACTU aft'irmed a p.:)l i ti.:al r.:)le f.:)r i tsel f as the 
trade uni,:)n winl;! I)f the national I ibel'ation ml)vement. In his addl'ess to 
the inaut;Jural cl)nference .)f SACTI.l in 1955, the Chairman stressed that 
1 y,)U .:annIJt sepal'ate p.:)l i tics and the way pe')ple are govel'ned f I'om their 
bread and butter, Qr theil' TI'eedom tl:;' m,:>ve t,:;, and from pla,:es where they 
,:al1 find the best empll)yment. I)r the h,)uses they live i n , IJr the type I)f 
edul:ation thei I' ,:hi ldren l;;jet. These thil1l;;Js are of vi tal .:on.:erl1 t.::. 
workel's. The Tl'ade Unions would therefore be neglecting the interests Qf 
their members if they failed t.::. struggle for their members I)n all 
matters which affect them. The Trade IJnions must be as active in the 
political field as they are in the economic sphere because the two hang 
together and ,:annot be isolated frl:;)m each Qther'. (23) The same principle 
was embodied in the Statement of Policy passed at the first Annual 
Conference in 1956: 
SACTIJ is I: onsc i ous 0 f the f ac t tha t the organ is i ng 0 f the mass 
of the workers for higher wages. better conditions of life and 
labour. is inextricably bound up with a determined struggle for 
poli tical rights and libel'ation fron\ all I)pppressive lawli and 
practices, It follows that a mere struggle for the economic 
rights of all the workers without participation in the general 
struggle for political emancipation would condemn the Trade 
Union movement to uselessness and to a betrayal of the interests 
of workers, (24) 
Lutuli expressed the same point more eloquently when he said that he was 
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';llad trlat :;ACTIJ halj 'n.::.t listened tl:1 ttle ill advil:e trlat they srlljuld not 
be interested in politics. There is a Zulu saving that if you are 
prid:e,j by a thljl'n y.:ou alslj have tl:1 use a thorn to ';let it out. W,jrkers 
are oppressed by political action; they must take political action in 
reply' (25), :;ACTI)'s first campai',;lning rljle in 1955 was in support clf trle 
Congress of the People; later that year it formally became a member of 
the Congress Alliance with representation on the National Co-ordinating 
C'Jlnmi ttee; Communist Pal'ty members played a key I"jle in its 
organisation, SACTIJ was frOM the start in every sense a 'political 
Econljmil: and pol i tical struggles wel'e insepcu'able, I Apol i tical ' trade 
uniljnism was but another name f'jr a fOI'm of tl'ade unionism which 
embra,:ed 1)1' compr,)mised with the existin',;) state, Thus SATIJC's claim to 
be 'apolitical' comprised in substance a commitment to cold-war anti-
communism, support of 'western' tl'ade union mOl/ements, e~<clusion of 
afri,:an workers and ,:onfol'mity with apartheid law, The term 'p'jliti,:al 
trade unionism' (26), however, says nothing about the substance of the 
poli ti,:s adopted by SACTIJ, SACTU was not merely 'p'Jli tical' but embraced 
a definite kind of political orientation, one that was influenced by the 
Communist Party and ol'iented to Congress, In this arrangement, working 
class or.~anisation was limited to the trade union sphel'e, while the 
political struggle was conducted in national rather than class terms, 
SACTU's .jff ic ial conception of 'political unionism' accepted this 
division of labour from the start, SACTU itself was a hybrid creature, 
On the one hand, it functioned as a transmission belt conveying 
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nationalIst politics to the working class with the Communist Party as 
the key intermediary, On the other, it functioned as an organised 
expre':;sll)n clf Wljl'k i ng .: lass .:onsc iousness, C'jmmentatcl\'s have ten.jed t.j 
emprlClsise .Jne or .jther side of the dual .:hal~a.:ter of SACTIJ wi thout 
c'Jlnprehending its c.:.ntradictory nature, A battle was f.:.ught .:out between 
tn.:)se wh.:: .. sou.~ht t.j use SACTIJ as a ·:;pl'in.~b.jal'd for buildin.~ a wOI'k in.~ 
.: lass .)rientati'jn in C.jn';jl'ess and th.jse wt...:. sought t.:. c.:onstruct a mass 
base for nationalist politics through the medium of SACTU, The balance 
of these forces shifted significantly over time, 
In trle first three veal'S .jf its e}<:isten.:e SACTI) nati')nally was very weak 
an.j depen,jed heavily f.jl' its finan,:e and ol'ganisati'jn on its well-
established I'e.;jistered unions, Textiles, Food and Canning, Laundl'y and 
trlei r Af r ican c')Untel'pal'ts, Trlere was a I imi t, ther'efore, to the 
inf luen,:e which SACTI) as a tl'a,je union ':'jngress ,:ould bl' in.~ t'j beal' on 
i.ts affiliates, Combine,j with the rise from below of industrial 
':'Jmbati vi ty, this meant that the poli ti':al agenda ,)f SACTIJ nationally 
':'Juld n,:ot easily displace the bread-and-butter econ'Jl'llics of the trade 
unions, An example of this can be seen in the battle over 'registration' 
wi thin SACTI), When the government introduced its bill t'J amend the 
Industl'ial Conciliation Act. SACTU was united in its oppositi'Jn t'J its 
racially divisive edicts (as too was SATUC) and ,:a11ed for equal 
I'ecogni tion of all ""orkel's under the Industrial Conci liati.)n A.:t, The 
question at issue, however, was how to respond. Especially among 
Communist Party officials in SACTU. there was a call for the registered 
affiliates of SACTU to deregister rather than accept the new terms of 
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registration, Their argument was couched in the terms of african 
nati.jnal ism: if afl'i,:al1 W,)rki:!l'S could l1'jt bel.:mg t.) l'e.~iste,'ed uni.:.ns, 
then it would be divisive if other workers did belong, In Gaetswewe's 
w'Jrds, 'l'e.~istratiQn has q,)t stl'in';js '" the set up in South Af"ica 
means that ,'e'~istere,j w'Jrkel's c'Jntinue t'J benef it f r,)fI'I trle suf fel' i ng .)f 
Af r ican w'Jl'ke,'s' (27), 
The proponents of de-registratiQn arguec that 'those that have some 
benef its from ,'egistl'ati':Jn sh':Juld thr'jw that away and .:ome back t'j those 
who a,'e nc,t registered' (28), They downplayed the advantages ':Jf 
registration: 'a trade union exists because it has members, not because 
it is registe,'ed, " Let us have conf idence in our wc,rke,'s and let us not 
underestimate our stren';jth' (29), As Eli Weinberg put it, 'the Af"ican 
workers a,'e on the m'Jve again, and they n'J doubt wi 11 again pl'ove t'J the 
members of registered unions that the most effective way to secure 
benef its is workers unity and n'Jt some kind of nebulous "recognition'" 
(:30), The proponents of de-registrati'Jn argued that registrati'Jn was the 
kiss of death for independent trade unionism since 'workers would no 
longe,' have the "ight to run their ollln organisations in their ollln 
manner' (31), Mpetha made deregistration a point of principle, arguing 
that 'Illorking within the Act lIIas to agree to baaskap' (32), 
SACTU's registered unions, on the other hand, lIIere reluctant to forego 
the advantages which registration offered them and preferred to make use 
of the limited legal recognition available, while evading as far as 
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possible the restrictions which accompanied it, Whereas the amended ICA 
demanded an all-whlte executive in 'mixed' unions, the registered unions 
in SACTU chose either to fight for exemption from this requirement, 
which they sometimes won, or formally to split their unions into 
racially separate bodies while working closely together on an informal 
level, They opposed voluntary de-registration since it would lose them 
the vital trade union rights which registration offered, The trade union 
organisation of African workers was extremely weak ana this needed to be 
should face facts and consider how many organised workers there were in 
::;.:.utr, Afri':<i, when they called f.)r I,eg.)tiation fl'om strength' C:::3), 
Registration was useful for access to workers, for winning recognition 
from management, f.)r Cilakin.~ legally binding agreements; it was n,)t t.) be 
thrown away li';Jhtly, As Don t'lateman .:.f the Textile W')l'kers succin.:tly 
put it, 'what we have we must keep, What we .jo n.)t r,ave we must fight 
f()I" (:34), 01- at '~I'eatel' len.~th: 
WC'I'kel's must buil.j themselves up on what trley have c,,:rtieve.j. 
They must .\"taintain what they had won and 1 ike s.)ldiel's they need 
t., dig trenches. What y.)U have suffered and fought f.,r, you must 
maintain. If y.)U .:.,nquer .::me sp •• :e, yQU can r,\()ve into ., the I' 
factories. Workers can only be stron.;J in an .)rganised fashion 
and they must preserve what theY've g.,t Qthel'wise it becomes a 
vel'y cheap struggle. (35) 
There was apprehension an)ong the opponents .:.f .:leregistrati.)n that SACTIJ 
could lose its whi te, .:.,loured and indian workel's t., I'egistered unions 
outs ide SACTtJ (most elf whom were al ready in SATUC) wi thout any advantage 
to african workel's, wel'e they to forego the rights of registration. It 
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was for good reason that the most successful african unions in SACTU 
were those closelv associated with registered unions and that formal 
separation of african workers from non-africans dld not stop their real 
unity, As Liz Abrahams, an organiseI' tor Food and Canning, commented on 
he I' unil)n: I we just spii t the name, but evel'yii'"ling l'emainelj the same, In 
those eal'ly days we die not even take notice of the race lssue - our aim 
was to build up tne worKers, unite the workers and unite the unions, 
(::::6 ) 
The de-registration position, supported by members of the Communist 
Party, pI'edominated in SACTU nationally, but thel'e was n,) clear 
resolution clf the issue, It was resl::>lved in practice by the rel~istel'ed 
uni'jns in SACTlJ when none I::>f them al;Jreed t,) de-I'el;Jister al1d they and 
thei I' 111::on-rel;1i s tered af I' i,:an ':'junterpal'ts ':Ol1t i nue,j to be the best 
organlsed and most effective of the SACTU unions, SACTU's official 
I"listol'ians I"lave interpI'eted I the unwillingness clf I'egistered unions tCI 
follow the lead proposed by their African brothers and sisters ' as 
'reflective of the". limitations on trade unions as revolutionary 
l::>rl;Janisatil::>ns I and as eviden,:e that I trade uni'jns al'e, " essentially 
defensive capitalist institutions organised to protect workers and are 
thus inherently reformist' (37), This conclusion was entirely 111-
founded, What was at issue was not Ireformism ' but usinl~ the legal 
space made avai lable by rel~istratil::>n t'j build tral:le union Ijr,~anisation, 
The issues behind registration were further muddied by the hostile 
I'elations between SACTU al1d ::;ATUC. Both opposed tt""le arllende.j ICA an.j 
SACTU approached SATUC, in splte of their differences, to form a united 
fl,.jnt in 'Jpp.:.sition to the A.:t. In an edit'j"ial in WOT'k~I's Unit.y Ray 
Alexander argued that whlte unions in SATUC objected to the IC Bill only 
be.:ause they teal'ed trlat t.lack workers threatene.j to I'e.:luce the1\' 
standard of living unless they were organised and that SACTU could not 
therefore base its policy on the assumption that 'in the present set 1..10 
of trace unions there is a possibility of real worklng class unity' 
(38). Nonetheless, Alexander concluded that SACTU should still look for 
' .. II1i ty wi th SATUC mindful that a la",~e maj,)\'i ty of or';Janised in,jian and 
,:.jl.ju,'ed w·jrke,'s were in SATUC and n'jt S;ACTV. F,)r its part SATVe 
sab,jta';Je,j the ')PPol'tuni ty for a united front in opposition t'j the 
govel'nment·s tl'ade uni,)n laws. It t,)ld ::;ACTU that it 'would determine 
its .)wn p,)licy and pl'epal'e its ,jwn ,:ampai';Jn' (:39) and declare.j that it 
would .:,j-.)perate wi th the g,)vel'nment in • pl'eventin~~ the evel'-in.:reasin'~ 
Native laboul' f,)r,:e fl"jm cQntinuing t,) mena,:e the European standa,'d .)\' 
living'. It promised that it would not break the law or ol'ganise strikes 
against the Bill. Within SACTIJ the demand ,)f the ,je-registl'ation lobby 
that all progressive unions should .je-register ,:,)uld only affect 
adversely any chance ,)f a uni ted front wi th SATIJC and .)f ,'ea':hin'~ the 
wor~:ers whom SATIJC ,)r,~anised. 
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The election strike 
Early in 1957 SACTU was swept Dy the growing tide of popular militancy, 
in pal'ticulal' trle Ale)·::andl'a bus b,)y,:,)tt, int,) launchin9 a £1 a ,jay 
minimurll wa,~e ,:ampai.;Jn, 8efore ::;ACTlJ ':'Juld devel'Jp the ,:ampaiqli Clli its 
I)wn tel'ms, the Nat 1 ,:,na 1 C()-I)I'di nat i ng Commi ttee IJT the ConQl'ess All iance 
called for a countrywide 'Day of Protest. Prayer and Demonstration' for 
Freedom Day, the 26 June, 1957, In which workers in Johannesbul'Q and 
Port Elizabeth were enJoined to stay at home and workers elsewhere to 
hc)ld pl'ayel' meetinqs anlj pl',:n:essions iii their fl'ee time, The main issues 
wel'e £1 a day minimurll wage and ')PP,)si ti.:.n to passes, but these were 
combined with a wide range of other demands: no tax incl'ease, no Bantu 
education.. n,:. UI'I)UP Areas, n.) banni ngs, StlJP p.::.l ice rai.js, f I'eedom elf 
w')I'ship, open univel'si ties, n,) apartheid in nursin,;}, Vel'woed must '~'J, 
down with apartheid, fOl'ward to a multi-racial conference, The idea was 
to use the stay-at-home to hold I'eligious sel'vices, offer prayel's 
a.~ainst apal'theilj, hlJl,j S~")l'tin~:;! and cuI tural meetings and I::.rganise 
discussions around the FI'eedom Charter, In spite IJf extensive state and 
management eff.::.rts to under·:ut the call, it met wi th ,:onsiderable 
response among workers with claims that it was 70-80% successful in 
Johannesburg and al'ound 50% in Port Elizabeth, Alongside the I'elatively 
high level of industrial strikes that yeal', the bus blJyc.::.tts, the anti-
pass agitation and the rural unrest, the stay-at-home seems to have 
I:oncentrated the l'I'lind '::.f government suf fidently t'J inl: i te a flurry I)f 
wage board activity and wage determinations increasing the pay of the 
'unskilled', (40) As a demonstrative event, the stay-away was a success 
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in its o~n terms and showea the Dotentlal of conjoining political and 
economic struggles. Workers could only particlpate in strike action. 
ho~ever) In the face of great danger to tnemselves; to undertake such 
effort and risk required that they had some conception of the utility of 
the action and some involvement in the decision to take action. Failure 
by the Cc.n'~I'ess leadersl.ip to a.jdl'ess tl"'.ese issues ie.j t.) ~I.at .jne 
c.jri.mentatol' has calle.j tr.e bel ief that • the pe';)p1e ~el'e .jnly t.;)() peady 
to stay at home, whenever they were called UDon to do so' (41), 
The 1957 C()nfel'ence .:.f the ANC did n.jt discuss the issue .:.f how the 
e.:onc.mio: ';lains ma.je in the at termath of the stay-at-h'::ome .:.juld be 
c.;)nsc,lidated .::'1' h.jw they .:.juld be tied in with attempts t.::. bl'eak the 
political wall .j1 I'ea.:ti.jn whi.:h faced the Inovernent, The main f.jcUS was 
not .In 'the poten.:y of w.;)rkin.,;I .:1ass t.Jrms of stl'ug';l1e' (42) but .In 
Lutuli's .:all t.:.1' a uniie.j fr.:.nt, inclu.jin';i the I)nited Party. t'J 
campai.~n f.jr the .jefeat .::.f the NaticlI1alists and t.j e)(press • our .jesil'e 
f.jr a United Party vi.:tol'Y' (4:3), Lutuli had had no illusions in the 
Uni ted Party. In 1954 he had l'emal'ked that • the long awaited for new 
native pol icy .::of the Uni ted Party can be described as bein~;;J a mark-time 
order by drill-master Mr Stl'auss with an .)ccasional "mar.:h-backwal'd" 
order' (44). He desCl'ibed the UP as a party that 'poisons you slowly 
while the NaticIllalists Il"lurder you most ruthlessly'. Nonetheless he now 
argued that a I)ni te.j Party victory would 'provide opp')l'tuni ties fo,' 
white and non-whites to come together' (45), Lutuli's rationale was that 
'we are for widespread activity among the voteless peoples at election 
time so that the voices and opinions of the voteless may be taken into 
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five years of Nationalist rule' (46), Lutuli called for a day of mass 
gatherings, prayer and dedication to coincide with the election, 
In putting foward this position, Lutuli was speaking for Congress as a 
campaign is to bring home to the e~ectorate the biggest problems of our 
Communist Party also supported the election campaign, calling for the 
Party to get rid of the Nationalists, The Communist Party leader, 
Michael Harmel, called for a victory for the United Party, urging them 
despotism'(48), He emphasised that 'the campaign would force the Unitea 
Party to tell the truth and 'jpen the eyes ,)t the ele.:t,jl'ate' (49), N,:;. 
doubt a defeat of the Natic,nalists would have seriously weaic:ene,j the 
apartheid state, but the problem lay in what C,:mgl'ess ,:ould do to 
facilitate their defeat in a whites-only election, 
SACTU itself campaigned for a national strike in support of £1 a day 
minimum wage, shorter hours, trade uni':)\1 recogni tion and an end t,) the 
pass laws. A nURlber of regional w'jrker conferences wel'e held where the 
• 
slogan 'Asinamali, sifunam~i' ('we have no m'::oney, we want l\loney') 
resounded as workers demanded action over wages and passes, ~w ~~ 
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reported that 'the resentment and indignation of the workers was 
';irl,rl,erin,;:! to tll)ilinq DOlnt' as tt-,ey ,·;tru';J'~led desperately on the I)ne 
hand against S()arlng livin,;,j ((.sts on his stal'vati.::>n wages wt-Ille ('n tt-Ie 
,)ther han,j he was sub.iec ted t,) the rem,:)\'seless pl'IJcess (If el,.jless pass 
raids, thus 1 ivin.;) in .:.:.nstan't ,jrea,j of ,jep,:,rtati,::>n f I'om tt-Ie ul'ban 
areas' (50), The workers wanted actil)n, Looking back tIJ his days as a 
SACTU organiser and Communist Party memoel', Ben Turok obsel'ved that 
'working (lass comrades became more involved and people with a class 
ideology (ame to the fore", The pressures of the proletarian elements 
wel'e stl',)n,~el' I, TUI'ok, t",owevel' , I'eveaie,j mu,:I", about the pel'spe,: tt ves ,:,1 
Con';!I'ess and the (:.:.r'flmunist Party when rle a.jde.j tr-Iat '·::me in fact had tc. 
be cal'eful that this tendency did not become hegemonic, " This was 
always re,:ogni se.j, Cape was taken n.)t t.) f I' i.;!hten off the oetty 
bourge.)is elements' (51), 
The Nati.:,nal Workel's' C.:mference was (.,nvened in Mar.:h 1958, a lar.~e 
.;!atherin.;! attende,j by 167:3 tl'a.je uni')11 dele';Jates and :3000 .:>bservel's, It 
was resolved that there I should be a week .)f national stay-at-home 
pl'otest and dem.:mst,'ations in supp.:>rt of the people's den,ands' (52), In 
the face of some opposition from within its own ranks, SACTU was 
prevai led up.)n by Congress leadel's to merge its str ike ,:a11 wi th the 
ANC's call for mass action at election time, Thus the twin slogans of 
the campaign became 'F.,rward to a poun.j a .jay victory' and 'Nats must 
go', In pra.:tice, this meant that the stay-at-home, scheduled by SACTU 
to straddle the electi.)n day, f.)cussed on the election, whi 1st the 
demands for a £1 a day, tra.je union recognition and the ab.)li tion of the 
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pass laws took on secondary status, As SACTU's official historians put 
it, 'the strike call had become less and less a SACTU-orientated 
camoaign and more and more one focussing on the white elections' (53), 
Harmel saw the significance of the National Workers' Conference as 
putting pressure on the white electorate to understand the 'lron 
realities' of South Africa, concluding that for this reason the 
conference would be seen 'as a major turning point in history' (54) 
The National Workers Conference appears to have been convened by the NeC 
of Congress rather than by SACTU, The Conference statement was lssued by 
the ANC wi thout mentioning SACTI) and Lutuli stl'essed that trle Confel'en,:e 
was m)t e;{,:lusively a tl'ade uni.)n affail', It w.)uld appeal' that SACTU's 
own stl'UI:tul'es I)f a,:c':Juntability a11d de':isi.)n-makin.~ wel'e by-passe':L 
Just as lts I)wn tra.je unll:Jn deman.js were p':Jlitically re-Iji rei: ted, The 
actual response of Congress to the Workers Conference resolutions 
ag.~ravate,j the pr,)blem, The ANC I'efuselj to put its IJwn name tl) the stay-
at-hlJme I:all and instead dipec telj i ts enel'.~ies tl:J the white electorate, 
Pamprllets were to be put under the ':"JOI'S l:Jf white vl,te\'s call ing f')I' a. 
reco,~ni tb)n I)f the right of the african pel'ple t'J 'sha\'e in the shaping 
of their own destinies' (55), In the light ,)f this electoral policy, 
Congress then overrode the Workers ' Conference decisions, ruling that 
the stay-at-home should be only three days long and nlJt a week, that it 
should be undertaken only I where p,)ssible' and that there should be nQ 
picketing, It also declared that trle stoppage was not t" be direl:ted 
against .:ommerce and industry but a'~ainst the government, 
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The response of black workers to the stay-at-home call was uneven, Most 
commentators have called it a failure but the evidence of the first day 
of the action is less clear-cut, It seems that the strike was 50% 
effective in the Eastel'n Cape, 40% in Durban and si'~nifi,:ant in the 
Sophiat()wn and New,:lal'e t,:,wnships ,::of J,)hannesbul"~, The I'esp.::onse of trle 
ANC, h,::owevel', was ': leal'-cut: al thou.,;}h the stay-at-home was i nten.jed t,:, 
last for three days, Oliver Tambo called it off after one day, declal'ing 
that 'the purp,:,se ,::of the pl'otest had iii the main been a.:hieve,j, nOle c,ne 
day w'::OI'k st,::oppa.,;}e had ensul'ed that trn? '~I' ievan,:es and aspi rati.::.ns ,::of the 
people were c.:,nsi.jered while the c,::ountry was en.;}a.,;}ed in trle sel'ious 
questi,)n ,jf ,:h'::o,::osing a ,~,:)Vel'nment· (56), This de.:isi.::on was hotly 
contested in certain al'eas, In Port Elizabeth, where accordin.,;} to 
Luckhardt and Wall momentum for the strike was picking up at the end of 
day one, trade union leaders were 'upset with the decision - especially 
as i t had been made wi th'JU t the i r .: onsu 1 ta t ion' (,57 ), Moses Mabh i da 
re.:alled that, th.::ough the ANC leadership had not been involved en.:.ugh in 
the ol,.~anisation .)f the campai.~n, 'in OUl'ban we th,)ught it was most 
successful, Dockers were out", the Whites in the suburbs even supported 
us' (58), In the decision to call ,)ff the stl'ike, SACTIJ was not 
apparentl y c'Jnsul ted and there was an angry response f ron\ the Managen\ent 
Committee and other SACTIJ members over their seemingly servile role in 
the Congress Alliance (59), In Sophiatown and Newclare, workers held out 
for the full three days amid riots and police violence (60), but the 
whole affair had been taken out of the hands of the unions, 
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As far as the trade union movement was concerned, its own initiatives 
wel'e lQst in the eie,:t')I'cd ,:amp"aign. As fal' as the e1i~':tc'l'al ,:ampai';;Jn 
was con,:erned, the strategy was a disastel', The Uni ted Party was no 
fl'iel1,j c,f blac~: pe')ple and ANC SUppOI't was ab,)ut the last thin';;j in tt-Ie 
world the party wanted in its competition with the Nationalists. Far 
from responding to the Congress appeal. the United Party sought to 
distance Itself as far as possible from Congress. basing its electoral 
strategy on wooing white workers on the same terraln as the ruling 
Nationalists. The result of the election was a decislve victory for the 
Nationalist Party. who for the first time won for themselves a bare 
majol'ity.:.f the white v.:>te. The l'epl'esentation .)f the United Party was 
dedmated, the LabQur Papty It;,st all its five seats and St"ijdom 
dec lal'e.j that the Naticmal ists wc,uld fI'lai ntain 'the tradi ti,:>nal way of 
li fe of ()Ul' country' (61). M.:>st .:ommentatol's have shaped the view of 
Duma Nokwe, the ANC's Assistant General Secretary, that • the overall 
pictUl'e was ,)ne of failupe ... bitte1'ly disapp')intin,~, humiliatin';;j and 
e>:ceedin';;jly depressing' (62). 
N.:>netheless in his evaluation .:>f the strike, Lutuli argued that its 
primary objectives had been achieved in that black pe.:>ple ceased t.) 
regard elections as a white man's affair (63), This may have been so but 
the problem ~as that the election ~as almost exclusively a ~hite affair, 
Lutuli. for all the strength of his liberal spirit, looked to the 
Nationalists t,:> 'mend their ~ays' or to the ~hite electorate to 'give 
the country a progressive government', The National Executive Committee 
of the ANC considered that the election results had shattered the 
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illu'5io:,ns ,:,f o:han,~e ttw':'U';jrt elect()l'al means (64) but evaded the question 
,:,f whose i 11usi':'l1s wel'e st-Iattere,j, sin,:e it was trle ANC i tsel f Whl,:h ha,j 
'5,)uo;jht tc, channel wC'l'k in,;! ': lass mi 1 i taner' int.::, ;1n elect"l'al I'fI"uid, The 
Executive analysed the weaknesses of the strike in technical terms: 
inadequate pl'eparation. insufficient organisation, too little political 
education, too much reliance on coel'cion to sustain the stl'ike and 
Africanist wing, It upheld the view nonetheless that 'no one can 
(j()IJbt, , , tl-Ie impact thi·; decisi,)n had ,:,n the wh,)le ,:,:)untl'Y, Indee,j it 
mal'ks a turning point in our politio:s, We can no lono;jel' '" allow 
the minol'ity to elect without OUI' intel'vention' (65), The question it 
did nc,t ad,jress was why i l,tervention was tai lored n,)t t" a sr-..:,w ,)f 
stl'en'~th by the black working ,:lass but t,) an a,:,:,)mc,dation wi th a 
largely imaginary middle class liberalism, 
On the left cl'iti,:ism ,:ame fl'OI'II all quarters, includin'~ the C"h)munist 
Party, An edi t')l' ial in Nelli Age suggeste,j that 'the overall picture was 
one ,)f failure by the workers to l'esp"nd - wOl'kel's lacked the ,:onfiden,:e 
that their organisati,)ns w,)ul,j see the fight through' (66), It saw laCk 
Qf Ql',~anisation as the key to the ,:ampaign' 5 failul'e: 
I t is significant that the stoppage was most complete wherevel' 
organisation was best, " Slogans are Il,)t good enough, The ,)nly 
answer is to build the strength of the people on sure 
foundations to organise the workel's to give them machinery in 
which they have c'Jnf idence, (67) 
This was true but did nQt address the fact was that the existing 
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structures of trace union organisation in Congress had been overridden 
in the course of the campaign. The banned trade union offical and 
Communist Party member. Dan Tloome, also argued that for mass action to 
succeed strong trade union organisation was essential. blaming the ANC 
for its failure to understand the importance of trade unions. He also 
criticised the contusion of issues behind the strike: 
The average African ... had been told that the intention was to 
dissuade White voters from electi~g another Nationalist 
Government; he had been told that the struggle was for £1 a day; 
he had been t.:.l,j tr,at the .jenK,nstration was an anti-apartheid 
one. No ,joub t he supp'J l' ted eac h spe,: i f i.: issue, bu t the t l' i 1 o'~y 
of pleas was tell) c,)mplex. (6E:) 
Tl,)ome s~.w the slcJl~al1 'Defeat the Nats' as 'Wl',)ng an,j misleading' sin,:e 
'tr,e s l,),~an led a c,)nsiderable sec ti,)n ,:.f the pe':.ple te, bel ieve that the 
C,)ngresses wel'e in fav,)ur ,:.f the lJni te,j Party c,:.min';J into p,)wer, as a 
party capable of solving our problems' (69). This critique of the aims 
of the strike was echoed by the Durban trade unionist, Roley Arenstein, 
who argued that 'black workers did not identify with the call' since the 
ele,:tions were' t,),) l'emote a f a': t')l' fl")m theil' daily lives' (70). 
Trotskyi te let t-wingers in C,)ngress, centered ar,)und the j,)urnal 
~nalysis, drew a deeper ,:la5s analysis I)t the issues behinl:1 the election 
campaign's failure. They did not disagree with the slogan 'Nats Out' but 
ar,~ued that 'to leave the slogan at that is t,) say the lJni ted Party must 
,~,)vern'. I t was not enough to hope that the lJni ted Party would 'show 
some sensitivity to democratic opinion at home and abroad': nor was it 
enougn to blame the PAC for dIsunity, especlally as 'far too manv of the 
leaders (of Congress) stOOD to emplov the same methods', For them the 
funaamental pOint was that 'until a working force emerges on its own 
platform and with its own orogramme, Congress will continue to witness 
this set ot struggles for leadership', The Workers Conference brought in 
thousands of workers wno were not organised in trade unions but who 
5Uopol'te,j Con';lress: 1 thi·:; strenqtt-Ienin~::} was to be welc':lme,j but it was 
the shift of leadership out of the hanas of workers' representatives to 
the all-class leadership of Congress that made us uneasy', Why was so 
ft"Iuch effl)rt put inti) the ele,:tol'al Ijefeat I)f tt-Ie Natil)nalists when New 
Age ,jel: lared tt-wee times tt-Iat thel'e was nlJ ,:han,:e ,)f gettin,;,j the IJni ted 
Pal'ty in? Why in the ml)nth between the ':0.11 fl:,I' a stay-away at the 
Workers ' Conference and the election did Congress tarry while the state 
prepared? In the Transvaal it took eleven days before any steps were 
taken; then the fOUl'-perscln organisinl;l I: l)rJ"lmi ttee never functioned; 
attempts at organisation in Sophiatown and elsewhere were delayed; then 
Lutuli wrote in New Iolge that every individual sh.)uld del:ide f,)r himself 
anlj each al'ea to de.:ide fell' itself whether to 1;)0 t,) wl)rk. (70) 
Re.:allin.;) the 1:1' i tique he am.)ng I)thel's p,)sed in l-ll1alysis three years 
before, Baruch Hirson argued as follows: 
The leadership of Congress had transferred an essentially 
work ing dass .:ampaign into a broalj poli ti,:al front and placed 
at the fore a false slogan which related to the coming general 
election ... We cannot say definitely that the ,:ampaign would 
have succeeded but there could have been a greater response if 
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the slogan had been confined to '£1 a day' - a slogan which had 
the support of the entire urban working Class, It could have 
been more successful if the trade union movement had been the 
centre of the campaign and if the appeal had been directed 
mainly to the industrial workers", Whereas an econOMiC struggle 
can get a response when the demand has the support of workers, a 
political strike, directed at affecting an all-white election, 
cannot get the response that was needed to keep the worker at 
t-ll~rlle, ' (72) 
His was a penetrating critique but characterised by the same tendency to 
syndicalism that had been present in the Progressive Trade Union Group 
in the 1'3405. The sub,jrdinati,:,n c,f the econ.::>mi,: Ijeman·js .jf the w,:.\'ke\'s 
to the political orientation of Congress was one aspect of the problem, 
but black workers had shown their willingness to fight over political 
issues. The 1957 stay-at-home had been called on the basis of political 
CI.S well as e.:on'~mil: demam:is and had w·~n a lart;le l'eSD'jnse. A signi f i.:ant 
numbel' of black wOl'kers did respond to the strike call over the election 
despite all the confusion. All this did not indicate an inability on the 
part 'Jf blad workers t'J identify with p.::>litical issues beyond the 
w.::>rkplace. The p".~blem lay n.::>t just in the subor.jination Ijf e.:.::>n.::>mics t.:> 
politics but in the substance of the politics which prevailed. In a 
later article Hirson developed his anti-parliamentarism writing that: 
The African could not be .:a11ed up.::>n t.::> intervene in 
parliamental'Y affairs which did not affe.:t him appreo:iably, The 
AfI'io:an is fa,' too wa,'y t.::> enter battle when victory can only 
lead t.j a Uni ted Party victory, Verwoed must ';J.j - but not in 
.:arder to be \"epla.:ed by G,'aat,.. The At r ican people are not 
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only respond to bread-ana-butter politics but that he can see 
little reason for intervening where little or nothing can be 
achieved and when the methodS proposed are suspect, (73) 
Congress was right, however, that the afr1cans did have an interest even 
in the replacement of Verwoed by Graaf, if only to weaken the political 
base of the apartheid state, 
election but it lay rather in the form of intervention which Congress 
adopted, hleeding t,j harness the e.:onomi,: demands ,jf workel's t.) a 
pljl i tical pr,j.~ramme fiji' demo':I'ati,: ,:hange, it instea.j justi f ie,j the 
subordination of working class struggle to the need it felt not to 
alienate middle class opinion, Analysis put the issue succinctly: 'in 
S.)uth (4fl'i':ci, where the non-white mi,j.jle class 1S s.) weak, we ,:an see n,:, 
reaSIJn f'Jr makin';:j so many ':'In,:essions t'J their ide.jlo.;:}y, C,)n';JI'ess in ,jUI' 
.'pini'Jn must fI).jve over to the left and the w':lr~:in.~ ,:lass must emel'ge as 
a class f,)rl:e t,) lead the stl'u';Jgle' (74), The question whi,:h I'emained 
entirely unresljlved by these ':I'iti.:isms, h,)wever, was what ,:on,:retely 
was meant by CIJngress 1 mov i ng tlJ the lef t' and by the work i n9 I: lass 
emer9inl~ as 1 a class f'jrce to lealj the struggle', We shall see very 
different answers put forward, 
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Gender, class and naiionalis. 
It was not only In relation to traae unionism that the class perspective 
of Congress was eviaenced, Black women were largely aosent from trade 
unions but nonetheless played a vital role in building the workIng class 
movement in the latter nali of tne 19505, The focus of women's protest 
was agaInst the pass laws and in particular their extension to afrlcan 
I/Jljflleii. F01' afl'i,:an women despel'ate to:. eSI:ape tl'I::om l'ul'al imp,:ovel'isi""tment 
and to make a living in the towns, the extension of the pass laws soelt 
disaster, The impetus behind theil' ':often hel'I::oic l'esistance came fl'ljfl"l 
below and much of it occul'l'ed without any fOl'mal political organisation, 
It w;o.s '~uppljl'ted by the two w,)men's 1)I'ganisati1jns within Cljnl~l'ess! the 
ANC Women's Leaque an.j the Fedel'ati.:on ,:of S.:outrl Afri.:an W')men., anlj t.y trle 
Congress leadel'ship itself, though they related to it in ditfel'ent and 
.:onf 1 i.:ting ways, The I'ealjiness Ijf the Fedel'ation and t,:, a lessel' e;(tent 
the I,oJI)men ' s League t.::o l'esp'::ond t,) the fIli li tanl:y Ijf the movement from 
below met with a mClj'e cautious and ,:c,"servati ve approach f I'om the 
Congress leadership. Until 1958, while the militancy of african women 
was higrl, the ini tiati ve lay with the Federation anlj its approach tl:O the 
women's anti-pass .:ampail;jn, After 1958, as the tide ,:of rt,Uitanl:y within 
the anti-pass caMpaign began to ebb, the ini tiative was transferre,j to 
Congress. 
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In 1955 Black Sash, a radical ~hite women's organisation, held vigils 
outside the Union buildings in Pretoria in cefence of the constitution, 
Soon after the Federatlon, responding to the intensiflcatlon of pass ana 
permit raids on the Rand, ~)bilised 2000 women in an illegal rally in 
the heart of white Pretoria, Petitions were signed on a wide range of 
issues from forcea removals to ghetto housing, Bantu education, black 
poverty and passes, emphasising the responsibility whicn society placed 
upon women: 'we have not come here to beg or to plead but to ask for 
We soeak from our nearts as mothers, as women' (75), Shortly before the 
demonstration, the government announced its Intention to issue women 
with 'reference books', starting with women in the rural areas and small 
towns, At the first place to be visited, Winburg, the centre of the 1913 
Free State anti-pass resistance, nearly 1500 women were induced to take 
out trle new I'ef el'en.:e bCn:lkS befm'e l.xal wClmen l'equeste.j help f l'c.m the 
ANC, When Lilian Ngoyi visited the town, she found women l'eady to turn 
to ': i vii .jis.)bedience an.j pass-bul'nin.~ in the tradi tic," .:.r the w.)meI1' 5 
pNtests .)f 1913 (76), Against ANC a.jvice, women a.:tivists c.:.llecte.j 
their newly issued passes, marched with them to the magistrate's office 
and publicly burnt them, 
Winburg al:ted as a spark f,)1' ,,,any other areas, In the ne>c:t six months, 
durinl~ whil:h time n,) more passes were issue.j t,) w.)men, the Federation 
and the Women's League organised hundre,js I)f local rt,arl:hes, peti ticns 
and protests, particulal'ly in the East Rand whel'e municipalities were 
contNlling the presence of african women thr,::>ugh residen.:e permits, 360 
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african domestIc workers. for Instance. threatened bv new regulations 
prohibiting flat cleaners and servants from living in. marched in 
protest, The authorities used increasingly intimidatory tactics to 
impose the passes: threatening husbands whose wives refused the passes 
wi th loss (If j(lt,s, Ijenyin:;1 penSI.:ons or' medi,:al treatlnent to wo:ort".en 
without reference book numbers, using employers to register their female 
It is an interesting comment on South African i legality' that at this 
time the carrying (If passes by african women was not yet legally 
mandatory, The police violently dispersed demonstrations with baton 
charges. severe penalties were imposed under the Criminal Law Amendment 
A,:t .)n women wh,) bUI'nt theil' passes. tWQ w';)men in Li,:htenbul";! .jied in a 
fight with the police, In Standerton. on the arl'ival (If the mobile unit 
issuin.;! passes, the entil'e lQcatiml, men an,j WQmell, stayed away fl";)1l"l 
w.::ork and t.uses wel'J:? b,:.ycotted, W'jmen mal'.:he.j in gl"Jups of ei,;!ht t" the 
ma,;!istl'ate's office: aftel' the fil'st qrQup was detained, hUll,jl'eds mOI'e 
.jeman,jed t.:, be arreste.j, Eventually trley were ,:lI'iven away by i. baton 
.:hal";je and 914 were ,:hal";jed ("77), By the end ,:of the yea I', s,)me of the 
Fedel'ation' s main lea.jers were al'rested and .:har';je,:! wi th treason 
a10ngsi.je .)ther C,)ngress a.:tivists, 
The we/men's anti-pass movement linked up c.r';janically wi th the growth of 
rural resistan.:e in the I'eserves, The most important instance occUI'red 
when in March 1957 the mobile pass unit arrived in the small town of 
Zeerust in the Transvaal, Its boycott by n\ost of the WI)men in the town -
out of 4000 women in the village only 76 took passes (78) - met with the 
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sympathy of the local Chief of the 8atarutsne people in the area. When 
the Chief was deposed by government officials and replaced wIth a 
stooge, news soon spread to the Batarutshe migrants in the urban areas 
of Witwatersrand who sent two delegations, one of men and one of women, 
back to Zeerust. A boycott of the local school and trader immediately 
followed the delegation of women. A people's trial of the men who had in 
1952 made ,:offlplaints B';lainst the now-dep,)se.j chief fc,llc'wed the men'·; 
delegation. The accusea men were reportedly beaten and sentenced to 
death before beIng saved by the police. Thereafter the houses of those 
seen as collaborators were burnt in revenge for extreme police violence. 
Official retribution centered around terror raids by the Police Mobile 
C,:;,lumn bl.Jt als,) inelulje,j the trials of rl)any women pass I'esisters (most 
,:of wh,:oril were acqui tted be,:ause it was not yet i lle9al fe,l' w,:;,men t,) carry 
a pass) and a,jministl'ative punishments, In their hundl'eds, w';)men sh,:owe,j 
the power of cCIllel:tive .:ivil ,jisobiO!diiO!nciO! a.s tt"Iey burnt theil' passiO!s 
and presented themselves for arrest by the police. James Fairburn wrote 
at the time tr,at it was 'almc,st imp.;)ssible t,;) find a 8afurutshiO! WI)man 
p,;)sses:;in'~ a pass, I)utsio:le of those working on White farms and th,;)se 
living in Zeerust's location. As a direct result of the struggle against 
passes, evel'ything CI)nnec ted wi th the G,:>vernment has be,:,)me sus pee t anlj 
is resisted' (79). As the state-app':>inted ',:hiefs' and the police 
intensifielj theil' reil;;Jn of tel'r':>I', a virtual ,:ivil wal' bl'oke out in the 
reserve, leading t,) a breakdown in the flimsy economy of the area and 
the flight I)f thousan,::ls to Bechuanaland until the I'evol t was queUed. 
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The Native Affalrs 0epartment Commisslon oranaed the ANC as the root 
cause of the trlbe's troubles and called for its banning, In the main, 
however, the ANC was not involved, Mary Benson commented that it was 'a 
weakness of the ANC tnat it seldom rushed representatives to these rural 
areas at the first sign of discontent, The people had suffered to the 
point where they could bear no more, But they nad no organlsatlon' (80), 
James Fairburn, a radical journalist of the time, had some equally 
critical observations on the role of the ANC: 
Far trom gIVIng a lead to tne Baturutshe, the African National 
Congress has lagged behind them so pathetically that even today 
it rlas no real clrl:;J.misatiljn in the Reserve. Individual merfloers 
of the 8afurutshe Association (migrants in the townships) are of 
Cljurse vel'y of ten alslj members of the ANCI but thei I' pl'imary 
rllcltivati.)n has tleen the protel:tll)n 1:lf their wl)menfcllk and 
l' am il i es bad: h.jr'-Ie i n the Rese I've. I t shlju 1 d pe r haps nl) t be 
surprising if latterly the desire for revenge had entered into 
theil' al:tivities. It shoullj \1ljt be trlought that events in trle 
Afl'ica, as .: lose parallels I:an be l~ive\1 throughout the country, 
nljt only fljr the spontaneous anlj deep resistance Ijf Afril:an 
wonten to the al:ceptanl:e Ijf passes but to the reacti':ln I:lf tribes 
to attempts tlj move them frljfl\ their land and depose their 
Chiefs ... Much will depend on the el<tent to which the Baful'utse 
will wish or be able to link thei I' strug.~le with the wider one 
... fijI' on theil' ()wn they will SOI)n be crushed by the state and 
i rreparabl y I:onsumed by civil war. When a nai led boot descends 
on small pebbles. they dl:> not shol:;)t upwar.j but I~l'ind against one 
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seven months of 1957, the Federation estimated that around 50,000 women 
took part In 38 aemonstrations against pass laws in 30 different 
centre5, The key question facing the national liberation movement was 
how to relate to the explosive energies released by women; the key 
question faclng the women was how to win national support before the 
nailed boot of tne state crushed them, 
It was in trle .:':jUI'se of these developments that .jisaql'eement bN)ke c.ut 
between the W.:.men' ';:; Fe.jerati':Jn and trle ANC, The tensicln .:ame tc. a head 
in trle Johannesbur.~ anti-pass OI"Jtests of 195:::, 8y this time the 
government had succeeded in issuing a million pass books to african 
women, mainly in trle rt.II'al al'eas, The aci.j test came when the ';:!')Vel'l1riiel,t 
s ta r ted t.:. tak e 'XI women i 11 the 1 a I' '.~e t.:.wns a Ii·j .: i ties, I t .j i .j th i s 
(jol i'Juel y at f i rsi, by mak in';;I l'egistl~atia:,1n as a nUI'se deoendent ':)11 
haviliq a pass, Then it strud: against ·j·:.mesti.: w'Jrkel~s, always a 
vulnerable group, telling white householders to insure that their 
domestic servants became registered, In most of the major towns there 
was little resistance, but in Johannesburg a largely grass-roots 
campai.~n .)f Il\ass c ivi 1 dis.jbedience br.jKe out, with several thousands .:.f 
w.jmen del iberately .:.jul'ting al'rest and charge under the Cr iMinal Laws 
Amendment A.:t. A.:tive support was given by the Federation of S'Jutrl 
African WOMen, who argued for the enlargeMent of the .:aMpaign and the 
non-payment of fines and bail in order to clog up the judicial systerl'l. 
Tne Congress leadership, however, overruled the Federation saying that 
oaii was to be paId and no more volunteers to De sought, They argued 
that it was placing a large financial burden on Congress to bail women 
out of gaol, particularly as their finances were stretched already by 
the defence costs incurred in the long drawn out Treason Trial, The 
Women's Federation responded with irony that it was not the arrested 
women who wished to be bailed out but their husbands who were 
unilaterally bailing them out since they could not coce at home alonai 
Beneath the rhetorIC the ANC stressed that the anti-pass campaign was 
under their direction, not that of the women, and that it was not 
obliged to consult with the Federation or any other body 'on each and 
every aspect', a position accepted by the Federation women, A mass 
demonstration in Johannesburg planned by the Federation was cancelled by 
Congress and in its place a • parade' of about three or four thousand 
took place, Congress enJoined education and organisation rather than 
confrontation, At this moment, when there was a lull in the momentum of 
the anti-pass campai,.:;!n, the ANC deci,jed that 'the first phase had ended' 
and called it off, 
The l'ights and wrongs .)f trtis dec ision wel~e strongly debated at the time 
and have I'emained the Qbje.:t Qf confli.:tin.;} assessments in I~e.:ent 
.:ommentaries, The JOi'1t E~:e.:utives .:of the W':>fI\en' s League and the 
Federation expresse.j their regret at the ANC' s .jecisb:>n • f.,r there had 
been encouraging signs that had a lead been given f.:or further 
demonstrations. " it would have been f.,llowed, Nevertheless the 
autho,' i ty Clf the ANC was regarded .s supreme' (82), Perhaps it was 
better. as Heien Joseph - herself a leading member of the Federation 
has argued, to call off the civil disobedience at its height than to 
allow it to f1zzle out siowly, In ner historv of the movement Julie 
WellS has supported this view, arguing that 'the Federation of South 
'S8 but found the interest waning somewhat' (83), Anotner commentator, 
spontaneous sociai movement loses its momentum it is easy to blame the 
leadersnip for an occurrence the roots of which lie aeeper: 
Whilst the temptation 01 blaming the untimely criticism of the 
ANC as hc..Ylng been the cause I)f the del: line .. this a"gwl\ent does 
realistiC analysis WhlCh would have better prepared them for the 
future. (:::4) 
The decision of Congress to call off the 'first stage' of the anti-pass 
,:an\paign inti) its prl)mised secl)n.j stage, Thus in 1959 the FSAW' s rep,)rt 
,:oncluded that I the Federation awaits direl:tic,n f"I)ffi the ANC as to the 
course which the anti-pass campaign wi II f,)llow and requests that this 
direction may be given in the very near future.,. Women await with 
impatience the active entry of men into the anti-pass campaign', EchOing 
this p.Jsi tion Cheryl Walker has al'gued that 1 it was essential for the 
-::::::::4-
ANC to follow up on the women's campaIgn. Having suomitted to the ANC's 
authority. the women were entitled to expect that the particlpation ot 
tne men in the rest of the campaign would be active. In this tney were 
disappointed' (85). This request was repeated tne following year in 1959, 
out in the Federation's view was never answered. The ANC designated 1959 
'the greatest anti-pass year ever' and planned a series of 
demonstrations for which the Federation offered its support. Most 
commentators agree. though, with the spirit of the Women's Leaque's 
critique that 'it seems that the campaign against passes is being 
ignored because very little has been done to intensify the campaians' 
(86). With the calling off of the Johannesburg campaign, the 
Federation's anti-pass activity vrtually ground to a halt. 
In explaining these events, Cheryl Walker has emphasised the question of 
patriarchy within the ANC. She has documented the reluctance of men 
within the ANC to support political participation by women and the 
grud.;!ing way in whi.:h ANC men s.jmetimes suppol'ted the ,:ampaign against 
passes (87). Walke,' qU'jte,j one speakeI' at an ANC anti-pass meetin'~ as 
saying f'Jr instance that 'the .;:}.jvernment cann'jt '~ive Y'Jur woman pass if 
you do n.:>t want t'J, be,:ause the woman she is u\,del' the ':'Jntrol of a man' 
(88). While patrial',:halisM was d.:)ubtless pl'esent within Cangl'ess 
,:ir.:1es, the ,)verall pi.:tul'e was m,)re ,:')ntrad i.: t')I'Y. At the same time as 
the C,:mgress leadership S'JU9ht to use its auth.::>l' i ty t,) subol'di na te the 
women's organisati.)ns. it was involved in the w.)men's .:ampaigns thl'ough 
its affiliated women's organisati,)ns, it endc,rsed their c,:>ntributian to 
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the natIonal struggle and openea its own ranks to more involvement by 
In spite of the differences the women's organisations had with Congress. 
they accepted i~s autnority and shared many of its Ideas, inCluding its 
commitment to non-vlolence and the primacy of the natlonal struggle, 
The Federation believed that It could not and should not go outside the 
Congress as a separate women's movement and was reaay to subordinate 
itseLf whenever a serlOUS difference of opinion emerged, The reason 
offeree by Cheryl Walker for this was that the women's campaigns never 
.jver.:ame theil' secti.)nal Chal"ji.:ter and I:.)uld nQt I)f themselves I:Qnstl"UI:t 
an alternative focus of leadership to that of Congress, In Walker's 
words, they 1 related to the eradication of specific abuses rather than 
f ('l"m 1 ng par t c.f a cot-Ier-ent, l,jn'~ term stratel~y f CIl" pl)l it il:al I:rlange, I 
(89), The political reason which Walker does not pursue, was that for 
the Communist Party women who played a leading role in the Federation, 
party discipline came befQre what they themselves perceived as the needs 
of the struggle, Accordingly they took the road not of general ising the 
lessons elf the WI)men l s struggles l)utwal'lj into the I iberatil)n ml)vement as 
a whole. but rather ,)f subsumin';l the WI)men l s stru'ilgles to the national 
policy of Congress, The Women's Federation withdrew from its mass civil 
disobedience carnpaign in 1958 fl)r the saine l'easons that SACTl) wi th,jl'ew 
f"'Jm its week-lol1g stay-away that same yeal': because the uni ted fl'ont 
stl'ategy pursued by Congress was tl) restrain such fl)rms I)f worker 
mili tancy and bel:ause leaders in the Federation just as in SACTU 
recognised the ul timate authori ty ,:,.f Congress. As a result african women 
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on tne ground were left without a nationallY based organIsation to back 
them, Writing in 1958. Helen Joseph spelt out what she saw as the 
POlitical importance of women in the wider struggle: 
The 1'8si,:;tan,:e ,:,f women", is nljt is,:,late,j fr'::om the stl'u';J'~le c,f 
the Af I' ican ~,e,:,ple a~::lalnst the whcole pass systerfl and d"teap 
labour policy, 'foday It is the women who are in the forefront of 
that struggle, .. In this vast, unmeasured and vet inadequately 
ol'ganised potential ,.:of the l'eSistalKe of w,:.men to pa';ses, ites 
':'ne of tt"n? snal'~,est weapons a';lainst, ,. aoal'tt"tei,j, And 1 t is not 
to:u:o l. a te, ('30) 
The inability of Congress to realise this potential was due not only to 
the patrial'chal relation of men to women but equally to the class 
relati'Jn ,:of C'Jngl'ess t,:o the masses, This only t,e,:mt)es evident when the 
women's question is seen in its lal'gel' political context, 
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COIMKmi ty and class 
Ana1.:II;!':)U":; issues were l'aised by the relation .:of (:.:.nl;lress t.:) trle 
community struggles waged in the black townships on issues of social 
c.:onsurflption and in particulal' the bus tIlJy.:.:otts !iK·unted in ':)pp'Jsi ti.Jn t'J 
fal'e incl'eases. The bus boY':otts had a p'Jli tical si';jnifi,:an.:e beY'J\1.j 
their original targets. for what was at issue was not simply opposition 
to fare increases. in which respect some of the boycotts were 
su,:,:essful, but the bui Idin';j ,:of in1jependent c.:ommulli ty ':organisati,:,lts an.j 
the winning of real municipal reforms. For black workers forced to live 
in tow\1ships away frl:om the industrial and ':'Jmme",:ial areas, transport 
was .:of ten trle second bi.:J.:Jest part ·:or between 25% and 40% ,::>f thei,' 
domestic budget. Any fare increase was deeply felt by workers. Buses 
were overcrowded. badly ventilated and insufficient in number. For black 
wal;:Je w.:orkel's and the urban p,::>o", like the washel'wl:omen deliverill9 thei!' 
bundles IJf washing t,::> the n.::>rthel'n suburbs .:of J'Jhannesbur';j. thei,' 
w.:orkin,;! day include.j trn" diffi.:ult and e~:pensive journey to and from 
work. In Alexandra m.::>st workers spent over three hours a day commuting. 
The issue which t"i';lgered the boycotts was eo:onomi.:, a rise in fares, 
but the ramifications were political. 
In Evaton the movement was said to be '95% successful' (91) in trle 
support it received from the workers who used the bus for the thirty 
mile journey to Johannesburg. Picketing was aggressive, including 
assaul ts on would-be passengers and bus c,;:,mpaI1Y employees and the 
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bUi'nin,.:::! ':,' buses, O\'qanisati,:m thl',)u';jh tt-Ie Evat,)n PeQPle' 5 Tl'ansp,)\'t 
(Ijunl: i 1 (EPTC) was oaselj .jn week 1 y mass meeti nl;ls which detel'rl\i ned the 
polil:ies of the bljycljtt anlj the r",")vement was ovel'whell'l'linl;lly w')I'kin';J 
,:lass witrl the F'l',jperty Owne,'s Asscll:iation n'jt beino;l includelj Ijn the 
(,jU\'C i 1. The ,jeman,js put ,jn the pl'i vate bus ':Ijmpal'y i \1': luded \1'jt Ijn1 y a 
revel'si'j\1 tlj the clld fapes but a number ojf 'jther demands ':I)nl:ernino;:J the 
natul'e of the service provujel:!: bus shel ters, afri,:an inspe,:t,)\,S, a 
timetable t,j be drawn up by the EPT(, an unde,'tak in';I by tt-Ie bus c,jmpa\1Y 
not to raise fares without consultatiQn with the EPTC at the pain of a 
£500 fine, concessionary rates for students, a bus depot within the 
tQwnship and S,) ,)n, When the b')y(,)tt movement gained a ':I)n,:essi,)n by the 
bus I:ompany on the fares issue, it rlel,:I ,jut until it also w,)n many of 
its ,)ther demands, th,)ugh it was n,)t su':cessful in its opp,)si tion t,) the 
renewal of the bus company"s licence nor in its bid to set up its own 
transpo,"t (,j-operative, 
In Evaton the b,)ycott movement was fraught with intra-community 
fighting. as vigilantes known as the 'Russians' and d,"awn from the 
'blanketed' Basotho migrants were used by the authorities physically to 
attack and kill the boycott supporters, A vigorous defence was mounted 
against the vigilantes with a number of killings on both sides, The EPTC 
placed demands on the state that vigilantes be arrested, disarmed and 
endorsed out of the area, but without success, With little state 
administration or provision of services in the town, the boycott 
movement had behind it a tradition of smaller bus boycotts in the 1950s 
and a political tradition dating back to the 1940. in which demands for 
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some kin.j of !o.:al self-.;}.::>vernmel1t ha.j been put. These p.::>liti.:al .jeman.js 
were 11.:.t, howevel', pursued ill the .:.jurse .:of the b':>y.:.:ott and af tel" the 
b'JV':'Jtt .:ampai,;}n was over the state impl:osed its own full gamut 1)1' 
fflunE ipal re';lulatiO:1ns .:on Evaton. N.::> lastinq ':.Jmmuni ty ol'ganisati lJn was 
cOl1s.)lidated and the b.:oyc.::>tt l'emained lal,.~ely is.::>lated within Evat'Jn. 
not least be.:ause the I.J.:al leadership was Afrio:anist in orientati,:,n and 
at I).j.js with the ANC establ ishment, whi.:h • ha.j n.:othil1';} to .j.::> wi th tt-Ie 
boycott and took very little part in it· (92). 
The political situation in Alexandra in 1957 was different. An attempt 
in 1957 by the PUTCO bus .:ompany t'J raise the bus f al'e to J.::>hannesburg 
by .:one penny led t.) a three month boy.:.::>tt .:of the buses, wi th w.::>rkel"s 
walk in.;} c.r tak ing al ternative tl"ansport for the eighteen mi les to an.j 
fr.Jm J.Jhannesburg, c'Jinin.~ the sl'Jgan 'Azikhwelwa' or 'we do not ride'. 
The b.:oyc.)tt soon e~<:tended to other areas of J'Jhannesbur';I and P,'etor ia 
and sympathy boy.:,:>tts t.jok pla,:e in Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth. One 
participant who has written on the boycott, Dan Mokonyane, was probably 
not exaggerating when he said that at its peak the boycott movement 
involved nearly 300,000 people (93). A broad organising committee was 
set up to direct the boycott. Known as the Alexandra People's Transport 
Committee (APTC). it comprised a number of different political groups: a 
'standholders association' which represented property owners in 
Alexandra; the official ANC which constituted the largest single group 
in the committee and had recently divested itself of its former bUSiness 
leadership: two ANC splinter groups - the Africanists under Madzunya 
(who Wlj" the loca.l ANC elections) and the conservative National Minded 
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Bloc; and the Movement for Democracy of Content (MDC) which was 
comprised of a small group of radical intellectuals (including 
Mokonyane), The Society of Young Africa (SOYA), the youth wing of the 
Unity Movement, was invited to join the committee but declined, 
Mokonyane reports that the joke went round that SOYA 'which always 
pread'"It?d the b,::.ycott weapon, " b.;;,y.:.::.tted evel'ythin,~ in.: ludin,~ the bus 
boycott' (94), The APTC reported back to mass meetings in the community 
evincing a notable degree of democratic accountability, The high levei 
of community organisation generated by the boycott was indicated, 
i'efusal .::.f the people to be dl'awn int.;;, stm1ing the buses and the unusual 
presence of whites in the township until midnight, 
The situation facelj t.y the I:.:>rllrilittee was ,:>ne .::.f 1:I:>nsiljerable p,:>lice 
I'!?pressi,:,n and staund-, ':>pposi tion from I:el'tain secticlns I:>f business an.j 
IJ()vernment. NI:>netheless it .1151:> won SUbstantial SUPPOI't f I'om 1 ibel'als 
within the white,:,:>mmunity and a willingness tl:> real:h some fl:>rm of 
compN)mise on the pal't ,:>f the Johannesburg Chambel' of Commerce and some 
le,cal p,:>li tic ians. As exhausti,jn f rom the long boycott set in, pol i tical 
divisions grew shal'per wi thin the organising committee. When PUTeO and 
the national government threatened withdrawal of the bus service in 
Alexandra altogether, pressure to reach a compromise settlement grew 
stronger, actively encouraged by the Liberal Party, 
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The role played by the ANC in these circumstances was controversial, 
BarUCh Hirson has argued that they were out of touch with the new 
militancy which was rocklng the area: 
At a very early stage the ANC pressed for negotiations and an 
ear I y end to the b.:.y.:ott, !::.j eao;Jer were trley tc •• :.jmpromise that 
they supporte.j the bus company's ph.jney soluti.:m .jf payin.;! trle 
full fare and later refunding the extra penny, This was 
indignantly rejected by a mass meeting in the township and the 
leadership passed to a small group of militants", The ANC were 
unab 1 e t.) l'espclI1d t.j the new mil i tal'c y' , (95) 
Lutul i a.:.:epted the I imi te.j r.jle played by the ANC in .jrganisin.;} trle 
boycott, saying that 'the boycott was essentially a movement of the 
commc.n people' and that 'the ANC had no part in .jrganising it' (96), He 
agl'ee.j trlat the Con';Jl'ess o:mly ,:ame in when the Chambel' .jf Comrner.:e 
offered an 'honourable conclusion' to the boycott: 
The difficulty was that the boycott was such an unqualified 
succeiiS that many pe,jple wanted tc, e~:tend it whether 01' not the 
boycotters' deman.js were met, To us it seemed that if the 
declared objective could be attained, the b,jy,:ott should cease, 
We were very much awal'e of the hardship of rank-and-f ile 
boycotters and awal'e too that if opinion becaflle divided the 
whole boycott might fizzle ,jut and the Government intention 
ultimately triumph. FIJI' these reasons we threw the weight of ,;:lUI' 
argument in on the side of tel'fllinating the boycott if the 
initial demands of the people were met. Then is an end to 
endurance, This isa reality which wiiie leadership mUiit take 
into account, In the event the demands were met completely. ,. 
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We did, however, have to endure some stiff criticism from the 
'dierlal'ds' , ('37) 
There was also criticism from the Communist Party, as when Michael 
Harmel attacked the 'marked failure of '" Congress to give positive 
leadership to the peopie of Alexandra' (98), He does not, however, appear 
to have offered any alternative strategy, 
Among the 'diehards' the most articulate was Dan Mokonyane, whose Ditter 
denundati':.n c,f the ANC' s Nle is wl'i ttel' up i Ii L~ssol1s of Azikhw~lwa, 
Rejection of the ANC by its Africanist wing and the subsequent formation 
of the PAC were heavily influenced by the perceived failure of the ANC 
in this situation, Under the slogan of 'rainy Monday' Mokonyane's MOC 
wi th the supp,:.rt ,:,f the Af r i':anists propogated a hK.ve t,:> e}(tend the bus 
b,:>yc1:>tt int.:;) a stay-away anlj 1 ink up with the £1 day ,:ampai';jn bein';j 
initiated by SACTU. The ANC after some confusion and division rejected 
these .:alls on the ';Jl'.:;)un.j, a':I:I)rdinl~ t.) M.:;)k.)nyane, that I we cannot an.j 
... must not .:a11 f.:.r a strike, because we wel'e nl:>t a trade uni,:;)n' (99), 
Instead, under pl'eSSUl'e fl'l)m the stall-holders, Wl-IO had n\ade theil' I)wn 
secret deal with PUTCO, and fr.)m Liberals who urged a setttlement, the 
ANC played an intel'medial'Y role. When a compromise deal was a.~ain 
offered, ANC pamphlets declared it a victory and told people they should 
ride the buses, even though the proposals were l'eje.:ted at the mass 
meetings IJf the ol'ganising .:ommittee. F,)ll.)wing on from this initiative, 
the boycott crumbled. Mok,:>nyane c lain\s that su.:h was the ul1populal'i ty of 
Congress at this point that it could not .)rganise a meeting in Alexandra 
1 because .)f their recent treachery' (101) 
The case against the settlement put by Mokonyane and the ANC's critics 
was first, that the offer was temporary with no guarantee of future 
Tun,jin9; sec I::.nlj , tl-Ie p,::.pular meeti.nq·; at whid"1 the .:.::.mpl'omise rlalj t.een 
discussed firmly rejected them; third, the demands of the mass meeting 
that PUTCO shl:luld pay .:,::.mpen·;;ati.::.n f':'l' the al'l'ests and deaths that ha.j 
occurred as a result of police action during the boycott were not met; 
and finally that the deal was applicable to JohannesDurg routes only and 
offered nothing to the bus boycotters in Pretoria. who pursued their 
boycott well into 1958, Over and above the details of thi.s critique, 
h,:,wever .. were deepel' differenl:es ':Ivel' strategy, The 'Ijierlal',js' saw the 
ANC as selling out through its decision to call the boycott off, the 
unljemlxl'atic mannel' in which its decisil:>n was taken anlj its refusal tl::' 
extend the boycott, Mokonyane and the Africanists drew the lesson that 
trle pi:> I i til:al leadel'ship pl',::.vide,j by the ANC was ina,jequate tl:> the tasks 
it f acelj and had tl:> be l'epla,:e,j, They attl'ibutelj the pl'oblem tQ the 
subordination of spontaneity to planning, afl'ican nationalism to white 
1 ibel'alism anlj mass ml li tal1l:y tl) c,)nservative leadel's, Cl' i tical of what 
they saw as the ANC's alienation from the masses .. they clffered in its 
place an idealisation of mass african spontaneity, In reality mass 
militancy and extreme african natil:>nalism had their lil'l\its, There I'l\ust 
have been a genuine risk of the b':ly':Qtt collapsin,~ if it had been 
pursue,j further, The spontaneism al,d nationalism of trle I diehards I did 
nl:lt provide an answer tl) these problems, 
The b'Jycott revealed in the words of Ruth First that I Africans in the 
towns are industrialised, settled, poli ti,:ally aware individualsi, 
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Congress was able to taD its political potential. As the Alexandra 
boycott drew to a Close, nearby 1n the Western Areas of Johannesourg 
there were ffiass protests against the introduction of perffiits designed to 
stop people entering the township and a large ffiarch of over 30,000 
peQple in what the New i4ge descl'ibed as alrll.)st a '.~enel'al stl'ike' (whi.:h 
accQraing to Mokonyane senior ANC men opposed). [n reply to moves from 
the left to extend the boycott into a general strike and to link UD wlth 
::;AcrU's tl'ade unl,:,n-based £1 a day minirt'luril l,I,Ia'.;le campai';jn , the ANC 
channeUe,j the enel'gies CIT trle b.:,ycc,tt flKJvement int.) its 1957 one .jay 
stay-at-home. In Mob)nyane' s viel,l,l this enabled the ANC t,) 'pick the 
fruit' of the struggle for itself l,I,Ihile its own credibility in Alexandra 
l,I,Ias 1':11,1,1. 
Tt-Ie ArK's alle.;led bet!'ayal of the mil i tants of Evaton and Ale)<:anljra 
follol,l,led the logic of its programme: to contain working class militancy 
within definite bounds f"r the sake ,:,f the 'anti-Nat' unite,j fl'ont, By 
the time ':If the 19,58 ele.:tion communi ty pI'otest in the black townships 
had subsided, The Afl'icanists blamed the decline of urban rnass milihnl:y 
on the ANC ' s leadership but the reverse was in fa.:t of greater weight, 
Rather than the ele.:t.:.ral strategy ':If Congress having de-rai led the 
workin.~ class movement, the weaknesses I:.f the working .:lass movell\ent 
allowed the electoral strategy of ~ongress to come to the fore in 1958, 
The idealist method of the left .:riti.:s of C.)n.~ress led them to see the 
fall in mass militancy as the effect of leadership but not to see the 
nature of leadership as the effect of the weak"ess of the maSSIiS, 
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cn iO 
The ~risis of political leadership 
~ united front policy 
Tt"le Kev t., unljerstanljinl~ C.::onl;!ress p.::ol il:Y in this peri.:uj lay in its quest t" 
l'e-C'JI1stru.: t what it .:alled a I uni ted front I i 11 opp':>si tion t" the 
Nati,:,nal ists. The theoretical basis IJf this strategy ""as spel t IJut by 
leadinl~ figures in the ANC and particularly in the C,)mmunist Party. Brian 
Bunting put the policy thus: 
In the struggle against the Nationalists a united front is 
absolutely necessary. For ""hat is the purpose of the united 
front? I t is the mobil isation I:>f the masses I:>f the people in 
active struggle against the apartheid tyranny. What do ""e mean by 
the masses .,f the people? In the first place all the mi 11 ions of 
Non-European oppressed ... Side by side with them we must aim to 
mobilise all other sactions of the people, European and Non-
European, who are prepared to for a variety of reasons to oppose 
particular aspects of the Nationalist policy ... The needs of tn. 
struggle demand the creation of the broadest unity among antl-
Nationalists, " Congressmen, Liberals, Labourites, Black Sash and 
others, (1) 
In an article entitled 'building a united front' Jo "at thaws, who hi ... lf 
joined the CoMMunist Party, wrote on siMilar lines: 
As tne Nationalist oooression becomes worse the call for a united 
front composed of all genuine opponents of aoartheld becomes ever 
flK'I'e Insistent. It is perfectlv natul'al trlat trlis srll:lul.j tie SQ" , 
The dictators of OUI' country are cQmpelled to threaten", all 
gl'QUPS except those of the very tiny mInority of monooQlist 
mining magnates, landlol'ds and industrialists", Under such 
conditions it become historically correct for the Progressive 
Movement to rally the peoDle on the widest PQssible basis to 
reslst and finally defeat the dictatorsnip, (2) 
An e
'
:3i tClrial in Ublil'ation Dl'esented the elel:til:>n strike as i. vindi,:ati,:>n 
of the united front strategy, since 'the only way to defeat the 
Nati.jnalists is by 'Jverwhelming and united pressure fl'om all ,jem,:>cl'ats in 
fav,:>ul' .:.f I'Cldical ele,:t':>I'a11'efol'm', It ':')n·:1uded that 'the C()ngrsss 
emer'Jed f ronl the election perio.j lIIi th immeasurably increased stature as the 
(1111 y .Jsnui ne .:>ppos it ieln' (:3), The C.)n.~ress the.) I' i sts al'gued that many 
whites, including secti.,ns "f capital, were beginning t·:> think tINice about 
the benefits of Nationalist rule, Sisulu for example INrote that 'there is 
n.) p,:>ssibi li ty .)f the National ists .~ro\l,ling stronger than they are at 
present, They have played all their .:ards ... in particular the Europeans .::>f 
the country are gradually beginning to see that South Africa has no choice 
but to follow the r.)ad to a multi-racial society. (4) 
Congress itself was depicted as a united front. but it was a~gued that in 
order to make the united front as broad as possible the Freedom Charter was 
too radical to serve as its basis. Thus Moses Kotane's booklet. The 6reat 
CrisiS Ahead, put forward the view in 1957 that the unity of all anti-
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Nationalist forces requirea 'courageous, united and decislve leadership', 
out not on the basis ot tne ~reedoffi Charter which was too 'abstract' and 
, far-reaching", In reference to the stand agalnst apartheid taken by such 
groups as the Labour Party. the Liberal Party, the Bishop of JohanneSburg, 
Black Sash. the Institute of Race Relations and the students and staff of 
unlversities, k'Jtane nCltelj tt-Iat 'tt-lei!' l'ejel:tlIJll ,:,f apartrleilj Ij'Jes n'Jt msall 
that all tness pe()pie have ali'eadv al:cepte,j tt-Ie Ijerl\l:lI:l'atic alternative 
i:'Jniained in the FI'eed'Jril Chal'tel") and ':'Jnclude,j that t,:, tluild unity it 
would have been 'politically lncorrect., , to adopt so far-reachIng a 
proql'amme as the Fpeedmli Chal'tel" (05), ::;0 i,:IIJ Sisuiu wl'oie it-Iat 'thlJu.;;1rl 
CI:1I11~rSSSraien al'e ,:,:mvin,:ed trlai the struggle f,::.r the Fl'ss,j,::.m Charter is ths 
I:mly ,:clrre,:t I="jl icy, thsy are pl'epared and am<:ious iI' I:,,-operate on 
spe,:ifi,: issues with all who oppose any manifestation '::.f apal"'iheid ... 
Congress real ises that n"t all people Wi'"t" are I,pposed t,::> apariheid accept 
ihe Freedom Chal"'iel,l (6), Similarly ill all article entitled 'Ul1col\iprol\iisinl~ 
";trul~l~le for trle Fl'eedorli Chal'iel' I, .1'0 Matthews wrote that the FI'eedom 
Charter snl::.uld nljt be the basis '::.f the United Fl'ont, since I wi thin the 
C,:mgress Movement a hiqher f"rm I,f unity upon essentials is requi red than 
in a broad united frl:mt \rIhieh includes Liberals, Labourites, etc", who do 
not accept the Chal'ter ' , At the same time he declared that 'for its p~rt 
the Congress naturally daill's pO'loler of independent action", to exprQSS its 
dif f erene es f rom others I: lear 1 y to protec tits programme and e)<:tend its 
influence. I (7) Similarly an editorial in Liberation argued that 'the 
essence of a united front polil:y is that it is al'lolays based on opposition 
to dictatorship rather than common adherQnce to long term objQCtivQs, ,. The 
Ch~rter cannot serve as the basis for a united front, It is our blueprint 
.for ~ people's democr~tic state and not ~ minimum programMe for teMPorary 
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storage? A thousand times no!' (8) 
In assessing this policy, it would appear that formally Congress was right 
not to turn its own political charter lnto an ultimatum before agreeing to 
en9age in ,:,jmmon a,:ti';:.n witrl ,:,ther anti-apal'tt"lei,j f')rces, The th,jr,:,ughly 
sectarian way in which the Unity Movement put forwar~ acceotance of its 
Minlmum Programme as a pre-condition of any form of alliance or common 
action offered a negative reference point of the alternative, It would 
appear t,:;.o trlat formally Cc,ngress was right not to foreg.) adv.j.:a.:y of its 
.jwn pol i ti':al ideas as expressed in the Freedom Char tel' and not to refrain 
from criticism of its potential allies when their opposition to apartheid 
was unac.:.jmpanied by the p.)si tive commi tment t,) univel'sal suffra';;Je in a 
unitary state expressed in the Charter, In this regard it appeared to have 
learnt fr.)m the weaknesses .)f the old popular front approa.:h. F.jrmally the 
uni ted fl'ont pol i.:y of Congress assimi Iated the trotskyist view of a united 
front based on the slogan 'march separately but strike together', which 
attacked both the left sectarianism of 'third period' politics and the 
right .jpportunisll\ of people's front politics. The shift in the language of 
Congre~s from 'people's front' to 'united front· reflected this formal 
change. 
We have str~sed the term 'formal' becau~e the substantive content of the 
united front proposed by Congress in fact represented a return to the 
parameters of the people's front policies of the 19405. First. as Congress 
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placed its emonasis on buildIng the unl~ed front, the Freedom Charter was 
In ta.,:t put lnto ,:oloj stOl'·a'Je ':'\' altel'nativelv re-lntel'pl'ete'J in a less 
radical light, ~e saw thIs earlier in OUI' discussion of the Fl'eedom Charter 
when leading congressites In the later 19505 argued that the ldea of 
transfel'rin'~ the lan'J., ffllnes an,j rl"l,:onl:OI=":o1 ies t'J the pe,:,p1e ,ji.J ll,:,t mean 
nationalisation Ol' collectivlsation but only the lifting of raCial barriers 
to private ownershIp, In this regard Congress did not so much protect its 
in,jepen':1ent J:I\":O'~I'amme as o:,)no:eO:le to) middle ·:lass antioathies t,::. any hint 01' 
socialIsm, Second, wnlle tne proponents of the 'united fl'ont' o:alled for a 
co)mbination of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action (9), the 
intel'pl'etati':'\1 ,:of tt-lis D,:oliey made by Congress \/Jas tel (.:ontain the e)<:tra-
parliamentary win.~ 'Jf the £t)I:ovement within self-defined limits so as not to 
rod: the boat ,:of its antic ipated par liamentary all iances, The uni ted ff'ont 
was ad,jressed t.:o middle .:lass publil: .:opini'Jn \'athe\' than t,) the \/Jork ing 
,:1ass whc,se mass sUPP'Jrt (in the case of black w'Jrkers) C,:on'~ress p\'e-
suopose.j, The ol,j tendency T.'J praise unc\'iti':ally o'Jtential allies I'ather 
than en'~age with them, re-appeared 11:01' example in K'Jtane's i,:iealised 
representati'Jn of the Lab'Jur F'arty as having 'brilliantly undertaken the 
burden ,:of OPPOSition which the UP leadership has so miserably failed to 
carry' , 
The key to the united front policy adopted by Congress was that working 
class action was t'J ba subordinated to the search for a parliamentary 
alliance centered around the Labour Party, Liberal Party, Black Sash, the 
radical clergy, the Institute for Race Relations and other mainly white 
liberal organisations, Many of these people were unenthusiastic about an 
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alliance w1th Congress, either oecause they saw l~ as too radlcal or as 
dOMInated by the ComMunist Party, In any event the combined force thev 
COMorlsed was nardly the Stuff to overthrow a supposedly fascist 
oovernment. At the same tiMe the real Motor of democrat1c change 1n South 
Africa, the working class, was disarmed, 
Giving the official CommunIst Party view, Michael Harmel argued after the 
alection campaIgn tnat the (onores; movement was 'steadily winning tne 
'herein lies the certainty of the defeat of the present form of Government 
and the victory of the S,)uth Afri,:an I'evolution', No '~')Vel'nment, he 
believed, ,:ould endure, 'however I'igid its repression or seemingly p,)wel'ful 
its f')I'ces, I)nce the '~I'eat majori ty cof the pel::opie have taken the path '::of 
res,)lute resistance', On h,)w the government was to fall Hal'mel was vague: 
'l'ev,)li...Ition need \,,)t inv')lve vil)ien,:e. Thel'e rlave been plel,ty I)f e:~:amoles 
il' hist,)r'f where a combinati,)n I)f factors have been emllPell il1g el1,)ugh tl) 
(\lake a ruling .:lass give way", without d,'agging the people through the 
agony I)f civil war, We ,:an only nope that this may also be the ,:ase in 
South Afri,:a, We cannllt tell what e)c:al:t f,:orm the changes will take, how 
exactly or when the I:hanges will cOMe ' (10), The crucial point f,:or Harmel 
was that apartheid was an anolll.ly whi,:h necessarily provoked the opposition 
of white as well as black society: 'nowhere outside the Union does a 
privileged minority claim to govern by divine right, This kind of despotism 
is a freak or an anachronism which cannot have much longer to survive' 
(11), An editorial in Libsr.tion echoed the view that 'the Nationalists 
. 
have come to the end of the road' since even 'the big business .upporters 
of tne Party are oeclnning to nave lona and deep second thougnts apout 
:f it were the case that signIficant sections of white societv ana big 
ousiness were having secona thoughts about apartheid - ana there must be 
doubt since the eiectoral results were discouraging - this dld not exnaust 
the question of how to relate to these sections, The election camoalon 
~evealec that the support of Mlodle Class pupiic opinion was ourcnased at 
tne exoense ot disarming the worKers' own struggles, The auestlon of 
wr,ethel' to 5ub'jl'dinate mass action t'j the suoport ,:,f the middle ,:lasses ,jl' 
the SUPP':>I't cli the mi.jdle ,:lasses t'j mass a,:tion was l'esolved in favoUl' of 
the f'jrmer, The l'esults were n,jt propiti,jus, Amonq thE! more pl'ogressivs 
se,:tiQns of capi tal thel'e wel'e thQSE! who l'j'jked f,jl' an a1 ternative t'j 
apartrlei,j, but the dl'iving f,:.r,:e behind theip co:)O,:el'n5 was n,jt .:only that 
~.parthei,j was an · an.:omaly' in .:aoitalist ter.I'\,::; but pathsl' that ~',ass 
i'eslstan,:e was be'.;linnin.~ tc' threaten the stability ,:.f the l'e'~lme, C'jngress 
was not wl'ong to seek the 5UPPOI't ,:of the wavering middle .:lasses but faile.j 
tQ see that the basis of this support lay in strengthening the power ,:of 
labour, 
A perceptive liberal critic of Congress strategy, Julius Lewin, wrote in an 
article enti tled • No Revoluti':m around the C,)rner', that • it was an 
illusion to suppose that South Africa, 50 obviously rotten with injustice, 
must be ripe for revolution (13)', First, the state was strong in that the 
armed forces were loyal and the white polity more firmly behind apartheid 
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t~an ever. Secone. wniie tnere nad eeen a great deal of extra-parliamentary 
disorder, it was necessary ~o aistinguish between revolution ana oisorder 
since popular pro~ests were generally localised and easily suboueo. Thire, 
Congress strategy itself had no revolutionary content, If revolution was 
not around the corner, wnat of reform? Lewin argued that disbelief in tne 
possibility of reform emerged from the apparent intransigence of the 
Nationalists and the failure ot extra-parliamentary campaigns to Win their 
demands. He argueo, however, cnat the government was under some oressure to 
reform not just from oelow OUt also by big OUSlnessana that tne two main 
methods .:,f or.)iest use,j bv (:,)ngl"eSS - passlve ,'esistan':e an.j ti",,~ stay-away 
- were both limited in their efficacy as tar as the winning of reforms was 
.:on.:e,'\1ed. Lewin's pe,'.:eptive .:.)n.:lusion was that what was \"equired was a 
l.:m.;j-term strate.;jic perspective based on building the trade union !\).jvement 
al1d fi';jhtin.~ in this way f.)r l'efol"I\\ f,".:,m below. As he put it: 
Changes are 1 ikel y t.) ,jepemj rlH)re ·:m the s 1.)w an.j ,:ii f f icul t 
emel"';lenCe ,:.1' effe.:tive tra':le uni.:ons than .:on any .)ther sin'~le 
fact,:or. The increasin,~ emplc.yment .,f Africans in industry offel's 
the best h.jpe that in due time ':':olle,:tive a.:ti,:on will produce 
social change. (14) 
The irony was that while Lewin's 'reformism' wa.s based firmly .:on the gl"ound 
.:of working class organisation. the 'T'evolutionism' of his .:ritics in 
Congress prioritised the united front with labourites and liberals over the 
development of the labour movement. 
The Rfricanists 
As the crisis of ooiitical leadershlp came to a head in the aftermath of 
the election strike in 1958. tne maln african oeposition to the 'united 
front' policies of Congress came from the Africanist minority 1n the ANC, 
notaoly in its Transvaal base. who finally broke loose from the ANC to form 
~ne ~an African conaress (PAC), The Africanists argued that sUQordination 
to wnite control, oarticularlv COD and the Communist Party, nad been the 
root cause of the failure of the election campalgn. The Africanists had 
refused to support the strike from the start because it was 'left inspired' 
and five african trade unions on the Rand supported the Africanists' 
refusal to participate on trade union grounds: 
We as resp.:.nsible trade ul'i.~n leadel's do not believe that the 
proposed decision will help native workers, many of whom are 
livin9 bel.)w the ol'eadline, t.j win better wages. Rather we 
bel ieve it wi 11 hal'r .... )ur cause, C.~nsequentl y we ask employers to 
cooperate t.) ensul'e as much as possible the safety of their 
workers, (lS) 
At the annual meeting of the TI'ansvaal ANC in early November 1958 the 
Africanists who were present announced that they would launch .)ut on their 
own, claiming that they were now the sole custOdians of the Programme of 
Action and that they intended 'starting a political battle against white 
domination' (16), Emerging as a radical opposition to Congress, the PAC 
offered a political home to african militants who felt that the ANC was not 
reponding to the mood .)f the african masses. Its effect was to channel 
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aTrlcan Clscontent Into a Doiiticai blind alley at tne end of whicn was i 
mix or economlS~lC trade unionism, anti-communism and olack exclusivlty, 
The PAC attacked the multi-racialism of Congress on the grouncs that equal 
reDresenta~ion for the four national organisations was 'a warped principle 
of equality' wnich guaranteed the dominance of the minority over the 
maJOrltv, The Consultative Committee of Congress was 'undemocratic In that 
eacn Congress lrrespective of its memoershlp IS representee by an ecuai 
numoer of delegates', This was but 'an aggressive invasion on the principle 
.)1 majorIty puie', Robel't ::;.;:.bukwe adde.:! that nc,t IJnly was multi-ral:ialism 
inherently undemocratic but that the influence of other national groups in 
Congress blunted the sharp edge of african nationalism: 
The Africans constitute the indigenous group, " form the 
maj"rity, , , al'e the fti.;:.st ruthlessly e><:ploite.:I", The Afl'i,:an 
masses ':'Jnstitute the key tlJ liberatit:,n and ,:an be oJrl~aniselj IJnly 
under the banner IJf Afri.:an nationalism. " They must .je.:i.je oJn 
methods I::>f strugl~le wi th'Jut interferen':e f 1"JM either the SIJ-
.:.l1ed left wing IJr right-wing groups of the minorities, (17) 
Sobukwe' 5 .:ri tique of multi-racialism came fr'Jm two incompatible sides. : On 
the "ne hand, he saw it as fostering the same group antagonisms which have 
plagued the history of S'Juth Africa, arguing that 'i f we have t'J l'etain the 
same group exclusiveness, we shall be transporting to the new Africa these 
very antagonisms'. 'Mul ti-l'acialism', he wrote, 'is racialism multiplied' 
(18), With little regard for consistency he nonetheless conceived of the 
abolition .,1 group antagonisrlls only through the dominance and exclusivity 
of the african group, his aim being 'government of the African, by the 
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African, for tne African', 7he very idea of 'afrIcan' was elusive: at one 
time counteroosed to other grouos In South Africa and at anotner Oroadenea 
out into 'evervoody who owes ioyalty to AfrIca and who is preoared to 
accect the democratlc rUie of an African maJority, being conslderea an 
The 1959 ManIfesto of tne ?AC strove for an overall political crltiaue of 
~he snortcoffilngs of Congress. It argued tnat tne ~reedom CMarter 'pandered 
to European bigotrv' but Itself resorted to a xenophobic depictIon of 
wnites in Soutn Africa as a 'foreign minority': 
n',e ; leaders' .:.;:.nsi.:ier S.;:.uth Afri.:a", t.;:. bel.;:.n.~ t.:. all whc. live 
in it, the alien dispossessors and the indigenous dispossessed, 
They I'egar(j as equals the foreign master and the indigen.:.us 
slave. ,. They al'e t.)O naive to see that tt'le interests .;:.f the 
subject people, " are in sharp conflict with those of the white 
ruling class, The Charterist leadership is doing the oppressors' 
dirty job", seeing to it that the African is deprived for all 
time .,f !-.is l'ight to cC'"trol the .:ountry .. , The Afrb:an nation 
wi 11 n.)t t.,lel'ate the existence I,f othel' national groups wi thin 
the confines of one nation ... All individuals Must owe their 
first and only loyalty to the African nation. (20) 
The clause in the FreedoM Charter that 'South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it' was anathema t·, the Africanists, They saw it as meaning that 
the Charterists 'can have nl' real quarrel with those whitQSi who would cut 
up thQ land into Bantustans and Whitestans', According to thQ ~fricanist it 
displaced the enemy from a group of people to an abstract SystQM! 
The CharterlStS say that 'our people nave been robbed ot their 
birthright to land' bv a form of government", They cannot face 
the ti'utli that the oeople have been l'()c,oed ty trie whi tes, Hen,:e 
the robber 15 an abstraction: a form of government, (21) 
indians too were (once1ved as a fore1gn minority group under the political 
leadershlP of a mercnant class that identified with the oppressors, While 
th,:.se \="Jor in(Jians wriO ,ji,j nc,t have the rt'tl:mey t,:, buy land ol..ltsi,je the uni,:m 
.)1' tel g'J t,ael:: tel In,Jia '.:oul,j i,jenttfv with us', first they had t,:, 'l'eqard 
themselves as aebarred from all those OUSlnesses from wnlch Africans are 
debarred, " and accept Africanist leadership' before the PAC would co-
operate W1 th them, Wi th'Jut any apparent sense 'J! ,:,jntradiction tt" .. e PAC 
,jeclal'e,j in tt"nO! same bl'eath that it was 'fOl' full ,jeflK,cracy' in which 
'C01'jUI' will h.1ve n,j impoI'tan,:e', (22), 
The PAC had a spe,: ial antipathy t'j the Cc,"gress I:" Dem,j,:rats. seen as a 
fr':mt fClr the C'Jmmunist Party and re-named I the Curse clf Oell\ocracy', 
Standin'~ as ,:andidate fIJI' the Presiden,:y I:.f the ANC in 1958. Madzunya 
de,: lal"ed that the Freedom Charter 'never I'eally was a baby of the ANC' but 
rather 'the illegitimate child denied by its natural father COO' and that 
it represented an 'unholy alliance with elements 'Jf the exploiting class' 
in which' the black masses who filet at Klipt,)wn were IIlerely pawns' (23), 
With the same target in mind, Sobukwe rejected the 'totalitarianism which 
has become manifested in some states in the East in favour of full 
political democracy' and affirmed that 'it is not the intention of African 
states to change one master (western imperialism) for another (Soviet 
tutelage)' (24), It was certainly the case that South African Communists 
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extolled all thinas Soviet. from Sputnik to tne repression of the Hungarian 
uprising of 1956 and indeed likened the PAC to ~ne 'fascist' rebels in 
Hungary, The PAC's attack on stalinism. however. was extended into a 
rejection of working class politics in toto in South Africa: 
Whites are steeped in Herrenvolk ideology, so much so that the 
idea of class struggle in which it is hoped to bring African 
workers alongside white workers in a common struggle against the 
a::ac,ita.iists can t,e es,:aDist. illusorv ... The Africanists sav tt"lat 
the lssue of class struggle in Soutn Africa is so InSignificant 
~.s t,:, play Ii,:a Dart at all. (2.5) 
The PAC's i'etl'eat fl"Jm ,:lass was su.:h that even the BI'itist", w'Jrkel' was 
des,:ribed as 'not a w.:arker in the I'eal sense ,:af the w.:)rd' sin.:e 'he is 
heavil y subsidised by the toi I an.j sweat and blood .::af the .:olonial slaves 
of Britain'. It adopted the watchword of Nkrumah rather than Marx: that 
'the liberation 'Jf trle African is the task ,:·f Afl'i.:ans, We Afl'icans alone 
can emancipate ourselves', Its ultra-nationalism did not permit the PAC to 
penetrate the .: lass .:ontradi.:tions at the heal't .:.f the struggle, 
The contradictions at the heart of the PAC were visible in its trade union 
work, The PAC drew those african unions whose unhappiness with SACTU came 
to a head in the 1958 election strike into a new trade union body, FOFATUSA 
(the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa), which was 
set up with ICFTU Money and support and in conjunction with SAlUe as its 
african parallel wing. What started perhaps as a left-wing split turned 
into a rather conservative, cold-war and racially defined trade union 
centre dependent on a white trade union parent-body. In the naMa of trade 
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union autonomy FOFATUSA attacked SACTU for cacitulating to political 
prassures Trom Conqress, aC~ln9 as 'distant SPOkesmen of the totalitarian 
~as~' ana canallslng 'our cause as workers wi~hout our naving a voice In 
framing our future as workers', FOFATUSA defended its right 'to express our 
001nlon as far as trade unionism is concerned without paying any allegiance 
to party political organisations', but its alternative view at trade 
unionism was that it should be confined to 'bread and butter Issues'. 
7he PAC's raison di~tr~ was to give political voice to african mass 
militancy. Its spontaneist rhetoric extolled the revolutionary power of 
fllass a,:ti.)n: 'all we al'e requi red to .::1.:. is srl')W the lio;:Jht an.j trle masses 
will find the way' sai.j Sobukwe in 1949 (26) and he I'e-iterated it tel' 
years latel'. N.) lc.ve was l.)st between the ANC and the PAC who .jire.:ted 
.~reat energy into mutual .jenun.: iation and sabotage. with the PAC providin.~ 
an easv target T.:.r the ANC' '=> .:harges .:.f reverse rae ial ism. Thel'e was 
intense .:.)mpeti ti.)n between the .::o"ganisati.)ns .::ovel' wh.::o was the true 
inhel'i t.)r .)f the tra.ji ti.::on .::of af rican nationalism. ::;;.:ar.:e res.)urces were 
used up in bitter fa.:tion fighting. The o:l.)se relations which the PAC 
formed with whi te melllbers .)f the Liberal Party like Patrick Duncan. as well 
as the relations which FOFATUSA formed with SATUC and the ICFTU. bore 
further witness to the incoherence of PAC's alternative to Congress. It was 
not simply the case that the PAC was I'ight-wing and I'a.:ialist. as Congress 
critics repeatedly affirmed. but rather that the rational core of the PAC's 
critique of the united front policy of C.)ngress was converted into a cult 
of african leadership and the rational core of its critique of stalinism 
was converted into cold war anti-communism. It is an interesting footnote 
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that the major ideological influence on the PAC. George Padmore. was 
0rlClnallv a leaclnc stalinist In Moscow who DrOKe froM his old master 
eXClUSlvely on the cU9stion of african nationalisM witnout develOPing any 
further critique l27). 
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Amon.:;! ;:.:.l')Ure(IS all(1 some af r ieans III ti-Ie Caoe ('00')51 tion to C.)nql'ess was 
cel,te,'e.:l al'.)un.jthe 1'~':'I1-EUl,.)pean Unity i'1.)velYient (NEUi'l), ~=;in.:e we lett ttie 
NEUM in our account of the 19405, it had in the course of the 19505 
increasIngly marginaiised ltself as a political f0r(e by its own 
sectarlanlsm, The original policv .:.f n.:.n-(ollaborationlsm put forwara bv 
Tabata became an ever-More steriie orinciple aopliea as mucn to mass 
strugg~es themselves as to the aisapDearing institutlons of 'non-european' 
,'ep,'esentati'Jn, The turnin.;} p'Jint had c'JlYie in 1948 when the iJni tv M'Jvement 
led the opposition to the introduction of apartheid on the trains through a 
body .:alled the Tl'ain Aparthei.j Resistan.:e C'JlYilYiittee, The .:ommittee, 
containin.~ members b.)th (\f the CPSA an.j the Anti-CAD, decided that the only 
way t., .jefeat the new legislati.,n was thl'.Jugh mass bc,ardin.;! .)f the trains 
by v.)lunteers, 450 v.)l.unteers enrolled but the Anti-CAD endlessly p.)stp.::>ne.j 
the a.:tion claimi"g that the minimum number I)f volunteers was not enou.~h t.) 
make ita suc.:ess, Even when there was a spontane.Jus demonstration and 
boarding c,f trains, the Anti-CAD ,'efused to support it and by all acc'Junts 
the .:ampaign ended in dismal failure (28), 
The lesson drawn by the Unity Movement was not to prepare itself for mass 
action in the future but rather to justify its own abstentionism, It 
repudiated any campaign which it saw as • sectional' 0" • partial' I that is, 
which did not attack the fundamentals of apartheid, and accordingly turned 
it. back on all the major political initiatives of the 1950., It rejected 
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ail further otters bV otner . .. . PQ i 1 t 1. I: a. ! bodles to form a united front to 
fignt aoartheid on the grounas that they ~ere the 'unprincioiec stunts' ot 
opportunists, Instead the Unltv Movement offered a blanKet lnaictment of 
all the protest strikes, days of mourning. anti-oass campaigns and the like 
for the 'unedifying childishness of these sporadlc disclays', In several 
to lead oeoole In their day to cay demandS and sourned struggle on smaller 
issues, Tabata argued that whiie he symoatnised '~ith eacn ana every 
orotest against tne pass laws", ~e consicer that all this energy and 
activitv should De co-ordinated into one political field and not dissipated 
1n sporadic outbursts', 
To no avail did left critics like Zayed Gamiet argue that 'if political 
conditions force collaborators or reformists to put up some show of 
fiqhtin,~ repressive measures, sUl'ely thel'e can be no better WiJ.y ,jT exposin,;;! 
their bluff than by entel'ing inti;) a pra,:ti,:al agreement with them on the 
IJnless the people are ,:onstantly led Ijn smaller questions, in struggles for 
"petty reforms", their ,:,:mfidence and support will not be wl:on in the 
struggle to realise our major p,)li tical demands' (29), Gamiet was 
particularly angered by the NEtJM's refusal to participate in the May Oay 
strike of 1950: 
'to whip up hysteria against striking, to terrify workers with 
threats of reprisals and dismissals, to call upon the people not 
to strike but to blackleg, is the work of the ruling class 
agent. .. We were treated to the degrading spectacle of prominent 
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Unity ~)vement leaders using all their Dower and influence", in 
attemotlnq to breaK the May 7 protest, " To refuse to take etrike 
action until 100% victory will be absolutely Quaranteed is to 
postpone political action to judgement day', (30) 
i"i-jere na.j been 'a,::::ventIJ1' i st ,:amoal'~ns' but c: .. s ::::aru.:ri Hi I's.)n n.)te.j I..,in.:lel' the 
pen name of R Mettler 'haVIng called for co-ordinated struggles we wait 
eagerly for the NEUM to tell us how and where to struggle." Nowhere in his 
Dook does Tabata mention a directlve for a campaign sent out ov the NEUM, , , 
Only non-collaboration with oppressors' (31), Another lett critic, Peter 
Dreyer. observed that 'a central thesis of Anti-CADism is that you don't 
fi.~ht f,:,r anythill';! e::<:cept evel"ythin.;! - an.j theref.)re nothin.~' (:32), Cll' as 
the NEUM itself put it, 'it is of no avail to fight specific issues as they 
.:rop up wi trl.)ut relatin,~ these to the ge"eral stru',;)gle t,) 1 iquidate 
Herrenv.)lkisl\\ as a whole', Only when apartheid was ':ompletely vi,: tor i,::.us, 
SI) it seeme,j, ',voullj the · Her l'el1VO lk • bec,::ome c.)mpletely I'.)tten and the Non-
Europeans COMpletely united, The pre-condition for complete victorY was 
.:,)mplete ,jefeat. 
The I.lni ty Movement refusal to have any ,jealings with Congress was justi fielj 
by the charge that Congress was a segregationist organisation defined 
according to race, The federal structure of the Unity Movement, however, 
was equally based on racial definitions and the NEUM's programmatic 
depiction of the enemy as the 'herrenvolk' posed the struggle in strictly 
racial terms, For all its non-collaborationism the Unity Movement accepted 
what Gamiet called 'the Herrenvolk reactionary divisions i (33), To the 
charge that what was needed was a unitary non-racial organisation based on 
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ln01Vldual membersnlO, Tabata could only reply that lndiviaual memcersnip 
~as urong oecause 'individualism IS the essence of the capitalis~ svstem', 
! iie a::;,ji to\' eaT The Ci ti,zen, i~:enneth Hen.jl'l,:kse, c;..uqnt well trle l'~ ... : ial 
,:ontent .)t Na::an-fUl',)peanism when he ~.rqued that 'in the f i.~ht aqainst 
'racial" division and discrlmination, we cannot proceed, " on the baSIS of 
1;l""le k raal in.~ of f ,:,t the nation int.) "Eul'oc'ean" an.j "N,)n-Eurooean" .:amps,., 
Today this idea nas become absolutely reactionary' (34), Peter Dreyer made 
a SImilar observation that Non-Europeanism was akin to Multi-Racialism and 
to Airicanism 1n that they were all 'pre-aemocratic, neanCertnal torms. 
e::(ol i.:able only in terms of :::.)uth Afl'i,:an cl...ll tlJral backwal'dness., , T.) the 
Non-European mind, long confirmed in the acceptance of these (racial) 
.:ate.~.jl'ies a';; I'eal and a.:tual s.:ientifi.: divisi'jns .:af sO':iety an.j n.:at as an 
artifice of class exploitation, .. they have political validity". Non-
Europeanism is essentially the l'esult elf the sarfle hist')rical ,lnomaly that 
threw up "white" l'a.:ism' (35). 
The loJEIJM like C.:)l1a;Jl'ess self-col1SC i.jusly sub'jrdinated ': lass ta:, nation, 
.jec!aring that 'the place ·)f the w.)rkers is first .)f all in the national 
n'lovement for liberation' and that 'his first duty is to his people and to 
himself as part of the people', The NEUM was even less oriented t.) the 
working cla~s than Congress. It put off trade union organisation till the 
'second stage' of the liberati.)n struggle, since • only the achievHent of 
the Ten Point Programme can result in the growth ... of a healthy, free and 
vigorous trade union movement, ,. Present legislation is such that the trade 
unions could not hope to fulfil their mission, " They are compelled to get 
to workers through our national organisation' (36), The Unity Movement's 
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lndii~arence to workIng class struggles was coupied with a sectarian 
rerusal to ally with Congress on anv terms. Baruch Hirson's comment that 
there was 'no excuse' for the Unity Movement's seoaration from the Congress 
fil')Vement. S i n.:e I the e::{i ·;ten.:e c,f tW'j IIKlVell)ents. c.ased .:.n the S~HI)e .: lass, 
with slmilar programmes, has no justification' (37), was appropriate. 
Even on foreian policy the NEUM could offer no alternative to the oro-
Communists in offering its full support for the Russian intervention in 
Hun.~ary an.j the suppressi.:.n .Jf the \,\hJl'kers' revolt. When New Age in 1956 
defen,jed trle judi.: ial lI)u\,.je\' .jf III)re Nage and qU'Jte,j • the '~\'eat Engl ish 
jurist·, Pritt as saying t~lat • the Hungarian revoluti'Jn was a ':arefully 
,Jrganised attempt to \'est'J\'e a fas.:ist \'e,~ime', and in 1957 c'Jl'lul'lende.j 
G!omulka for suppressin.~ student dissent and the t\'amwaymen's str ike in 
P'Jlan,j, trle ijni ty M'Jvement fully con,:url'ed (3:::). 
Such briefly was trle state in which the Unity Movement entered the 
political crisis of 1958. True to form it characterised the election strike 
as a 'costly and criminal stunt', asking: 'are the policy makers of 
Congress really so stupid that they do not know that 'Jne of the best ways 
of helping t·:) get the Nats back in... is for the so-called Congress 
MOvement to shout and stunt. .. in order to get the white electorate t.:) vote 
UP?' (39). In the course of the election strike, however, they were 
provided with an issue that might have led to a recovery of their fortunes. 
SACPO, the coloured wing of Congress, reversed a prior decision to boycott 
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~ne election of a colourea reoresentatlve, wno accorcing to the terms ot 
tne Seoarate ~epresentation or Voters Act of 1956 had to De whlte but was 
to be eiected by coiourecs on a separate roll, its decIsion to support Piet 
8evleveld, a Communist member or cuD, led to bitter allegations of rigging 
an'J ttil? l'eslqnatlc,n ,=,T five e::-::ec1 .. ,l'tlve memt.el's, i.n.:lu.::iin.;,j the F'l'esl'Jent 
George Peake, They signed a statement saying that they believea that 
'particioation in tne mock elections would only disillUSion and confuse our 
~eople' and that the decision to participate 'aeliberately undermlned' the 
aeC1Slon or an official SACPO conference on the oasis of a furtner 
. conference' in which only 14 people were present and those favouring a 
tnJycc'tt were .jeliberately e~<.:lu.je.j, Whatever trle truth 'Jf these criarges, 
the l'esignin';;j mel'l',bel's .:.f the executive said that they were thinkin,~ of 
10rl'lling a new organisation", more in accord wi th pN)gressive Coloured 
thought·. F'Jr the NEUM this was a '~'Jlden oppol'tuni ty, They led the boycott 
,:aropaign against the election and .: laimed a maj.jr defeat f.Jr SACPO. Of the 
19, 138 cot.Jured VQte\"s I'eglstel'e,j c.n the ':c,l'jured 1"011 under 20% • ..... jte.j an.j 
BeY.1evel,j only l'e,:elve,j a bare 813 v'Jtes a';Jainst 2138 for the fIl'Jre 
consel'vative 'Jpposi ti'Jn candidate, Abe Bl'Jomberg (40), 
Mandela was among those who supported standing a candidate in this 
election, He argued that it was a serious mistake t'J regard the boycott as 
a matter of principle which must be applied invariably at all times, It was 
rather a tactical weapon, Attacking what he saw as the projection of a 
tactic into an inflexible and overriding principle, he wrote 
There is also the failure to draw the vital distinction between 
partiCipation in such elections by the people who accept racial 
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to exploit them in tne interests ot the liberatory struggle., . 
the C')I1IJl'eSS m,)vement t,)day is the defeat I)f the Nati')l1alist 
'J')Vel'nment an,j its reola,:erllent by a less j"'eactionarv one. '. The 
defeat of the Nati(:malists WQui,j at least lighten tiie heavy 
burljen, ., The par 1 iamentary TI)rUm must be e~(pll:'i telj t,:, put f,)rth 
the case for a democratic and prQqressive SQuth Africa, ., Through 
pal" i lament we ,:an 1'eacii tt-Ie (\"lasses I)f tt-Ie peclpie, t. 41 ) 
Mandela offeree an important critique of what we might call the fetish of 
tilJycott. The pl'actil:al quesiicln, th'Jugh, was whether Mandela was right tCI 
opp,)se the b')y,:ott in this particular instance. His view that the 
j'eplal:ement of the National i sts by tt-Ie IJni ted Party was the mClst urgent 
task facinl;) the liberaiil)n movement IJfferelj a set "f priOl'ities many steps 
rem,)velj from that of working cla.ss ol'ganisaiion, The electoral method 
aljl)Pielj t'J a,:hieve tt-lis en,j, preljil:ated on the ':'Jntainr.'lent 1)1' e~:tra­
parliamentary action, had little realistic hope of success, The weakness of 
the electoral strate,~y in this sped fie case fuelled the fire ,,1' I non-
,:ollaborationism ' I~enerally, strengthening what had been a lI\inori ty view 
that any partiCipation in the institutions of the racist state w.s 
illegitimate. It was a misfortune for the left in South Africa that this 
helped to prepare the ground f'Jr the mainstream of the liberation movement 
to assimilate the NEUM's fetish of non-collaborationism and lose sight of 
the formal validity of Mandela's critique (42), 
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Ine NEUM its~lf was unaole to exoioit its aavan~aae. instead. at a time ot 
In~enSlfYlng class s~ruggi~ it devot~d its eneraies to a split within i~s 
own ranks marked by tne defec~ion of the AAC. At one level tne solit was 
based on a racial divlsion be~ween the africans and colour~ds. a symptom of 
the Inability of the NEUM to int~grate into a single mov~ment its different 
national components. At another ievel the split was over personaliti~s, 
With the luminaries of the movement - Jaff~, Vut~la, Ki~s and Tabata -
fi9hting for leadership. The maln aoctrinal ground of the split was over 
tne Interpretation of the fen Point Programme. 7he argument centerea around 
pOlnt 7, the clause calling for 'the redivision of the iand'. There was a 
negative a';lreement that this meant the ab,)liti,)n ,:.f the Lan,j Acts an,j an 
end to all forms of 'serfdom' or forced labour, but the question which 
,ji vi,jed the I)ni ty Mc,vement was h')fN t,) I'edi vide the land an,j fNhat 
arrangements fNere t,~ be i nsti tuted ,)nce the land fNas redivided. 
The AAC affirmed the Pi'~hts of pl'ivate pr')perty: 'we delnii.nd merely the 
remoYal I,f the restrictions on tt-Ie I'ight to buy and sell land'. It argue,j 
for 'lawful acquisition within the fl'amework I)f capitalist society', 
espousing a doctrine ,)f rugged individualism, 'kulakisation' and the 
development of a capitalist class of african farmers, Their appeal was 
directed at the small-holders in the reserves and not at the 2,3 millions 
who lived and worked on white farms. The peasant was in their view the man 
of the future, based on a free economy and the crystallisation of a new 
agricultural bourgeoisie and proletariat. There were to be no fetters on 
the exclusive and absolute right to private property. As Th~ Soyan put it, 
'the Ten Point Programme visualises only bOUrgeois deMocracy and nothing 
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eise' (43), The ~nti-CAD denounced tne AAC: 'couid there be a greater 
betravai of the Mll110n~ of laneless oeasants?' In its eyes the AAC's lane 
the foreign imperialist masters and adapted itself to the role of helolng 
in the exploitation of its own people in exchange for a share in this 
exploitation', Hnti-CAD demanded instead an 'equitable distribution' of tne 
land In which ownersMlp would be nationalised and occupation granted to 
individual peasants wlth an averaqe holding of about 100 morqen eacn, This 
R,)u';seauesque 'Jl'eam was t,aselJ cln trle Ijivision or whi te-ownelJ ianlJ arlll)nq 
millions of african oeasants and the return to the land of millions who had 
entel'ed the ,:ities as wage lab'Jul'ers, 
While R.jrl)e burn~lthese two wings of the NEIJM fiddle.j with their .:Ipposing 
doctrines, subjel:ted at the time to a fine marxist critique by Kenny 
J'Jrdaan (44), In pral:tical terms, the ':,Jnservative AAC was more militant in 
its determination to I'elease private property fl")m the restrt.:tions I)f race 
and status and prepared to participate in the rural unrest beginning tlJ 
rock the TI'anskei (45), The radical Anti-CAD became more abstentionist, 
Perhaps the reason was that given by Peter Dreyer when he commented in his 
article on • the Death Agony of Non-Europeanism' that it was under the 
banner of Non-European unity that coloured teachers conducted their 
struggles for higher wages and better conditions, but it was only with the 
gradual 'perfection' of apartheid that they could • realise themselves 
dOMinating coloured locations, schools and universities' (46), Without 
roots in the working class Movement, Dreyer argued that the AAC were at 
once More Militant and more open about the petty bourgeois nature of their 
rioht: the Anti-(AD snelterea behina sociaiism ana the oenunciation of 
qUlslinos, the more it sougnt to establish its own status in apartheid 
socIety, With these aivisions tearing It apart tne NEUM was in no position 
to orovide any rational solutions to the politicai crlsis facing the 
liberation movement, 
Marv Simons reachea a slmilar conclusion about the 'sterility' of the 
~eacner leadership of tne Antl-CAO, arguing that their depenaence on a 
monthly salary meant that 'they could either support the government or 
e;:,:pj'ess tt-Iei r !J,)i i tical i rl.Jstl'a t i,)n in mi 1 i tant lan';;jua';Je an,j P') li t l':a1 
ina,:ti,)n', Anti-CAD was the politi,:al e:':pression ,)f th'jse who would 'give 
vent to their political resentment and frustrations", and abstain from 
posi tive a,:ti,:,n an,j ,:.:.ntrontati,)n wi tt-l the auth,jj'i ties', On the tl'otskysant 
p.)1 i ti.:al win'~, Nevi 11e Alexander has al";Jued that the teachers, lawyers, 
oj,)ctO:Ij'S and stu,jents who were the d,,:tivists ,)t the Unity M,)vement were a 
petty b,)ul',~eoisie eager n,)t tQ je,jpardise theil' pl")pe\'ty but at the same 
time t,:!J improve theil' standin,;;! and ,:redentials, For them 
The boyc'jtt ':'juld be':ome in a vi'jlently l'epl'essive society such 
as aparthei,j, ,. the ideal ,:Hsguise for political abstenti'jnism 
and more revolutionary-than-thouism". The class interests ,)f the 
NEUM made the latter formulate a position of almost total 
paralysis ... I Non-collaborati'jn became .. , the anti-septic 
'negative' boycott of one government institution after another, a 
kind of conditioned reflex whereby ':)\1e maintains one's political 
purity, ,. There were no short-term gains in the struggle because 
the so-called ad hoc struggles were boycotted and sneered at in 
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the most superciiiousiy pontifical manner", The pertect moment 
(for a general strike or an armed InsurrectIon) never turned up' 
The Justification aT non-collaborationlsm as a path toward the general 
strike and a violent assault on state power, was little more than an 
abstraction remote from any practical or theoretical significance, 
:he @Jst oromislng aspect ot tne Unity Movement lay in tne acute writings 
of the socialists who broke from its ranks in the 19505, as the criticisms 
of Hirson, Dreyer, Gamiet and Jordaan point to, The NEUM itself played a 
destl'ul:tive r.:.le both in dis,:orientin,;! the left and in leading the 
mainstreams .:of the 1 ibel'ati>:m m.)vement d'Jwn the cul-.je-sac of non-
collaborationism, The origins of this self-serving abstentionism were to be 
f,jund less in theil' middle dass status than in the .:le';lenerati,:on l:of a 
tr1jtskyite p.:olitical tl, •• jition wt"li,:h subsura".ed class workin,;! p'Jliti,:s to a 
spe.: ias .:of thi I,.j w.)r l.j nationalism, 
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The non-racialists 
The 'tl"'lir.j win.~ (.t what might b:lI)sely be .:alled the left .:>pp.)sitic.n was 
1:I)mp,)Sed I)f th')se wh,) SI)UI;1ht t,) (I)nstruc t a n)IJre ':'Jnsistentl v Ijemol:l'atic 
l:ritilJue c,f C.)nl;1reSs 0)11 non-racial, class lines. Fl'om outsi,je the (:,)n';1reSs 
movement the edi tOl' ,)f Thli Ci tizlil1, Kenneth Hendrid:se, had malje the attack 
I)n the mul ti-I'al: ial ism I:,f the C,:mgress into his cause celebre since 1956. 
He saw multi-racialism as a mirror of apartheid, l'eflecting its l'acial 
catel~ories al,d diYisi.)ns. Aftel' 1958 he wrote with increasing frustration 
on the deficiencies of Congress: 
Racial separation 1)1" social segregation is practiced in Congress. 
It is unquestionable that this practice is a y,)luntary and 
posi tiye implementation ,)f the insti tution I)f social 
segregatil)n ... It is in diametrical IJpposition tl) the abolition 
of the colour bar. (48) 
Hendrickse made some headway in constructing a non-racialist perspective, 
but his own alternative was rooted in yet another form of racialism, His 
cri tique of the Communist Party degenerated. into a virulent anti-semi tis., 
when he attributed the Multi-racial perspective of Congress to jewish 
influence in the Congress of Democrats, With his essay on 'Tn. Ess.nc. of 
MUlti-Racialism' sub-titled as 'An Analysis of the RbI. of J.~isn 
Conscious".ss in South Af,.ican "L.ftist" Politics', Nt clai ... d that 'horror 
of anti-seMitisM,., is the screen behind which the jewish consciousne.s 
shelters to escape the obligation of transforMing its.lf from a sectional 
or caste consciousness into a genuine non-racial. South African deMocratic 
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conSC10usness' and that 'the genuInely independent theoreticians, .. of 
ffiultl-racialism will be found.,. only and exclusively 1n the 'white' 
component - the COD - which is overwnelmingly 'Jewish' in compositIon' 
(49), Frustrated 1n his efforts to combat segregationist consicousness 
within the liberation ffiovement, Hendrickse resorted to an irrational and 
racist explanation of resistance to his Ideas, 
Hendrickse's critiaue of ethnIC communalism was channelled into a 
(.:.mfllitrllent t,) a '~;outr-. African nati,)nal c,)nsci,jusness' ,j!' 'pat"i'jtisl'fI' 
which p,)stulated 'the unity of tr-.e S,)utr. African nation e':'Jnomically, 
culturally, politically', 'One S'Juth Africa, one nation' was his watchword, 
He argued that since 'the,'e has been an irreversible process of integration 
under Apartheid, ., dell)ocrati,: .Jrgans c,f struggle must be con.:eived in the 
spiri t of a mode,'n South African patriotism', He 'Jpposed pan-Africanism and 
"ther kinds of internati'jnalism "n the ground that' the subjective 
prerequisi te f'Jr the devel'Jpment 'Jf so.:ialist .:onsciousness is thl! highest 
national patriotism', Hendrickse's patriotic idealism was one way of 
seeking to overcome communal divisions but it did not answer why it was 
necessary or indeed how it was possibll! to build a new form of nationalism 
in order to overcome ethnic diVisions, With increasing frustration 
Hendrickse banged his head against the wall of Multi-racialism without 
thinking through its material basis, It had nothing to do with a lack of 
patiotisM nor with jewishness but with the political weakness of the 
working class, For Hendrickse. putting the cart before the horse, the idea 
of a non-racial South African patriotism, sabotaged only by the sectional 
consciousness of jews. substituted for class politics, 
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A far more conslstent non-raciai critIque of the multi-racialism of 
Congress came from socialists within tne ranks of the Conqress Alliance 
and particularly 1n the Congress of Democrats. Soon after the election 
i:ampaign a letter was Dubl ishelj in Counter-Httack. the bulletin 1:;.'1' COD, 
calling for a single non-racial congress rather than the four national 
i:l:.nl;Jresses ,:.f the (':>11qress All iance. The editor ial ,:,f Cou"tel'-Httaa: 
i'e,:,::.qni·;e,j that the lettel' e;.::pl'esselj a 11:I:lmml::.n feelin';j' but Ijefenljed the 
prin,:iDle ,:>f the fOUl' ':I:lnl;jresses (SO). In the debate which ensued, tile 
terms 'multi-pacial' and 'n':ln-I'acial ' were I:onfuselj but their meanings 
wel'e I: lear. The substantive issue was INhether tlj organise the liberati':ln 
movenlent around four nationally-defined c,jngresses or 'jne n,jn-racial 
congress. COOlS defence ,'f the former rlung Ijn a distinction between the 
n,)n-l'al:ialism of the leadel'ship and the ra,:e-,:,:msciousness Ijf the 
masses, It wrl:ote: 
Every Congl'ess leader of today would be lNilling - even eager -
to belong to and jl)in a mul ti-racial Congress ... But are the 
Masses ready f,jr a mul ti-rac ial Congress? No
"
, The mass 
following ,:>f the Congresses today indicates that this separation 
works in gathering the masses for political struggle", The 
example of the multi-racial Liberal Party shows that this form 
of organisation appeals only to the intellectual and leaves the 
masses outside its ranks, 
COD saw it as natural in the light of South African conditions that this 
should be so: 
Africans have special problems as Africans, " Likewise each 
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other section of the Dopulation, " From this arises the teeling 
that ~ I)pqanisation is I~." In any multl-\'aciai 
I)rl:;,lanisatilj\"i we (in COD) wi 11 always be a s.)meWi,at al ien 
fIHn.j\'i ty ... D·;}!'e we iqnore the in(~rained o\'e.ju':::lil:es CIT whi tes 
and make the barrier- yet hi9her bY Ijemanljinq tt-Iat they n,:,t I)nlv 
seek and strive tor the multi-racial future but also Join 
against all their background and traditions a multi-racial 
organisation ... Our alm is not to turn white South Africans into 
negrophiles but into Deople who dedicate their lives to thelr 
Ijwn cause. t,:, the cause of Eur.jpeans in S,)uth Afril:a. 
In response to further criticisms and resolutions, a special supplement 
I)f Countt?r-,qttack was issued in 1960 in .jefence .)f the multi-ral:ial 
I)rganisation .)f the Congress Alliance. COO argued that the Ije.:ision to 
f,)rlli f.)ur cl)ng\'esses was taken in 1953 at the sug,;!esti.:on elf the ANC and 
that the atri':ans' wish 1")1' thelr I)wn national I)!'ganisation sh.)uld be 
respecte,j: 'an oppresse.j naticlnal I;}roup rlas trle rlght and duty tCI f':orm 
its ,jWn shield', Further, they said that it was necessary to I'elate to 
the popular fears of white people so that 'an organised body of white 
democl'ats ,:an serve a. a bridge ·:)ver the colour bar and concentra.te on 
winning white support: a speCialised task in itself ... Why should there 
be a clamour for one Congress when there is so much work to be done 
among the whites? Is this not indirectly writing off the whites as a 
political force1' 
COD believed that it was necessary to relate to the backwardn •• s of the 
mass of ordinary africans, ;1nc. 'many Africans not yet polittcally 
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sochisticated would nave reservations about joinLng a colitical 
oraanisations that could appear to them to be led by Europeans or 
(nClans and not obviously their own' (51), COO agreed that it would 
'!ike to see the cay wnen multi-racial organisation 1n all fields ot 
life i·; ,:apable ,:,f unitin,.;! all !:;,)uth Afl'icans', but tr,,)ught trlat 'that 
stage has not yet been reached' and would not be until such time as 'all 
the old prejudices of race against race' were first broken down: 'All 
~he aeep ingra1ned feelings of inferiority and superioritv WIll first 
nave to be wlped away, " All the residential and group area bars to real 
multi-racial living will have to disappear, Until that time, multi-
\'a,:ial ,)l"ganisatiQns at best will be ,:apable ':)\11y ,::.f ')I"ganising the ,nost 
a,jvanced ,)f all races - nc,t the masses', The san\e pC)int was e.:h,)e.j in 
Libel'ation when it asked rhetorically 'what c·)uld be m'Jre natu,'al than 
that at least in the ANC members wish to make ':el"tain that this is truly 
their organisation?' (52) 
The .:laim that the n\asses were not ready f'Jr one non-racial congress .... as 
.:hallenged by the socialist critics of multi-racialisn\, One such critic, 
Vic Goldberg (53), argued that .:en the only occasion in recent years .... hen 
the question of a single non-racial Congress had been put to the masses, 
'the answer has been a resounding yes', He was referring, he said, to 
the response Ronnie Segal received at an Anti-Pass Conference where 
there were a thousand delegates representing 20 to 25,000 people, 
Goldberg argued that the failure of the Liberal Party to win the support 
of workers was not due to its non-racialism but 'because their interests 
are basically iniMical to ihose of the masses', We should add that the 
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major working class organisation In Congress, the South African Congress 
,:,f Tl'a,je Unic,ns, was its only fully n.:.n-l'a,:ial (':ompQnen't. if 'trle mass ;:,f 
workers votea for one organIsation across racial categorIes in their 
economic life, why not in their PQlitical life? 
The nUD Qf the issue fc.r the nQn-ra.:ialists was whethel' tne fi.~rlt f':'I' a 
non-l'<:;'.:ia1 s':II:iety ,:.juld be achieved through a ra.:ia11y .:Jefine.j 
Qrganlsation. Golaberg arguea that this was an Internal contradiction in 
the l.ea.jel'shlp Qf the 1 iberatk.n m.jvement whi·:h ha.j t.j c.e supel'se.je.:;]. it 
was n.jt enou.;!h tel wai t ,.jr old preju.jices t., be .:overc.jfl\e; the pol i tical 
organi sations rlad t" take a lead: 
The Freedon, Charter insists that .:our aim is the C I'eation of a 
comm.,n s.j.:iety. Can we realise su.:h a society from battle 
p.jsi ti.jns which are inter locked at the highest level, but not at 
the rank and file level ... Have the different sections different 
problems? Is n.Jt our .:.jmmon problem the abol i tion of 'Jppression, 
the creaticm of a new South Africa in which the people shall 
govern? Are we organisationally stronger in four organisations 
than in one? Are we not splitting and duplicating our forces in 
separate organisations with parallel committees that only n~et 
at the top" ,(54) 
The key points were these, First, the evidence that multi-racialism 
responded to the prejudices of the masses was less substantial than the 
evidence that it responded to the prejudices of the leaders, Second, 
whatever the prejudices of the masses, the liberation movement should 
seek to overCOMe them in their own body rather than tail them, Third, a 
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consls~ent democracy cQula not De ouilt by replicating the raclal 
cateqQ\'le'; OT aoal'thei.j in the Cn:njy oi the iibel'ati'Jn J1)'Jvement, And 
finaliy, the quaaruolication Qf organIsations was debilitating for the 
movement, It was a CilJwertul .:ase, 
The campaign in COD tOI' a single n.:on-I'acial (:'Jng,'ess was als'J a .:ampaign 
tor a more soclalist direction fol' the MQVement as a whoie, The two 
issues were intimately connected, The COD leadershlp explicitly l'eJected 
wo,'k lnq .: lass po:ol i tics in the name of a b,'.:,a.j, national m':)Vement, 
ar';1uinq tt-lat COD was not a p'Jl i tical party but • a 1.)ose assoc iati':)l' of 
like-min,je.j pe'Jple, b'Jund t.:).~ether by a comnlon belief in a democ,'ati.: 
society', .:omprising within its ranks diverse p.:)liti,:al allegiances, It 
rejecie.j the view that its ide'Jlogy c'Juld be strengthened by $'J.:ialist 
ideas as ill-f'Junded since 'it results from attempts t.) turn COD from 
what it is - a loose association - into wnat it is not, a political 
party, .. COD as a b.:ody should n.ji and does not take sides for or against 
50,:iali5m' (,55), The exclusion .)f socialist ideas was justified by COD 
precisely in the name of not taking sides, its formal commitment to 
'multi-class' politics representing in substance the denial of socialist 
politics, Thus from the premise that the working class was not the only 
class aff lictad by dis,:rimination, COD drew the conclusion that it would 
be • poli tically incorrect for Congress to concentrate on "work ing class 
politics" in thair propaganda toward white workers' and argued that 'the 
Labour Party and the trade unions exist to do such work', To introduce 
socialist politics was 'to skip the historic stage of full deMocracy in 
South Africa'(SO), 
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r.) ·;,),:iali·:;ts seekino;j t,) appeal riI')re t,) the ,:lass issues fa,:in,~ white 
w,)rkel's. COO's answel' was tt-Iat this 'r!\i';lht antao;j')nise a large secti')n ,:oi 
potential supporters who are anti-Nationalist and yet have little 
sympathy for the economic worries of white workers' and that the l'acisril 
,)f whi te w,)rkel's meant that they were ',:me of the last se,:tions t,) be 
won over I, When tt-Ie lef t in COD als') wanted tl:' reaerl I)ut t,) af ri,:an 
w')l'kel's. tl) help pl")paqate sl)cialist ideas and assist in theil' 
,)rganisation, this tl)O was l'uled out by the COD leadership, Even when it 
was 5uqgeste,j that COD membel's shouL,j take a1jvantage of thei I' al:,:ess t,) 
domestic servants to organise african women in the anti-pass camDaio;jn. 
Mal'y TUI',)k advised COD membel'S not to seek a way out ,)f the 'at times 
frustrating. slogging work among Europeans', reminding theh) .:,f the ";1ood 
reason' why Congresses are organised along racial lines: 'suspicion of 
Europeans among many Africans', (57) 
COD acted decisively to repel a working ,:lass perspective, interpreting 
the economic clauses of the Freedom Ch.rter to exclude .ny socialist 
implication, At the sama time, it celebrated the Soviet state as the 
embodiment of socialism, assuring its readers th.t 'we c.n point .to a 
living example of the theory and practice of socialism", the USSR', 
Even the Moscow Tri.ls, it s.id, the purges of generals whieh shocked 
the world in 1936 and 1937, were 'methods of ridding the country of 
Fifth Columnists' (58), There were critics of COD who thOught that it. 
celebration of state despotiSM in the Soviet Union was reflected in less 
violent for. in its attitude to dissent in South Africa, One anonymous 
.. ri tel' co.ented that I tho •• INking suggestions fall under. cloud of 
-::':79-
sus[ncion", They are .:j"'ia,"a.:tel"ise.j as "se.:tal"ian" an.j, hel'esy of 
rn?re':;les, even ilfa.:ti.:·nalism" is ninte.j at, COD has a p.)ii.:y and a 
programme; if you disagree with it, then get out and form your own 
organisation' (59), This view was echoed by Joe Nkatlo, who was a 
leading member of the Liberal Pal"ty and a former Africanist within the 
ANC, He claimed that 
The C.:.d.ji te papers al"e tl"ying t.::. dls.:redi t all triose in trle ANC 
opposed to their policies", as Africanlsts. racialists, enemies 
·:·f the pliK.oie and .~.:.vel"nment a';Jents, " Many people in trnO! ANC 
opposed to theil" baaskap are democrats and like myself even 
so,:ialists, , , The e,jitorial (clf Counter-Attack) has the cheek tel 
demand that the ANC should no longer tolerate within it 
groupings wi th different points cd view who canvass support for 
themselves. " We must c.:ompletely reje,:t the view that the,'e must 
oe spe': ial ,:.rgani sations .:.f the various s,;:.-,:alled rae ial 
.~roups, " The ANC should ,'eje.:t all I'a,:ial labels", All those 
who a,:eept the F,'eedoD' Charter should join the ANC' (60), 
In the face c,f strong ,:opposi tion from wi thin Congress and the ,:opposi tion 
of PAC and the Unity Movement outside Congress. it was no easy matter 
for the non-rac ial marxist lef.t to make political headway. 
Over and above the external difficulties facing the marxist left, their 
own idea of 'working class leadership' remained largely an abstraction. 
The tendency of the trotskyists in particular was to identify stalinism 
with what we have called its 'right turns', embodied in two-stage theory 
and popular frontism, forgetting that it had a left face as well, The 
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trotskyists had a far more deveiooed critique of stalinism than the 
1 ikes clf F'aljmo,'e OP Tabata, tiie PAC 01' the Uni tv [·j.jvement; yet they t,j'j 
had difficulties 1n transcending its boundaries, Reacting against wnat 
they misread as the specific characteristic of the COMmunist Party, the 
·;ub'jr,ji nati'j" Ijf w()rk inl~ class i n,jependen,:e t,) b,'ljalj all iances of a 
popular f,":mt kinlj, the tN)tskyists were pl'l)ne t,) mir,'I)r ()r even 
anticipate the left turns of the ComMunist Party, This was preCisely 
what transpire.j in the tumul tUljUS years t,) I: I)me , when trle C,)mMunist 
Party turne.j srlarply t,) the left and the trotsky"ists and the stalinists 
wel1t ,j,jwn sepal'ate but pal'allel paths 1)1 a.rmed struggle, 
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The CoMImmist Party re-surfaces 
As the crisis of tne old political leadership deeoened and the search tor 
new ffili!th·j·js ';jl'ew fll')I"e UI"gent. the 1 imi tati.)ns cl1' C.)n';Jl"eSS as a br.jad-base.j 
nati·)nal fI)')vement wi trl.jut a well .jevel>:.ped thec.reti.:al practi.:e or 
i.je.) i.)>;;i.:a 1 t 'xus, .:al'l,e t.j the t ':'l"e. The stren.~th .)t C.:mgress lay ill 
uniting people on a minimum basis rather than acting as thelr oolitical 
mem'::>I'Y ,)r trle.jl"etl,:c,l vall.~ual,.j. 1".) map .)ut a new ·:.)urse TOI" the rti,)vement, 
what was neede.j was a more .:.:.herent 1.jrm .)1 politiccd or.~anisatic.n. The 
Communi,:;t Pal"ty - wi th its intel'national .:.jnl1e.:ti.jns, theoreti.:al armoury 
and centralist .jr.~anisation - sought to tulf i 1 this role. In 1959-60 it 
turne,j sharply t.) the left, l"e-surfa.:ing as an independent poli tical entity 
after almost a de.:ade .)f subterranean life, having changed its name t.) the 
SACF'. It reveale.j that it had been I"e-formed as a party as far back as 1953 
an.j had fun.:ti.jned t.)r the rest of the 19505 as an .)rganised p.::>1 i tical 
';Jroup. The .:harge which ':1" i tics f.)r years had laid at the Communists and 
which for years had been denied, that they were operating as a secret party 
concealed behind the public stage of Congress, was now conceded but turned 
into a virtue: the tran.cendence of legalism. 
The first issue of African Communist appeared in October 1959 and a leaflat 
in 1960 announced the re-emergence of the party in South Africa. The 
ComMunist Party re-as.erted its independence in Congr •••. It now disavowed 
the old 'united front' tactics of Congress, which it had done so much to 
foster. as a form of legalism explicable in terms of the christian-pacifism 
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of the ANC leadershIp but inappropriate in the revolutionary situation said 
to 08 confronting South Africa. It now gave prominence to socialist goals 
a.nd t.he leadin'~ role of tr-Ie worki.ng ,:lass 1n tr.e national ,jemQcrcl'tic 
rev,::.lution. Thus trle 1959 Rt/'iean Communist wl'ote ,::of 'the libel'atin,~ spirit 
of Communlsm' in Africa and of the proletariat as 'the most adVanced 
,:iass'! since it al,)ne 'wc,uld fight t'J the end against imperialism' while 
the middle classes 'would 1 ike to ':'Jmproillise and accept minor ':,:mcessi,:ms 
which will leave the masses 1 i ttle better 'Jff'. The uni ted f I'ont pol icy was 
redefined to stress that while it was important to 'unite all classes in a 
,:,jr.lmon stl'u,~,~le against impel'ialism', it was als'::. ne,:essal'Y that trle uni ted 
fro:mt be 'led by the w')I'king dass' and that wOl'kers be organised not ':mly 
in their own tl'ade unions but also politically' in their own p'Jlitical 
party' (61), 
In 1960 the party al'gued that the winning of political independence was 
only the 'first phase' and that 'the l'evolutioJn must c'Jntinue to wipe ,jut 
all remnants of colonialism', including economic backwardness, in order to 
attain 'COMplete independence', The COMMunist Party now prided itself on 
being a 'non-raCial organisation, the first in this country to admit all 
Men and WOMen regardless of race 'Jr colour on the basis of complete 
equality', It nailed its banner firmly to socialism in South Africa, a 
society where 'all the industries, farms, mines and other means of 
production are Made public property", and progress is planned by a strong 
workers' and peasants' government' (62), Turning its back without 
explanation on the political role it itself had played since 1952-53, the 
CoMMunist Party now sought to steal the thunder of the left, The weakness 
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1)1' the ",:,"-C,:.mmunist lett C'pp')si ti,)n malje !=":.ssible this latest or the 
party's transmuta~ions, 
It was only at a later date, 1\1 its 1962 Pl'o'.;!l'artlme ,:alle,j 'Th~ Road to 
South African Fr~~dolll' (63}, that the SACP spel t out the new 
'revolutionary' direction it had taken. Apartheid was analysed as a 
'soecial form of colonialism' deslgned to enforce 'the maximum exoloitation 
.:.i bb'Jur' ':'n behal f 'Jf the 'monc.ooHsts' who al'e 'the l'eid power in S'Juth 
Afrb:a'. The ·;tate was .:haracterised as moving • t,:.wards the pattern ,:,f 
fascism: an open, terrorist dictatorship' in which 'almost every legal 
channel is closed'. The SACP called for • a national democratic rev'Jlution 
to destroy white ':lomination, the main ,:ontent of which wi 11 be the national 
liberation of the African people', but would include 'breaking the p'jwer of 
monopoly,:apitalism' in South Africa and f'Jrging links with the Soviet 
I)nion. It asserte,j that 'f'Jrmal independence alone wi 11 not enSUl'e the 
genuine independen,:e 'Jf the Afri':an people' since 'the f'Jrmer ':'JitJnies 
remain tied by a thousand bonds to their former owners', What was also 
required was a 'non-capitalist' form of development linked to the Soviet 
Union, The choice to be made was between 'capitalist and socialist paths', 
'Nattonal democracy' was no longer simply one person, one vote in a unitary 
South Africa. as it had been at the time of the Freedom Charter, Nor was it 
any longer a gradualist electoral strategy of voting out the Nationalists 
and bringing into power the United Party as part of a strategy of 
~rattsation. as it had been during the election caMPAign, It now re-
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defined in lett terms as a transitional stage from caoitalism to socialism, 
In accordance with 'the declaration of 81 Marxist Par~les in December 
1960', 'national democracy' was defined as a state which 'consistently 
upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperlalism 
a~d its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; fights 
against ,:,:,lonialism an,j the penetration c,f impel'ialist capital; l'eJe,:ts 
di.:tat.jrial and .jesp.jti.: I'Ileth.jds of ';jOVel'nment; ensul'es trle pe.jple t'I'.Jad 
democratio: ri.;!hts and fl'eedml"ls", an.j the ':'PP'Jrtunity c.f workil1';l fc,r the 
enactment of agrarian reform and other domestic and social changes, and for 
oarticipation in shaping government policy', Through its critique of 'neo-
.:.)10nialisl'l" and a .jefen.:e .:af the • non-capi talist road'. the SACP's ,:hange 
of line in South Africa echoed a wider shift in Soviet foreign policy 
toward at r iean nati'Jnalism n,.)re generally, As the Soviet Union began more 
aggressively t.) wo,) newly independent Afriea.n states and African 
nationalist movements. it dubbed those with which it had fl'iendly relations 
as 'non-capitalist' and 'national den,o.:rati.:', 
For the SACP it meant a det ini te adjustment in its relation t.) the ANC, Its 
programme re-iterated that 'there are no acute or antagonistic class 
divisions at present among the African people', but a.t the same time 
affirMed that 'the working class alone is capable of leading a victorious 
struggle', While the ANC was said to represent all the classes which Made 
up african society in South Africa and to have rejected 'narrow 
nationalism', the immadiate task of the COMmunist Party was to 'lead the 
fight for national liberation' on behalf of the working class, The language 
of working class leadership replaced that of broad alliances, We shall see 
-::::85-
in the following chapters how ~he SACP interoreted the substance of 
1 work lnl~ I: lass lea1jership 1 in the tUll'lul tUl::OUS I: lass struqqles whi,:h rQcked 
:;;Ijuth Afl'il:a iil the ::;t"'larpevilie peril::01j and trlell' aftel"math, 
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eh J J 
The Mass Str ike 
Trade unions and nationalism 
After the failure of the election strike the balance of forces within 
SACTU shifted toward a greater reliance on Congress as industrial action 
5lJDsi,jeo:i an,j l'epl'eSslon in':l'easeo:i. Lud::rlal'dt an,j Wall have ':,;:.mmente,j 
that the effect coT the ele,:ti.::on campai';ln was in thei!' view' vel")" 
enc.jul'a9 i n';J' inasmuch as it pr.)ve.j t.:. be an • impetus f,:.r builojinq a much 
stron.~er l'elationship' between SACTlJ and the ANC (1), Acc')I'ding tQ their 
accQunt, this clQser working relationship was • based on the importance 
of organising the working class in the struggle for liberation' (2), The 
new relationship !'eflected a resolution passed at the World Federation 
.)1' Tl'ade Unions (WFTU), the 'eastel'n-blo.:' federatio:on t.;:. whi.:h SACTU was 
affiliated, declaring that 'workers and trade unions in dependent and 
':Qlonial .:.)untl'ies are asked t.) bind their tl'ade union movement closely 
t.;:. the natic.nal liberati.)n m.)vements' (3), It also reflecte.j trle .jefeat 
,jf an independent wOI'king .:lass perspe.:tive in SACTU in \958, 
The pol i tical SUPPOl't given by C.:mgress to SACTIJ certainly had a 
.:onstl'uctive side as far as tl'ade union ol'ganisation was ,:oncerned, 
Lutuli appreciated the in~ortance of a strong trade union movement, 
,:oinin,~ the expressi.:m 'SACTIJ is the speal' and the ANC the shield', and 
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his call to ~orkers after the election campalgn to join trade unions led 
to an Inflo~ of new members into SACTU, The capacity of Congress to 
organise boycotts ot goods from ~ompanies where workers were on strike 
or particularly badly exploited, as in the potato DOycott of 1959. 
indicated the i:Ii'a,:tical '.Jtility of political leadel'shio for tl'acle 
~nions, The stronger relationship between SACTU and Congress. however, 
also signified the integration of SACTU as the workers' wing of Congress 
at the e;.::pense clf its tl'a,je union functi,:.ns anlj tt-Ie dimuni ticln ,:of the 
influence c,f :::;ACTU as a beal'el' of wOI'kinl;j ,:lass politil:s il' C,:mql'ess, 
The introduction of factory committees in SACTU was heralded as a key 
instance of the new l'elationship between tl'ade unionism and politics, 
Trley wel'e said to have trle advantage clf elJmbinin'J pl:.l i ti,:al and economic 
fl..mctiol's and buildinl;j up shlJP flool' ol'ganisatilJn in the unions, The 
fal:tol'V committees were tCI cmopl'ise trn:! j:IIJlitically 'm,:.st advanl:ed' 
workel's. theil' fUl1l:tion tQ dl'aw workel's behinlj the natilJnal I:ampail~ns IJf 
Congress, The relationship of these committees to SACTU branches in the 
f ae tlJ\"" ie·,; was ambi';juIJuS, In SIJme cases they were set UP Iji rectl y by ANC 
members independently of existing tl'ade union structures; according tQ 
Lambel't, the 'seminal' ,:k),:ument on the fa,:tory cl:.mmi ttees , wri tten by 
Sisulu and Turok, was pl'esented not tlJ SACTIJ but t'j C,:>ngress (4), 
EnCIJUI'al;jement was Qften given to the establishment of factory committees 
in the townships rather than the factories, By-passil'g the structures of 
authority and a,:countability in SACTIJ, the fa,:t'Jry I:ommittees funl:tiol1ed 
to tie the trade unions to the political agenda of Congress, This 
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particular fusion of politics and economics represented a diffusion of 
trade union priorities, 
::;in"li le,r" pI',:,blems beset the f,:,rmati'Jn ,:,f in,justrial ar-ea ':mnmi ttees, 
designed to organise workers in their areas of work, Area teams would 
political and trade union matters, The idea was put forward by the 
National Consultative Committee (NCC) of Congress as part of its plan 
for- industrial action in support of the demand for a national convention 
in 1960, The NeC set up its own action committees to implement the plan 
with the assistance of SACTU's Management Committee, At SACTU's national 
executive committee and conference, however, there was increasing 
disquiet over SACTU's lack of control over these initiatives and fear 
that :;ACTU would 'lose its identi ty' (,5) as a il'ade ulii,:>n ':'In.~ress, 
'What were required were doers, not additional planners', the minutes of 
one meetin'~ said, and they ,jid 'not need pe':'ple t.:, tell them what tQ ,jc, , 
(E.) , 
Arguably the most illustrative example of what the new relationship 
between tl'ade uni,)nism and the natbJnal 1 iberati'Jn m'Jvement meant was 
the £1 a day minimum lIJa';Je campaign, It was originally put f'JrllJard lIJi thin 
the ranks of SACTU as a national demand for a statutory minimum wage, 
bad:e,j by industr ial action and 1 inked tc' the partb:ular wage demands of 
the individual unions, Aftel' 1958 it was tUl'ned int'J a bNlad-fl'ont 
pol i ti.:al .:ampaign based on peti tions and deputatiolis t'J business and 
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'.;j,:.vel'nmental ass.:,,: iailons. it filet wi th vel'tial sympathy f I'om some 
sections of business but little practical response, A resolution passea 
at SACTU's 1959 conferen.:e de.:lared that 'the £1 a day campaign", has 
made its impact on South African economic life and that employers' 
a.ss.:n:iatic,ns h<:~ve t,een f,:,rce,j to 1'8C':!9nise the need fCI\' suostantial wa';:Je 
increases', It resolvea 'to take advantage of this by sending 
deputations to employers' organisations' (7), The deputations fell on 
stony ground, however, as far as material benefits were concerned, A 
1960 conference resolution called on SACTU to ask for further 
OlScussions with the Chamoers of Industrv, Commerce and Mines though it 
was l'ep':'l'ted it-Iat 'many membel's fel t tt-Iat no PUI'pose w':!uld be serve,j t,y 
simply re-iterating our demand' (8), In the confusion of failed 
peti tic,ns, the £1 a day slogan ,:ame t,:, ,jominate the norm.l pl',:.cess of 
wage bal'gainin,;}, At the 1960 SACTI) ,:,::anferen.:e, one .:.f f io: 1al .:,)mplai ned 
that 'it happened c,:,ntinually that individual uni.::ans affiliated to SACTI) 
,jid na:ot submit demands fOl' £1 a day tQ their empl.::ayers' associati.jns' 
al1d ,:ited the case c,f the Afl'ican Laun,jrv, Cleanil1g al1d Dvein';1 f"J,:I\'kers 
which was asking for Qnly £4 a week, AccQrding to the report, 'he felt 
this was .:ontradict,:.ry and embarl'assinq, It was a.~reed t,j re,:ommen.j t'j 
all uni.:ms that theil' wage demands should be £1 a day' (9), It was 
pointed out that in the .:ase of S'jl'l'le unions workers wer~ already 
I'eceiving above £1 a day, It was agreed that in these .:ases the deman.j 
f.:or £1 a day t.::ar every day of the week, as opp.::ased tQ every w.::arking day, 
should be advance.j, At the 1961 I:.::>ntel~ence thel'e was more of the same, 
The 1962 ,.::anference agreed to ,jraw up a draft minimum wage bill and send 
a delegatil::>n t,::> the Minister ':at LaboUl'. asking him t,::> intrl::>duce 
legislation on the basis ,:af the draft, SACTU wrote to the Progressive 
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MP, Helen Susman, to gain her support for this project and was told in 
repiy that 'the parliamentary agenda for 1962 was crowded' and that 
anotner bill was going througn parliament from the Progressives without 
consultation with SACTU for the recognition of trade unions (10), 
yet again without effect, 
The aemand for a statutory minimum wage originallv put forward bv SACTU 
was a means of generaiising the partIcuiar struggles ot organIsed labour 
and of extending the gains made bY the most advanced workers to the less 
advanced, As the £1 a day campaign developed, however, wage demands on 
emplc'yers backe.j by industrial acti.:.n and srl')p f 1.).)r .jl";,Janisati.jn be.:c'.me 
subsumed to a seemingly endless round of petitions to employers' 
eo.ssc.c lations ~.nd .~c.vernment b,jdies, t'ioses Mabhida caught part of the 
PI'()c.lem when I-Ie ·;;\..l';jgested tha.t 'l'j,)kin';I bad: I think we were fl'J'~';jinq 
tho,? wI'c.ng tK.rse, We ~.rloul.j have tocuso,?j it against the empl.:.yel's, not 
tho,? government that wouldn't cnange the wage structure' (11), The torm 
of 'political unionism' espoused by SACTU, though presenting itself in 
very radical dress, represented in this respect a return to a kind of 
deputational pol i ti.:s based on peti ti.:.ning empl'Jyers an.j govel'nment, The 
.)ffi.:ial view that econ.)mic .~ains .:.:.ul.j not be w.jn without pri'Jr 
political advance served as a discouragement to industrial action, One 
SACTIJ l'epo)I't put the matter thus: • A w.jrkel's' .:ommi ttee cannot get a 
rise in workers' wages all by itself, It will have to stand together 
with all other trade unions and workers' committees for £1 a day all-
round increase in wages' (12), But standing together for an all-round 
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increase meant further deputations to business and government. 
Notwithstandlng thls policy there were industrial actions in 1959 ~hicn 
were certalniv no less effective than the seemingly endless round of 
appeals to the liberal bourgeolsie. 
There was discontent among some members of SACTU with the progress of 
the :21 a .jav .:amoai';ln. An interesting lettel' a.j.jl'esse.j t.:! the Ci tizen in 
the early days of the campaign was revealing of the problems to come: 
This campaign is being launched in order to organise the workers 
- and this is unreal. To achieve £1 a day will require a fierce 
struggle by an organisation that is strong and firmly built. 
Thel'e will i,ave t.) be an establishe·j m·:!vement with funds an.j 
trained organisers .. , It is farcical to campaign for 
organisation under the banner of this slogan ... The workers will 
be organised under more specific slogans - in tact for demands 
that are far less than £1 a day. Only this slow work of 
patiently enrolling workers into trade unions on small demands 
will pI'epal'e them for a campai';Jn SU.:t"1 as SACT\) pr':::lo.)ses. Knowing 
the pi tiable stren.~th .::.f SACTlJ, .::.ne can only feal' trlat the 
.:alnpai';Jn they prop':::lse wi 11 lea,j t':::l f,'ustl'ation, .. SACTlJ's tasks 
a,'e ':::lbvious, Or.~anise the wCH'kers first and then campaign f.:::lr £1 
a day, Y':::lU .:annot I'eao when Y':::lU have n':::lt s.:::lwn. (1:3) 
This lette,' indicates the gap between SACT!) , s nati':::lnal approa,:h and the 
,jay-t()-,jay priori ties of trade union ':::lr';Janisation, As p':::lli tical as a 
trade union may t.e, it has t" satisfy some of trle rl\':lst immediate 
e,:onoMic demands ':::If the workers if it is t':::l win their c.:::lnf idence. The 
exoeriencs of the Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU) is instructive 
We affilia~ed to SACTU in the mid-' 50s but with the government 
harassment and continued intimidation, the SACTU unions foune 
themselves unable to deliver the short-term goods to their 
members, We ~uicklv realised that we were faced with a choice: 
either keep to strict bread and butter politics like most of the 
other industrial unions which were winning some economic 
improvements for their members or to be involved in political 
issues wnicn could tire our memDers and lead to demoralisation, 
Bv lq~~ we nad definitely chosen the latter, (14) 
::,0 it must have appeal'ed: as a ch.,i.:e between effe·:tive tl'a.je Llnionism 
without politics or political commitment at the expense of effective 
trade unionism, In reality 'apolitical' tl'ade unionism was to prove just 
as much a chimera as its 'political' counterpart, As long as the 
substance of the politics espoused by the liberation movement was 
treated as immutable. there was no apparent way out of this double bind, 
SACTU did not simply neglect trade union issues but the tension between 
its trade uni.:.n wl)I'k and (:1)I1':;;Il'eSS p.:.l i tics ':;;II'ew stl'.,n(;!el' as SACTU 
nationally was drawn deeper into Congress-initiated campaigns, When a 
mal'ked !'ise in melllbership 'J,:,:ul'red in the 1960-61 peri.,d in the wake .;)f 
the new sur';le of work in':;;I .: lass resistan':e, many of trle new membel's were 
placed in General Workers Unions CGWUs). intended to serve as temporary 
bodies di re.: tly under the .:ontr.,l .:.1 SACTU' s l.;),:al .:ommi ttees, in which 
new membel's w.)ul.j stay until alio.:ated t.) theil' j'espective industl'ial 
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unions, Some GWUs were aole to perform effective industrial work, but 
several SACTU delegates questioned the wIsdom OT what they feared was a 
dilution of SACTU's commitmen~ to industrial unionism and expressed 
theIr doubts about the supposedly temporarv character of the GWUs. Only 
a small number of separate industrial unions were created from them, 
with a notable exception in Durban, but in most cases the maJor functIon 
of the GWU's organising work was less in connection with trade union 
organisation that with mass mobilisation for Congress campaigns. 
The trade union movement held the key to tne self-organisation of the 
working class as a whole and SACTU in particular was the only part of 
the liberation movement organised along non-racial, working class lines. 
The specific form of 'political unionism' which SACTU practiced, 
however, functioned paradoxically to weaken working class influence on 
the political level and independent trade unionism on the economic level 
(15). In the eal'ly 19E.Os, fil'st with the ma·:;s ·:;tl'ike artel' ~;hal'pevil.le 
and then with the turn to armed struggle, the contradictions at the 
heart of this form of political unionism were soon to ripen. 
-::::94-
Women fight back 
For the women's movement the failure of the election strike, couoled 
wltn the calling off of the 'first phase' of the anti-pass campaign, led 
to the virtual dissolution of the women's anti-pass campaign as a 
national movement, This did not put an end to the militancy of african 
i,,I(·fllen ,:·n the '~l'oun.j but it did leave thei I' strug.~les m.j\'e f l'a9mented ami 
bereft of political leadership, The fierce resistance of women in 
Zululand, spreading in 1959 from Cato Manor, a shanty town bordering on 
Durban, to the countryside, was an important case in point, 
The issue whicr. tl'il;l';lered the e~<plosion was the announ.:ement of the 
.~c,vernment·s intention t'j m,jve peclple from Cato Mam>r t'j Kwa Mashu, 
Behind that lay the pass issue and the fury of women at the .... "jrsen1n9 
thl'eat ':.f e~:pulsi(:on t,::> the • nati ve l'esel'ves', As .::>ne ':'jmmentator 
Those wh.jse mari tal status did not sui t the authol'i ties, those 
who were nljt mal'I'ied under stril:t Christia.n la.w, those .ji.j women 
who had ce)me t.::> IClljk af tel' grandchildren while thei r dau.~hters 
worked, an,j those ';Je'1e\'ally wh'j di,j n,::>t find favoul', were bein'~ 
'endorsed out'". to the Reserves by the hundred. Any family 
life they were building up, any stable future they might have 
cher i shed, was srl)ashed in the moment the of f ic ial' 5 pen end'jrsed 
them out of the area, (16) 
The women's anger was directed at the state-run beer halls. Many women 
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survIval, Women stormed these beerhalls, sometimes assaulting men who 
patronised them in the face of their boycott, destroying the buildings 
or plcketing premises to stop men entering, The authoritles responded in 
strength, Cato Manor was described' like a town under siege, dominated 
by armoured cars and armed men' (17). Women were beaten, gassed and 
shot, The official casualty figures of four africans killed and 24 
wounde,j undel'-estimated the lClsses, In 11arch 196'j 1 ::: pel'sl:.nS were f clund 
guilty of killing nine policemen in the fighting, (18) 
Observers at the time marvelled at the women's strength: 
The hel',)ines of the whole affair al'e undQubte,jly the w.)men, 
th.)se magnificently built Zulu warl'iol's of 1959, I stoppped f':'I' 
a time wi th ab.)ut :300 .)f them while they pid:eted the 
Lamontville beerhall .. , Police, black and white, heavily armed, 
llned the roaa for about a hundred yards, The women, prancing 
about wi th their sti,:ks, san';J and jeere,j at the men -
particularly the African PQlice, The WQmen looked determined, 
deeplyangl'Y; but tl'aditional good spirits sparkled to the 
sUI"face ... They shook their fists at the few .jefiant y,)un';lsters 
who, wi th much swagger and bravado, thought they ,:ould get 
thr.)u.~h the feminine picket lines tel the beer, Within seconds 
the men scuttle.j, sheepish and fi lIed wi th awe. (19) 
The outstandin.~ aspect of the women' 5 dem.)nstrations which ')ne 
contemp.,rary cl)fl\mentator i.jenti f ied was 'the c"herence and certainty of 
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thei I' battle: thev Knew Wt-IOII! they were f b;:lhtin.::j - Counc i J. and Govel'nment 
officials, This is quite different from the 1949 Cato Manor riots, when 
resentment and frustration burst out in passion against Indians' (20), 
The <;<.ction was soon to t.e copied by women in [lld.ny .:.f the smallel' 't.::lwns 
1n Natal and linked with issues of police harassment, passes and 
housing, The camoalgn was extended into the rural areas, where suffering 
was even greater because of constraints imposed by the Natal Code, The 
beel'hall i';sue was l.inke.j t.) 'Jther grievances: the .~overnment·s dippin.~ 
tanks whi.:h WQ[llen were f.:.rced t.) sel'vi.:e free and whict-I many bel ieved 
were responsible for killing their cattle; the culling of cattle which 
i'esel'ves; the 8ettel'l\lel1t !~;chemes which e~<a.:el'bate.j land sh.:ortage and 
I'esul ted for d. nurllbel' of women in loss of land rights; an inCl'ease in 
taxes in the I'ural al'eas and the intensification of influx controls 
whi.:h pl'evented them ')1' their husbands f rom moving tel DUl'ban to eal'n 
n·I.:mey, E;(cept in Hardi ng, whel'e men mal'.:he,j on the t,:)wn t'J f I-ee women 
,:onvi,: ted of destl'ucti,:.n .:.f 9.)vel'nment property, the l'esistel's wel'e 
neal' 1 y all W'::lmen, On many ,:oo:,:asi.::ll1s dem,)nstl'ations tUI'ned violent as 
women attaeke,j '~'Jvel'\lment pl'opel'ty, especially the beel'rlalls an.j 
dippin.;! tanks, ai1d bUI'nt theil' passes, One el.:)quent demonstl'at'Jr was 
l'epol'ted t,) have given her vel'sion 'Jf a deputation to government, 
saying: 'in .jestroying a .jippil1g tank, the people had wl'i tten a lette!' 
whi.:h the G'Jvernment would rea.d', 
The p.:)tential present in these la!'gely sp.:mtane.)us ,:ampaigns .:.)uld not 
t.e realised in th€! a.bsence cd mol'€! formal '::lrga\"\isation, Th€! ANC Women's 
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League had a branch in Cato Manor and the ANC's Freedom Day rally in 
Durban drew a larqe crowd of around 50,000 people, In the rural areas 
ANC women were Involved in organising demonstrations and articulating 
grievances. The Congress leadership, however, urged restraint and non-
violence, Its offer to go into Cato Manor to pacIfy the women was 
rejected by the authorities who falsely denounced the ANC as the 
instigators of the trouble, A statement by Lutuli condemning violence 
was distributed through Natal villages by volunteers. He paid tribute to 
trle spil~it .:,1 resistan.:e st-Iown by afl~il:ans but warned the WQrt\en that 
We .]0 noi; sUPD.)rt a.nvb,)dy who ,jama,~es or bl...Irns bui Idinqs 0:1\' 
destroys property, It does not benefit the nation and it loses 
us sUPpol'i; thl'ou';JrJl)ut the wOI'ld, be,:ause vi,)len':e makes us lo,)k 
like terrorists and irresponsible people, We also lose support 
frQfl1 ')1...11' sympathise,~s in the ,:,)untry and abl")a,j, (21) 
Drum ,'ep')l'ted that Lutul i sent .)ut 250,000 leaf lets thl'ough a netwl)I'k .)f 
volunteers and tha.t 'his a,:ti.:m has bl~.)ught quiet f,)1' the pI'esent t,) the 
tr.)uble.j pl'ovince of Natal'. Le,) Kuper, en,j,)rsin,~ the ANC's n')n-
violence. commented that 'peaceful development", may depend in large 
measure on the ability of Congress to canalise passion, under conditions 
of gl'eat hardship and pl'ovocation, into disciplined and effective non-
violent political action' (22), The I'egional ANC and SACTU in Natal 
benefitte,j fl")R\ the distuI~ba\1ces, e~:pel'ie\1,:in';J in 1'359 a mal'ked reviva.l 
.)f membership and organisati,:,n, but the question nationally was whether 
the ANC's \'ole as a no:m-violent intermedia,'y lo)oking for support an\o\1,;} 
'sympathisers' at home a\1.j a~rc,lad would suffice to .:analise the pa.ssions 
unleashe':!, Retrospe,:tively M.)ses Mabhi.ja .:,)mmented on the Natal protests 
that 'perhaps the leadership ,)f the ANC did nl)t understand very well the 
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problems of the people", Unfortunately for our people, we didn't 
realise the extent of the organisation of the people which was at the 
tlme very high, and the women formed a very strong nucleus for a 
H note on l'UI'cd resl stance 
At the grass roots the anger of many black people was bubbling with a 
fury beyond the capacity of the united front approach of Congress to 
(CIl"'ital n, in the country as well as the t.)wn the!"'e was evi':len.:e .)t 
growing revolt. but here a different story, one largely of political 
isolati.:.n I'ather trlan p.)litical dependen.:y, rilay be t'Jld ab'Jut the 
struggles of reservists, Coming in the wake of the rural revolts in 
Zeerust and Sekhukhuneland il1 1958 and the Natal reserves in 1959. mass 
resistance spread to the reservists of Pondoland. a rural area of the 
Transke i, Thei I' battle was against Bantu Authol' i ties, new taxes. cattle 
culling, forced resettlement and state repreSSion (24). The Pondo revolt 
was the largest c.f trle I'ul'al I'evol ts I'esul ting in the death by shc,c,tin.~ 
of 30 Afl'icans in June 1960. 
Mandela had already ,)bserved in 1956 the lack of political ,~rganisation 
of Congress in the rUl'al al'eas. realising that' isolated and sporadic 
outbursts' would not be sharply felt by the regime. 'The problem of 
organisation in the countl'yside'. he wrote. 'poses itself as one of 
maj,:>r importance for the liberat,jry n"jvement' (25). Moses Kotane had 
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written in 1954 that 'as yet the democratic movement for liberation has 
barely beaun the task of arousing and mobilising the tremendous 
potential forces for progress among the landless millions in the 
countryside' (26), Govan Mbeki argued that it was not until the Pondo 
revolt that recognition of the potential at rural struggle was achlevea 
by Congress, He wrote that 'the Pando movement succeeded by example in 
accomDlishing what discussion had failed to do in a generation -
':Ol1vinc inq the lea.jel'ship of the impol'tance of peasants in the I'esel'ves 
to tne entil'e n<:~tional stru';jgle' (27), In spite clf .;j.:u:nj intenti':'ns 
Congress had little relation to rural unrest except through the efforts 
.:.f indi'v'i,juals like G.:.van r-jbeki am] R.)wley AI'enstein (2::;) , It thus la.id 
itself ,:.peI1 t,) the kinl:::! I:,f veiled I:l'ltil:ism whid-I appeal'ed in SPark in 
December 1960, when it wrote: 
We must see t.) it that nl:. gl'I)UP fil~hts alone. It is clnly if we 
carry 011 the fight in different places at the same time that we 
wi 11 be able tl;:' spl i t the f.)rl:es 1)1' the l~c.vel'nment, ., If the 
pe.Jple .)1 Zeel'ust, Sekhukhunelan.j, F'on'Jland an.j Zululal1.j ha.j 
rlsen together, we would today have been nearer the freedom we 
want ... We will stand tcn~ethel', people c.f tt-Ie t'JW'1 an.j 
country, .. The best way in which we .:an SUPPOI't the people .)f 
Po"doland now is to I'aise the stl"uggle against Bantu Authol'ities 
in evel"Y c.;)rne," .)f the land' (29). 
The strug.~les against Bantu Authori ties were n.;:)t gene,"alised in the way 
Spar/<: hope.j for. We shall return latel" to how Congress in fact s'Jught to 
relate to rural unrest but it was the spontaneous a.:ti'Jn 'Jf u,"ban 
workers which took the f ,'ont of the pol i ti':al stage, 
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lhe ANC cailed 1959 its anti-pass year but weaknesses in the campalgn 
allowed the Africanists in the PAC to take the initiative with their 
'p.:.sitive action' a.;!ainst the pass laws. I'k. bail l'equeste.j, n':' defence 
offered a~j no fines paid were the defiant watchwords of the action. 
Sobukwe declared that the campaign would be conducted in a spirit of 
absolute non-violence but would be the first step in the africans' bid 
f 01' f reed':'ri! by ·1 ~)E.::::. "'he carl\pai~:::in, whi,:h started ,:.n trll? 21 I"lal'crl 1960. 
was uneven in its effects but large crowds, including the PAC leaders 
S.:.bukwe and Leball.:., pl'esente,j themselves at p,:.lice stati.jlis in Evat,jn, 
Vanderbijl Pal'k, Shal'peville (neal' Vel'eenigin • .;!) a11.j Langa in Cape T.:.wn 
to SU1'I'tm.jel' thei I' pass b.joks and invite al'rest. In Jc.hannesburg s.::.me 
1:30 at ri,:ans, i \1.: 1 l..Idi11';j S.jbukwe an,j Leball.j, wel'e detai ne.j and i 11 
Vel'eeni';;Iin'd an,j Cape T.jwn thousali.js .:.f men stayed away fl,.jm wCI\'k. In the 
.:;.)I..II'Se ,:.f these events, the PQl i,:e f i re.j ,:.n de~).:.nstl'at.jl'S at :3hal'oevi lie 
and Langa. At Shal'peville it is estimated that some 87 africans were 
k i lle.j an.j 227 woun.je.j; at Lanqa a f ul'trlel' 17 wel'e k Hied and 46 
Wou\'1.jed. F.::or the g.jvernment Dr Verw.jerd e>c:plained these events as 
sympt.jmati.: .jf what was happening m.jl'e ';:Jenerally ,:;.n the Afl'it:an 
continent and as a pl'ljdul:t of political incitement. After a flood of 
cri ti.: isrl\ from home and abl'oad, induding a statement from the U,S, 
State Oepal'tment deplol'ing the l'jsS of 1 ite, the government appOinted on 
the 2:3 March a judi,:ial commission of inquiry, 
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F,)r black people inside the country these massacres triggered a wave of 
mass protest: the 'days of crisis' or 'the nineteen days' as thev were 
called, Tens of thousands of african workers went on strike in Capetown 
and on the 25 March Philip Kgosana, a PAC organiser, led a crowd of some 
2000 africans to the Caledon Square police station without passes to 
offer themselves for arrest, When the police agreed not to arrest anyone 
in Cape fown tor pass offences until the sltuation returned to normal, 
the crowd dispersed, On the 26 March the Dolice throughout the country 
were instructed as a temporary concession not to arrest africans for 
failing to carry passes, a measure which the United Party leader in 
Natal, a Mr Mitchell, condemned as 'a shocking exhibition of complete 
weakness', On the same day the Minister of Justice announced that he 
wc,uld pl',::ocee,j wi th le,~islatio:m t,j ban the ANC and tt-Ie PAC an,j Lutul i 
1'8sponded by ,:el'erfl.:mic,usl y burni n,;:) his pass b':I1:,k, He de,: lared lIIi th 
chl'acteristic courage that he had 'no intention of ever carrying a 
,'eferen,:e b(\c,k aqain'" e::<I)I'essing the 'hope that all 'J the l' Africans lIIill 
v,::olunta.l'i 1y f,)ll'::01ll my e:x:ample' (0) 
Trle ANC respc,nde,j to trlese outbl'eaks 'Jf militan,:y by pI'oclaiming f,::.T' the 
2:~ Mar,:h a Natk'11al Day ,:>f M,::ourI1in'~ when everyb,:>dy thl',)ughout the 
,:ountl'y lIIas i nvi ted tc, stay away f I'om 1II0rk and Lutuli ,:alled f,:>r 'a top 
level meetin';;J ,:>f Af"i,:an lea.ders lIIi th the leaders ,:>f all p')li tical 
parties', lest there should occur 'a further deterioration in race 
relations' (31), He lIIas rep')rted as saying that ,:>ne stay-at-home 1II')uld 
not lead to suc,:ess but that a series of them lIIoul,j f,::.rce the government 
to ne';;Jotiate ai' IIIhi te soc iety to get rid 'Jf the g'Jvel'nment, The PAC 
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decided to support the day of mourning. The stay-at-home was estimated 
tc, r;a\.ie been 9S% su':,:essful among africans in Caoe Town (th,:,ugh mainly 
ignored by coloureds), 8S to 90% successful in Johannesburg and F~rt 
Elizabeth and 20% among africans in Durban (where most indian businesses 
also closed) (32). On the evening of the Day of Mourning there ~as 
rioting in the african townships to the sQuth-west of Johannesburg and 
some african townships in the Cape residents set fire to schools and 
churches. Workers pursued the 'stay-at-home' far beyond the calls of 
their leaders. For more than a week after the day of mourning, nearly 
all of the 60,000 africans emoloved in Cape Town stayed away from work 
ana large numbers of migrant workers were reported to have returned to 
On irle Day I)f M,)ul'ni ng par 1 iament debated the Unlawful Ol',~anisati,)ns 
Bill. which the United Party agreed to support subject to annual review. 
The Minister of Justice described the actions of the two Congresses as 
bordering on revolution. 'What they want'. he explained, 'is our 
CI)Untl"(. On trle 29 Mar,:h the ';i')Vel'nment passelj a state of emergen,:y 
undel' the Publi,: Safety AI:t an,j some 200-:300 off1':ials and membel's ,:sf 
the Congress All iance, the PAC and the Libel'al Party were a.rrested, some 
,)f whom were I'elease,j telnpo,'al' i 1 y at tel' a wr i t of hab~as corpus was 
served. On the :30 March, PI) I ice entered the Langa township t" eject 
workers from their homes to force them back to work. Workers reacted by 
mar.:hing :30,000 strl)ng fr.::)m Langa a.nd Nyanga t.) the Caledon Square 
pol i.:e station. The PAC leadership as well as· the ANC was ,:aught of f 
guard by this lal"l~ely sp.)ntane.)us protest. Philip I<gosana, the se,:retary 
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of the Cape PAC, 'led' the march but admitted that he first heard of it 
wniist in bed and had to be given a lift by a reporter to get to the 
head of tne procession, Kgosana asked for an interview with the Minister 
of Justice to secure the release of their leaders and the satisfaction 
of the PAC's immediate demands: abolition of the pass laws, a minimum 
wage of £35 a month and no victimisation, On receiving an assurance from 
the police chief that he would arrange an interview, Kgosana urged the 
Deople to return to the townships, which they did, Kgosana himself was 
not afforded a m8etlng with the Minister of Justice but was insteaa 
detained, 
As the general strike continued in Cape Town, there were demonstrations, 
riots and pass-burnings in a number of other towns in the Western Cape 
(nl)tabl y Si£l\l)nstclwl1, Paar 1, Hel'manus, ~;tellenbl:lsch and W.)rcestel') and in 
W')i',:ester many ,:.)l,:,uI'e,js j.)ine.j the stay-away fr.)£1\ w')I'k, In Natal thel'e 
wel'e stav-aways, demonstl'ati.:.ns an,j serious I'i.:,ts in a number .:,f 
townships, notably in Gato Manor where at least three africans were shot 
dead and 18 injured on the 1 April, Demonstrations and stay-aways 
continued until the 4th or 5th of April, In Johannesburg, however, there 
were only isolated anlj small .jeml)nstrations and n'j offi·:ial strike lead 
from SACTU despite calls from the left to join the workers in the Cape 
and Natal (:33), Facing bl'utal intimidation fl'om the p,jlil:e and army and 
the al'rest ,)f 11,1)1)0 afl'i.:ans, the mass strike began to peter out in the 
week startinl~ the 4 April, It ha.j been organised and initiated largely 
from bell:;'w and appears to have I'eceived little dil'el:tiljn from either the 
Congress Alliance or the PAC beyond the orb~inal Day of /'Iou,'ning. It was 
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only when the state had already recovered the intiative, when many of 
the C()nqpl.~ss anlJ PAC leadeps wepe imOl~is()ned, when workers were 
exhausted bv the ppolonged strike and the effects of bputal police 
assaults and in short when the tide of militancy had receded, that the 
ANC callelj fl:II' afl'j.l:ans to stay away f\'om wljrk 1:1\1 the 1'3 April in 
protest against government repression, a call which the workers were by 
nljW incapable clf meetin9, 
fhel'e was widesOl'ealj feeling 1:111 the left trlat neithel' the ANC nljl' PAC 
found the means to lead the mass protest or to (ountel' the degree of 
repression meted out by the state, One membe\' of the Communist Party, 
Ben TUl'ok, a\'gued in I'etrospect that Congress failed to 'make the pight 
break, " we wel'e 50 pre-o,:cupied wi th the legal prol:esses (1:1f the 
Tl'eaSI:ln Tl'ial) that we didn't have the I' b~ht c.jncepti.jn of rev()lutiol1 as 
l:app.jse,j t,) pressure I (34), Many mil i tants were beginning to cl)nl:eive of 
the neelj t,j fI'I()ve from pI'otest to challenge, 
The ANC e)(e.:utive blamed the failure of the strike ,:all 1)11 the 19 April 
on pl)lice terror and intimidati.:m. Leading Congress mil i tants, inc luding 
the C:clrMl\Unist Party, began t.) al,.~ue that the repressiveness .)f the state 
demanded a shift il1 stl'ategy, This view was nlirrl:)I'ed on the tl'otskyist 
left, Baruch Hirson, now wI'iting on behalf of a small left group in 
Congress .:alled the Socialist League of Africa, .)ffered a ,:oropelling 
polemic against blaming the state exclusively for the defeats of the 
movement: 
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We are frankly tired of this excuse, It has been used now for 
the past few failures and is always produced after the event, 
Surely we have to be political simpletons not to take this into 
account in planning campaigns, (35) 
Hirson argued that the strength of the state and its relative insulation 
from the effects of the withdrawal of labour demanded a new strategic 
apPl'oad"'1 i I'I::.m the fI"lCoVement beyond the 1 imi ts of the tl'ied and test\~d 
stay-at-home, He Wl'()te: 
We face a. stronq, arl":II;lant and .:.:mfident rulinq class, " 
fortified by a state machine on which it can rely, Above all 
else it has an al'my, a Dolice force and auxiliaries 
can rely 1)11 at all time, The pl'esent 91)Vel'nment and its 
SUPpI)\'ters aI's al'~I) not immediately hi t by the wi th,jl'awal of 
laboul' bel:ause they al'e not the dil'e,:t Clwnel'S .:>f the mines. the 
fa': t.:>r ies 1:>1' the lar,~e c,:>nuner l: ial h,)uses, (:36) 
Thel'e was in shl;:'l't a 'JI',;:.wing dis':I:mtent with the '.;:.ld methl)ds' i.n all 
quarters: within trle (:.jmmunist Party, the left ·:d the ANC and the left 
opp.jsiti.jn, The questi.:>n whid'l fa.:ed the movement. h.jWeVel', was fil'st 
what pre.:isely wel'e the faults in the ()ld meth.)·js which neede.j t.j t.e 
remedied and se.:on.j what alternatives we,'e p.;:.ssible and desirable. 
The w,;:.rkers' revolt revealed definite .:hinks in the al'mour of the 
apartheid state, beset by the proljucts of its own irrationality, The 
authorities had shown in,jecision anl::l a marked nerv,)usness in the face ,;:.f 
the mass strike and the economic crisis which triggered it. Capital i" 
South Africa was distinctly jittery. In the fifteen months after 
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Sharoeville gold and foreign reserves dropped by R173m, to R142m" and 
the stock market and gold price piummeted, There was a capital outflow 
of R12m, per month in 1960 and the first half of 1961 as foreign 
investors lost their confidence (37), Within the ruling class, 
alternative strategies were debated with the reformist option once again 
on the agenda, In May 1960 P,O,Sauer, acting a Prime Minister in place 
of Dr, Verwoed (who was recovering from an attempt on his life) called 
fo,' l'efo,'rn of the 9')Vel'mnent's bla,:k policy in foul' areas: the 
application of the pass laws, the supply of liquor to africans, the 
level of wages and the political rights of urban blacks, According to 
Sauer, 'the old book of South African histol'Y was closed at Sharpeville 
a month ago and for the immediate future South Africa would reconsider 
openly and h,)nestly its appNa.:hes t,) the National (iuesti.::on', We must 
create a new spirit which will restore ovel'seas faith, both white and 
The E'1.~1 ish-speak in'~ p,'ess was m,),'e f,::o,'th"ight 1.'1 e::-::p,'essi'11;! its 
,jemands, An edito"ial in the star warned trlat 'trle overriljing ,juty rli:!sts 
on the g,::overnment to rec'::Ol~nise that the use l::of thli:! fOl'CIi:!S of the state 
t" rest,::ore a respect f,::or authority and law offli:!rs n'::o solution t,::o our 
human and ra,:e pN)blems' (39), Five business asslJI:iations (the Federated 
Chamber I,f Industries, the AsslJciated Chamber ,::of Commerce, the Chambe,' 
I')f Mines, the Afrikaanse Handelsinsti tut and the Steel anlj Enl~ineering 
Industries Fli:!deration of South Africa) presented a memorandum to the 
Prin)e Minister demanding majl::or pl::olicy reforms, includin,;] ,:hanges in the 
qualification for permanent urban residence and amendments to trade 
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union iegisiation regarding biack workers (40), The Chairman of tne 
Genel'a 1 11 i n i n'J and Finance C()I'pol'atic1n summed up a .;Jeneral f eeli n';i when 
he stated that 'when the policies of the politicians threaten the basic 
economy of the country, " the leaders of industry have not only the 
right but also the duty to express their opinion and continue to do so 
untii some change of policy is apparent' (41), There were weaknesses in 
the repressive apparatus of the state, The Defense Force operated 
essentially on the basis ()f equipment han.jed d.::>wn 1'1'()O\ Wol'l.j War 'j 1 an.j 
defence expenditure was not high by later standards, In 1958-59 it stood 
at 36 million rands, in 1959-60 at 40 million and in 1960-61 at 44 
million. It was only in subsequent years that it escalated from 72 
million in 1961-62 to 210 million in 1964-65 (42), There is evidence 
that in trle immediate aftermatrl .::>f Shal'pevl.lle, many c(,untry t'Jwns wel'e 
denude,j Qf pCll i.:e as l'e-iI1f'::>r.:ements were l'ushed t.::> the major urban 
flashp.::>ints (43), 
The aftermath of Sharpeville presented the rulers of South Africa with 
substantial ,ji ff i,:ul ties: an e,:()nomic ':l'isis that ha,j been thl'eatenin';J 
bef')l'e the Shal'peville period, a wl.thdl'awal ,::>f .:onfiden,:e fl'om fOI'eign 
investors, widespI'ead international ,jenun,: iation ,::>f apartheid (induding 
the threat of e,:,:momic sancti,)ns an.j the vil'tual e~<pulsion of S.:)uth 
Afri.:a from the Commonwealth), mass UI'ban strikes and demonstl'ations 
inside the ':'Juntry and the outbreak of rural unrest particular ly in 
Pondoland, The I'ulers themselves were 'undecided as to which path t.) 
tread: whether simply to pursue 'separate development· or adopt some 
form elf concession t'Jward urban blacks, As the Cape Nationalist 
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newspaper. Die Burger, wrote in an editorial in late MaT'.:h: 'Our 
legislation must give top priority to a re-consideration of the position 
of Natives in the cities with an open and realistic heart and a 
wi 11 in.~ness t.;) ,j.:. what was ne.:essary i 11 .jUI' si tuati.jn'. N.jtwi thstanding 
their defi.:iencies, the 'QI,::! meth.jds' shook the power ,:af the state. What 
was needed was a way .:>f cons.j1 idating and e}<tel1ding the gains. 
Wi thin trle C,:mgress leadership the dominant view was that the emergen,:y 
revealed that the Nati.:malist government was in dil'e tN)uble, n,:at 
knowing wt"li.:h way t,:. turn, and that the broad democratia: strategy c.f 
CQI1.~res·:; was l'eapil1g its I'ewal'd. Bdan Bunting summed up this view when 
he wrote in 1961: 
Afrikaner nationalism has reached the peak of its possible 
strength and is already ded ining. It has pl'oved unable t.J win 
allies, apart fl'om its paid servants, among any other secti'Jn of 
the p'Jpulatiol1. The English-speaking South Africans are mOI'e 
anata.~onistic than evel' before ... On the other hand, Afri,:an 
nationalism grows persistently in strength ... The attitude of a 
large section of the public ... has been drastically changed by a 
successi,:m of government defeats - the forced departure from the 
Commonwealth, the series of anti-apartheid votes in the United 
Nations General Assembly, the collapse of the treason trial, It 
is obvious to all that Nationalist Afrikanerdom cannot long 
survive the combination of its internal and external enemies, 
The pressures for change '" are enormous and grow all the time, 
Nationalist isolation has never been 50 complete as now, The 
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mood of ':':)I1f idence an).)n';J the non-whites is mat.:hed by the tempel' 
.::.f uncertainty, helplessness and ... srleer neqation in 
Nati.::.nalist l'anks ... (44) 
From this perspective it was precisely because the strategy of isolating 
the Nationalists was I"s,)rking that thel'e was a need for a change in 
meth.)d t.) complete the I'.)ut. As Buntin~;! put it, • nevel' sin.:e the 
National ist government came t.J power have condi tions been m'Jre 
prelpi tious for an all-out assaul t on trle citadel of apartheid' (45). The 
view that thel'e was a rev.)lutb:mal'Y ':I'isis in S.Juth Afdca, echoed by 
many of the lea.jin.~ repl'esentatives 'Jf C.)ngress, was wishful thinkin.~ 
';:Iiven the .:ir.:umstances of the time. The mass strike had exhausted 
itself. It had not been extended into the industrial heartlands of the 
Rand, it had n.Jt 1 inked up with the rural unrest and it had not 
translated itself int.) any form of dual power. It is an interesting 
footnote that while Hirson stressed the strength of the apartheid state 
and Bunting stressed its weakness, from these ')PP,)sing starting points 
they both saw the need for the adopti.:m of nelll methods. 
At the initiative of Congress a furthel' attempt was made to organise 
mass pressure on the government using the old methods. A conference of 
leaders from the C.)ngress Alliance, the PAC and from other .~roups was 
called for Decembel' 1960. The PAC soon withdrelll, claiming that such 
conferences achieved nothing but ANC domination and served only to place 
the african people under the spell of foreign elements and ideologies, 
The ANC lIIent ahead lIIith the conference anyway, which met on the 25th and 
26th March 1961. The conference demanded that the government prepare a 
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national cClI1venti.:m ,::of elel:ted l'epl'esentatives of all adul t men and 
Wljmen Ijn an equal basis irl'espective clf ra,:e, cl::olour, creed or other 
limitation by 31 May 1961. It warned that failure by the government to 
.:ompl y w,:,uld be met by massive deml::onstrations f I'om the 29th to the 31 st 
of May coinci,jino;J with the prl::odamation of ~;outh Africa as a republic. 
The likelihood that the o;Jovernment would comply was minuscule. Critics 
of the stay-away, pal'ticularly those in PAC wh'j opposed and bl::oycl:sttelj 
it, argue,j that ,::one of its main shortl:I::omin~~s was that the C,::ono;Jress 
leadership l:hQse t'j f'::OI:us ,::on an issue that was essentially to do with 
white politil:s and clf little interest tl:;' blal:~: workel's: namely the 
del:laratil::on ,:,f Sl::outh Afril:a as a I'epublic. The ,:hoi':e l::of Republil: Day as 
the c .. :casion tl:O put f,:orwar,j the demand for univel'sal suffrage and a 
den~ocl'atic constitution, by serving to identi fy the Congress wi th anti-
republ icanism, brought tl::O the ears ,:of the PAC echoes of the ANC I sold 
rel ian.:e l::on the British Empire to confront the Boers. Mandela sought to 
countel' this impression, saying that the campaign I did not mean that 
conference prefel'red a n,onarchy to a republican form of gl::overnment' (46) 
and that the PAC' s objections had ml::ore to dl:O with factional rivalries 
than with politi,:al principle. 
When the government and the opposition unsurprisingly failed to respond 
to the demands of Congress, it was decided on the 14th of April that the 
three day strike would take place with Mandela, working from 
underground, as its chief organiser. The state was forewarned and some 
10,000 africans were arrested in advance of the stay-away, ostensibly 
for pass offences, The state passed a new law, the General Law Amendment 
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A,:t, allowin,;! f'Jr the detentiQn 'Jf persons for twelve days without bail. 
The stay-away be';Jan as planned, its a,:tual effe,:tiveness m:ot easy t,::o 
gua'3e. I twas l'ep'JI'ted that it met with s,::ome su,:,:ess in J,)hannesburg 
(with 40-60% of the workforce on strike) and in Port Elizabeth and the 
Cape (wi th ::::0-40% ,::on stl'ike) but a p'),)r response in I)).)st 'Jther ,:entres. 
The immediate assessment 'Jf leading figures in C,::ongress ,)f the success 
of the stay-away was p'Jsi ti ve. A 'tremend'Jus SUPPQI't f'Jr the strike 
,:all' was I'ep,:>pted by SACTlJ (espe,:ially al)),)n'3 clothing, te~:tiles, 
,:anning, launder in,;) and fUI'ni ture workers) and a sUI'vey ':arl'ied 'Jut by 
SACTU argue,j that: 
I,rJ'JPkel's who are ,::or'Janised into trade unic,ns al'e More reponsive 
to a PQlitical call than unorganised workers. Their trade union 
a':tivity has given thel)) heightened political consciousness and 
they als'J respond mOI'e readily when the appeal is made 'In a 
factory as opposed to a residential basis as they feel that 
ther'e is less ,:han':e ,:>f dismissal if the wh,)le fa,:tory is 
i nvol ved. (47) 
New ~ge a,:o:laime,j the strike as the most widespread on a national scale 
that the country had ever seen (48). Mandela wrote that' industrial 
workers in the key centres once again answered the call for political 
action' and that 'the strike in Port Elizabeth was more widespread by 
far on the second day than on the first'. Noting 'the wide support the 
stay-away received from students of all races' and that 'the Nationalist 
government was severely shaken', Mandela concluded that 'this campaign 
remained an impressive demonstration of the strength of our 
organisation, of the high level of political consciousness attained by 
our people, and of their readiness to struggle against the most 
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il1timidatil1',;j odds', He a,j,jed that the ':'Jl'Jureds ill Cape T'Jwn an,j P'Jrt 
Elizabeth • I'espo:mde,j splendidly' in .:c,ntrast tc, 1960, (,49), 
N'Jnetheless em the seccll1d ,jay 'Jf the stay-away i"landela told the w')\'~:el's 
t'J l'etUI'I' t'J w,jrk as 'the strike was n,jt the national success I had 
h'Jpe.j f'JI", He added 'Jmin,)us1y that' this ,:l'Jses a chaptel' in ,)ur 
rneth'Jds ,)f p'jliti,:al acti'jn' (50), With the banning of the ANC and PAC 
thel'e was li ttle '::>1',~anisatiQn il' the t'Jwnships and the state reponse was 
th,)l"jugh an,j severe, Mandela n,)w attributed the strike's la,:k Qf su,:cess 
b'Jth tQ state l'epl'essiQn and to el'rOl'S c'Jmmi tted by C'Jngress, He sin',;jle,j 
out the appeals f'JI' n'Jn-vi,jlence put out by the leadel'ship whier, ',:,)uld 
easily have been interpreted as instru,:ti'Jns a9ainst pi':ketin'~' and 
pointed to the weaknesses of '.::>rganising a strike without picket lines', 
Despi te the repressi.::>n and the el'I',JrS, Mandela con,: luded that 'the 
stl'ike was wi tness to the 9reat political matur i ty of th,)se strugglin9 
fol' thei!' l'ights in S'Juth Afl'i,:a' and that' the pe'Jple emerged mo!'e 
cQnfident. unshaken by the prognoses trlat they had failed. that strikes 
coul,j lin') loJnger w'Jrk"', He added that the strike was further 
strengthened by 'the climate of world opini'Jn' treating S'Juth Africa as 
an 'is'Jlate', The history of this event is vel'y confusing, Why did 
Mandela both praise the response of workers and call off the strike 
after the first day saying that it had not been a suc,:ess? why did he 
say that it represented 'a close to our methods of political action'? 
The answer is not at all clear. Mandala indicated that what he had in 
mind by new methods was not a turn to armed struggle but rather a mass 
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non-c·:' 11 abo rat i .:tn .: ampa i qn in wl"l i c 1"1 I' e f usa 1 t.:t pay ta}<:es IAh:'U 1 d .)c C upy a 
central place, 
Othel' c·:tn)mentators warned a';Jainst the dl'awin9 of hasty conc lusions TI'om 
tl"le alle';Jed failul'e of the strike and in pai'ti.:ular against any tUI'n 
away from mass organisation to armed struggle, In a perceptive article 
on 'Techniques .:t1 Revolt· in Hfrica South. a 'speCial .:orrespondent' 
a"gued against what he saw as the emel'.~in';J view that the stay-at-h'Jme 
was a failure and that • the disenf rancl"lise.j cannot liberate themselves 
except by methods I)f individual terrol'ism, violent sabota';Je an.j eventual 
armed rev.:,lt·, The writer outlined the suc.:esses whi.:h trle strike had 
achieve.j n.)twi thstanding its limitations and the QPposi ti.:,n it 
encountered fl'om PAC and the Anti-CAD: 
Those .)f us who expected, " a breakdown of the state's 
organisation al'e inc lined to admit defeat, " but they have a 
wr,)"g .:.)n.:eption ,)f the purpose and functions of mass pol i tical 
action", Many observers claim that the constitutional issue did 
not appeal t.) the 'politi.:ally immature' Africans who are 
concerned mainly with the removal of specific grievances", 
People who argue that the demand for the vote is untimely must 
surely be blind to the state of opinion at home, " Not the least 
valuable of the lessons that Africans learned was that the 
Coloured shared their detestation of colour discrimination and 
were as willing as they to risk imprisonment and loss of jobs in 
the cause of liberation .. , The object of a mass campaign is to 
harass the governMent, put it on the defensive, hamper its 
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nl)I'mal I)pel'atil)ns and undel'mine confi,jence in its stabil i ty, , , 
In trlese l'espec ts the stay-away al:hieved a I\\a.;;lni f icent 
success, " The ,:ampaign, by un.jel'mining cl)nf i.jen.:e in the 
govel'nment, helpe.j tCI .jeta.:r'1 support f rmll it and t,) sharpen the 
demand also among whites fol' pal'liamental'Y reform", So fal' 
therefcll'e f rom having been a f ai IUl'e, the stay-h.,me campaign 
acc.,mplished many impCll'tant resul ts, ('Sl) 
This special cl)rrespondent may have been minimising the problems in the 
conception and execution of the strike but his conclusion I)ffered a 
pres.:ient warnin.;} a';Jainst what was l'apidly emerginl;j as a new orth.:)d,,)<:y 
wi thin sec tions of the 1 iberatic.n movement: 
The pel:)ple whl' den,:>unce sUI:h f,::.rms of mass al:til),' and wh" by 
impl ieatUm if n.:>t in words a.jv.:).:ate l'e.:ourse to terr.:)rism and 
violence, cannot show that more will be gained by these n)eans, 
Mass prl:>tests and the pol i tical str ike rlave pr.:)ved to be 
effel:tive weapons .:)f sabotage and harassment, valuable agen.:ies 
I:>f pl:>li ti,:al education and I:>l'ganisati.:m. and unrivalled methods 
I:>f detaching whi te support f r.:>m the g.:>vernment and it!:> apal'theid 
policie!:>, The!:>e are the aim!:> of political warfare on which a 
disenfranchi!:>ed people must rely, (52) 
In the national leader!:>hip of Congress. by contrast, key figures moved 
to the view that the old methods were no longer appropriate and that 
recourse to violence was the only l'oad, The Communist Party appear!:> to 
have already come t.:> this deci!:>ion prior to the Republic Day action, 
which might go some way toward explaining the peculiarities surrounding 
it: why a utopian demand was made at the start? why it wa!:> called off 
after one day? why the intitially favourable assessment of its results 
-415-
was reversed? While it was certainly true that the old strategic methods 
were found wanting, the question remains as to why a turn to armed 
stru,;},;}le appeal'ed as the reme1jy for their defects, 
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eh 12 
The Turn to Arm~j Struggle 
All the ma.i.:>r se.:tions of the libel'ati.:>n IIK.vement made sirililal' diaqn.:.ses 
of the defects present in the old methods. They lay. it was said, in 
pacifism and legalism, The cure for the old ailments followed from the 
diagnosis, It lay 1n the abandonment of pacifism and legalism and more 
Dositlvelv in the turn to armed struggle, The three most significant 
sections of the liberation movement each established its own armed wing, 
Con';lress fOl'med l.lmk.::ant.:. We Siwe (Spear .::af the Nation)' the PAC f.:.rmed 
Poqo (Alone) and an alliance of radicals and trotskyists formed the 
Nati.jnal COllul,i ttee of Libel'ation. late!' known as the Af r i.:an Resistan.:e 
M'Jvement (ARM), In a.jdition a small gl'Oup made up fl)c.stly Qf f.jl'mel' Unity 
Movement a.:tivists, f'JI'med the Vi Chu Chan Club, latel' kn'Jwn as the 
National Liberation FI'Qnt, These different armed bodies were both 
organisationally and politically distinct, each adopting its own 
distinctive fOl'm Qf al'med struggle, l.lmkonto went for disciplined 
sab'Jtage by select sab'Jteul's aimed at installations like pylons and rai 1 
lines but n.jt at pe'Jple, F'Jr Umkont.) the prospe.:t .::af m'Jvin.~ fl")1\) 
sabotage toward guerilla warfare was put on the agenda but not adopted. 
poq.) advo.:ated mass insurrection based on the en.:.juragement of 
spclntaneous violence fl'om bel.)w and aime.j its .::awn violence at persons as 
well as material symbols of white society, The ARM ch'Jse sabotage 
against property but found itself by default also killing civilians, 
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Various individuals out of the control of the armed organisations used 
~hem as an umbrella to execute their o~n forms of violence, 
Arilon'? the genel'al infJ.uen.:es t,erlin,j the turn t,:, arms, Le,:. Kupel' , trlc,u';lh 
himself committed to non-violence, dre~ attention in 1960 to the 'patent 
suc.:esses of violent action' elsewhere in Africa, 'Who could have 
foretold the constitutional and social changes in Kenya, following upon 
the t'iaLI I'lc: .. u. I Kuper asked, '01' the quid:: pace of c,:.nsti tuti'Jnal ref Ol'fil 
in tne 8elgian Congo after the riots of Leopoldville?' (1) An official 
r,ist.:.ry ,:,f trle Aj\lC has l"l,:oted that 'the suc.:esses of armed stl'u~~gle in 
Algeria and the victory of the Cuban revolution in Latin Amel'ica weI's 
sour.:es of great inspil'ation to our people' (2). The works of Regis 
Oebray and Che Gueval'd. wel'e widely I'ead in left wing drcles ~ith their 
sug.~sstion that .:me ':.Juld cI'eate the obje,:tive .:on.jitiColiS fIJI' the 
revolutionary ovel'throw of the state thl'ough armed resistance. Che 
Guevara's 'Guel'illa Wal'fal'e' was distributed among activists in South 
Afl'i;:a with its ,j'Jctl'ine of action: 'A l'ev'Jlutic,n .joes not have t'J c.e 
oelaye,j unti 1 evel'ything is ready. The rev'Jluti'Jn itself can make things 
ready' , 
For tl"'.e Communist Party J'J Slovo echoed this view when he recounted that 
'the deliberate ,:reation of IJI'ganised groups which embark upon 
prl:otl'acted armed revolutionary stru.~gle to transfON1\ $'J.:iety at a time 
IIIhen the moment IJf insurre,:tbJn ha,j \1I:)t yet matul'ed ... lends a spe,:ial 
stamp t'J the \'evoluti'Jnary gueri 11a struggles IIIhich have punctuated 
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re,:ent histC'I'V fl"")fll China to Vj.etnam' (:3), In tile early 1'360s armed 
struggle was also on the agenaa in the Portuguese colonies of Guinea-
Bissau. Mozambique an~ Angola and theorised by revolutionaries like 
Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Nato. Guerillarism was in the air and there 
were few on the left in South Africa who resisted its attractions, 
umkonto We Sizwe 
The cecision of Conaress to turn to armed struggle is wrappeo in a 
certain amount of rovsterv. It was under pressure of being outflanked on 
the left by Poqo and the National Committee of Liberation, but the 
intel'nal ini tiative appeal's t,) have C')file fr.;)m the Communist Pal'ty, At 
its December 1960 conference, that is, before the Republic Day strike, 
the SACP res,:> 1 ved in f avoul' .jf a carl\pai':;Jn of ec,)n,)mic sab,)tage t,) 
precede a guerilla war, Six months later in June 1961, immediately after 
the Republ i,: D.:..y sir ike, Umk,jnto We !:;izwe (MK) was f')I'med by a ';JI"jUP of 
Congress activists, Including a number of SACP leaders, as an non-racIal 
armed un.jergroun,j in,jependent 'jf C,)n':;Jress itself. The decisi'jn was ma,je 
by a small .~r.jup ,)f pe'jple wi th, natural I y, enough, n,j debate among the 
broa.der ranks ed Con'~I'ess (4), In N'jvembel' 1961 Fighting Talk carrie,j an 
artid.e sayin.~ that 'pea.:eful solutions have become in\possible when ,jne 
of the contending giants resorts c,jntinua.lly t.j f.jrce', It also 
commented that in spite of his Chl'istian pa,:ifism 'the Chief (LutulU 
will move with his people and his times' (5), 
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MK conducted its Initial acts of sabotage on December 16 1961 and Issued 
a flyer explaining Its actions, It dissociated ltself from the Committee 
for National Liberation, which had itself already began its sabotage 
campaign, it announced that it was a new and indepenaant body formed by 
africans but including in its ranks individuals of all races, It said 
that it fully supported the national liberation @)vement and that its 
members placed themselves 'under the overall political guidance of that 
movement', It a,jds,j that (~overnment i'epl'essi.:m I-,ad left it 'n.) .:II':)i,:e' 
but t.o f iqht, but e;.::presse,j the hc,pe that 'even at this late hour, " we 
will bring the government and its supporters to their senses", before 
matters reach the desperate stage of civil war' (6), 
ll1i tially the l'elatb:m between C,:mgress and Umk'Jntcl was unresoLved, The 
Natal leaders ,)f Con'~l'ess s.)ught dari f ication at a June 1962 national 
meetil1'~ ,:;.f tr,e jClint Conl~ress e)(ecutives an,j were tol,j that Sl)me ANC 
leadel's were in I:,:mta.:t wi th Urilkc,nt,j and that the ,j\'qanisaticln was 
.jesil~nelj t.:) undel'take sabl)tal~e in l:onnel:ti')l1 wi th nl)n-viQlent ANC 
,:ampaigns, Ac,:,)rding to R,)wley Al~enstein, a leading cl)n~:}ressi te in Natal 
,)pp,)sed tQ the tUl'n tel al'med stl'uggle, Natal pl'essed f'Jr and w,)n a 
guarantee that IJmkontl) would tailol' its activities tl) specifi,: ANC 
requests (7), The Natil)nal High C.:)mmand I)f I)mk,)ntQ ,:ol1ceded that it 
would be 'at all tillies subject... to the p,)li tical l;,Iuidance of the ANC 
and would not undertake any diffel'ent fOl'm I)f al:tivity from that 
contemplated without the consent of the ANC' (8), The central committee 
of the SACP, h,)wever, according to Al'enstein issued a statement al'guing 
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that Umkonto was an independent body which could not be reasonably 
F01' It·; pal't the ANC was still committed t,) sustaini\1'~ mass p,)liti':al 
action through community and trade union organisations alongside tne 
sabotage activities of Umkonto, On his trip abroad between January and 
July 1962 Mandela emphasised in his speech at Addis the need for mass 
struggle to continue, noting that 'certainly the days of civil 
disobedience, of strikes and mass demonstrations are not over and we 
1962, that is one and a half years after the formation of Umkonto, that 
a fOl'mal ANC-Umkont,) l'elati':'\1ship was a.:k\1l:)wledl~ed by the ANC at it·; 
national conference in Lobatsi, 8echuanaland, A report of the conference 
pN)ceedin';;Js was i.ssued by tt-Ie ANC 11ati.)nal e::<:e.:utive in Apl'il 1'36:3 
referring to the two wings of the national liberation movement: 'the 
mass p'Jli ti,:al win,;:! speal'heade,j by tt-,e ANC, " and the spe,:ialised 
military wing represented by Umkonto', It re-affirmed the importance of 
mass a.:ti.:m: '·)ur emphasis stt 11 I'emains mass p.)1 i ti.:al aeti.)n, The 
political wing will ever remain the necessary and integral part of the 
fight·, It also seems to have affirmed the precedence of the military 
nee1js I,t Umkonto I)ver mass action when it p,'esente,j pol i tical agi tatit)n 
as • the I:>nly way of ':I'eating the atn\osphe,'e in whi,:h nli li tary acti.:>n can 
mos t e ff eo: t i ve 1 y I)pe rate' (10) , 
-42i-
[n 1963 the ANC interpreted mass political action as the formation of a 
'united front' of all anti-government political forces, The language of 
tne united front carried over trom the late 1950s but it was now 
afforced a totally dlfierent content, The term now represented the 
buileJin'.=i of 'a. pel'manent (1'isis' in wni,:r, 'the pe.:oplt:? must 1'esist 
oppression all the tlms, they must refuse to be governed, " they must 
take the initiative to attack without giving the rulers time to reflect' 
(11), The ANC called for agitation and propaganda on every issue: wages, 
rents. ejections from homes. decortations, bannings. arrests, stock 
culling, Bantu autnorities, forced removals, mass starvation and so 
In the same yea I' trle African Communist s.:.ught t,:. I'e-.jef ine the al'ena of 
mass a.:tic,n as f.:. 11.:.ws: 
Every attempt to I'edress 01' rectify a local or partial grievance 
is ne.:essa\'ily ,:onne,:ted with and .:an only tie w.:.n by the .jefeat 
of the National ist g.)vernment i tsel f and the end of wrti te 
minol' i ty rule, ,. D.:>es that Rlean that it is useless to .:ampaign 
on any sort of local issue or partial grievance? .. , No, that 
w.:>uld be WI'OI'g ... Real liberation leaders .:annot escape their 
duty to take pal't in their evel'yday struggles f.:.r higher wages, 
against pass laws. group areas and mass evictions, against Bantu 
authorities and bantustans.,. It means that each .:rucial 
struggle. .. wi 11 inevi tabl y .jevelop into a stl'uggle f,:>r state 
power. (12) 
New condi tions, dec lal'ed the SACF', demand new methods. Legal mass work 
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nad to continue but now constituted only 'a minor side of work", 
iJ.leqal wOl'k i·; ti-18 major si,je' (13), The masse';; wel'e enj.::.ine,j to 'fiqht 
oack on every front .. , merging every l.::.cal or partial struggle into a 
l'(li,~hty ri.vel' of people's insUl'recti.:)n', If the united ti'ont of !958 was 
based on the conscious containment of working class militancy, the 
united tl'(lnt of 1962-6:3 was base,j ()ll pel'l'fIanent ,:l'isi.s a.nd 
un,;}ovel'nability, The wor,js l'ernained the same but tt-Ieir meanin,;! was 
entil'ely transformed, 
The readiness of the masses themselves to resort to violence appeared to 
Congress as a cl'ucial determinant of its turn to armed struggle, Mandela 
place,:! much emphasis on this aspect, when speaking fl'"m the dock three 
years after the tUl'n t.) al'ms, he p.)inted to the ';lap whb:rl had .,;Il'.::.wn in 
the l'350s t,etween p.,pulal' (.)n,:epti.~ns ,jf vi'jlen,:e and the n.~n-violent 
principles of the ANC: 
For a long time the people had been talkin.,;l of violence - of the 
,jay when they v,h~uld fi.~ht the white man and win ba..:k their 
(,juntry - an.j we, the leaders .,f the ANC, had nevel'theless 
always prevai led up,)n them to av,ji.j vi.jlen.:e an.j t" pUl'sue 
peaceful meth,:"js", It ,:ould not be denied that OUI' pol i,:y i,) 
achieve a non-I'a,: ial state by non-violen.:e had a,:hieved n,::>thin';I 
and that our followers were beginning t,::> l.::>se conf idence in this 
policy, (14) 
Mandela argued that violence was alrea,:ly a I'egular featul'e .,f the Soutrt 
Afr iean p.)li ti.:al scene and that the period which ended in 1961 was .,ne 
of non-violence for the ANC but not f'::>r the masses: 
ordered to carry passes: there was violence in 1958 with the 
enforcement of cattle culling in Sekhukuneland; there was 
violence in 1959 when the peoole of Cato Manor protested against 
trle pass I'aids; there was vi,:,lence in l'3E,O when the gC1vernment 
attempte,j t;:; impose Bantu al..lirlorities in F'omJoland", In 1'361 
there had been riots in Warmbaths and all this time the Transkei 
had been a seething mass of unrest, Each disturbance pointed 
clearly to the inevitable growth among Africans of the belief 
trl~t violen':e was the only way out, , " <: 15), 
Manoela drew the conciusion that unless responsible leaderShip were 
given to canalise and control the feelings of the people, there would be 
outbreaks of terrorism which would intensify bitterness and hostility 
between the ra,:es, He viewed the pl")Spect ,::.f a dvil war between the 
races with alarm, since it would mean 'the destruction of what the ANC 
stood for'", with civil war racial peace would be more difficult than 
ever to achieve' (16), He believed that violence was inevitable, so that 
the point was not to avoid it but rather to direct it, If the danger lay 
in unplanned spontaneity, the solution lay in propel' c'Jntrc,l, 
The .:hoice of sabotage as the preferred form 'Jf violen,:e \lJas made sin':e 
it did not • involve loss of life and it offered the best hope f';)r future 
race relations, Bitte,'ness would be kept to a minimum' (17), Economic 
sabotage would scare capi tal from the c.Juntry and in the long l'un be a 
heavy drain on the economi,: life of South Africa, Eventually white 
voters \lJould be forced to recon.ider their p'Jsi tion, The attacks \IJOuld 
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those i:.eopJ.e wh.:. 1,1,181'8 Ijj'.;;inq tile ad.)pti,)n of violent meth.xls, , , an.j 
concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger line and 
were fighting back' (18), Avoiding loss of life. sympathy for the cause 
wc.uld be I'c.used in .)ther c.)untries, On s.:.rl,e c.ccasi.:,ns a larger claim was 
made for sabotage, Thus in an ANC leaflet in May 1963 it was arguea that 
'smasrled railway-lines, damaged pyl.:.ns carrying electri.:ity a.:r.jSS the 
countl'Y. bombed out petrol dumps cut Vel'woed off from his power and 
leave him helpless' <: 19), 
The strategy of • properly controlled violence' led Congress into an 
arttbivalent l'elaticl11 to 1.)ca1 initiatives, In 1'36:3 Afl'ican Communist 
wl'ote tr,at even unplanned .jespel'ate retal iation steels the fQI'.:es .)f 
liberation and that they did not take a merely critical attitude towards 
the • poq·) , type outbreaks: 'they d.) n.jt, " seek to .jampen .jl' .jis.:.jul'a.~e 
the revoluti.jnal'y spirit abl'Qad, " Instead they aim t·) harness tr,at 
spil'it· (20), Yet it als.) wl'ote that 'l'esD.)nsible leaders .:ann.,t mel'ely 
f ,,11 ow the p.)1 i.: ies .)f desperate ami impatient men wh.j grow reck less and 
.:lamour fQr any S.jl't e,f action l'egardless of the .:.)nsequen.:es' (21), On 
the .:)11e hand it said that they c.,uld n.,t and sh.,uld not restrain the 
people and that a.:tion ha.j to be taken on l.j(a1 initiative when and 
where the masses were ready, On the other hand, it said that reprisals 
and blind rioting would only \'esul t in serious political setba.:ks for 
their cause, dama'~ing the pl'estige of Congress at home an,j abroad a'1d 
exposin.~ the people to a '.:rushing defeat', L.jcal a.:ti.,n had thus 
always to be 'principled in acc.)rdance with the established p.::>licy of 
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tne national leadership', Poco was analysed as 'in essence an 
uncontrolled and violent reaction to oppression, " an outlook of blind 
r~venge on Whites, " not an organised political movement with an 
resistance was not yet possible it was first necessary to raise the 
consciousness of the masses through organised non-mass violence or in 
other words sabotage, 
i.&il'itin';j in trle Star c,:)ncel'nin9 the i'362-63 peri,),j, Walter !:;isu1u 
commented that africans in the Western Cape 'were seething and planning 
al:ts .)f vicI1enl:e' and tt-Iat 1 the position was vel'y desperate indeed', 
Mbeki was sent d,:.wn to 1 appease the Africans, " A plan was wlJrke,j IJut, , , 
fOI' an anti-pass ,:ampaign which would ,:ulminate in d national strike and 
trle b J.JI'l1in
'
;j of pdsses, We hd1j in mind that by June we w()uld be l'ea1jy f()I' 
a national strike, But this did not materialise, " The idea WdS put into 
the oackgl")Un,j, It wa·~ t,) have been the major ANC ,:ampaign I)f 196::::' 
(22), Tt-Ie Ijiffb:ulty fa,:ing CI)nl~I'ess was not dissimilal' to that whil:h it 
faced in the Oefial1l:e Campaign, It sl:.ught tlJ stimulate mass action 
through the force of example - in the one case defiance and in the other 
sabotage - but it Ijid nClt want the blind l'iotinl~ and indiscriminate 
attacks on white .: ivil ians and property which went along wi th mass 
action, Congress .:ould find n,) way out IJf its dilemma, 
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Thel'e wel'e key fiqures within UI'IlkQntlj who, seein';j sab,jtaqe not as an en,j 
In itself but as tne first snot in a protracted struggle of the masses, 
made provision for the extension Qf sabotage into guerilla war, Mandela. 
said in court that the main purpose of his trip abroad in 1962 was to 
organise training for guerilla warfare, even though he conceded on his 
return that' it would be a long time before the possibilities of 
sabota',;je were e)<:hausted', An e,jitljrial in African C"mmunist in early 
1'36:3 -;aw the -~i9ni f il:ance ,:of sabotat;Je as an initial stage, desi'~ne,j tQ 
'inspire a mood of confidence among people', in 'a process of training 
and preparation for the building of a fOl'midable military force' and in 
this light believed that it took on 'an entirely new significance' (23), 
Am'jn'~ trle ,jQcuments fQund by the p'jlice in July 1963 at Riv'jnia, the 
headquarters of Umkonto, was a blueprint for moving toward guerilla war 
called 'Ope,'atiojn Mayibuye', It had not been finally apprQved by Umkl::ont'j 
or tr,,? ANC but it ,:offers eviden,:e of the strategic thinking ojf a 
significant wing of the movement, Its premise was that little if any 
scope e~<isted 'tl:)r the smashing of white supremacy other than by means 
'jf mass revoluti'jnary al:tion, the main content c,f whit:h is armed 
resistance leading t,::o victory by military means', and that In'j mass 
struggle which is not backed up by armed resistance and military 
offensive operations can hope to make a real impact', Since the 
immediate situatiQn was not revolutionary and the possibility of a 
general uprising was remote, a revolutionary situation had to be 
constructed: 'as in Cuba the general uprising must be sparked off by 
organised and well prepared '~uerilla 'jperations' (24), 
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The plan was to place in the field armed and trained guerilla bands 
whi Ie at the same time i';suin,;! I a qeneral .:all f'JI' unpI'e.:edented I'I)ass 
·~tru';Jgle, " both violent and n,::on-violent·, which t0gether w.::ould 1:I'eate 
havoc fol' the enemy and a boost to the peoole's mOl'ale, A provisional 
I'evolutionary government would be set up abroad and the country itself 
w.)uld be I bQmbal,.jed by a f l,).)d I;)f leaf lets by plane anl1OUI1I: inl~ the 
CI)l'l'Ifllel1Cement I)f OUI' al'med stl'u9g1 e, " anlj .:all il19 I)n the p')pulat iOl1 to 
rise against the goVel'l1ment ' , TQ prepal'e for this, local guel'illa gl'oups 
\\,h)uld be set up, sablJtage intensi f ied and pol i tical actvi ty inl:I'eased to:l 
dl'aw the masses in support of the guerillas, Eventually a full-scale 
9uer ilIa war inside the cl)untry wCluld develop in wMch the stru9g1e 
would I'ely on the support of the people for its protection and Qn the 
enemy f'Jr its supply of I~uns, Cuba was tt-Ie model to which appeal was 
made, 
There were thQse in Ul'Ilkont,) who were opposed t,) Operatiljn Mayibuye, In 
his tl'ial Braam Fisher described it as Ian entirely unrealisti,: 
brainchild of some y,)uthful and adventurous imagination", If there was 
ever a plan which a I'Ilarxist could not approve in the then prevai ling 
circuMstances, this was such a one", If any part of it at all could be 
put into .,peration, it could achieve nothing but disaster' (25), It 
would appear that others in Umkonto also opposed this plan, including 
Govan Mbeki and Dennis Goldberg, Fisher's statement expressed his belief 
that a revolutionary situation could not be brought into existence by 
what Jo Slovo was later to characterise in another context as Blanquism, 
-428-
that is. 'the belief that the actions of the small. heroic and dedicated 
1;ll'OUt:o will (In its (Iwn stimulate mass suppclrt' (2E.). 
Whi te soc iety did n,:,t under,;!,) a ,:hange of heal't as a l'esul t cd sab,)tal;:Je. 
On tr°le ,:ontl'al'V, as i"iandela rel:ol;:lnised later, 'the Wrli tes fai le,j tel 
respond by sugl;Jestinl;J ,:hange; they respondelj t,) I::OUI' call by suggestinl;J 
the laagel" (27), The Satujta';Ie A.:t became law in June 1962 in the fa,:e 
of United Pal'ty parliamental'Y opposition and lal'ge demonstrations. It 
allowed fol' 90-day detention without trial and defined sabotage broadly 
enouqh t.:. include o;tl'ike action, By July Ijver a hUndl'ed people had been 
banned aml fifty more were addelj in the ne)<:t eight I\\I)nths, Mandela was 
arrested on his return to South Afl'ica in August and in September COD 
""as banned and all meetings I)n Johannesburg Ci ty Hall steps ""ere 
prohibited fijI' I,ne year, In October-November Mandela ""as l::on trial and 
all pl'otest gatherinl~s ""ere pr"hibi ted until AP1'il 196:3, In Novembel' New 
~ge ""as banned but reappearelj temporarily as the Spark, The state 
pursued a vast programn)e of e~{pansil)n I)f its p'jlil:e and al'med fOl'ces, 
The passinl;:! of a series of security la""s, c(>upled ""i th sophisticated 
interrogatil::on techniques said to have been learnt from the French in 
Algeria, provided the state with information leading to the arrest of 
most of the experienced leaders of Umkonto, The arrests at Rivonia of 
the High Command and the subsequent abi li ty Ijf the regime to mop up the 
second level Umkonto leadership and its rank-and-file members decimated 
the underground, By 1964 Umkonto We Siz""e had been uprooted having 
reportedly committed 193 acts of sabotage and having ,:aused damage 
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estimated at under £100,000, By about 1966 little of the armed 
The view l'epeaiedl y e)<pressed by iJmkc,nto was that the weakness .;:.f the 
';jovel'nment made it VI.,lll1el'able to vi'jlel1t attad:, F,jl' example, a lead 
e,jit('l'ial in the Afl'i,:al1 Communist in late 1962, entitle,j 'H'jw :3tNn,~ is 
Verwoed?' declared that 'the reality is weakness', First, the 
'~IJvel'nment had n'j f l' iends abl'(lad whel'ea5 the f I'eedom fliljvement rlas 
genuIne fl'iends who would SUPPOl't it 'as soon as it entel's int.;:. a 
seri'Jus strug';lle f,;:.r !="jwer', With'Jut f,j\'eigl1 supp,:,rt, it a\'.;;Jued, \11:> 
govel'nmel1t (ould survive unless it rules with the consent of the 
maj'jl'ity 'Jf the. pe,jple. ::;econd, the South African state was weak 
compared to the classic colonial powers since 'its armed forces are 
slnaller, the p'jol ,jf wrlites is smaller, its armaments are inferic,r ... 
its industl'ial base smaller. .. it is isolated ... on the edge of a 
':\'i5i5' (2:3). In 1'36:3 the ~frican Communist repeated this theme, The 
I'e,~ime, it,: laime.j, was being ,jl'iven into a posi tion ,:;,f is.:;,lation abroad 
an,j at home; a min'jrity, however heavily al'med, cannot pl'evail over the 
great maj.jri ty .)f the people. Ea,:h f Ul' the I' act ,)f repI'essi,)n by the 
state, regardless ,)f its actual eff icacy, appeared as a sign of 
deepening ,:l'isis. The state was beset by contradictions but the Cl'udal 
point was that as armed struggle substituted for mass struggle, the 
state became ever stronger, having found a terrain which it could 
control more effectively than the mass struggles of the previous period, 
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The sab,:.tage .:ampai9n faile,j tl:' inl:ite the masses into a':ti':m. On the 
contrary, tne mass organisations of Congress collapsed under the strain. 
On the tl'ade unil:.n f 1'(lnt, SACT!), whid'l was nl::.t outlawe1j, .:ontinue,j t,::. 
operate but the focus on armed struggle within the liberation movement 
shi f telj it away from its tl'alje union pl'i,:'r i ties. ::;ACTI) srlared the view 
that the state was confronted by a revolutionary crisis. For example, 
its press statement on the Sabotage Bill said that the Bill was 'a 
re,:,:,,;:/ni ti()n 1,1 the devastatin9 blows deal t trle gljvernment by the 
resistance t,) apal'theid ... a last Iji teh stand c,f the wrli te supl'ema,: ists' 
(29). With victories like this, the movement did not need defeats. SACT!) 
ad')pted the language of w')l'king dass leadel'ship, declaring in 196:;: that 
workers are 'the pillar ... the spearhead ... the vanguard' of the 
libel'ati,:," struggle and that SACTU was aware of their 'histclric r,)le of 
leading the strugl~le' (:30). It even ,:alled ,:,n white workel's to 'st,jP 
their ',;jr1jup thinking' and 'think of trleir class interest'. The content 
it aSI:ribed tQ w
'
jl'kin'3 ,:lass leadership, however, was support for the 
armed struggle. Fei t has argued that the turn to armed strug';Jle hive,j 
,jff the best w'jrker militants fN)m SACTU: instead ,)f organising WI)rkel'S 
at the point of production, working class activists were either sent 
away Ijr willin'3ly '3ravitated away frl::>m the fal:tories to iJ''l\Kont'j and it 
was SACTlJ's spec i fie re,le to act as a feeder for this operation (31). 
Whatever the truth of this claim, SACTU's official historians have 
confirmed that 'many SACTU militants became active members Ijf 11K' (32) 
Individual unions continued to organise, In 1962 for instance Workers' 
Uni ty, SACTU ' s newspaper, picked out for special manti,:)n the struggles 
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of Durban Munio: ipal wlj\'k~\'s, Howi,:k Rubb~\' w.j\'k~rs and th~ Texti 1~ Unicm 
(whi·:h sol it under the pressures of p'j1 i ti,:al di f f e\' en.: es ). Workers 
UI1J. tyo b(,ast~d that I the Nle of SACTU halj ';;JI'ljwn t.::1 prlenomenal hei';;Jhts ' 
(33), but the NEC of SACTU received numerous complaints that it did not 
qive adequate SUPPCI\'t t'j individual unions .. that there was not en,juo;;Jrl 
factory organisation, that FOFATUSA was taking advantage of SACTU's lack 
elf trade union initiatives and s.j f.:orth. By th~ time of the 9th Annual 
Conference in March 1964, 45 SACTU officials and members had been 
detai ned or bann~d and f1tu.:h .jf the \'est ,:.f i ts 1ead~rship was in e~<i Ie. 
The CIJnfe\'enc~ Repo\'t ':'In.:e,jed that I the futu\'e f,ji' SACTU is '.;II'im': 
Our loyal and devoted officials are suffering privations in 
every .:tty in South Africa, unable to find employment anywhere 
since their bans, "But SACTU is not doomelj, " A t,'ade union is 
not the se.:retary in the off i.:e but the w.jrkel's in the 
factory", You are the trade union." Your unions are legal, Do 
not be intimidated", There is nothing to stop you getting 
together with your fell,;)w wljrkers, (34) 
The,'e may have been nothing t'J stop wor~:ers getting t.Jgether with fellow 
workers (except the law, the state and the empl.Jyers) but hereafter the 
officials of SACTU (which remained f.Jrmally legal) went into exile, 
leaving workers to get together without their help, The trade union 
organisation of black workers sunk to its lowest ebb for Many years, In 
1961 59,952 workers belonged to 63 unions in SACTU; by 1969 only 13 
unions with 16,040 meMbers were known to exist among african workers 
generally, It was an unhappy end for non-racial trade unionism in this 
period, brought about not just by the weight of repression and the 
-432-
structural weaknesses of tne black working class but also by a misplaced 
political conception of revolution, 
The official historiography and its critics 
In what it calle.j its 'revoluti.:mary pro.~ramme' ,:m .strat~gy· and Tactics, 
passed at its Third Consultative Conference at Morogoro in 1969, the ANC 
put f'Jrwal'd rts (.\,Im retr.:.spe.:tive a.:.:ount .,f the turl1 t.J armed stl'u'3'~le, 
The document sought to justify the decisions that were made in spite of 
the terr ible defeats triat were suf fered between the 1961 turn and trle 
1969 conference. It said that there had been 'no choice' but for the 
liberation movement t.::. break f rom the c.::.nstraints .::.f legal ism and non-
violence and move toward the revolutionary path of armed struggle. The 
state was bec.::.min,;) incl'easingLy fas,:ist in its methods. The masses were 
rea.:hi\1l;J .::.ut fo,' thei r .)wn vi'Jlent solutions. The .::.ld methods .)f mass 
stru.;}gle ',:ould n,::. lon.;}er be effectively empl.::.yed .. , (and) were 
.jem.::.nstrably n.::. l>::.nger feasible ... (since) all .:>pp.::.si ti.)n by legal ()r 
pea.:eful means was rendered impossible' (35). 
This acc.:>unt had the hallmark .)f a post hoc rati':)I1alisation rather than 
a critical re-evaluation. The feasibility of legal and peaceful means 
was an entirely different question from that of mass strikes and 
demonstrations which in South Afri.:a were unlikely to be legal or 
peaceful. In 1960-61, immediately before the turn to armed struggle, 
mass strikes were mounted which were deemed successful by the liberation 
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organisations at the time and certainly shook the apartheid regime, Mass 
filobilisati.)n decline.j aftel' the Republi.: Day stl'ike but many .)f the mass 
organisations wel'e still operating either under their own name or under 
pseu.jonyms, There was no reason to believe that the decline c.f mass 
fl\l:)oi 1 i";ati.)n un.jer the weight I)f state I'epression was pel'manent or 
lrreroediable, The sharp upturn in the economy which followed the 1960-61 
crisis did nl)t give support to the view that 'a revolutionary situation 
was unfolding in the country' (36), but it did provide favourable 
e.:.)nomi.: .:.)ndi ti.)ns fOI' l'e-c':Jl1stru.:tin.~ the w.)rkin.~ class m.)vement, The 
GOP in':I'ease.j by 7% pel' ~"nnum .)vel' trle s1:<: year peric.d between 1961 and 
1966 and rea.:hed '3,4% in 196:3; in 1962 g.)ld pI'.)du.:ti.)n I'ea.:hed re':')l'd 
levels, thel'e was a 50% in.:rease in building and a nea.rly 6% increa.se in 
se.:ondary industry; in 1964 the de.: line .)f f.)I'ei';J1l investment was 
reverse.j and ill 1965 lal'ge amounts of capi tal began t.:> enter the c.:>untl'y 
.lgain, These f.lcts wel'e well known but the 1969 cOI,ference omi tted to 
mention how a.jvantageous the gl'owth .:>f secondal'Y industry in 
particularly was to trade union and other forms of popular organisation, 
In what sense then were the old methods no longer feasible? Perhaps 
popular ol'ganisations would have been suppressed anyway, whether or not 
the turn to armed struggle had taken place, but this could not be 
foretold in advance nor could the mass organisations be therefore 
abandoned to their fate, History was turned on its head, The ANC 
defended its exclusive use .)f non-violent means in the 19505 on the 
ground that the leadership had to • relate to the masses and not just to 
it. advanced elements'; and that before the turn to armed struggle could 
occur, it was imperative to wait for the overwhelming majority of the 
people to experience 'disillusionment with the prospect of achieving 
liberation by traditional peaceful processes' and to learn 'through 
thei\' I:,wn participati.~n", that in the lc.nl~ run the pdvileges ,:,f the 
minority will only be wrenched from it by a reversion to armed combat' 
(:37), But wh,:. were the beal'e\'s of these illusions? t1andela revealed trlat 
Inany secti.::ms of the masses Ijid n.:>t share theil' leadel'sl ':'jn,mitments tel 
non-violence and that trle histOI'y ':.f the 1950s was n,:.t short .~f vi.:>lent 
c.:>nf\'ontatil:>ns between black WI:>rkel'S and state fO"I:es, The image l:of a 
Ijeep gul f between the nl:on-vi.~lent and vil:.lent phases I:;.f tr,e stru'~';Jle was 
true clf the ANC i tsel f but nl:>t I)f the masses, n·,ei r reality was ml:>I'e 
fluid as I:;.ne fl:>rm of struggle flowed inti:> another: strikes, 
demonstrations, stay-aways, civil disobedience, pickets, boycotts, self-
defence, riots and violent confrontations, If it was necessary for the 
leadership to wai t fl:>r the n\asses to e)c:pedence disi llusionment th,'ough 
thei r own partil: ipation, why then did the leadership not add theoretical 
lessons t.j the pl'al:til:al and find some n\eans (,~iven the constraints of 
law) of telling the n\asses that their struggles were doomed in advance? 
would this not have shortened the peril:>d I:>f study for the masses? 
In 1969 the turn to sabotage was re-interpreted as a first step on the 
road to guerilla warfare on the lines set out in Operation Mayibuye, 
This was despite the fact that neither Umkonto nor the ANC had endorsed 
Operation Mayibuye. The ANC now wrote: 
We understood that the main physical environment of such a 
struggle in the initial period is outside the enemy 
strongholds in the cities, in the vast stretches of our 
,:.:)un"tl'v·:;ide. The ('penin9 steps in 1961 - or';Janiselj satllJtaqe 
mainly in the urban areas - served a special purpose and was 
never advanced as a technique which would on its own either 
lead to the destruction of the state or even do it great 
material camage, (38) 
The soe,: i<:,1 !:)urp,:,se IJf upban sab
'
Jtage was seen as layinl~ the f,:,undati'Jn 
of guerilla war in three ways; by creating 'an experienced professional 
military apparatus', by demonstpating that the movement was makinq 'a 
sharo ana ooen break with the processes of the previous per loa' and by 
demonstrating the need 'to provide an effective method for the overthrow 
of white supremacy through pLanned rather than spontaneous activity'. 
Wt-tat went wl'ong acclJl'ding to this acc,:,unt wepe tt-tree fal:t'Jrs, First the 
vi,: i,:,u-;;ness ':', the state's response ,:aul;jht the n .... :>Vement uI,prepared, As 
Sl!!}chaba put it .. 'still suffel'ing frcln', the habit clf semi-lel;jal days priIJ" 
to trle t,anninq ,:,f the ffilJVement, we halj n'Jt yet devise,j a til;!ht 
conspiratorial method of work", Notorious traitors emerged' (39), 
Second, the movement was over-optimistic concerning the 'readiness of 
the ,:,utside wl:,l'ld and in particulal' (If the emergent nations "f Afrb:a to 
iSl,late :301Jth Af l'i,:a I and 'Jl1del'-estimated the tenal: i ty ,::of the 
imperialist forces to support the apartheid regime, Third, the policy 
Ijepende,j on 'the high level '::.f al:tive mili tanl:y am,:mgst the pe.::ople' 
which was not in the event sustained, In shlJrt failure was blamed on the 
the l'epressiveness 'Jf the state and its allies, ()n traitol's in the ranks 
and lack of support from independent African states and 0" the declil,ing 
mi li tanc:y .::.f the masses. The tu'~n to armed stl~uggle itself was e>o:empted 
from any criticism e>o:cept for its over-.~ptimism in relation t,~ its 
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friends and under-estimation of its enemies, The turn to armed struggle 
was finally Justified on the cryptic grounas that 'without activity of 
this nature our wnole political leadership may have been at stake both 
being outflanked by the PAC and other left oppositions, Did this mean 
that even if the poiicy was a wrong one for the masses, considerations 
of maintaining political leadership were more important? 
Writing In tne Mld-1970s Jo Slovo ecnoed this official view, He concedea 
examlning only the results of MK sabotage in its narrow 
imrne.jiattr! str!nstr!, cri tics .. , havtr! had a gala day, " Sabotage 
of property", could neither bring about the downfall of the 
government nor draw into action those not already in the 
fairly small conspiratorial group of activists, The 
,jl";Janised beginnin,~s of sabota';Je an.j the semi-spontane,jus 
o)utbupsts of the PAC-inspire.j Poq.:. in 1962 a.:ted t"IOWtr!Vtr!1' as 
a spur to .~overnment ':'junter-action, .:ulminatin.;;! in blows 
which led to the virtual destruction of all effective levels 
.jf Itr!a.jel'ship an.j .jl,.~anisation wi thin the .:ountry' (40). 
Slovo further conceded that serious mistakes were made but not that 'all 
the reverses were .jue t.j avoidable errors', He too .: laimed that sabota.;;!e 
was seen as the first stage of a lon.;;!-term, mul ti -staged campaign of 
disciplined violence in which a hard core of trained militants, 
supported by mass-based political activity and external aid, would 
confront stiite power wi th the ultimate goal .jf seizing it, While 
agreeing that this did not materialise. he nonetheless argued that 
sabotage served as 'a politically useful bridge between the period of 
non-violent campaigning and the future people's armed struggle', 
According to Slovo. Operation Mayibuye had been elaborated by the High 
Command of Umkonto and 'the broad conception behind the plan cannot be 
faulted', What went wrong by this account was only that 'the objective 
obstacles to the implementation of such a plan in the 1963 South African 
sItuation were not properly appreciated', The plan itself, abstracted 
from the material conditions of its execution, seemed faultlessl 
:::lovo conce.jed one fLll'thel' an.j imp')I'tant fa.:tol': 'the in':I'easin.~ 
concentration on military pl'eparation helped to generate an attitude 
both within the organisation and among the people that the fate of the 
stl'uggle depended upon the sophisticated actions of a professional 
conspiratorial elite, The iMPortance of mass work was theoretically 
appre.:iated, but in pI'a.:ti':e r(lass p.::aliti.:al w·::al'k was minimal', It is 11.::at 
the peri,)d of sabota.~e if the ,)l.j meth':lIjs c,f mass n.)n-vi.)lent a·:ti.)n 
wel'e ei<:hausted and local unplanned f.::al'ms of vi.)len.:e were I'uled out, 
Slav.::> and S·tr.it~g'y and T.ictics presented the off ic ial view of the turn 
to al'med strul~gle, whi.:h they j ustif ielj as the I' t.~ht and necessary 
course of a.:tion despt te the defeats which follclwed, From wi thin trle 
Communist Party a mo,'e cri ti.:al analysis has been put f.,rward by 8e" 
Turok in a debate with J., Slov., over the al'med strategy (41), Turok' s 
crItIQUe was centered on the timlno and form of the turn to armed 
struagle. He argueo that 'in retrosoect it may seem remarkable how slow 
tne idea was to attain ascendancy in the liberation movement' and that 
'eV80 when the need for vIolence was recognised, how tardy th8 
lmolementation was of the first steos i • Turok sougnt to explain this in 
needed': state repression, the iacK of an alternative model in black 
Africa, save in Algeria which was 'swimming in blood and not 
FCII' lUI'elk rK,t only was the turn to arms late but I the actual f'Jrfl) of the 
campaign led down the road to disaster', He criticised the sabotage 
,:ampai';ln for repI'o.jul:in';l in new f'JI'£I) the old ~n:'litics ':.f appealing tlJ 
trle (I)nso: iel1l:e al1lj l'eaSIJn IJf whi te SI)I: iety instea,j of orl~anisinl;! the 
masses, Turok offered what should stand as a perceptive critioue of the 
limits of sabotage: 
tJhi 1e sabotage pr,:.videci the gClvernment wi th every e)<:I:use for 
unleashing a brutal wave of terror, it failed to mobilise 
the roass of trle people wr .. :. seemed to be lef t outside the 
al'ena f r,)R\ the time of the first blasts, Sab.)tage remai ne.j 
the weapon 'Jf an elite c.Jrps in the liberation movement, As 
a c.)nsequence, sab.:.ta.~e had the effect .::of i salatin.;! the 
organised movement f 1"Jfl\ the mass who felt unable t.::o join in 
this nelll phase '::01' even to ·jefend the acti.:mists IIIhen they 
IIIere seized, , , Having ta1ke.j .:af fas.:ism for a decade .:ar 
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more, the movements were nevertheless caught by surprise 
when the c'oli':e behave,j like ras,:ists." The saclIJtaqe 
campaign failed on the maln count - it did not raise the 
level of action of the masses themselves. Although it seems 
that the masses supportea and even welcomed the resort to 
force. they could find no way of joining in and expressing 
their support. They were left on the threshhold, frustrated 
by-standers of a cattle being waged on their behalf ... 
~;at")taqe was ·;een a·; an,)tr-Iel' Vehle!€' f,:,r- pl'l::.test and not as 
the first shots in a pr-otracted struggle ill which the masses 
had to playa,: puc ial. pal't. (42) 
What was needed according to Turok was a form of struggle in which 'the 
masses had to playa cpucial part'. lurok's own solution was to look to 
mass-based guerillarism, to which end he offered a technicist critique 
of Operation Mayibuye, While Umkonto had used 'highly technical 
':Jaljl~etl'Y', rle al'gue,j that tt-Ie movement sh,)uld rlave begun wi th 'the 
simplest methods' which would have been more easily assimilated by the 
pelJDie, while the methl)lj clf Opel'ati'Jn Mayibuye was' tOI) aljvan,:ed an,j the 
organisatil:on ina,jequate', It srlould have prepared 'a line of ,jefence and 
retreat ' : defence in the sense of 'organisational arrangements which 
ensure that a leak tlJ the p,:.lice does n,:.t lead tel the disclo:.sure I::.f a 
II:.ng chain I)f the ,:.rganisation' and retreat in the sense IJf 'an adequate 
under,~r,:ound network I,f hiding pla,:es a'1d T'1:.utes tor flight to nearby 
bordel's', The basi,: pl',)blem with Opel'ation Mayibuye in TUNk's eyes was 
that 'wi thlJut sound ol'ganisatisJn at home, no devel':'pments abroad I:an 
really expel:t to lead tl) SUCI:ess, not least because of the absence of a 
friendly b'Jrder' (43), 
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'swimmlna In Dlood' nor that of Cuba in which 'conditions and traditions 
were very different', out rather that of Vietnam, Citing La Quan, Turok 
argued that the essential thing at an early staae of the struggle was 
'raising the level ot struggle step by step' and using methods 'that the 
masses could ~se too', He argued that 'the very deep involvement of the 
Vietnamese pea-:;ant-:; was .jue to the simpli,:i ty oi the weaponry in trle 
earlier days and it would seem that the parallel is appropriate' , 
Turok's critique of sabotage - that the masses were left on the 
threshold, frustrated bystanders of a battle beIng waged on their behalf 
- was to the point, Turok failed to explain, however, why a guerillarist 
solution, based on methods of struggle which in theIr own ~ay worked in 
trle peasant-t.ase.j e.:.)n()my Qf Vietnam, was any thin.;! O)·)\'e than phantasy 
when transferred to the most urban and industrialised country of Africa 
whel'e the masses were nl)t peasants but w"I'kel's, 
There were individuals ana groups within the Communist Party who 
rejected the turn to armed struggle in its entirety, RowLey Arenstein, 
an a.: ti vist in Natal. has been the m·::ost arti.:ulate al1\.)ng them 01' at 
least the ml)st intel'viewE!.j, He l'ecaUs that 
Thel'e was much wi Id talk ing at the time, The idea was that 
thel'e sh.)uld be is.)lated sabota.~e acts in the beginnin':;j, 
These would move rapidly into greater and greater acts of 
sabotage until large centres would be involved in sabotage 
and trlen these wou 1 d f ina 11 y end up in the masses m.::ov i n.~ en 
rnasse t.) sabotage, • .;jeneral strike and the taking ()vel' .)f the 
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.: ,:;.un t i' V , ( 44 ) 
Of tne maJor lnfluences behind the turn. Arenstein arquec, a vital one 
~as the success of Castro 111 Cuba: 'if Castro could do it in t~o years, 
Wn\' (,x.llGn't t.he\' 'JO it? It was a fai·:;e anal':";ri', in Cuba tin? state tell 
apal't, tne fra'.;J11e vi,:tim Qf it·:; ':;'~ll c':I\'I'uptiQll an,j lad: of SQ,:i2d ba';;e 
DU this was not the case In South Africa (45), Arenstein believed that 
it was 
a comelete misunderstanding of the situation and a 
completelv wrong analvsls of the forces at wQrk, ,. ~ni(h had 
terrlbie effects on the growth of the mass movement in South 
Africa, To my mind, certain of the leaders were al~avs 
dissatisfied with taking things over a long term, They were 
keen to ,~et things settled a'; qui,:kly as p()ssible ... It 
problems, " It was this simplistic attitude that was 
entirely wrong, There ~a5 a sense of complete euphoria about 
this. " They did not take into account the strength of the 
state, (46) 
AI'enstein ,)bSel've,j that an impclrtant stimulus behin,j the turn tc, a,'me,j 
struggle ~as the Pando uprising and the violence used in its course, but 
wi tt-. personal e~<:per ience ()f rural reVI) 1 ts he painted I,ut that by the 
time C':)I1g,'ess t()ok the ,jec ision to tw'n t" armed struggle, 'the F'"nd,)s 
themselves had decided tCI take the questi"n I,f violence n" further an,j 
were }',)"k ing t,) ,;:.the,' meth,)ds I,f stl'ul;:JI~le' (47), 
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Arenstein seems to have been right that bv 1961 the Pondos were movIng 
.:ti;J~.V rl'.:o!\) al'me,j ,:on-rr'Jl1tation. in Julv New ~ge cal'pie,j a I'epcq't (,n a set 
of interviews with Pando leaders, in which it was said that 'the pe.:ople 
are still full .:of spirit and fight' but tnat 'one thing is (ertain", We 
lflilS't evo 1 'Ie new me th.:o.]·:; 0 f s t 1'1...(0;)';1 1 e, " The HilI C.:,ml'fl i t tee an,j fIIee t i nqs 
on the Hill have served their puro.:ose' (48), New methods in this context 
meant a l'II(IVe away "fl'om al'med c,:,nfl'ontatic,n, FOI' e){ample, in 1'36:3 a 
leaflet dlstpibuted illegally by the ANC read as tollows: 
The government have cn.:osen the Westepn Cape and Transkei as 
the battle fields." We accept this challenge without 
regpst, " The time has come for us to adopt a new attitude 
toward rupal areas", Peasant committees of migpant workers 
in the cities and of peopie in the countpyside must be 
f 'JPl'ln:.-d pI"Jmptl y t'J ,:o-c,pdi na te a,: t i v it ies, (49) 
The ima';le of 21. peasant wal' doe'; appeal' tl) have tleen a I"Jmantic ficti.Jn 
In the South African context, unrelated to the I'ealities of 
working as migrants at the time of the revolt, The revolt itself 
swi tche,j tactics fl'Offl violen,:e ,jil'ecte,j a,;)ainst trle 'traditil)nal 
chiefs', who wel'e lo.:al agents of the state, to the more effective use 
of tl'ade boycc,tts an.j pickets, FUl'thel' the intense l'epl'essi'Jn fl)t:'!ted .jut 
to trle F'ljndljs - nljt just trle sho.Jtin,;}s but the arl'est of .jvel' 4700 
af1"i.:ans - was suc,:essful in puttil1';j dl)wn the \'ev.jl t and f')1".:ing I'llany Qf 
the 'tl' ibesmen' to pledge thei r SUPP01"t f 1)1" the hated Pararoount Chief 
Botha Si';Jau, 
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Desoite nine months of fervent activity, the history of the Pondo revolt 
'the isolated pockets of resistance in various reserves have never 
that there was truth to Arenstein's view that Congress leaders, having 
long neglected rural movements, now idealised them as a model for a 
rural guerilla campaign, Arenstein's ow~ political alternative was less 
elsa i"" , ('S 1 ) 
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Poqo 
1T Congress over-estima~ed the power of sabotage and under-estimated the 
damage it woula cause for mass organisation and mobilisation, the fate 
of the armed s1ruggle of the PAC is equally lnstructive, 'Poco', the 
Xhosa word meaning 'pure' or 'alone', was set up by the Pan African 
Congress in 1961 independently of Umkonto, In spite of retrospective 
claims to the contrary, the PAC leadership. like Congress. had been 
formally commItted to non-vioience until 1961. When the PAC turned to 
violence. its method was different from that of the ANC, While Umkonto's 
declared strategv was in favour of 'controlled violence' without loss of 
life, Poqo emphasised mass spontaneity and attacks on persons, First 
african police were attacked, then there was an attack on Matanzima's 
palace in Emiqi'ant Tembulan.j by sevel'al t"lun.jl'ed men uSin';j spears and 
pan9as, trlen an attad: ':on a p,:.li,:e stati.:,n at Paarl in the Westel'n Cape 
by badly armed men who on being repulsed killed a number of white 
civilians. and then the killing in February of 1963 in the Transkei of 
five wrlite holi.jay-ma~:ers at Bashes River. There was a thin .jividing 
I ine between san,:ti.::med an.j unsanc ti.:oned atta.:ks.. as when Leba11., IS 
exiled leadership in 8asutoland disclaimed responsibility for the Paarl 
and 8ashee Rivel' killings, saying that the Cape 81'a\1l:1'"1 had acte.j 
i ndepen.jent 1 Y (52), 
8etween l)mk.:.nto and P':)qo no love was lo:.st (despi te a temporary I uni telj 
front' between the ANC anlj the PAC in e}<:ile), F'1:)ql:) was altel'natively 
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denounced as irresponsibLe for its attacks on civilians and for its 
endorsement of mass violence and as conservative for coming into the 
armed struggle late, Umkonto was denounced for its remoteness from the 
half-hearted way it adopted a violent road, Poqo's mass insurrectionism, 
however, fared no better than Umkonto's pianned sabotage, On April 
196:3, Leball'j am"junce,j that a ';Jenel'al upr iSil1';! was imminent, The 
E:asutoland p,:,l i,:e I'aided his headquarters and by 12 June 196:3 324E. 
alleged Poqo men were arrested and a series of trials sought to 
estatlish that there were Olans tor a co-ordinated uprising, There was a 
short-term revival of PAC fortunes in 1965 followed by the conviction of 
200 men in PCtl't El izabeth and ::;::3 in trle Western Caoe, 
Poqo revealed the limitations of the PAC'S left opposition to Congress, 
In the Cape, the spontaneist programme of the PAC meant that violence 
soon went out of control of the leadership, On the Rand, where 
organisation was tighter, the leadel's wel'e unprepal'ed feJl' violence, Trle 
ol";Janlsatic,n was Sljon inf il tratelj by the pol il:e, as when an afl'ican 
p,)lil:eman becah,e bl'anch chai rperson wi thin two ml)nths of joinin,;} the 
Ijrganisatiljn and was p,'esent when the plans f'jr the mass up"ising wel'e 
being prepared, The use Ijf school students by the F'oqo attests both t,j 
its p.;:>pulari ty anlj t,;:> its use IJf inexperien.:ed y.)uth, The,'e was a 
messiani,: flavour to the moven\ent with quasi-magical powers being 
bestowed I)n S'Jbukwe, its leader, The mi~: of I:hristiani ty and tt'adi tional 
african spiritualism was e~<:pressed in the references to Sobukwe as our 
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'Sheonerd' and to the name 'POQO' itself used by secessionist cnurches 
in South African in the 19205, 
POQo's plans for tne uprising were fantastical, With three weeks to 
organise, the cadres were instructed to converge on Pretoria and kill 
whites for four hours, Then they were to stop, Those whites who remained 
would be free to help participate in the new african government, To 
perform the killings, the branches were to be instructed in the making 
of crude petrol bombs, As Ladae comments, 'there 15 a sense ot complete 
unreality about the proceedings, except for the undeniable commitment 
an.j .:.::aul'a.~e shown by the ac,:u·:;e.j in the tl'ial. What rlappened in the Cape 
sprang f l'om the desperati.::an .:.f the .:.:.ndi ti>:.ns there; in the Tl'ansvaal 
the external leadel'ship was tl'ying to impose the crude strategy of a 
fantastic scenal'io c.n unpl'epal'e.j ·;;.:h.x.lcrlildren' (.5:;:), 
The ~frican Resistance novemeni 
The third group to tUrn to armed struggle came from the ranks of the 
Liberal Party, some .::af whose m':;'I'e ,'adical members j.::aine.j wi th 
trotskyists f,'om the S.::a.:ialist League in J,::ahannesburg and the t,.).:.ri<ers' 
Democratic League in Cape Town to fOl'm what was initially called the 
National C.;)mmi ttee of Liberati.:>n and then re-named the At rican 
Resistance Movement in 1964, Cd tical .)t the ANC-SACP's united front 
strategy in trle 1950s and calling tor independent wClrking class 
leadership, this small all iance of anti-communist 1 iberals an.j 
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trotskyists set up an organisation that was very similar to Umkonto in 
that it was non-racial, committed to sabotage of property and formally 
socialist. The trotskyists claimed that its formation preceded that of 
Trotskyists who joined the NCL-ARM had long been calling for a more 
working class orientation in Congress and for the abandonment of multi-
racialism in favour of a fully non-racial movement. Why, however, these 
orouPlngs moved into armed adventurism remote from the working class at 
the same time or even before Congress, is a question that has never been 
satisfactorily addressed, Here we can point only to some of the factors, 
For the trotskyists, the turn to armed struggle was a reaction to the 
p'JpUlal' fl',:mt p'Jlitio:s ,:,f C'Jn'3reSs and the C'jl"tul'lunist Party. which the 
trotskyists misconstrued as the essential hallmark of stalinism. as well 
as to their own inability to create an alternative centre of gravity for 
workers. The frustrated effort of members of the Socialist League in 
Jorlannesbul'q in 1960 t'J pel'suade SACTI) t.) call .)ut w'::OI'kers in the 
Transvaal in SUpp.jl't of the mass strike in the Cape and Natal. was a 
,:ase in point, It was (lI1e fa.:t.jr whi.:h seems t.) have led then! t.j res.jl't 
to m')l'e .jespel'ate forms .jf a.:ti.jn (54), 
The m.jst striking feature clf the 1961)-61 perio.j was the politi.:al 
.:olwel'gence cd stalinism al,d tl"jtskyism ar'jund the turn t" al'me.j 
stl'u';j';jle, The trotskyists had fixated .jl1 tWlj-sta';je the1jry - that is. the 
artifical separation of the democratic and socialist tasks of the 
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revolution - as the defining characteristic of stalinism. So when the 
Communist Party turned left in the period 1969-61, the trotskyists were 
thrown into total confuslon. They either mirrored the policies of the 
Communist Party or sought to outflank them by oeclaring that they were 
insufficiently left and that what was needed was a more revolutionary 
version of the self-same policies. 
We can glimpse at the political reasoning of the trotskyists through the 
oulletins of the Workers Oemocratic League (55), Seeklng to draw the 
lessons of the rlarch days of 1960 they argued that there was no 
revolutionary crisis in South Africa since the rulers still tound it 
I=u)ssible t.:) rule and since trlel'e was nc. rev.)lutional'y party. The only 
.:.::mdi ti.)n or l'ev.:duti.)n whi,:h they thou.~ht was real ise.j was the fel'ment 
of the masses. They argued, however, that the events around Sharpeville 
ha.j "::;hattel'ed the illl...lsi()llS cd pea.:eful .jeflKll1-:;tl'ati.)ns and passive 
resistance'. They rejected 'national liberation' in the forms of multi-
pac ial ism and non-european ism as uttel'ly .)bsolescent. And they stl'esse.j 
the class nature of the struggle: 'the national struggle is the form in 
whi.:h the .:lass stl'ug.~le is e~(pressin.;} itself'. In theil' view I'acial 
policies were 'the ideological form in which class interests assert 
then)selves ... The colour bar is in sum both the mode .)f ')peration and 
l'I)ode of dml\ination of capitalism in South Af rica'. N.)ne of these 
posi tions substantially differed fr.)m the new left line .)f the SACF'. 
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While not ruling out the oossibility of minor reforms, these trotskyists 
saw the oasis for serious reform in the ruling class as dead, Thev wrote 
for instance that when the strikers In 1960 demanded from the state that 
'it should force the industrialists to negotiate with them for ~age 
increases, this 50-called progressive bourgeoisie maintained the silence 
c,f the ';:II'c..ve', Tr"lis was t,e,:ause in the final red:':'11in,;:! thel'e was 'an 
identity of interest between mining, agriculture and manufacture' ~nd 
because liberalism was merely the means to 'bring the movement under the 
neel of oroperty', What the Liberals did was to 
arrogate to themselves all the traditional slogans associatec 
with the democratic movement: non-racial democracy, social 
equality and the like. 'The enemies of the people', said 
Robespierre, 'speak with the voice of the people in order to 
betl'ay the pe.,ple', The Liberals held bef.:.re the people trle 
pr.,spe.:t "f fightil1'~ alol1.~side property in order to live under 
PI":'perty. The PAC furnished trlem wi th the ne.:essary mass base, 
The trotskyists did not rule out trade union organisation but they 
stressed the 'limited scope' for trade union struggles and the 'ceiling 
to reforms that ,:an be e~:tra.:ted'. Sin.:e • eve,'y ec'::>nomic deman.j .:af the 
workel's aSSl.lIl)es a p.,litical fOI'm', they pla.:ed theil' f.:acus '1.jt on trade 
uni.:an organisati'Jn but on building a class cm1scbJus party committed. as 
they put it, to 'proletarian methods'. They .:on.:luded that 'because .:.f 
the more impol'tant poli tical wc/rk, it is n.;:,t p,::>ssible for us t'J take a 
lead in forming new uni.;:,ns or in renovating old ones'. 
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Although the situation was not yet In their judgement revolutionary, 
~hey argued that it was rapidly becoming revolutionary since 'the 
dYnamic productive forces are coming into open conflict with the static 
Pl',:ujl..lction relations', Theil' al'gument was trlo:lt in S.:.uth A'i'l'l.:a 
'capitalism has shouldered on the worker himself the responsibility for 
supplementing his income by iOl'cing the mlgrant to retain connections 
witrl small ':;I:ale fal'min,;! in the l'esel'ves", but the ine~<:';)l'able law that 
capitalism must C':'l'l'ode all pi'e-capitalist s.;).:ia1 fOl'ms, , , (entailed) the 
oepletion of that supplementary source of income', This contradiction 
was developing Into a full-fledged revolutionary cl'isis which needed 
only a revolutionary party for it to mature, They saw themselves as the 
Anti-liberalism, anti-l'efol'mism, anti-economism were the watchwol'ds with 
which the tl'otskyists confl'onted the problem of new methods of stl'uggle, 
These ne.;jative l'eferen.:e PClilitS wel'e no basis f.;:.r the develc.pment of a 
w')l'~::iJjl;J ,:lass lea.jel'ship but wel'e i'ather c.)ndu':ive t.:) a se.:tal'ian 
l'epudiati.)n 'Jf all stru.,;.lgles f':'l' ref.jl'm as l'ef'jl'mism, all tl'ade union 
wOl'k as economism an.j all strate,~ies of .jem,jcI'atisation as liberalism, 
The tl'otskyists wel'e 'jppc,sed to natim1alism in the name of the 
leadel'ship .jf the w'Jrk ing I: lass, but the idea that • the national 
struggle is the form in whicr. the class stl'uggle is e~:pressing i tsel f 1 
lent i tsel f to an accomodati.:>n tel nati.:mal ism. The doctrinal 'Jl'igins Ijf 
this ar.:r.:omodatiol1 lay in a rei f ielj n.jtion of permanent or uninterrupted 
revolution (the terms wel~e used intel'.:hangeabl y) I acc.::>rding to which the 
den,ocratic revolution would necessarily and naturally have t.j 'grow 
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over' to a socialist revolution, The reason for this was in their view 
that racism was an 'essential component of capitalism' in South Africa 
and 'crucial to its continued existence' (56), The theory of 'combined 
and uneven development' was identified witn the ldea that africans 
suffer from what Kenny Jordaan ca~led 'a double exploltation: as workers 
who produce surplu·:; va.lue al1lj ."s blal:k·:; fl'Ofil whom an addi ti,::onal surplus 
i·; e;(trac ted by spec i~d leqislatic'n'. In ::;cluth Af r i':a, .lordaan eo.l'l;Juelj 
with great perceptiveness, 'the last word in modern technology is 
combined with the most barbarous forms of exploit~tion and oppression; 
tl'aditional backwal'dness with the most sophisticated forms of life' 
(.57) . 
Do away witt'. I'a,:isrl\ and backwal'dness, SI:1 it seemed, al1d tt'.e whole 
edif il:e of SI:Juth Afr ican capitalism r'-Iust CQme I: rumbl in'~ IjlJwn, The 
national struggle against raciSM was identified with the struggle 
against capitalism and conversely without a struggle against capitalism 
there c,)uld tie nCI genuine natil)nal stru';Jgle against racism. The national 
question was dissQlved into the working class struggle for SOCialism 
while at the same time the w,Jrking class strug';Jle fiJI' s,:,,:ialisr.·. was 
dissolved into the struggle for true national liberation. The theory of 
permanent 1:)1' uninterrupted revolution was turned into a metaphysi,:s of 
history in \Alhil:h subje.:t and predi.:ate \Alel'e reversed. The revlJlution 
appeared as the subject 'Jf history, \Alhile the real subject - the \AI'Jrking 
class - appeared as its mel'e pl'edicate. The work ing dass be,:amQ the 
instrument of revolution rather than revolution being the instrUA)ent of 
the work ing c lass. In the 1970s left Communist Pal'ty theoreticians 
pooularised these 'trotskyist' ideas as their own and treatises were 
written in which these concepts were juggled in any number of 
permutations on the head of a dialectical pin. in thsoretical terms the 
acnievements of the trotskyists in the 19505 haa been considerable: not 
least in distinguishing between nationalism and ethnic communalism, in 
developing a ciass analysis of the struggle ana In putting forward the 
imp.:ortance .:,f \lJ1)I'kiill;J cIa':;':; leadel'ship. At tr,e enoj of the pel'iod, 
however, with theil' eyes fi::<ed on the ':I'itiIJue 1:lf tw')-stage the')l'y as 
the defining characteristic of stalinism, they themselves failed to 
escape from the orison house of left dogmatism. 
Tr,e turn to) al'melj ·:;tru.~.~le was for the tr.)tskyist·:;, tel pal'aphl'ase 
Clausewltz, but a continuation of their peacetime politics. It proved to 
be no less a ,jisastel' that it was for trll? :;ACP. In I).:t·)ber 1961, as the 
white p.:.litiG\1 I:arl,paign fl:'\' the general ele,:tion was nea\'in.;! its e\,d, 
NlC saboteurs cut the steel legs of a pylon carrying power lines in 
Johannesburg, disrupted telephone service and burned an office of the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development. In December 1961 it 
announced its ad",ievements a\,d dec la\'e.j that 1 there was no lCIll.;}e\' any 
legal, dem')':l'ati,: way tl) oppose the Nationalist g,)vernment ' (58). The 
NCL-ARM was destrl)yed in much the same way as Umk,)nto, through sel:urity 
lapses anlj the inability ,:of some l:of its membel's to resist police 
questi,)nin,;). M,)st of its membel's were already in gaol when J,)hn Harris, 
one .)f its last remaining free membe\'s, l'esponded to the Rivol,ia Tdal 
,:onvi,:tions by e~:pll).jing a bl:omb in tr,e white se,:tion of the Johannesburg 
railroad stati,)n, killing one I)ld woman and injuring two d,)zen others, 
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He became trle fil'st white man am on.;) 45 pel's.:ms han.~ed f.,r politically 
inspired acts of violence between 1960 and 1964. 
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Ch. 13: Conclusion 
The orthodox view that the liberation movement had 'no choice' but to turn 
to arms failed to engage with the political nature of the choice that was 
made. There were strong grounds for abandoning the doctrine of non-violence 
and the 'united front' approach of the 1950s, but the alternative of armed 
struggle represented a specific solution to the problem of the old methods, 
explicable only in relation to the constitution of the liberation movement 
itself. At each moment Congress was out of step with the tempo of the class 
struggle. In the period of working class militancy in the late 1950s 
Congress called on workers to temper their radicalism; when the workers' 
movement retreated after its historic struggles, Congress called on the 
masses to resist on every front. The turn to armed struggle did break 
through the constraints of legalism and pacifism but this advance addressed 
only the surface defects. Hidden beneath the debates about the legitimacy 
and efficacy of violence lay the question of class. From the point of view 
of the wOrking class, the turn to armed struggle dissociated the liberation 
movement from its struggles. It left workers to fend for themselves in an 
increasingly hostile environment, while at the same time they could only be 
passive observers of an armed struggle carried out in their name. 
The turn to arms, rather than resolving the alienation from the masses 
expressed, in the old methods aggravated this alienation. In theoretical 
terms it was a problem of empiricism. By seeing only the problems which 
existed on the surface of the movement in the 1950s, legalism and pacifism, 
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and by failing to analyse the underlying sources of class estrangement, the 
liberation movement reproduced in its solution to its political crisis an 
exaggerated variant of the same class relations. Notwithstanding all the 
defects of the old methods, ties were established between the leaders and 
the masses. The turn to armed struggle, while transcending the narrow 
horizons of the bourgeois legality and initiating the search for 
revolutionary alternative, also severed the thread which linked the mass to 
the leadership. The long period of defeat which followed the turn to armed 
struggle - both for the mass struggles of the working class and for the 
national liberation movement itself - could not be divorced from the turn 
itself. 
The '1950s' were over. For all the weaknesses in the conception and 
execution of mass struggle offered by the Congress Alliance, the period of 
mass struggle was one in which the seeds of - what we might call in the 
best sense of the term - social democracy were laid within the working 
class. In their community groups, trade unions, women's organisations, 
rural associations and the structures of Congress and other political 
bodies, mass struggles were waged for a democratic future. Through strikes, 
stay-aways, demonstrations, boycotts and violence the masses confronted 
again and again the power of the ruling class. They struggled for the right 
of self-organisation and for state reforms; they developed ideas of 8 
future society free of apartheid and based on a state belonging to all 
regardless of race; they penetrated beneath the forms of apartheid to 
unearth the capitalist relations of exploitation which supported them. 
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By the end of the decade there was an urgent need to construct a new 
direction: away from the limitations of pacifism, legalism and multi-
racialism; away from the petitions, deputations and appeals to liberal 
public opinion; away from undemocratic practices within the liberation 
movement; away from the politics of the 'united front'; away from the 
celebration of stalinism and other totalitarian images of socialism. The 
turn to armed struggle appeared as a revolutionary step forward, mirroring 
developments in Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam and Portugal's African colonies. 
In reality, however, the turn to armed struggle did not resolve the old 
problems. Rather it greatly magnified them in a new guise, for in turning 
to armed struggle the liberation movement turned away from its only real 
strength, its reliance on the working class. What was needed was a turn to 
the masses but it was not delivered. 
The old methods, forms of organisation and ideas needed to be revised but 
not to be abandoned. Since the utilisation of these methods, forms of 
organisation and ideas did not lead to liberation, the liberation movement 
- at first unwittingly and reluctantly and then self-consciously and 
purposefully - turned its back upon them, not noticing that it was at the 
same moment turning its own back upon the working class itself. The 
liberation movement turned instead to a select group of saboteurs, 
agitators, guerilla fighters, diplomats, propagandists and writers who 
remained undefiled by reformism and through their exemplary actions and 
words would educate the masses until they became a force capable of 
accomplishing national liberation. This approach was permeated with 
individualis& 
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The mass struggles of the 1950s marked a certain period in the development 
of the working class, one not of revolution but of reform. The proble~ with 
the liberation movement of the 1950s was not that it was a movement for 
reform but rather that it was an inadequate movement for reform. It was 
inadequate in its theorisations of the state, its forms of organisation, 
its methods of struggle, its programmes of action and its ideas of 
socialism and liberation. These inadequacies were explicable 
developmentally in terms of the maturation of the working class movement 
and conjuncturally in terms of the residues of defeat suffered by the 
working class in the 1940s. They could be remedied. The organic growth of 
the working class continued through the 1950s and was about to accelerate 
rapidly in the 1960s, strengthening its economic weight and political 
potential. The liberation movement now had the benefit of much deeper 
experience to guide them for the future. 
In 1961-62 the epoch of reform was not over. On the contrary, it was only 
in its infancy in South Africa. Comparing the course of evolution of the 
bourgeoisie with that of the working class, we may say that the working 
class needed a reformation of its own. The nub of the bourgeois reformation 
at the dawn of its independent social existence was that the bourgeoisie 
did not immediately set itself the task of conquering power but sought 
instead to secure for itself, within the framework of the old society, 
conditions best suited to its needs. This tendency expressed the relative 
historical weakness of the bourgeoisie. Only after securing these positions 
for itself could the bourgeoisie enter the struggle for state power. In the 
1960s the working class in South Africa had not yet experienced its own 
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reformation either in the sense of enlarging the framework of the South 
African state and forcing it to adapt to the needs of the working class, or 
of securing its own independent forms of action and organisation in civil 
SOCiety. 
In South Africa of the 1950s the adaptation of the masses to the forms of 
bourgeois society was a historically determined process occasioned by the 
structural and political weaknesses of the working class. It gave rise in 
this context not to a labour bureaucracy, as it did elsewhere, but to a 
political elite rooted in the traditions of liberal nationalism and 
opportunistic marxism. The new radicals who emerged in the 1960s, 
identifying this political leadership with the masses, fell prey to all 
manner of idealistic illusions. They proclaimed that the general strike was 
exhausted, economic strikes were exhausted, legal organisation was 
exhausted and reform was exhausted. According to this view the liberation 
movement had to begin anew and start with the 'head', that is, with select 
groups who separate and apart from the old forms of organisation would 
carry revolutionary truth to the masses, scrub it clean of all liberal and 
opportunistic prejudices and spruce it up for 'true' national liberation. 
They greatly exaggerated the respect of the masses for non-Violence, 
constitutionalism and multi-racialism and ended up levelling their 
arguments against all forms and methods of working class struggle. 
They created an organisation with a small, vacuum-packed membership, 
believing that this would safeguard it from ideological vacillations, but 
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found that organisations of the sectarian type are even more subject to 
them precisely because of their isolation from the masses. Since the bond 
between the political group and the mass was fixed through a pedagogic 
relation of example and enlightenment, at least until armed propaganda 
should seize hold of the consciousness of the masses, the centre of gravity 
necessarily remained with those who conducted this propaganda, the 
politic~l leaders. The relationship between leaders and masses was 
conditioned by the cultural and political level of the working class, 
contingent upon the class organisation and education of the masses and 
their habits of mass action. Apart from the self-organisation and self-
activity of the working class, there were no means to subordinate the 
leaders to the conscious and democratic control of the masses and without 
the masses there could be no revolution. 
What new methods were adopted to replace the old was a matter of choice not 
necessity. The turn to armed struggle was rooted in a romantic equation of 
violence and revolution and uprooted from the forms and methods of working 
class action. Most strands of left opposition either mirrored or pre-empted 
or magnified the deficiencies of Congress. In South Africa, where the 
masses are proletarian, the struggle for political emancipation could not 
by-pass the working class. There was no short cut and no back entrance to 
liberation. By re-building its base in the unions, community organisations, 
rural associations and women's groups, and by re-constructing its socialist 
forms of political expression, the working class could fight back bit by 
bit to become a power in SOCiety and an influence on the state. Whether 
this view was combined with an ultimately revolutionary aim of seizing 
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state power or with a vision which stopped short at reform, there was no 
choice for the working class of South Africa but to go through its period 
of reformation. This is why we speak of the historic role of social 
democracy, not in the sense of a social system or form of state, but a 
working class movement for the emancipation of society as a whole. It was 
not until ten bitter years had passed - with the rebirth of an independent, 
non-racial trade union movement on the one side and of black consciousness 
on the other - that black workers began in the early 1970s the difficult 
task of drawing their own lessons. But there lies another story. 
-461-
Nationalism, socialism and democracy 
What can we learn from this history more generally on the relation between 
nationalism and socialism? It seems to me that there can be no simple 
formulae and I am not going to run through the extensive literature. 
marxist and non-marxist. on this subject. I shall limit myself to making 
some brief personal observations which derive from my historical analysis. 
First. there is no reason in my thinking to withdraw from the orthodox 
marxist view that socialists should support national liberation struggles 
to the extent that they represent the democratic aspirations of a nation 
for self-determination. This support, however. should retain its own 
critical faculties and not subsume itself to nationalist ways of thinking. 
My overall conclusion is that in South Africa, particularly after the 
Second World War, socialists have tended to subordinate working class 
independence far too readily to one or other form of black nationalism on 
the misguided assumption that nationalism represents both the rational form 
of opposition to apartheid and the consciousness of the mass of the people. 
On both counts there is room for far more questioning than has usually been 
apparent. 
Nationalism has represented a specific form of opposition to apartheid: one 
which has suffered from its own historical limitations. It has had great 
difficulty in avoiding reproducing what we might call 'state consciousness' 
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in its struggles against the apartheid state. By poeing the demucr,at1f: 
question in South Africa in a nationalist form, it has usually been 
compelled to embrace one or other of the racial pre-suppositions of 
apartheid: in its most primitive form tribalism, in a more advanced form 
african nationalism, or in a still more advanced form black nationalism. 
All these forms of nationalism, while expressing the struggle for freedom 
of the oppressed people of South Africa, have at the same time reflected in 
the body of the liberation movement the forms of political life embodied in 
the state. The building of a consistently democratic movement against 
apartheid, one that is fully independent of the state, requires a 
commitment to non-racialism which transcends all such limitations. What we 
often find in the history is the dressing up of race in nationalist 
clothes, but what we should remember is that changing the name of the thing 
does not change the thing itself. 
In part, this problem derives in my view from the understandable but 
confusing presentation of the democratic struggle in South Africa in the 
language of a struggle against a special form of colonialism. It seems to 
me that the presentation of white people in South Africa as colonial 
settlers - or at least the presentation of the system of white rule in 
South Africa as a colonial form of power - is seriously misleading in 
political terms. Not only does it fly in the face of the real history of 
colonialism and anti-colonialism in South Africa, it also reinforces a 
superficial communalism based on the mutation of whites in South Africa 
into a 'colon' class. 
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The form of nationalism now being pushed to the fore in the liberation 
movement in an effort to overcome the • colour-caste' or communalist 
associations of black nationalism, though one with a long ancestry in the 
liberation movement, is that the national struggle in South Africa, like 
say that of Italy in its risorgiment~ is to create a new national unity in 
opposition to the balkanisation of the country under apartheid, to rid the 
country of an archaic colonial form of state and introduce in its stead a 
modern, representative government based on the will of the people as a 
whole. The liberation movement presents itself as the true patriots of 
South Africa, whose commitment to the genuine national interest of the 
South African people stands in contrast to the merely sectional interests 
of the present white rulers. An all-embracing South African (or Azanian) 
nationalism is portrayed as the resolution of racial divisions within the 
polity; the white rulers appear as putting their 'colonial' interests 
before the interests of the country as a whole; true South African 
nationalism seems to substitute itself for the pseudo-nationalisms of what 
is in reality black and white communalism. 
This argument, first proselytised by Neville Alexander on the left and then 
increasingly appropriated within the mainstreams of the liberation 
movement, offers the most convincing dissociation of nationalism from the 
racialism of the state, though containing its own ambiguities over whether 
or not whites are conceived as having a place in the new South African 
nation. It raises, however, the political dangers and difficulties of 
propagating a state consciousness in the form of another kind of 
patriotis~ It seems to me that a critique of apartheid, based on its 
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allegedly colonial or balkanising character and posed in the name of 
national unity and a national democratic state, serves only to confuse the 
democratic question with that of nationalis~ It fails to come to terms 
with the functioning of apartheid as an independent capitalist state, which 
has adapted the political forms of colonialism to the modern imperatives of 
capital accumulation as successfully as the British state has adapted the 
feudal institutions of monarchy and the House of Lords to its contemporary 
needs. The problem in South Africa does not lie in the stunting of national 
unity and consciousness but in the suppression of democracy for the vast 
majority. Nationalism and democracy can and should be uncoupled. 
The representation of the consciousness of the masses as spontaneously and 
'naturally' nationalist - and therefore as justifying a nationalist form of 
political leadership - is also problematic. Too often this representation 
has been based on inadequate and insufficiently historical evidence. 
Sometimes it is derived, as it were, from first principles on the basis of 
deductive reasoning which does not hold up to critical scrutiny. Sometimes 
it is derived from selective empirical evidence, which is both partial at a 
given point of time and insufficiently sensitive to the dynamics of change 
over time. The history reveals popular support for nationalist politics, 
but this support has not been without its own considerable tensions, it has 
not been unconditional and it has varied markedly at different points of 
the struggle. 
If in our period of investigation the high point of popular support for 
african nationalism was to be found in the early 1950s <around the Defiance 
Campaign) and then the late 1950s (around Sharpeville), we should also 
remember that at both these moments there were considerable conflicts 
manifested between the interests of the working class and the nationalist 
leadership. We should remember too that popular support for african 
nationalism was volatile: declining noticeably after Defiance and then 
crashing to the ground after the turn to armed struggle. The representation 
of the history of the South African struggle as one of continuous popUlar 
support for african nationalism is one which over-simplifies a more complex 
reality. 
There seems to me to be evidence to support the view that black nationalism 
has predominantly been the ideology of the radical black intelligentsia, 
supported by most socialist intellectuals, and has sat uncomfortably in the 
ranks of the working class. Where workers themselves have organised and 
struggled, african nationalism and other forms of black nationalism have 
not found it at all easy to win ideological hegemony: witness on the one 
hand the difficulties which nationalists have shown in relating to the 
social demands, methods of class struggle and forms of democratic 
organisation adopted by workers in the trade union and community movements 
and on the other hand the non-raCial, class forms of organisation which 
have often accompanied the mobilisations of black workers. 
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I do not wish to substitute one myth for another: that of a non-racial, 
democratic, socialist consciousness for a nationalist consciousness. I wish 
only to point to the dynamic, uneven and conflictual nature of popular 
consciousness in South Africa as revealed by the political history of the 
liberation struggle. The key point is that mass consciousness is not just 
'there'. It is constructed by forces from below and above. To the extent 
that african nationalists have been the major anti-apartheid force in the 
country, it is not surprising to find popular support gravitating toward 
it. Popular consciousness is in part at least a function of political 
leadership and not merely its premise. 
The relation between popular consciousness and political leadership should 
be seen dialectically: even if nationalist ways of thinking predominated 
among the people, the question of how the political leadership relates to 
nationalism is not resolved by this fact. If the consciousness of the 
masses were 'backward', then presumably it is the job of the leadership not 
merely to tail it but to lead it to something higher and more effective. 
The orthodox literature tends to assume not so much the hegemony of african 
nationalism - for the term 'hegemony' assumes a battle of ideas between 
competing modes of thought - but almost the exclusivity of african 
nationalism as the expression of popular feeling. What should be recognised 
instead is a plurality of ideas within a socially differentiated population 
and that the making of the liberation movement has been the product of many 
an ideological battle more or less democratically fought out. 
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The rise of african nationalism to a position of ideological hegemony 
within the liberation movement has been far more contested than usually 
appears in the literature and was not so much a product of its own immanent 
rationality (as it is so often presented) as of the defeat or absence of 
alternative political traditions. The development of african nationalism as 
a mass force in the 1950s should be understood in part as the product of 
eKternal factors. The ascendancy of afrikaner nationalism to state power 
provided a nationalist frame in which political struggle was located. The 
defeat of the labour movement in the 1940s severely weakened the 
independent power of the working class and led to an intensified racial 
fragmentation. In addition there were factors at play which were internal 
to the liberation movement. For different reasons, the three main sections 
of what may broadly be called the socialist camp - the Communists, the 
trotskyists and the independent socialists - had all failed in the 1940s to 
tie themselves organically with the working class movement. Furthermore, 
each of these socialist camps either gravitated toward one or other 
nationalist perspective - african nationalism, non-european nationalism or 
afrikaner nationalism - as they were blown off course by the pressures of 
the time. Alternatively they were marginalised in the prison-house of 
socialist sectariana. 
The result was that instead of socialist ideas developing out of the 
defeats incurred in the 1940s, there were internal as well as external 
pressures pushing toward the assimilation of socialism to a nationalist 
perspective. This trajectory was then rationalised after the event as a 
natural progression of political consciousness and leadership. African 
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nationalism itself lacked both ideological coherence and an organisational 
base but it provided a radical and forceful political expression of the 
determination of black people to fight against the apartheid state and it 
was able to identify itself with the national liberation struggles of 
colonised peoples in their fight for an end to colonial rule and for the 
democratic right of national self-determination. 
The dominant view to be found in the literature is that socialist ideas and 
a working class perspective on the battle for democracy in South Africa 
represent what we have called a 'forced abstraction' in this context. Many 
reasons have been given for this: the racism of white workers, the 'group 
prejudices' of black workers, the need for alliances outside the working 
class, the predominance of race over class as the source of oppression, the 
immediacy of the national question and so forth. This is a view shared by 
the mainstreams of South African socialism. My own opinion is that none of 
these arguments has been convincing. There is no intrinsic reason why the 
battle for democracy - in the workplace, the community and the government -
should not have been politically led under the banner of socialism rather 
than under that of african nationalisL In fact there is every reason why 
it should in a country in which the great majority of the people are 
proletarianised and in which there are increasing concentrations of 
industrial workers capable of providing the base for such a movement. There 
is reason to believe that a socialist leadership based on the political 
independence of the working class might have provided a more consistent 
democratic opposition to apartheid, a more organic connection with the mass 
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of black people and for that reason a potentially more effective leadership 
of the liberation struggle. 
To understand the decline of socialism as the standard bearer of popular 
resistance, we need to look not to its immanent irrationality in the South 
African context but rather to the terrible defeats suffered by the working 
class, which were rooted in the structural weaknesses of the working class 
itself, as well as to the internal deficiencies of the actually existing 
socialisms of the time. In the 1940s the three main currents of socialism 
in South Africa competing for political and ideological hegemony within the 
democratic movement, suffered lasting damage from the effects of the 
international splits in world socialism between stalinism, reformism and 
trotskyism. The subsumption of socialism to nationalism in South Africa was 
a product of the internal defects in each current of socialist thought: of 
the lurches from popular front ism to communist sectarianism characteristic 
of the official Communists for whom the defence of the Soviet state 
overrode the interests of the class struggle in South Africa; of the 
inability of the independent socialists under Solly Sachs to break fully 
from the traditions of white labouris~ and finally of the inability of 
trotskyists, caught in a mechanical rendition of the theory of permanent 
revolution, to construct an independent working class perspective out of 
its critique of stalinism. In each case, but for different reasons and in 
different ways, these internal defects led the socialist parties themselves 
to abandon or suspend the banner of socialism in favour of ona or other 
form of black nationalism. The result was that a conjunctural defeat of the 
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working class was turned into what was perhaps an epochal defeat for 
socialis~ 
The fundamental problem faced by socialists in South Africa lay in the 
separation of the democratic tasks of the liberation struggle from its 
economic base. The democratic question was hived off into its own distinct 
sphere, converted into nationalist form and reserved for political forces 
distinct from socialism. Meanwhile, the socialist question was buried 
altogether, postponed to some second stage of struggle, identified with 
revolutionary nationalism or posed as the exclusive goal of the revolution 
in contrast to that of democracy. Either anti-capitalism was disconnected 
from democracy or democracy from anti-capitalism. The influence of 
stalinist forms of socialism penetrated far beyond official Communism. 
There is little doubt in my own mind that what was at issue here was a 
crisis of socialist thought which had its origins outside of South Africa 
but which took a particularly damaging form inside. Images of socialism 
were in one way or another counterposed to rather than integrated with the 
achievement of democracYi its identification with the stalinist states in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was the culmination of this tendency. 
The re-birth of socialist ideas and practices in the liberation struggle 
requires not merely the re-assertion of a given tradition, whether 
conceived as that of the Communist Party, trotskyism or non-racial trade 
unionis~ but rather of the re-discovery of the roots of democratic 
socialis~ What I have tried to do is to recover not just a sense of South 
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African politics as a contested terrain of competing political voices but 
also a silence within their midst whose subject is the working class. There 
are many who now pay allegiance to what is called 'the leading role of the 
working class'. I have tried indirectly through my history to give 
substance to this notion: negatively through a critique of the two 
traditions of liberal democracy and revolutionary romanticism whose 
counter-positions and strange couplings have dominated the political 
leadership of the liberation struggle, and positively through the twin 
ideas of social democracy and the proletarian reformation. 
The nationalist frame, which treats the state as an alien imposition, has 
been strategically dis-orienting: associated on the one side with rejection 
of all class struggles for reform and on the other with dependency on the 
liberal middle classes. Rather than see the strategies of the liberation 
movement as progressing inexorably from one stage to another, it makes 
better sense to see them as moving within a paradigm which has blocked at 
every stage the integration of socialism and democracy. By contrast, social 
democracy is a movement based on the working class, at once fighting for 
democratic state reform and building its own democratic organisations in 
civil society as essential pre-conditions for the transference of power and 
the transition to new and more democratic forms of power. The proletarian 
reformation is the period of class struggle in which the working class 
fights for its own independent existence, recognition and space. In my own 
analysis of the class struggles 1n South Africa, these concepts have not so 
much provided 8 point of departure as 8 point of arrival, a counter-point 
to a problematic norn They became the absent centre of my history. 
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Appendix 1: Town and country 
In focussing on the relation between trade unions and politics, we have 
omitted important areas of working class organisation and resistance in the 
1940s: not least the community movements in the black townships and the 
sporadic protests of rural workers. These sites of struggle reveal a 
similar relationship of the political leaders to the working class as we 
found in the trade union sphere, that is, putting dependency on the liberal 
middle classes in the form of pressure group politics before the struggle 
for working class independence. This may be illustrated in the case of 
community movements by the record of the 1943-44 Alexandra bus boycotts. 
In 1943 some 15,000 residents of Alexandra walked to and from the factories 
and shops of Johannesburg for ten days in protest against rising fares. The 
government responded by appointing a commission of inquiry and pegged fares 
pending the report. For the ANC Dr Xuma declared that the settlement was a 
'great victory' and that the exemplary behaviour of the residents had won 
great sympathy (1). Similarly for the CPSA Inkululeko claimed that the 
strike had been concluded with a complete victory for the residents (2). 
The moratorium on the boycott during the deliberations of the Commission 
appeared as a Victory Since, as one commentator has put it, 'a settlement 
won by orderly and punctually terminated protest could serve to emphasise 
the responsibility of African political organisations' (3). 
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When the Commission reported, it admitted that 'the vast bulk of the 
African workers .. -. were in 1943 unable from their own earnings, even when 
supplemented by the earnings of other members of the family, to meet the 
minimum requirements of subsistence, health and decency' (4). Yet it 
endorsed an increase in fares. In 1944, some seven months after the 
commission had published its findings, the bus fares were increased and 
were again met with a mass bus boycott. By this time a new political 
organisation, the African Democratic Party, had been formed in response to 
the perceived inability of the CPSA and ANC to lead this level of urban 
working class militancy. The CPSA recognised one half of this problem when 
it wrote of the formation of the ADP that 'this party could not have been 
born if the Congress leaders had organised the people, mobilised them in 
millions ... The African people have been frustrated by a Congress 
leadership which does not organise mass support nor carryon mass action to 
improve their living standards' (5). In placing the blame on the ANC, 
however, the Communist Party did not review its own role. The ADP was 
committed to what it called a 'middle position', rejecting the extremes of 
the 'method of revolt' and the 'policy of appeasement', and adopting in 
their stead 'the method of peaceful revolution' (6). This was defined as 
'the method of the strike used as the weapon of trade unions throughout the 
world - it is the method of mass protests and mass demonstrations'. 
The second bus boycott faced severe police action. Emergency powers were 
used to break the boycott by banning any gathering of more than 15 persons 
in any demonstration connected with the boycott and the transport board 
prosecuted sympathisers giving lifts. In response it was decided at a 
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meeting of over 5000 residents of Alexandra that they would continue to 
walk, but in small groups. In December the co-ordinating body of the 
boycotters, the Workers Transport Action Committee, attempted to extend the 
boycott to Orlando where rail fares had been increased. Political groups 
were divided on the desirability of this escalation of the action. The 
Communist Party advised against calling on Orlando to join the boycott, on 
the grounds that Orlando was not organised and the Orlando people had 
already bought their train tickets. The ADP on the other hand supported the 
local committee and attempted to callout Orlando, but the police dispersed 
a meeting organised for the purpose of picketing the station and arrested 
the leaders. Orlando did not walk but the ADP captured the Orlando Advisory 
Board at the elections shortly after the bus strike ended, thus outvoting 
the CPSA who had previously had a majority on the board. (7) 
Left wing militants from the Action Committee then sought to couple the bus 
boycott with a sit-down st~ike or stay-away organised in the community. 
This would have had the general advantage of linking trade union and 
community action and the specific advantage of relating to the exhaustion 
of the walkers. In response liberal white opinion began to perceive the 
boycott as a threat and withdraw their sympathy. For example, Paul 
Evenault of the Institute for Race Relations wrote that whilst the boycott 
'had been an orderly movement, a mass movement of which any body of 
responsible citizens might be provoked into for many reasons, there had 
been a feeling that any incident might occur to turn an orderly protest 
into a violent one. Indeed the possibility of a sit-down strike seemed to 
indicate a drift toward desperate action' (8). 
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From within the labour movement CNETU in line with its overall policy 
recommended the postponement of the projected strike. As the boycott 
nonetheless threatened to escalate, the City Council backed down and 
decided to subsidise the transport industry to an amount sufficient to 
absorb the fare increases for three months. After some argument over the 
terms of the agreement, which were opposed by left-wing activists, the 
Action Committee called the boycott off. The ANC and CPSA claimed a 
significant victory, which it was, but it was also evidence that direct 
working class action or the threat of it could win concessions that the 
politicians found so hard to come by through their constitutional methods. 
The African Democratic Party. the political embodiment of popular 
discontent with the role of the ANC-CPSA alliance in the black communities, 
itself soon split, some of its members moving to the left to help form the 
trotskyist Workers International League and others like Hymie Basner moving 
back into CPSA-ANC circles. 
The relation of the political leadership to agrarian protest revealed the 
same form of limitation. We have seen that the great majority of africans 
in the 1940s were still located on the land. There was a diminishing but 
not insubstantial class of african peasants located in the reserves and to 
a lesser extent on 'white' landj and there was a huge class of rural 
proletarians working as wage labourers or labour tenants on white farms. 
Although sharp divisions existed between relatively advanced urban workers 
and desperately backward rural workers, working class links between town 
and country were forged in practice by the oscillating movements of migrant 
workers. It was a two way process which allowed the worker to reproduce the 
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traditionalist outlook of the indigenous african communities and for the 
rural african communities to be permeated with the outlook of the urban 
worker (9). Thus the rural revolt among the Zoutpansberg Balemi reservists 
in 1943-44 against stock culling and 'rehabilitation' was centered around 
an informal urban cultural association formed among Balemi migrant workers 
and informed by the political education received by urban leaders like 
Alpheus Maliba, in his case with the Communist Party (10). Conversely, the 
1946 african miners' strike was in large measure organised around informal 
ethnic associations rooted in the countryside (11). 
The problem for the political leadership was not so much to create links 
between town and country, for these were forged organically by the 
migration of labour, but rather to give them political expression. What the 
historical literature emphasises first and foremost is that the political 
leadership generally had little relation in this period to popular 
resistance in the countryside. According to Walshe, at least until 1952 the 
ANC encountered 'virtually insurmountable difficulties in extending its 
activities to the rural areas' (12). Similarly Alan Brooks has commented on 
the Communist Party that prior to 1950 'the failure of the party to attract 
peasants may have been partly a failure of the party to attempt to attract 
peasants' (13). Some militants like I.B.Tabata, Govan Mbeki and Alpheus 
Maliba, associated on the whole with organisations affiliated to the Non-
European Unity Movement, did make contact with the resistance of oppressed 
peasants in the reserves of Transkei and the Northern Transvaal and posed 
demands for such democratic rights as security of tenure and cattle 
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ownership and the lifting of racial restrictions on the purchase and sale 
of land. 
In so far as the land question was addressed by the politicians - as ever 
the Unity Movement inverted the Communist Party's neglect of the agrarian 
question by magnifying it into the 'alpha and omega' of the liberation 
struggle - it was treated as in essence a peasant question. As Tabata put 
it, those who would acquaint themselves with the land question 'must learn 
to know how to approach the peasant and ... draw the landless peasantry into 
the movement' (14). The Ten Point Programme of the Non-European Unity 
Movement reflected this view. Its paragraph on land read as follows: 
Relations of serfdom at present existing on the land must go, 
together with the Land Act, together with restrictions upon 
acquiring land. (15) 
For the future, the NEUM looked forward to 'a new division of land in 
conformity with the existing population living on the land and working the 
land'. What these vague words meant - about how the land was to be re-
divided and what arrangements were to be made once the land had been re-
divided - was debated over the years within the NEUM and were in 1958 to 
become the cause of a major split within the movement. The left version was 
for an 'equitable distribution' in which land would be nationalised and 
occupation allocated to indvidual peasants. The right version was for the 
rugged individualism of 'kulaki,sation' I that is, the lawful purchase of 
land within the bounds of capitalist society but without racial 
restriction. Both versions either treated the existing rural population as 
given or sought to increase it at the expense of the urban dweller. Neither 
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version addressed the proletarianised farm labourer or the problems 
involved in dividing concentrated capitalist farms into individual plots. 
Neither addressed that part of the solution to the land problem which 
africans voted for with their feet despite all the obstacles put in their 
way, that is, their exodus to the urban areas and the reduction of the 
ratio of people in the country to those in the town (16). 
The juridic, exclusively peasant view was expressed equally by Dr Xuma when 
he declared in his Presidential Address to the ANC in December 1941 that 
'in all this land policy the worst and most dangerous clause is the 
restriction that provided that no Native may buy land from a non-Native' 
(17). The radical Youth League did not break from this peasant perspective, 
speaking only of a 'fair distribution of land' among africans but not of 
the requirements of the rural proletarian. The Fourth International (FIOSA) 
stressed that 'reserve dwellers are in fact tribal proletarians and the 
centre of their livelihood lies in the towns and cities' and that 'even 
their peasant outlook is steadily being changed into a proletarian one' 
(18), but it too does not appear to have taken on board the rural 
proletarian. 
The democratic rights of the minority of peasants were an essential aspect 
of the agrarian question but so too were the democratic rights of far 
larger numbers of farm labourers: to trade union organisation, legal 
protection from servile conditions, minimum wages, freedom of movement and 
co-operative enterprises. In the party programmes the particular rights and 
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needs of the two and a half million or so african farmworkers, the mass of 
the downtrodden rural proletariat, were ommitted from the picture. The 
world of the peasantry, with its demand for the emancipation of private 
property from racial restriction, was super-imposed upon the agrarian 
question in general. The world of the rural proletariat, with its demand 
for protection from the effects of capitalist private property, was pushed 
into the background. What was at issue here was not democracy versus 
socialism but rather what form of democratic struggle: one led by the 
working class or one led by the middle classes and permeated with the 
individualism of the peasant mind without the support of a peasant mass. 
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